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MASTER THESIS

The Political Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate after the 1850s

The Triple System and Its Dynamics

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Table of Contents

List of Figures, Maps and Tables

INTRODUCTION

[…] Othman wad Foido, the African Napoleon, who, at the commencement of this century, created the immense Fula empire of Sokoto and Gando.[1]

The British officer Seymour Vandeleur wrote this statement in his report concerning the expedition to the Emirate of Nupe (Bida) in 1897. In fact, he had never encountered ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī – as written in modern Hausa, Usman dan Fodio – or never read one of his manuscripts in which Ibn Fūdī manifests his understanding and opinions. Nevertheless, nearly 80 years after his death, Vandeleur could not resist calling him Napoleon. To him, the rise of such an *immense empire* (sic!) in a brief time could not be explained without a kind of Napoleonic genius. Furthermore, the reason which led Vandeleur to this expedition also overlapped with his interpretation, i.e., he was excited to see the "tremendous" economic activities that were told to him.

Despite this admiration and interest, Vandeleur was far from grasping the political and economic complexity of the Sokoto Caliphate as were other European travelers. In their imagination, such extensive size of domination (from today's Burkina Faso until the Central African Republic throughout northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and southern Niger) and remarkable abundance cannot be possible without an imperial organization. They, therefore, attempted in vain to find an emperor and a glorious capital of that "empire". The existence of the Sokoto Caliphate remained a mystery for these travelers and officers until its dissolution by the colonial invasions.

Nearly after over one century of these attempts to understand, which dramatically ceased during the colonial period, the complexity of the Sokoto Caliphate's political economy continues to be a challenge for historians.

A number of scholars have sought to uncover this issue by focusing on different parts of the Caliphate in their doctoral studies: Abdullahi Mahadi, Sule Bello, and Kabiru S. Chafe

[1] Seymour Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," *The Geographical Journal* Vol. 10, No. 4 (1897): 358.

concentrated on Kano and Sokoto between 1982-1992,[2] Ann O'Hear analyzed the Ilorin Emirate in 1983,[3] in 1969 Martin Z. Njeuma and in 1977 Sa'ad Abubakar inquired the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate.[4] However, to combine these works into a general frame in order to disclose the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate has remained a formidable project, partly because of the missing case studies concerning the other parts of the Caliphate and partly due to the salient dissimilarities between the conclusion arguments of these theses. In addition, the heterogenous character of the Caliphate's political economy has made any simple generalization effort arduous.

In this thesis, however, an analytical model (*triple system*) will be proposed to explore possible patterns in which coalescence of these case studies can be achieved. In this regard, the principal interest of this work will be providing a framework for the Caliphate's political economy and striving to underpin this framework with diverse sources, instead of yielding encyclopedic details that are fairly beyond the limits of this thesis.

Nevertheless, such combining and framing efforts have certain difficulties and require special attention to critical opinions. The first difficulty is the demanding language requirements of the subject because the primary sources regarding the various parts of the Caliphate are dispersed in numerous archives in different languages. For the central Emirates, such as Sokoto, Kano, and Zaria, Arabic, Hausa, and Fulbe are necessary to analyze myriad manuscripts, there are also some related Turkish documents in the Ottoman archives. Linked to the southern Caliphate, such as the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates, the main primary sources are found in the British archives. For the Adamawa Emirate, most of the sources are in German and French languages. Particularly the use of Arabic and Turkish sources creates additional difficulties with regard to bringing them to the Latin alphabet because they utilize Arabic script. Therefore, I relied on two different norms for transcriptions: for Arabic, I used the norm of *DIN 31635*, which has been provided by *Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, for Turkish, I utilized *TDK: Türkçe Sözlük*, which was published in 2011 as 11. Edition by *Türk Dil Kurumu*.

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[2] Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy: The Sarauta System and Its Roles in Shaping The Society and Economy of Kano with Particular Reference to The Eighteenth and The Nineteenth Centuries" (PhD Dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, 1982); Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano c. 1894-1960: A Study of Colonial Domination" (PhD Dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, 1982); Kabiru Sulaiman Chafe, "The State and Economy in the Sokoto Caliphate: Policies and Practices in the Metropolitan Districts, c. 1804-1903 A.D." (PhD. Dissertation, Ahmedu Bello University, 1992).

[3] Ann O'Hear, "The Economic History of Ilorin in the Nineteenth and Twenty Centuries: The Rise and Decline of a Middleman Society" (PhD Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1983).

[4] Martin Zachary Njeuma, "The Rise and Fall of Fulani Rule in Adamawa 1809-1901" (PhD Diessertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1969); Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*: *A Political History of Adamawa 1809-1901* (Zaria: Oxford University Press, 1977).

Apart from this, in his various works, Paul Lovejoy demonstrated that the Sokoto Caliphate's political-economic importance was not limited within its territories: in *Jihad in West Africa*, he illustrated the extensive impact of the jihad movements during the 18th and 19th centuries from Senegal till Sudan throughout the Sahel zone, which the foundation of the Sokoto Caliphate was just one of these movements; in his article "*Commercial Sectors in the Economy of the Nineteenth-Century Sudan*", he likewise showed the density and complexity of Trans-Saharan trade and the role of the Sokoto Caliphate. In other words, it has been evident that the framing of the Caliphate's political economy also requires a global perspective for an appropriate inquiry. The political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate had distinct roles and meanings in the various frameworks, such as West Africa, the Sahel zone, and Central Sudan. In addition, its trade ties with Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean coasts have linked the Caliphate to the various global networks such as European and Ottoman markets.

In his recent book *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, Mohammed B. Salau rather underlined that aside from these different scales and frameworks to examine the Caliphate's political economy, scrutinizing the local actors and their activities, as well as management techniques, is utterly crucial. From this view, he argued that we need new analytical tools and a critical perspective to elucidate the decentral governance practices in the background of the Caliphate's political economy, such as discipline, social control strategies, agency, and institutionalization. The importance of these conceptual tools is that they reveal active coping strategies of the Emirs and slave owners under the decentralized administration. Put differently, the decentral characteristic of the Caliphate was not simply because of the Emirs' and Caliphs' inability to establish a hegemony, as has long been presumed, but it was part of complex practices of overcoming the problems.

Concerning another critical perspective, in her recent book *A Geography of Jihad*, Stephanie Zehnle enunciated that we must further pay attention to the geographic understanding of the Caliphate's rulers and elites if we would need a venture of mapping the Sokoto Caliphate. Indeed, the Caliphate has long been misrepresented by the implication of the Eurocentric mapping techniques. Nevertheless, the necessity of mapping the Caliphate's political economy continues to exist in order to develop an analytic standpoint due to its heterogeneity.

Inquiring about the Sokoto Caliphate also brings its own interdisciplinary implications. Islamic studies, for instance, purvey a valuable understanding concerning the background of the Islamic character of the Caliphate, which was not merely foundational but also regulatory. The Mālikī School of Law has served as fundamental jurisprudence in the legal system of the Caliphate.

While the question about the extent of overlaps between the executive and legislative applications is retaining its significance, the determinative feature of this school of law in the normative discourse of the Caliphate substantiates further importance. However, to specify the available and most pervasive texts of the Mālikī School of Law in the Sokoto Caliphate arise as a necessity since there are numerous different texts in this school of law, and their accessibility and prevalence depend on various geographic as well as historical factors. In light of available sources, one principal text (*Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ* of Mālik ibn Anas) and one textbook (*Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya* of Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī) in the Mālikī School of Law will be used in this thesis. Translation will be made from original Arabic texts; references will follow Aisha Bewerley's classification.

Ethnographic studies likewise furnish notable information which gives the opportunity to discover the conditions and understanding of the minor and suppressed groups in and around the Caliphate. For example, in his text *An Islamic Frontier Polity,* Adell Patton unveiled the historical transformation of the Ningi area that was surrounded by the Caliphate territories but not part of it. Similarly, Catherine Vereecke gave voice to the narratives of enslaved people in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate in her field research *The Slave Experience in Adamawa*. As for the system of slavery in the central part of the Caliphate, *Yusufu Yunusa's Oral Collection* imparts myriad valuable details.

Some collections of folk tales from the beginning of the 20th Century, i.e., it is tenable that they were recorded as what they were in the Sokoto Caliphate, presenting the common worldview in the Caliphate. These collections are of particular importance for testing analytical interpretations. For instance, an argument suggesting the indispensable role of the rivers in the geo-politic strategies can be confirmed by these records that show a visible dominance of rivers in the narratives.

Besides, numerous informative elaborations and observations can be found on the works of different fields of history. Joseph P. Smaldone's book in the Military History, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, for example, glosses several crucial pieces of information related to the arms trade and its salient role in the political economy of the Caliphate. Hakan Erdem's *Osmanlıda Köleliğin Sonu* in the Ottoman History investigates the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the Trans-Saharan slave trade and furnishes a historical background for the transformation of this commerce during the 19th century, in which the Sokoto Caliphate was one of the important actors. In his *Early Globalization: Cowries as currency, 600 BCE-1900,* Peter Boomgaard

illustrates from the standpoint of *Longue durée*, how cowries arrived in West Africa, which were the official currency in the Caliphate.

While the significance of these secondary sources is always present, the core knowledge concerning the Caliphate's political economy mostly relies on traveler accounts and reports of officers between the 1850s and 1910s. 32 different traveler accounts and 12 reports were analyzed to test the key arguments of this thesis. 16 of these traveler accounts come from the British, 8 of them from German, 7 of them from French, and 1 one of them from Belgium agents. Besides, 6 of these reports have been written by British, 2 of them by French, 2 of them by Turkish, and 2 of them by German officers. While all traveler accounts are published works and accessible through the libraries, the reports and some collections of oral records are placed in various archives, such as *The National Archives of British* in London, *National Archives of Nigeria* in Kaduna, *Archives Nationales D'Outre-Mer* in Paris, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* in Istanbul, *Das Bundesarchive* in Berlin-Lichterfelde, *Church Missionary Society Archive* in Birmingham, and *Tubman Institute of York University* in Toronto. With the cooperation of the administrative officers, I was able to access some of these reports electronically and some by mail. In the thesis, the primary sources were used together with their exact dates, i.e., as long as there is no indication of the date, the references attribute to the secondary sources.

Although no picture or photograph from the Sokoto Caliphate has been utilized in the literature so far and it has been assumed that there are not enough available images, 12 pictures and photographs have been used in this thesis. I have accidentally found most of these images on the website *gallica.bnf.fr* when looking for sources. However, the use of image in historical work, especially in the history of pre-colonial Africa, requires particular attention and analytical skills.

The first reason for this consideration is that several of the images concerning the history of pre-colonial Africa were, in fact, created on the editor tables in the central European cities, and mostly they do not present a view from the field but represent the colonial worldview as well as fantasies of the European artists. In this regard, for every picture and photograph that was used in this work, these three questions were asked: *who* did produce this image, *when* and *where* was it generated? Some of the images I found did not sufficiently answer these questions. In many cases, it was not clear who drew them; as far as the photographs are concerned, the main problem was the lack of information related to their date and location. To avoid any misleading Eurocentric representation, I utilized only very specific images that impart sufficient knowledge for the above-mentioned three questions.

The second crucial point is the contextualization of these pictures and photographs. These images are not just a few interesting nuances for the subject of this work, but they have a character as informative as other written sources. In this respect, they were not used as a decoration for the text but were considered as part of the leading arguments.

Apart from this methodological background, a topic such as "the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate" necessitates a conceptual clarification being pertinent to what is implied with the term of *political economy*. Although this notion has been used in numerous texts without further explanation, as if it were a self-evident concept, its ambiguity goes even farther than yielding a mere definition. This is mainly due to the complex historical transformation of this term. In another word, neither a comprehensive universal definition of this notion nor its arbitrary and subjective description is sufficiently tenable. Besides, an additional clarification concerning its difference from politics and economy is indispensable for the topic of this thesis, since the clear definition of this concept also determines the framework of this work.

In this regard, the question relates not only to the definition but also to an appropriate model. Which political-economic model is most proper and applicable for the Sokoto Caliphate? This question, in fact, leads to a decisive challenge, because the overwhelming majority of the literature concerning the various political-economic models has consisted of the European History-oriented approaches. This rather strong and unreflective orientation is particularly problematic given the concepts which were used in the major works. Take an example, the prominent works in the theory of liberal political economy, Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* from 1776 and David Ricardo's *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* from 1817, utilize various fundamental notions such as capital, border control, tariff, and management of money circulation. Whereas, in the Sokoto Caliphate, these kinds of descriptions and analytic categories were not present. There were no printed coins, no border control, no understanding of tariff. The concept of capital did not have any equivalence.

In the relatively new models, the problem is even more difficult. For instance, the most preferred model in the liberal political economy, the Hecker-Ohlin Model, which is based on Bertil Ohlin's *Interregional and International Trade* from 1933 and Eli Heckscher's "*Foreign Trade and Distribution of Income*" from 1919, relies on the notions such as nation, stock market, tariff, and monetary policies. Similar concepts likewise play a fundamental role in the models of national economy (*Volkswirtschaft*), such as Friedrich List's *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie* from 1841. Socialist political-economic models, on the other hand,

insist on the notions, such as class, bourgeois, means of production, and ideology, as it is in the seminal work of Karl Marx *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomi* from 1867. However, the historical and philosophical context of these concepts is entirely unfamiliar for the Sokoto Caliphate.

In this respect, a special political-economic model aside from these European-centered approaches will be proposed in this thesis. This model relies on Ibn Ḫaldūn's *Al-Mūqaddima* from 1377. Although this book was written in saliently earlier centuries than other prominent books in the political-economic field, the chief concepts that were utilized in this work demonstrate a decisive familiarity with the social and historical background of the Sokoto Caliphate. Furthermore, Ibn Ḫaldūn distinguishes the categories such as politics, economics, and political economy.

In his book, Ibn Ḫaldūn discloses first what he understands from politics in terms of occurrence of the countries/states and kingdoms: "[...] the king (*al-malik*) and commune/populace (*al-ʿama*) of the country/state (*al-dawla*) only happen by the tribe (*al-qabila*) and [common] nervousness (*al-ʿaṣabīya*)."[5] In this respect, politics is based on local groups and their motivation to come together as a reaction to the existing anarchies – this perspective perfectly suits the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, as the *ǧihād* movement was based on the grievances and thereafter revolts of ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī and his followers. What is important is that at this stage in politics, no cities or urban centers exist yet.

Thereafter, Ibn Ḫaldūn explains the economy as the production of livestock and direct local exchange of goods.[6] Importantly, in this understanding of the economy, these activities take place outside of the cities or urban areas and they do not need any political administration. Finally, he explains why he deliberately excludes the cities or urban areas from these two definitions, because for him the rise of politics and economy is a natural process of human societies, nevertheless, the occurrence of the cities is not: "*rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) (*al-ʾamṣār*)[7] and

[5] Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Al-Mūqaddima*, III, 1 I am quoting from the original Arabic text, however following the Franz Rosenthal's classification concerning the chapter.

[6] Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Al-Mūqaddima*, V, 1.

[7] Here, I am deliberately translating the word *miṣr* (plur. *ʾamṣār*) as *ribāṭ*. Although the word *miṣr* indicates today the name of Egypt, as Takacs notes, it originates from the Akkadian word *miṣru*, which means "border." Cf. GaborTakacs, *Etymological Dictionary of Egyptian,* Volume 3: m- (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2007), 851; in this respect, Bosworth emphasizes that before this word became identical with the country of Egypt, it meant "the early Islamic settlements developing out of the armed camps and the metropolises of the conquered provinces." C.E. Bosworth, "Miṣr: B. The Early Islamic Settlements," in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, ed. P. Bearman, T. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs, Second Edition, Band VII (Brill Academic Publishers: Leiden, 1993), 146b. In other words, this concept implies a frontier settlement in this context. However, in West Africa and in Morocco the word of *ribāṭ* has mostly been used to point out frontier settlements. This word originally comes from *rabāṭ* (to tie) and literally means "bond" or "link." Its connection to frontier

cities (*al-mudun*) exist only from the king and from countries/states... the settling to the *rubuṭ* and designating of the cities must be done by the country/state or the king."[8]

This fundamental dependency of the cities and *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) to the political system, however, illustrates only half part of the theme, because Ibn Ḫaldūn also adds that the dominant characteristic of cities and *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) is the emergence of craft sectors and they rely on the economy as livestock supply: "[...] the craft sectors (*al-ṣanāʾiʿ*) are only complemented by the [developmental] urban construction (*al-ʿumrān al-ḥuḍarī*) and abundance."[9]

From this standpoint, the production of livestock and exchange of commodities that take place in cities or *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*), as well as all activities in craft sectors, are part of the political economy. Similarly, while the chronology of rulers is belonging to politics, every kind of urban construction policy and rulers' direct involvements in trade and production sectors are part of the political economy. In summary, in the political-economic model of Ibn Ḫaldūn, the key notions are the king or country/state, production of livestock, exchange of goods, development of cities and *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*), and craft sectors.

According to this model, the following questions determine the framework of a political-economic investigation: (1) which kind of livestock production and exchange activities did take place in cities and *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*), (2) which kind of settlement augmentation and construction policies did actualize, (3) which kind of involvement in livestock production, trade, and craft sectors did rulers initiate?

Another conceptual vagueness for an investigation of the Sokoto Caliphate is related to naming because in some cases, there are several various names of the regions or even the Emirates and many uncertainties have occurred between different sources as if they mention different areas. For instance, these two names have been mainly used to indicate the same Emirate: Zazzau and Zaria. Zaria was the name of the Emirate's capital, Zazzau was the name of the region in which the Emir practiced his authority. A similar occasion can be found in two other Emirates as well:

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settlement is that mostly "the person who is bound [to its faith]" (*murābiṭ*) lived these kinds of settlements due to the security uncertainties. For example, what known as Almoravid Dynasty in Morocco between 1040-1147 in the literature, in fact, originates from this word: the original version of Almoravid is *Al-Murābiṭūn*, "the people who is bound [to their faith]." In this regard, the word *ribāṭ* signifies not only a frontier settlement, but more precise, "a frontier garrison" and "a walled town" because of its historical link to the military actions. Nevertheless, in the historical transformation of this word, another meaning also stands out. The word *murābiṭ* – as has been used in West Africa, *marabout* – has been utilized as religious teacher, i.e., *ribāṭ* where *murābiṭ* lived also meant the religious school. To sum up, the word *ribāṭ* combines various meanings, such as frontier garrison, walled town, and religious school. Its importance in the context of Ibn Ḫaldūn text, *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) were the earlier stage of cities and part of the spread of Islam.

[8] Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Al-Mūqaddima*, IV, 1.

[9] Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Al-Mūqaddima*, V, 16.

Nupe – Bida, and Bauchi – Yakuba. The first words are the names of the regions, the seconds are the names of capitals. In this respect, I used both names together, such as the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate, Nupe (Bida) Emirate, and Bauchi (Yakuba) Emirate. One distinctive example is the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate because, in this name, the difference is not between the name of region and capital, but among the various names of the region. The settlers of the Caliphate named the region of this Emirate as Adamawa, however, the inhabitants called it Fombina. In this respect, I preferred to refer to as the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate.

Considering all these critical perspectives, methodological necessities, and conceptual clarifications, this thesis comprises two main parts and four chapters. The first part, which contains the first chapter, *Mapping the Political Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate*, is a preliminary investigation related to mapping the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate. In this section, the prerequisites for a mapping attempt regarding the Sokoto Caliphate were analyzed and a temporal-spatial framework has been proposed. Secondly, on the basis of these prerequisites, a mapping strategy for the political economy of the Caliphate was inquired and a general frame under the name of the *triple system* has been proffered for a proper analysis.

Based on the analysis of the first part, the second part includes three chapters corresponding to three components of the *triples system*. In this part, this system was tested and has been developed adherent to the comprehensive case studies and available primary sources. In this regard, the second chapter, *Central Part of the Caliphate: Agriculture and Craft Production with Trade,* subsumes an inquiry for three chief economic activities, such as agriculture, craft, and trade in the central part of the Caliphate. While craft sectors and trade activities were analyzed in connection with each other, for agricultural production, a more overarching investigation took place since these activities have special historical and discursive features.

In the third chapter, *The Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates: Slavery and War Economy*, the peculiar characteristics and importance of two Emirates in the south-western part of the Caliphate were examined. After an elaboration considered to the governance attitudes of these Emirates, the historical transformation of slavery and wars in terms of political economy was scrutinized and the interdependence relationships between the rest of the Caliphate and these two Emirates were interpreted. In the last chapter, *The Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate: Economy of Exploitation,* the biggest and unique Emirate in the Caliphate was analyzed and its political-economic exclusive characteristic in the frame of the Caliphate as well as the global networks was inquired. Following this broad review, the background of the Emirate's unique position was investigated with reference to its governmental strategies and historical transformations. In

this regard, its two-dimensional exploitation strategy – the looting expeditions and its colonial system – was examined.

Finally, in the conclusion, all findings and analysis have been combined, and the complex edifice of the *triple system* was demonstrated by interpreting the extent of the appropriateness of this model to the heterogenous feature of the Sokoto Caliphate.

1- Mapping the Political Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate

Mapping the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate, in terms of its temporal and its spatial dimension, is an elementary part of this thesis in order to restrain a possible misleading reductionism. This is due to the domination of the Caliphate expanding to an immense area that comprised many different geographic and demographic features and lasting nearly one hundred years from 1804-1810 until 1903. Therefore, it is possible to find a few general patterns concerning the political economy in the Caliphate, but these numbered phenomena are far from imparting the comprehension of the complex interdependencies and internal differences within the Caliphate's political economy. The leading political-economic dynamics and relationships were profoundly connected to the geographical, social, political, and historical conditions in the diverse regions.

Aside from this methodological necessity, however, mapping the political economy of the Caliphate brings with it its own difficulties and additional prerequisites, as well as inevitable limits because of the entangled characteristics of the Caliphate. On the one hand, it is important to pay attention to the heterogeneity of the Caliphate's political economy in its intricate form by uncovering the autonomies, disconnections, and exceptions; on the other hand, it is also necessary to clarify the overall patterns in the different regions and periods to comprehend the interdependencies, connections, and influences between – and inside of – the Emirates and regions. An attempt of mapping the political economy of the Caliphate will also be limited by the methodological requisite to utilize a strict political-economic understanding. In other words, this kind of mapping cannot subsume every detail concerning the Caliphate's political economy equally and properly, since it must rely on a chosen political-economic model that has its own incapability. Nevertheless, *the political-economic mapping*[10] being proposed in this work renders visible some facts which would be unexplored without such a framing venture.

1.1- The Temporal Framework

Through many examples, it can be observed that within the history of the Sokoto Caliphate, several dramatic changes alternated with quite stable developments after its establishing period

[10] In this work the concept of "the political economic mapping" instead of "the map of political economy" will be used. This is because while the word "map" fundamentally based on the geographic reference, the word "mapping" indicates broader meaning such as connections, relations, and matching.

between 1804 and 1810. While the changes of the political economy on the interregional scale were quite smooth, on the regional scale the level of stability was fragmented and fluctuated at a different point in time. Furthermore, the historical developments of different Emirates were not always simultaneous: take for example, the period of 1850s as an approximate date, which is recognized by many scholars – as it will be shown in the ensuing pages – as a turning point in the Caliphate's political economy, in some of the Emirates the key features of this period were visible already in the 1840s while in others they were only observable in the 1860s.

According to Chafe, the 1850s was particularly important because the Sokoto Caliphate reached its external limits and accomplished its internal consolidation in this period. This milestone, for him, entailed a major turn in the main policies of the Caliphate:

> [...] by about the mid-century… the primary needs of the Caliphal system were, thus, a new form of social and political relations, and the infrastructural growth being its secondary needs. It is here that the primary needs were never achieved, and the Caliphate leadership paid attention to secondary needs which, however, would make less impact against the background of failure to realize the primary requirements.[11]

Salau defines this transformation period as lasting approximately 20 years in the central part of the Caliphate and according to him with the end of this transformation period, the political economy of the Caliphate became more self-referential in terms of institutionalization rather than direct administration, and more enclosed in terms of the economic system especially through the economic integration of the different Emirates.[12]

While Chafe engages mostly with the administrative and institutional transformation in the Caliphate from a more critical perspective – that stems, in fact, from its argumentation concerning the so-called abandonment of the ideals of *ğihād* – from the economic standpoint this new era experienced a salient growth, particularly, as Salau stressed, in the development of the caliphal integration.[13] Adamu observes in his *field research*[14] in the Makarfi area of the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate that after the 1850s there was not only interregional but also intraregional integration that was decisively visible in the flourishing of trade on a massive

[11] Kabiru Sulaiman Chafe, "The State and Economy in the Sokoto Caliphate," 321.
[12] Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*: *A Historical and Comparative Study* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2018), 11.
[13] Concerning the Chafe's discussion about the ideals of the jihad in the Sokoto Caliphate, see: Kabiru Sulaiman Chafe, "Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination," *Paideuma* Vol. 40 (1994): 99.
[14] Regarding the history of the Sokoto Caliphate, there are many specific case studies that led in form of field research. They did not only peruse the archives but they farther visited the areas, colleced the oral records, and observed the relics as well as architecture from past.

scale: “Traders moved freely and new items of trade were introduced into the far from outside and, many were distributed within it. As a result of this, new markets were opened in virtually all the towns in the area [of Makarfi]...”[15]

Another decisive factor in the 1850s was the considerable decline in the expansionist military operations, which, according to Zehnle, was the major specificity of *ǧihād*.[16] This transformation caused a relatively stable – but in many senses still vague – area of domination. Thus, in terms of methodology, the 1850s stands out as a turning point in the history of the Caliphate, and an attempt of mapping the Sokoto Caliphate’s political economy for the period after the 1850s is more feasible because of the relatively stable territorial expansion and completed establishment of political-economic relations.

In other words, the period after the 1850s illustrates an exclusive characteristic that yields promises for the questions concerning the functions and dynamics of this – in many aspects well-formed and relatively steady – political-economic system. The political economy of the Caliphate before the 1850s on the contrary requires different methodologies and investigation questions that would concentrate on the discursive debates between scholars and rulers, and the application of these discourses, rather than the political-economic analyzes.

Therefore, because of the advantages in terms of mapping and its suitability for a political-economic analysis, the period after the 1850s will be the main temporal framework of this thesis.

1.2- The Spatial Framework

Related to mapping the political economy of the Caliphate, it can be assumed that this would preliminarily be based on a spatial map depicting the area of the Caliphate’s domain. The problem, however, is that since the understanding of space is bound to the different cultural perspectives, it is rather problematic to claim one universally valid mapping technique. Particularly in the case of the Sokoto Caliphate, it is a necessity to consider various aspects concerning space in order to grasp the scope and limits of several standpoints. This issue matters especially for the understanding, definition, and use of land and the mapping of these lands. Hence, the spatial characteristic of the Caliphate should be elaborated on in two terms: from

[15] Ahmed Adamu, “A History of Makarfi Area c. 1779-1902” (MA Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 2011), 251.
[16] Cf. Stephanie Zehnle, “A Geography of Jihad: Jihadist Concepts of Space and Sokoto Warfare (West Africa, ca. 1800-1850)” (PhD Dissertation, Universität Kassel, 2015), 426.

the Caliphate's inhabitants' understanding, *the emic perspective*, and from the analytical method, *the etic perspective*.

1.2.1- The Emic Perspective

A map of the Sokoto Caliphate from the perspective of its rulers and scholars had many distinct features, due to their understanding of mapping which was markedly different from the European perspective of mapping techniques. For instance, in her book regarding the geography of *ǧihād*, Zehnle defines three chief specificities about the caliphal mentality of mapping.

The first is on the sources of the spatial imagination in the Caliphate: "They established a mental and literary map of "lands" arranged on a round world slice, thus drawing from historical geographies found in Arabic literature as well as from spatial knowledge that was circulated orally by travelers, soldiers, and other migrants."[17] The second is the performative characteristic of mapping, i.e., in most cases, the travelers, merchants, or military leaders sketched the maps into the sand and discussed them with other fellows.[18] In this respect, the accuracy of the map in the sand was understood in a more practical sense, pertaining to the aim of the recent journey rather than the technical details and precision. Being relevant to this performative feature of mapping, Zenhle observes that: "maps, by contrast, were considered supplementary and aesthetical material illustrating the information given by the text... about the jihadist Central Sahel, where no geographical book or commentary, cataloged up to this point, contained any map."[19]

As a rare example, there is one precise caliphal map (*Figure 1*) that was charted by Muhammadu Belū – or as written in modern Hausa, Muhammadu Bello –, the second Caliph of the Sokoto Caliphate, for the European traveler Hugh Clapperton in the 1820s. Although this map is a reproduction of what Belū had drawn into the sand in their discussion with Clapperton, in many aspects, it represents the geographical understanding of the ruler and intellectual point of view, since Muhammadu Belū was one of the most prominent scholars in his time in central Sudan. From the maps, two major geographical criteria regarding the mapping of the Caliphate can be observed to realize how they described their environments and the area of domination.

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[17] Stephanie Zehnle, "A Geography of Jihad," 428.
[18] Cf. Stephanie Zehnle, ""Where Is My Region?" Geographical Representation and Textuality in Sokoto," *Islamic Africa* 9 (2018): 17.
[19] Stephanie Zehnle, ""Where is My Region?" Geographical Representation and Textuality in Sokoto," 18.



Figure 1: The reproduction of Bello's draft by Clapperton.

The map illustrates only some principal cities, towns, and rivers instead of the borders and districts; the position of rivers, however, seems to have particular significance. In the map, the rivers have more central characteristics than the borderlines; the major cities are depicted around their center of gravity. In Sub-Saharan Africa's savannahs, this was, in many senses, related to the integral importance of the rivers for water supply. The significance of rivers can be seen alike in several examples in the oral folk tales of the Fulani people in northern Nigeria, which was also the origin of Muhammadu Belū.[20] Besides, during his journey between 1883-1885 into the Niger valley, the German traveler Eduard Flegel observed that due to the state of war in the Ilorin Emirate many people and merchants retreated to the river and preferred to stay close to it, i.e., the function of rivers was multidimensional.[21]

With regard to the emphasis on cities in Belū's map, this understanding can be explained by the fact that the administration of the Caliphate envisaged considering the people instead of the

[20] According to oral narratives from northern Nigeria, Fulani nomads obtained their first herds from the river. See: F. W. de St Croix, *The Fulani of Northern Nigeria* (Lagos: The Government Printer, 1945), 8.
[21] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," *Mittheilungen der Afrikanischen Gesellschaft in Deutschland* Vol. 4 (1883-1885): 134.

districts. As Smith states: "[...] "districts" were not territorial units [in the Caliphate], but collections of people who worked the land and were taxed under the authority and supervision of a title-holder..."[22]

But these representations that seem to be beyond the district and border-oriented mapping perspective, do not definitely indicate that in the Sokoto Caliphate there was *no* understanding of borders or districts. For instance, the borders were more *frontier*-oriented,[23] and the focuses were on some overall geographic features, such as hills, forests, and river valleys instead of the exact border*lines*.[24] At this point, Zehnle mentions an interesting development relevant to the comprehension of these natural frontiers: when these frontiers indicated the external limits of the Caliphate, i.e., end of the protected areas from the perspective of Caliphate's rulers, they considered these as a "wilderness," and tended to cover themselves in their city walls: "They created artificial barriers around their *ribāṭ* and aimed at turning every 'wilderness' into controllable plains with little vegetation and hiding spots. Jihadist soldiers believed in walled borders [in their cities and towns] and feared the power of natural barriers…"[25]

According to field research observations, the relation between the understanding of frontier and the inclination to build walled settlements stimulated the rise of unique district understanding in the Caliphate: for example, Adamu observes that many traders from Nupe (Bida) Emirate settled in the Makarfi area in the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate, just because it was utterly easy to stop on their trade routes and be engaged in agriculture for a while; and later on some of them eventually settled permanently.[26] Sule Bello noticed for the Kano Emirate that some settlers in Kano and its vicinity were indeed long-distance traders, such as Arab merchants.[27] Between the external natural frontiers and the walled cities, towns, and villages, the rulers of the Caliphate defined massive lands as being wholly open for every kind of immigration and settlement. According to Last, this distinguished openness in their district understanding for settlers and immigrants – even for dissent throne candidates or contested religious intellectuals – encouraged noteworthy mobility which turned into the primary characteristic of the Caliphate:

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[22] Sean Stilwell, "The Development of "Mamluk" Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate," in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, 101.

[23] The conceptual difference between "border" and "frontier" is important in the case of the Caliphate. This is because the word "border" implies an exact dividing line between two sides, but frontier indicates one sided estimated limit, i.e., the beginning of the unsettled lands, or so-called *wilderness*, can be also a frontier. In the Caliphate, understanding of frontier purveyed them the justification for expansion, because mostly they did not recognize other political powers or social groups and they claimed that there is not border but frontier.

[24] Cf. Stephanie Zehnle, "A Geography of Jihad," 445.

[25] Stephanie Zehnle, "A Geography of Jihad," 426–27.

[26] Cf. Ahmed Adamu, "A History of Makarfi Area c. 1779-1902," 220.

[27] Cf. Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano c. 1894-1960," 40.

"Emigrés, especially if they were deposed princes or scholars, were made welcome; in due course they might obtain positions of influence and join or lead their hosts on campaigns. This was true as much within the Caliphate as outside it. Without such a tradition of welcoming an emigre, migration would scarcely be practicable, and mobility would cease."[28]

From these standpoints, it can be inferred that the equivocal features of external natural frontiers and – as a result of that – the tendencies to build wall enclosures for settlements forged a more flexible and transitive comprehension of district. Besides, in the perspective of the Caliphate's rulers, the open district understanding and strategy generated a mobilization as well as settlement-based epistemology of land. Although these facts do not furnish many and profound details for mapping the Caliphate in an analytical sense, they exhibit the fairly important criteria that can prevent a possible Eurocentric border-based interpretation.

1.2.2- The Etic Perspective

From an analytical perspective, many scholars already strove to sketch a map for the Sokoto Caliphate. Particularly Smaldone's map (*Figure 2*), which is based on the many other attempts of mapping and supplementary observations, stands out as the most comprehensive one for the Caliphate.



Based on Hodgkin, ed., *Nigerian Perspectives*, Map 3; Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy*, p. 67; and Johnston, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto*, Map 2. Johnston's map is the only one that delineates the boundaries of emirates and hostile enclaves, and they have been reproduced here. Johnston includes Aïr and Gurma within the caliphate. There is no proof of this, and these areas are shown here outside. Lafiagi, Pategi, Agaie, and Lapai were subemirates of Nupe. Jema'a, Keffi, and Nassarawa were subemirates of Zaria. Lafia was subordinate to Bauchi.

Although this map for the period after the 1850s encapsulates an endeavor to include internal frontiers and provide a proper depiction to envisage the area of the Caliphate's

Figure 2: An exertion to portray the Sokoto Caliphate in form of rigid map by Joseph Smaldone.

[28] Murray Last, "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-1968," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* Vol. 40, No. 4 (1970): 350.

domain, yet it has many shortcomings. The initial problem is the representation of exact border*lines* for the outer limits and as internal divisions among the Emirates. It should be mentioned that they are largely imaginary as it was previously demonstrated that the caliphal understanding of the border was adverse.

The second problem is the political and social heterogeneity of the emirates, which prevents the representation of the Emirates as the homogenous components. This heterogeneity many times engendered several revolts and various hegemony relations, such as vassalage inside of the Emirates. Adamu, for example, states several towns in the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate that seized every opportunity to gain their freedom from the Emir.[29] In another case, in the 1880s Flegel observes many autonomous "pagan" settlements environ of Rabba, the earlier capital of the Nupe (Bida) Emirate, and notices that in the periphery of Birni-n-Kebbi, a city that lies on the Gwandu Emirate, similar settlements had a different hegemonic relationship with the Caliphate's rulers apart from other parts of the Caliphate.[30] King observes similar phenomena in the Bauchi (Yakuba) Emirate and he emphasizes their pervasiveness throughout the Caliphate: "… in Bauchi emirate the Dass, the Yergam, the Montol and the Ankwe, who had been subdued only with great difficulty, revolted under the reign of Ibrahim b. Ya'qub. Throughout the 19th century these recalcitrant and unsubjugated enclaves, particularly in the areas within and contiguous to the southern emirates [continued] ..."[31]

Similarly, in the rather central emirates and old Hausa cities such as Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, and Zaria, there was no clear religious homogeneity. Especially for the resident non-Muslim Hausas such as Maguzawa in these areas, the conditions were very diverse compared to the Muslim Hausas. Ochonu, for instance, stresses how they were excluded from the Hausa identity after *ğihād*, and how that transformed their obligation and social status against the Emirs.[32] One of the oral records, which was conducted with Sarki Maguzawa Ango Shimni in the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate, expresses the extent of this exclusion and a new subjugation: "We (Non-Muslim Hausa) have felt the coming of Masallata (Muslims) more than that of the Europeans especially that they changed virtually most of our traditional set up."[33] Another social discriminations, however, were more visible and decisive in other Emirates because most of the

[29] Cf. Ahmed Adamu, "A History of Makarfi Area c. 1779-1902," 241.
[30] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," *Mittheilungen der Afrikanischen Gesellschaft in Deutschland* Vol. 3 (1881-1883): 58.
[31] Lamont Dehaven King, "State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* Vol. 36, no. 4 (2001): 354.
[32] Cf. Moses Ochonu, "Coloialism Within Colonialism: THe Hausa-Caliphate Imaginary and the British Colonial Administration of the Nigerian Middle Belt," *African Studies Quarterly* Vol. 10, No. 2-3 (2008): 99.
[33] Ahmed Adamu, "A History of Makarfi Area c. 1779-1902," 247.

population had different characteristics. For example, Smaldone mentions that: "Unlike the northern emirates of Katsina, Daura, Kano, and Zaria, where a pre-jihad Islamic tradition existed among the Hausa states, the eastern and southern emirates of Bauchi (Yakuba), Gombe, Adamawa, Muri, southern Zaria, Nupe, Ilorin, and Kontagora were founded in non-Muslim areas characterized by cultural and ethnic fragmentation."[34] In this respect, the complex heterogeneity of the emirates in the Caliphate makes rather complicated any kind of proper mapping attempt.

Apart from this problem of heterogeneity and problematic border*lines*, one is also faced with many difficulties when trying to define frontiers of the Caliphate, especially if there are no stable political relations and if the natural structures are the determining factors. The Ningi area was the most salient example of that. Because of the mountainous character of this area, an absolute hegemony became unattainable for the Caliphate. But more notably, according to Patton's remarks, the state of war in these mountains, made this frontier further complex than what it seems in Smaldone's map:

> It should be noted that [in the Ningi area] the opposition was not strictly that between the mountaineers on one side and the Muslims on the other. For example, Kano and Bauchi Emirates competed in their efforts to impose tribute on the mountaineers. The Buta around Marra and Dua villages paid tribute to Bauchi; those around Burra paid it to Kano, as did the kindred Ningi people and the Kuda. The nearby Pa'a, on the other hand, successfully resisted Bauchi while themselves imposing tribute on the Sira. Thus, the mountaineers were not strangers to relatively complex tributary relationships, nor were they entirely on the receiving end of predatory activities.[35]

Another entangled relation can be likewise found in the western frontiers. Abdullahi and Wara observe in the western part of the Gwandu Emirate that in 1889 the military forces from the Dandunguzu area attacked and raided the Yauri area the tributary of the Gwandu Emirate; interestingly, the Emir did nothing about this military campaign, rather he purchased many captives from Yauri as slaves.[36]

But presumably, the most intricate frontier relations were in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate. As King and Abubakar realize in their field research, the frontier between northern Adamawa

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[34] Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*: *Historical and Sociological Perpectives* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 56.

[35] Adell Patton, "An Islamic Frontier Polity: The Ningi Mountains of Northern Nigeria, 1846-1902," in *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, ed. Igor Kopytoff (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 199.

[36] Cf. Yusuf Abdullahi and Mansur A. Wara, "Slave Raiding and Slave Trade in Zuru Emirate: A Preliminary Study on the Isgogo Slave Market, C. 1700-190," *Dutsin-Ma Historical Review* Vol. 1, no. 1 (2018): 341.

(Fombina) and Bornu was never certain.[37] In the south of Adamawa (Fombina), on the other hand, the chief frontier difficulties were due to natural conditions. The Sub-Emirates' forces were utterly inadequate to control the equatorial belt because of their inadaptability to this strange climate.[38] Hence, the frontiers in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate were far from being reduceable in a strict domination area.

Nevertheless, there were also frontiers that were fairly stable. According to Smaldone, especially two main frontiers were relatively constant: "[Northwestern frontiers] were the most stable frontiers during the nineteenth century... To the south, Muri, Bauchi, and its vassal Lafia, and the southern Zaria vassals Jema'a, Keffi, and Nassarawa, held a relatively fixed frontier along the Benue, although Muri strapped the upper reaches of the river."[39] Unfortunately, there is not enough field research concerning the southern Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate, as well as the Bauchi (Yakuba) and Muri Emirates to analyze the frontier conditions in more detail. But Smaldone further adds that despite their relatively stable frontiers, the northern emirates were attacked and raided many times by the military forces from the Kebbi and Zamfara areas, which mostly originated from the Zuru district, and from Gobir, who were the enduring enemies of the Caliphate.[40]

Consequently, it can be highlighted that an analytical map such as Smaldone's would offer a more sound and accurate understanding of the Caliphate's spatial dimensions if it focused on the regional positions instead of border*line*-based entities. For instance, it is further important to know the position of the Ningi area inside of the Caliphate, rather than to place it into the rigid borders. Thus, its entangled relations and substantial diversity can be grasped more accurately. Similarly, it is decisive to consider the major emirates in their unprecise form: take an example, the different power and hegemony relationships in the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate should be considered its own complex forms rather than to delineate the emirate as a homogenous entity. In this way, the complex connections between disparate groups and powers inside of the emirate can be understood appropriately. To conclude, for a political-economic mapping of the Caliphate, two criteria should be underlined: it must be (1) location focused and (2) settlement based.

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[37] Cf. Lamont Dehaven King, "State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria," 354. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 117.
[38] Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 95.
[39] Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 56.
[40] Cf. Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 57.

1.3- The Framework of the Political Economy

1.3.1- The Socio-Political Background

After having considered the temporal and spatial criteria of mapping the political economy of the Caliphate, the socio-political background should likewise be paid attention to. The mapping of the political economy cannot simply be based on the geographical map, since there are many social and political features in the Caliphate that bring about the chief dynamics between the settlements, Emirs, and regions.

In this respect, seemingly the first exclusive character of the Caliphate was decentralization. As Ahmadu Bello mentions, subsequent to the death of its founder ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī, the Caliphate was divided among his brother and son; while Muhammadu Belū, the son of ibn Fūdī, was received the city of Sokoto and all the eastern parts of the Caliphate, ʿAbdāllah – as written in modern Hausa, Abdullahi, the brother of ibn Fūdī, settled in the old town of Gwandu and controlled the west and south-western parts of the Caliphate.[41] Therefore, politically the city of Sokoto was not the capital of the Caliphate; the Nupe and Ilorin Emirates, for example, were attached to Gwandu, which had symbolically similar status with Sokoto.

In addition, the major administrative structure was similarly influenced by this decentral feature. For instance, Last underlies that: “Sokoto was never... [an] "empire" - it was not like, say, the Ottoman, Roman, or British empires. There were no "consuls," "district officers," "residents," or "governors" sent out from Sokoto to govern other emirates; there was no senate or parliament, no cabinet or council at the center to create or debate policy throughout the caliphate; there was not even a central army.”[42] In other words, the Caliphate was not easily under the hegemony of two caliphal powers, a phenomenon that was already detectable in Smaldone’s map, since there were many internal autonomous powers. The example of the Abuja Emirate can be an appropriate indicator to look more closely at this original specificity of the Caliphate. As Brady stated the former Hausa ruler of the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate, who had been dethroned by the *ǧihād* forces, moved into the Abuja region after the establishment of the Caliphate, a region that was still so close to Zaria. But when they founded their new dynasty

[41] Cf. Ahmadu Bello, *My Life* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Limited, 1986), 11.
[42] Murray Last, “Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy,” *African Studies Review* Vol. 56, No. 2 (2013): 6.

there, the Caliphate was not interested in ultimately subjugating them, instead, the Caliphate and the Hausa dynasty had a good relationship.[43]

According to Last, one of the underlying reasons for this decentralization was the vast size of the Caliphate in a region where the transportation and communication possibilities were utterly arduous.[44] However, as will be demonstrated in the following pages, these undeniable requirements of the immense scale of the Caliphate were understood by the Emirs as a settlement opportunity. The field research observations further confirm that the Emirs' open district understanding that was bolstered by the Caliphate's vastness, paved the way for extensive settling phenomena, notably in the central Caliphate. Ibrahim discloses that: "It is interesting to note that evidence available to us have shown that most of the *kauyuka* (village) around the area [of Zaria vicinity] were either established or revived during the period of Shehu Dan Fodiyo's Jihad that established the Sokoto Caliphate."[45] Similar remarks can be found in Adamu's research on the Makarfi area.[46] Besides, in the frontier Emirates, this settlement strategy was even multifunctional; Zenhle reiterates that:

> The Sokoto Jihadists attracted farmers and pastoralists to colonize new and 'dead' land. However, they disapproved of pastoral nomadism in "deserted" land. They intended to create a caliphate that eventually only consisted of urban centers and *harim* environs used as pasture, firewood resources, and for cultivation. The 'dead' land and its inhabitants could not be controlled by the sultan, the emirs, or an imam. Therefore this land was free for individual colonization by cultivation, buildings, and pasture. Everyone should be sedentarized gradually. And the 'Land of the Unbelievers' was considered 'dead' land anyway: Both the farmers and the pastoral societies were asked to migrate to the Caliphate frontier and "revive" this land.[47]

This decisive emphasis on the settlement and sedentarization policy in the Caliphate can even be observed in the oral narrative of Nigerian Fulanis. Historically most of the Fulanis throughout the extensive lands from Senegal to Chad were nomad and their oral culture relies on their nomadism, among the Fulanis in Nigeria, however, the oral records remark that their origins can be traced back to settlers.[48]

What is more, this settlement policy was not confined to minor villages and towns. Two significant major cities of the Caliphate were built after the *ğihād* movement: Yola and Sokoto.

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[43] Cf. Richard P. Brady, "Hierarchy and Authority Among the Hausa with Special Reference tot the Period of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century" (P.h.D Thesis, University of Oxford, 1978), 89.
[44] Cf. Murray Last, "Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital," 6.
[45] Abubakar Zaria Ibrahim, "The Emergence of Settlements in the Shika Area of the Zaria Plains C. 1800-1920," *The Journal of Zaria Historical Research (ZAHIR)* Vol. 3, No. 1 (2008): 25.
[46] Cf. Ahmed Adamu, "A History of Makarfi Area c. 1779-1902," 266.
[47] Stephanie Zehnle, "A Geography of Jihad," 301.
[48] See: F. W. de St Croix, *The Fulani of Northern Nigeria*, 8–9.

The differences between their establishment and development processes imply a heterogeneity in the analogous policies in the Caliphate. For example, Palmers especially highlights that Sokoto was imagined as the model of ancient eminent cities in Western Sudan such as Timbuktu, Jenne, and Gao, as their typical feature, they were the center for religious intellectuals and students.[49] Regarding its development, Last mentions that:

> ... Sokoto city may have been the capital of a great polity but it was also a rural town. It lacked monuments or monumental architecture, and it was short of ceremonial space… The shaikh's [ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī] tomb (*hubbare*) is his old, originally suburban house in which he also had a tent (*laima*); his mosque was nearby - low, plain, and many-pillared, so unlike the splendid mosque built in 1836 for the emir in Zaria, or the huge ancient mosque in Rano with its high, bulky minaret.[50]

Yola, on the other hand, had an utterly different establishing model and development. For instance, according to Barkindo, the establishment of Yola was to facilitate the new military actions in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate.[51] The development of the city was determined, for Abubakar, by the economic interests and necessities such as the trade of enslaved people and ivory, which at some point became the indispensable part of the city.[52] In other words, cities and smaller settlements were all established in the framework of the Caliphate's sedentarization policy but at the time for very different purposes.

Therefore, it seems firmly significant to argue that the interdependencies – in some cases – and autonomies – to some extent – of the Emirs were quite determinative because of the decentral characteristic of the Caliphate. Furthermore, the variations between settlement policies and strategies were connected to the local conditions, while the existence of these policies was overall, and these local circumstances were chiefly decisive for the peripheral Emirates such as Adamawa (Fombina), Nupe (Bida), and Ilorin.

1.3.2- The Triple System

When the abovementioned temporal-spatial frameworks and criteria are attentively considered in combination with the socio-political background of the Caliphate, it is viable to observe some

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[49] See: H. R. Palmer, "An Early Fulani Conception of Islam," *Journal of the Royal African Society* Vo. 13, No. 52 (1914): 408.
[50] Murray Last, "Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital," 12–13.
[51] Cf. Bawuro M. Barkindo, "Slavery and Relics of Slavery in Bornu and the Three Emirates," in J. F. Ade Ajayi; Okon Uya, *Slavery and Slave Trade in Nigeria*, 60.
[52] Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 83.

political-economic patterns adherent to the differences and similarities between the Emirates and regions, which will be referred to as a *triple system* in this work.

This *triple system* is based on particularly three criteria in terms of political economy: (1) governmental tendencies, (2) system and dynamics of slavery, and (3) settlement strategies. The sources of these three criteria were explored in many field studies, and – in their peculiar context for the distinct provinces – were interpreted by several scholars, as to be shown in the ensuing pages. According to these observations and analyses, a three-dimensional map of the Caliphate's political economy stands out.

In the mapping of the *triple system*, the first component is the central part of the Caliphate, or more pointedly the central Hausaland, which comprises most of the Emirates: particularly the principal ones such as Gwandu, Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Zazzau (Zaria), and Bauchi (Yakuba) as well as minor ones such as Daura, Kazaure, Hadejia, Katagum, Jama're, and Missau. Although local differences are also evident among these emirates, the typical patterns were tied to the abovementioned three criteria. For instance, as Chafe emphasizes, the Caliphs had a visible influence – if not a hegemony – over these Emirates, which indicates comprehensive applications of the religious jurisprudence, because their jurisdiction was mostly limited through the implementation of the Mālikī School of Law.[53] Nevertheless, this common feature makes these Emirates' policies more predictable, since the rules of the Mālikī School of Law are detectable from the leading texts and textbooks of this school. Some of these texts were fully available in the central part of the Caliphate, such as *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ* (Mālik ibn Anas, d. 795), *Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya* (Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, d. 996), *Irshād al-sālik* ('Askar, d. 1332), *Al-Muḫtaṣar fī Al-Fiqh* (Ḫalīl ibn Isḥāq Al-Ǧundī, d. 1365), and *Tuḥfa* (Ibn Abī ʿĀṣim, d. 1427).[54]

One of the chief characteristics of these central emirates was also related to the system of slavery. While slave raids and captured goods were a significant part of the revenues in the Caliphate, according to Sa'id, the emirates in the central part were "… not one of those emirates that benefited from large war booty and substantial revenue the jizya, because of their nearness to large areas of non-Muslim enclaves."[55] However, it should be further underlined that these emirates also attended some – if not very often – slave raids, mainly against the other powers

[53] Cf. Kabiru Sulaiman Chafe, "The State and Economy in the Sokoto Caliphate," 306; the reason for this feature is the fact that the authority of the Caliphs was relying on more religious than politic.

[54] Moreover, Ostien observes these old canonic texts even in today's Nigeria. Cf. Philip Ostien, *Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006*: *A Sourcebook* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2007), 119–20.

[55] Halil Ibrahin Sa'id, "Revolution and Reaction: The Fulani Jihad in Kano and Its Aftermath, 1807-1919: Volume I" (PhD. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978), 180.

in the internal frontier such as Ningi, Zuru, and Gawari; but the economic impact of these was restricted and short-lived, and these central Emirates remained dependent on the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirates' supply of enslaved people.[56]

In addition, the settlement strategy in these emirates was revival-based expansionism. They supported already existing settlements and erected new ones; thus, they encouraged the spread of settlements.[57] From the accounts of the travelers, this characteristic was quite discernable compared with other Emirates. For example, in the 1880s Flegel observes many farms, markets, and water wells while he was approaching the Gwandu and Sokoto Emirates, after seeing several ruined and deserted places in the Ilorin and Nupe (Bida) Emirates.[58]

Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the central part of the Caliphate had more the Mālikī School of Law oriented governance. In terms of political economy, the principal dynamic was the production and trade basis revenue system and resurgence-based expanding settlement policy. These three phenomena will be thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 2: *Central Part of the Caliphate: Agriculture and Craft Production with Trade*.

The second component of the *triple system* is the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates. The primary exceptional characteristic of these Emirates was their political loyalty to Gwandu instead of Sokoto, because of the *ğihād* movement in this region had been conducted under the supervision of the Caliph in Gwandu. The influence of Gwandu, however, was rather weak in this area. For instance, Kolapo elaborates that: "… various constraints more or less prevented the implementation of central economic (or any other) policies [in Nupe (Bida) and the Ilorin Emirates] centrally directed from Gwandu or Sokoto."[59] In other words, although the principal ideology and jurisprudence of these two Emirates were linked to the Mālikī School of Law, its

[56] For instance, Palmer observes in the *Kano Chronicle* that in the reign of Abdullahi in Kano between 1855-1883, there were some slave raids as a result of the military activities. See: Herbert R. Palmer, "The Kano Chronicle," *The journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* Vol. XXXVIII (1908): 97.

[57] Abovementioned field research of Adamu and Ibrahim furnishes many confirmative observations for this fact. For example, Ibrahim remarks that: "By 1902, when the British arrived in Zazzau Emirate and the Makarfi area,... virtually all the towns and villages of this area were fully established. This could be seen in the light of how hardly one finds a newly established town or village in Makarfi area after 1902." Ahmed Adamu, "A History of Makarfi Area c. 1779-1902," 266. Also cf. Abubakar Zaria Ibrahim, "The Emergence of Settlements in the Shika Area of the Zaria Plains c. 1800-1920," 25

[58] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," 56.

[59] Femi James Kolapo, "The Southward Campaigns of Nupe in the Lower Niger Valley," in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, 71.

implications were not as visible as in the central part of the Caliphate. As highlighted by Kolapo, that made their governmental attitudes more unpredictable and conditional.[60]

Concerning the second criteria of the *triple system*, the slave raids in the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were essential, not just because of their economic return, but alike for their importance in the enduring states of war since the enslaved people were used in the military. According to Kolapo, the chief reason for this feature was the closeness and hostility of many other military and political powers in the region.[61] For fifty years, from the 1850s until the end of the Caliphate, no political power was able to achieve overall hegemony in the area, and this destructive warfare has been remembered up today as an "endless war".[62] The impacts of these conditions for the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were determinative in terms of political economy. While they were acquiring many enslaved people from the military campaigns, the expenditures of the wars were further than these gains. For this reason, their survival in the region relied on the constant importation of enslaved people from the central part of the Caliphate. At this point, Mahadi states that: "As for the Niger-Benue confluence zone, its commercial importance for Kano in the nineteenth century, lay in its role as a major market for slaves. Here Kano merchants or their agents disposed of some of the slaves they acquired from different regions."[63] Indeed, according to Hassan and Nai'bi's analysis on the *Abuja Chronic*, in some cases, this importation of enslaved people from the central part of the Caliphate was not sufficient, so that many military leaders and merchants from Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates established slave trade relations with Abuja.[64]

As for the third criteria, the settlement policies of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates differed from the central part of the Caliphate. For one thing, because the Fulani rulers – in the major cities or in their military camps – and Hausa merchants were only a minority in the region, and most of the people were non-Muslim, i.e., there was not sufficient control over the rural areas and there were not enough new Muslims settlers.[65] Besides, as Flegel noted in his detailed map from 1881, the endless slave raids permanently deserted and depopulated all rural areas and transformed them into ruins.[66] As a result of these conditions, while the rural settlements had

[60] Cf. Femi James Kolapo, "The Southward Campaigns of Nupe in the Lower Niger Valley," 80.
[61] Cf. Femi James Kolapo, "The Southward Campaigns of Nupe in the Lower Niger Valley," 74.
[62] Ahmadu Bello, *My Life*, 11.
[63] Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy: The Sarauta System and Its Roles in Shaping The Society and Economy of Kano with Particular Reference to The Eighteenth and The Nineteenth Centuries" (PhD. Dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, 1982), 724.
[64] Cf. Alhaji Hassan and Mallam Shuaibu Na'ibi, *A Chronoicle of Abuja* (Lagos: Frank Heath, 1962), 79.
[65] Cf. Michael Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding': The Case of the Middle Belt of Nigeria," *Journal of African History* Vol. 10, no. 4 (1969): 560.
[66] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition" (This map is attached to the volume without page number)

dramatically disappeared, belligerents of endless wars withdrew into the well-protected centers; for the Caliphate's forces and merchants, these were the principal cities such as Rabba, Bida, and Ilorin, for the resident people these were the mountains and forests.[67] Thus, the principal settlement practice in the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates was to build well-protected central cities or *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) while destroying all other existing rural settlements.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the main political-economic characteristics of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were the highly conditional – in this respect hard to project – governance, a dependency on regular procurement of enslaved people – often not for economic but for military reasons – and a central oriented destructive settlement strategy. These observations will be thoroughly investigated in Chapter 3: *The Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates: Slavery in the War Economy*.

The third component of the *triple system* is the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate. This Emirate is doubtless the least accurately depicted part in Smaldone's map. Contrary to the homogeneous portrait of the Emirate on his map, there were, in fact, a myriad of Sub-Emirates, whose exact number is still being disputed among scholars. In this respect, the predictability of the Emirate's governance was even more challenging than the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates. In the case of Adamawa (Fombina), neither did the Caliph in Sokoto have any influence in the region, nor did the Emir of Adamawa (Fombina) have a strict control over the Sub-Emirates.[68] For instance, the Tibati Sub-Emirate in the south of Adamawa (Fombina) was during its all existence autonomous from the central Yola Emir.[69] Burnham also manifests a related autonomous relationship for the biggest Sub-Emirate, Ngoundéré, in the south of Adamawa (Fombina).[70] Because of the uncontrolled governmental autonomies, the traditional Fulani customs and code

[67] Cf. Michael Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding'," 560–61; Constanze Weise, "Governance and Ritual Sovereignty at the Niger-Benue Confluence: A Political and Cultural History of Nigeria's Igala, Northern Yoruba and Nupoid-Speaking peoples to 1900 CE" (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 2013), 314.

[68] Kirk-Green notices how the Royal Niger Company was not convinced that their trade agreement with the Caliph in Sokoto in the 1880s will be also valid in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate; thus, they decided to make an additional agreement directly with the Emir of Adamawa (Fombina) as well. Cf. A. H. M. Kirk-Green, *Adamawa: Past and Present*: *An Historical Approach to the Development of a Northern Cameroons Province* (London: Dawsons, 1969), 49. According the Abubakar, the main reason of this independency was the decisive isolation of the emirate: "Fombina was politically isolated from the rest of the Caliphate, and geographically separated from the emirates of Muri and Gombe by unconquered Bachama, Kanakuru, Lunguda, and the other inhabitants of the lower Gongola valley." Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 109.

[69] Cf. A. H. M. Kirk-Green, *Adamawa: Past and Present*, 139.

[70] Cf. Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa: Slavery as a Regional System," *Paideuma* Vol. 41 (1995): 175.

of morality (*Fulaka*) became more effective than the principles of the Mālikī School of Law in these Sub-Emirates; Vereecke, for example, especially emphasize that:

> At least for the Yola area, there has existed a contradiction between Fulbe ideals of exclusiveness and Islamic assimilationism, in which Fulbe and non-Fulbe participate in a culture based largely on Islam, and non-Fulbe are encouraged to emulate certain aspects of Fulbe behavior, yet non-Fulbe can never achieve full incorporation into the Fulbe identity, though as noted, this contradiction has, for at least some slaves, been mitigated by the perpetuation of dependency relations between slave and slave master, freed slave and guardian.[71]

In other words, the pervasiveness of the community-oriented Fulani customs instead of applying the Mālikī School of Law in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate purveyed the uneven hegemonic power to the Sub-Emirs, whose cruelty against non-Muslim and non-Fulani people is clearly reflected in the oral narratives.[72]

The second characteristic of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, as it pertains to the system of slavery, was in some ways akin to the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates. Last particularly stresses the key importance of slave raiding for their economy.[73] However, as distinguished from the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates, the power relations and militarily conditions were utterly distinctive in Adamawa (Fombina); as German traveler Heinrich Barth observed in the 1850s, the military power of the Emirate – with all its Sub-Emirates – was unrivaled in the region, since resident groups were dispersed.[74] When this vast hegemonic power over inhabitants combined with the community-oriented Fulani code of morality, the whole region transformed into an enormous reservoir of enslaved people.[75] The slave raids and the amount of enslaved people were so huge that the number of enslaved people from Adamawa (Fombina) was truly distinct, not only inside of the Caliphate but close to those of Sierra Leone in the 1850s.[76] For

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[71] Catherine Vereecke, "The Slave Experience in Adamawa: Past and Present Perspectives from Yola (Nigeria)," *Cahiers d'études africaines* Vol. 34, 133-135 (1994): 47.

[72] Cf. Murray Last, "Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital," 4.

[73] Cf. Murray Last, "Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital," 4.

[74] See: Heinrich Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa,* Volume II (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1857), 510.

[75] For instance, Barth tells that: "I have been assured that [In Adamawa] some of the head slaves of these men have as many as a thousand slaves each under their command, with whom they undertake occasional expeditions for their masters." Heinrich Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, 502–3

[76] For example, Hair observes among the informants of Koelle, who wrote the book of Plyglotta Africana (a comparative dictionary for West African Languages) in 1854 in Freetown, Sierra Leone by interviewing with many enslaved people, that: "forty-eight of the informants had been 'taken in war'. Twenty-five of these... were taken by the Fula during their razzias... about a dozen men from tribes of Adamawa and the North Cameroons provided evidence of Fula raids from 1820 onwards." P. E. H. Hair, "The Enslavement of Koelle's Informants," *The Journal of African History* Vol. 6, no. 2 (1965): 196.

the Caliphate, the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was the principal source of enslaved people, and its significance relied on these regular slave raids.

Lastly, regarding the settlement policy, the Emirate had a feature similar to that of the Nupe (Bida) and the Ilorin Emirates.[77] They destroyed most of the local settlements in the rural areas and built *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) and cities such as Yola and Ngoundéré for protection. This elimination of inhabitants from the area of the Emirate's domination, however, was not only impact and strategy of the Emirate. Specifically, beyond the limits of their durable military existence and activities, they established indirect vassalage relations and even a colonial system with resident groups throughout an immense area. The chief reason for this was deserting and depopulating the area was not sustainable and profitable anymore since the distance between this area and the central towns was a serious obstacle at the time.[78] The noteworthy point in this vassalage relation was that the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate settled the small marketplaces for its – mostly – Hausa merchants in the towns of the vassal groups to facilitate a colonial hegemony. For instance, the French traveler Edmond Ponel observed one of these places in the town of Koundé (very close to the Cameroon border in today's Central African Republic) in the 1890s.[79]

From these standpoints, it can be summarized that the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate had more Fulani customs-based and uncontrolled governance. The slave raiding and exportation system were central to the political economy on an extensive scale. The periphery depopulating, centrist settlement strategy, however, was fluid, beyond the external frontiers they preferred more balanced relationships for the sake of trade and exploitation. These features will be attentively inquired in Chapter 4: *The Adamawa (Fombina) Emirates: Economy of Exploitation.*

Consequently, these three distinguished components concerning the political economy of the Caliphate yield an efficient framework to analyze the political economy more profoundly. Nevertheless, this model of the *triple system* also has its limits as it is not all-inclusive; especially these three emirates are not on this mapping: the Kontagora, Muri, and Gombe Emirates. The reason for these missing parts is *not* their inappropriateness to the model, but the

[77] For instance, Vereecke determines many examples regarding this strategy. Cf. Catherine Vereecke, "The Slave Experience in Adamawa," 31

[78] For example, in 1890s, French traveler Louis Mizon encounters with the Boutou people "qui ne sont pas soumis au gouverneur de Ngaoundéré, mais qui, cependant, vivent en paix avec leurs voisinsmusulmans et reçoivent les marchands venus du nord." Louis Mizon, "Itinéraire De La Source De La Benoué Au Confluent Des Rivières Kadei Et Mambéré," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie (Paris)* Série 7, no. 16 (1895): 365.

[79] See: Edmond Ponel, "La Haute Sangha," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie (Paris)* Série 7, no. 17 (1896): 203–4.

vagueness regarding their political economy since there is no detailed field research on these provinces so far. For instance, the Kontagora Emirate was situated between the central part of the Caliphate and the Nupe (Bida) - Ilorin Emirates. It is not very well known whether it had an identical characteristic in terms of political economy with the central Caliphate or the Nupe (Bida) - Ilorin Emirates, or whether it had a thoroughly distinguished feature. A similar occasion can be seen in the Muri and Gombe Emirates as well. They were placed between the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate and the central part of the Caliphate, and regarding their political-economic features, there is not enough knowledge so far. Eventually, if there are field surveys in these Emirates in the future, the model of the *triple system* can be reassessed and improved or replaced.

2- Central Part of the Caliphate: Agriculture and Craft Production with Trade

In light of the earlier mentioned field studies, it was underlined that the agriculture and craft production as well as central trade shaped the intrinsic dynamism of the political economy in the central part of the Caliphate. The settlement policies of the emirs were also decisive in the occurrence of these salient characteristics.

Map 1: Central Part of the Caliphate: Underlined cities (Sokoto, Gwandu, Birnin Kebi, Katsina, Zaria, Kano, Yakuba, and Hadejia) were the chief settlements under the direct control of the Emirs. Makarfi and Fanisau were the important settlement areas of the Emirates. Zamfara, Zazzau, and Bauchi were the names of regions that the Caliphate efforted to rule and partly did. Zuru and Ningi areas were entirely autonomous, the Caliphate had no autonomy there.

However, this suggestion should not lead to a reductionist assumption concerning the central part of the Caliphate, as if there were no other economic activities or political interests. These political-economic features were not essentially unique for these Emirates, but they were a pattern, i.e., in the other part of the Caliphate there were alike the agriculture, craft production and trade activities, or in the central part of the Caliphate, there were also indications and instances of the war economy and slave raiding. The peculiarity of the central part of the Caliphate in these different political-economic undertakings, however, was that while the signs of the war economy and examples of slave raiding were limited and fractured during the second

half of the 19th century, the main political-economic system largely was based on the continuity and efficiency of the central trade as well as agriculture and craft production.

The determination of these political-economic patterns in the central part of the Caliphate furnishes a valuable general frame. But these arguments only purvey the outline. It is imperative to further analyze and disclose these processes since it is not entirely unequivocal what is meant by agriculture and craft production in the central part of the Caliphate.

2.1- Main Dynamisms in the Development of Agricultural Production

2.1.1- Possessing the Land

To elucidate the agricultural production in the central part of the Caliphate has its difficulties because of the unique understanding of the land. The comprehension and use of land – in a more concrete and practical sense than the understanding of spatiality – in the central part of the Caliphate was determined by several diverse historical influences such as the old Hausa customs and application of the Mālikī School of Law as well as many other regional dissimilarities. Because of all these entanglements, the land tenure system of the central part was quite complex. For instance, Hamza combines all different – well established – ways of land acquisition, and he furnishes a general frame: "There were seven systems of land tenure... *saran daji* (bush clearance)... *kyauta* (gift)... *gado* (inheritance)... *aro* (lease)... *jingina*... (periodical lease)... *riko* ... (taking a land after the death of the owner without heritage or fee)... *saye* (purchase)."[80]

Although it is difficult to explore the importance and proportion of these different ways of the land tenure systems, due to the decisive data deficiency regarding their applications, it is still manageable to analyze some of them through historical and geographical references. It should be particularly emphasized that the concept of land in this tenure system does not indicate a similar meaning of this concept as it was used in the European history-oriented political-economic understandings, which imply a metrically measured surface of the earth.[81] As Ibn Ḫaldūn stated, the political-economic meaning of land begins only if it becomes part of the

[80] Ibrahim Hamza, "Slavery and Plantation Society at Dorayi in Kano Emirate," in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, 132–33.

[81] To see this detail, David Ricardo's grounding text *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* can be considered. He calculates the price of agricultural products according to the proportion of land that used for these goods: "[…] the price of wheat is 4l. per quarter…" David Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (London: John Murray, 1821), 195. Whereas, this kind of metrically measured land reference to define price is entirely unfamiliar for the Sokoto Caliphate.

interactions and interdependencies with *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) and cities by stimulating trade and craft.[82] Hence, theoretically, any piece of land becomes part of the agricultural production in terms of the political economy only after the bush clearing process (*saran daji*).[83]

This foundational position and meaning of the bush clearing to acquire the land had gained special and additional importance by the time the settlement expansion policy of the central part of the Caliphate became dominant. For instance, Mahadi stresses that after the 1850s the policy of the encouragement to immigration and settlement into the surroundings of Kano was at its peak, as the newcomers did not only get land by clearing bush but were also given the seeds and requisite information concerning the climate and soil.[84] Of course, the distance of the newly cleared lands to *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) or cities was crucial, as these new lands had some disadvantages because of their logistic difficulties. To mitigate these difficulties, the emirs of the central part of the Caliphate implemented supplementary inducements. For example, Mahadi utters that, "[i]n most cases new arrivals [into the vicinity of Kano] paid only half of the normal amount of taxes paid by other groups."[85] These incentives were even more generous in the periphery of *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*), because of security problems that discouraged the people to settle there. Salau remarks that:

> To overcome the reluctance to settle at Fanisau [near in Kano] and similar ribats, Dabo [the second Emir of Kano, between 1819-1846] offered a number of inducements. He and his subordinates allocated substantial tracts of land to individuals for large-scale agricultural production... Dabo was able to provide exemption from taxation to selected individuals, such as those establishing farms near ribats, and it was also possible to grant land with exemptions from taxation through the practice of clientage, in which allegiance (*chaffa*) was paid to the emir and hence the state.[86]

This utterance of Salau, however, subsumes a conceptual vagueness, because a substantial difference arises between granting lands to newcomers and fostering them to clear bush. In this respect, while the bush clearance policy had a developmental effect for both sides – the new arrivals and the emirate, the land granting policy entailed more complicated power relations. In the latter, the granted lands are, in fact, already cleared from the bushes by someone – that could

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[82] See: Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Al-Mūqaddima*, V, 1.

[83] Some friends from Nigeria informed me that this word is sometimes written as *sharan baji* as well. Bargery does not impart any information about this notion in his dictionary. But he defines the concept of *saran tuji*, which means "voluntary going round from town to town and village to village by a band of young men for the purpose of cleaning up and weeding the roads..." George P. Bargery, "On-Line Bargery Hausa-Englich Dictionary," accessed May 6, 2021, http://maguzawa.dyndns.ws/, The title of "saran tuji".

[84] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 464.

[85] Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 464.

[86] Mohammed B. Salau, "Ribats and the Development of Plantations in the Sokoto Caliphate: A Case Study of Fanisau," *African Economic History*, No. 34 (2006): 35–36.

be done recently or many centuries ago –, because as Ibn Ḫaldūn illustrated that land can only be a political-economic category *after* bush clearing, i.e., encouraging newcomers to clear bush is not a land granting since these plots of the bush are not under the category of land. The question then, is whose lands were granted?

This, in turn, necessitates an exposition of the unique feature in the Caliphate concerning the difference between ownership and leadership. As Brady enunciates there was a strict theoretical distinction between private ownership and aristocratic possessions: "The concept of *sarki* [the ruler, the aristocrat], denoting leadership or authority, is distinct from the concept of *mai* in its political sense denoting 'possession' or 'ownership'. Examples of the use of this term range from *mai gida*, the 'owner of a house' or household head, to *mai kyau* 'owner of good' or a good person. Increasing this distinction, the concept of emirate leader is equivalent to the Arabic term *Amir* (English, 'Emir')..."[87]

Put differently, the Emirs did not "own" the lands they ruled, while the farmers and bush clearers could possess the land as the owners.[88] The position of the Emirs as rulers was leadership, not ownership. In addition, it should be argued that this conceptual distinction was not just a theoretical phenomenon. For instance, Sule Bello observes this difference in the case of the Kano Emirate; the Emirs were solely entitled to manage the official estates of the Emirate, these lands, however, were not considered as their property.[89] Nevertheless, as Hamza mentions, their auspice in the management of these estates was almost indisputable, i.e., they could divide these estates into plots and grant them to the new arrivals as well as political supporters.[90]

From this point of view, the land granting policy of the Emirs was, in fact, a one-sided redistribution instead of providing new lands. The fundamental difference of this policy from the encouragement to clear bush bound up with that this policy was not developmental for both sides, most times it caused land deprivation for several owners. The pernicious character of this policy was especially visible in the examples of confiscation. For instance, Hamza observes that in the Kano Emirate:

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[87] Richard P. Brady, "Hierarchy and Authority Among the Hausa with Special Reference tot the Period of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century," 78.

[88] However, at this point, it must be farther clarified that this ownership rights were available only for the Muslims. For instance, Jumare enunciates that especially in the Sokoto Emirate the non-Muslims could obtain the lands only as commune, their patronage on the lands was entirely communal, not private. Cf. Ibrahim M. Jumare, "Land Tenure in the Sokoto Sultanate of Nigeria" (PhD Dissertation, York University, 1995), 129.

[89] Cf. Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano c. 1894-1960," 27.

[90] Cf. Ibrahim Hamza, "Slavery and Plantation Society at Dorayi in Kano Emirate," 127.

> Officials, including the emir, gave land with tax concessions to attract followers and to encourage the immigration of merchants. In the course of the redistribution of land under Emir Muhammad Bello [1882-1894], for example, a number of Agalawa merchants obtained land in this way, and they subsequently lost it under the reign of Emir Aliyu [1894-1902].[91]

This complex power relational characteristic of granting land made this policy mostly unreachable for the commoner (*talakawa*) new arrivals. In many cases, the granted lands were more valuable than the lands that had recently been gained by clearing bush, and this increased value attracted the rich merchants and emirs' political supporters to demand redistributions.[92] The Emirs, on the other hand, did not use the confiscation strategy only on behalf of people's demands. For example, Salau detects that in the Kano Emirate, the Emirs confiscated the private lands of their political opponents to expand the official estate of the Emirate.[93] However, this confiscation strategy to strengthen the official estates presumably did not reach extreme limits, i.e., the number of private landowners was quite observable and private ownership was firmly pervasive, at least in the case of the Kano and Zazzau (Zaria) Emirates.[94]

Despite this active involvement of the Emirs in the central part of the Caliphate in the redistribution of lands, Mahadi denotes that: "In spite of the apparent approval by Islam of the commercialization of land or at least that which is given to individuals by the Emir of Caliph, the authorities in Kano in the nineteenth century continued to regard the sale of land as illegal."[95] Here, Mahadi's remark regarding the approval of Islam, more strictly, alluding to the Mālikī School of Law, seems fairly right. Although in one of the principal texts of the Mālikī School of Law, *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ* of Mālik ibn Anas, as well as in a textbook, *Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya* of Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī,[96] the commercialization of the lands does not occupy the main

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[91] Ibrahim Hamza, "Slavery and Plantation Society at Dorayi in Kano Emirate," 128.

[92] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 459–60.

[93] Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*: *A Historical and Comparative Study* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2018), 120.

[94] Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 97; also cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 66. However, Mahadi scrutinizes a clear increase in the amount of the official estates through the second half of the 19th Century in the Kano Emirate: "… by the end of the nineteenth century a substantial part of the land in the central region had been acquired by the members of the ruling class." Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 460.

[95] Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 457; however, according to other sources, this phenomenon was not confined to the Kano Emirate. Because Hogben and Kirk-Green manifest that in the reign of Ahmadu Rufai [seventh Caliph of the Sokoto Caliphate between 1867-1873] there was a famous gathering that the Caliph spoke directly to the Emirs, and one of the first things that the Caliph demanded was to avoid all buying and selling processes of land. Cf. S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria*: *A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions* (Hampshire: Ipswich Book Co. LTD., 1993), 406.

[96] Of course in the school of the Mālikī School of Law there are several principal and explanatatory texts. But these two texts were most commonly available ones in the Sokoto Caliphate, their availability maintaines even today in the Northern Nigeria. Cf. Philip Ostien, *Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006*: *A Sourcebook* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2007), 119–20

discussions, the examples in which they effort to demonstrate admissible attitudes, point towards confirmation of Mahadi. Furthermore, in *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ* Mālik ibn Anas expresses that land can even be used as *qīrāṭ*.[97]

Unfortunately, existing sources do not impart information about the impact of this apparent contradiction or about the general consideration concerning this discrepancy. However, Salau detects that this prohibition had already substantial weakness because of the lack of control mechanisms and bureaucracy in the Caliphate: "It was possible to transfer land from one party to another without interaction with state authorities or without obtaining titles from the state."[98] Besides, Mahadi also confirms that the commercialization of the lands became a prevailing practice – especially in the Kano Emirate – after the 1850s.[99]

Aside from these characteristics of bush clearance and land redistribution policies in the land tenure system, another historically decisive way of acquiring land was inheritance (*gayo*). The significance of this phenomenon stems from the salient historical turn of the Hausaland. While a particular inheritance system existed in the pre-Caliphal period in the Hausaland, after *ǧihād*, the implementation of the Mālikī School of Law transformed this system. Traditionally the inheritance was based on the household (*gandu*) system, reflected also in the long-lived concept of *mai gida* (owner of the house), i.e., all members of the family were living under the patronage of one member of the family. In other words, similarly to the complaints of the founder of the Caliphate ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī in his famous text *Kitāb al-farq*, the land and the houses on it remained always fix and after the death of the owner, the land was handed over to the oldest son – for the most times – instead of being divided to all heirs.[100] In opposition, as Mālik ibn Anas and Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī enunciate, the inheritance system in the Mālikī School of Law entirely relies on the share to all inheritors.[101] After the 1810s, the prevailing application

[97] See: Mālik ibn Anas ibn Anas, *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ*, 32.1; this example unequivocally exhibits the huge liberality concerning the commercialization of land in the Mālikī School of Law. This is because the concept of *qīrāṭ* implies not only the free exchange of the lands but even usage of them as an investment loan. Mālik ibn Anas disclose this concept as follows: "[if someone gives someone] some money as *qīrāṭ* to use, the profit should be shared between them." Mālik ibn Anas ibn Anas, *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ*, 32.1; more importantly, Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī emphasizes that *qīrāṭ* must be made with money, i.e., land renting, for instance, cannot be a *qīrāṭ*. See: Ibn Abi Zayd Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, *Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya*, 34.25a; this fact indicates that it is permissible to sell land to convert its price into money, and then to give this money as *qīrāṭ*. At the end one can get his all money and profit of the loan back, in this way one can buy a new, more valuable land. Shortly, a possessed land equally means a freely convertible money.

[98] Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 96.

[99] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 460.

[100] See: Mervyn Hiskett, "Kitap Al-Farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to 'Uthman Dan Fodio," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 1960, 568.

[101] For Mālik ibn Anas, see: Mālik ibn Anas ibn Anas, *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ*, 27; for Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, see: Ibn Abi Zayd Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, *Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya*, 39.

of the Mālikī School of Law throughout the central part of the Caliphate entailed not only an immense systematic change but as Mahadi utters it also triggered a bigger transformation:

> The implementation of the stipulations of the [Maliki] shari'a regard to the inheritance of land meant that on the death of the head of a household the family *gandu* would be divided amongst all those entitled to inherit him. This, wherever it was applied, often resulted in fragmentation of holdings… This had the effect of forcing people to move into unoccupied areas or encouraging them to devote much of their time industrial production or trade.[102]

Therefore, the implementation of the Mālikī School of Law had several advantages in the enlargement policies of the Emirs in the central part of the Caliphate. First, while fostering the especially newly arriving immigrants for the bush clearing process was sparking the new settlement attempts on the inter- and trans-emirate level, implementing the Mālikī School of Law's inheritance system gave a fillip to the new settlement movements on the intra-emirate level. From this point of view, the overarching feature of these agricultural augmentation policies was chiefly visible in the decisive increase in agricultural production in the central part of the Caliphate during the second half of the 19th century. Second, peculiarly in the major cities and their peripheries – such as Kano, Zaria, Katsina, and Sokoto – after the allocation of inheritance, for many heirs to clear new bushes to get farming land was less profitable than to attend the craft production, since the not cleared bushes were immensely distant from the central markets in these well-developed regions. Besides, in these big cities, well-established craft sectors were already free-accessibly present.

However, applying the new inheritance system and gaining these extra advantages also required some conditions. Specifically, in the minor cities or *rubuṭ* (sing. *ribāṭ*) situated close to insecure regions, there were many constraints to implement the Mālikī School of Law in the inheritance system. In these regions, because of the security problems, the bush clearing process was more arduous than in the metropolitan districts such as Kano, Sokoto, and Zaria. Furthermore, the absence of the developed craft sectors in the small cities could not provide occupational possibilities for the new job seekers. When viewed from this aspect, it is not surprising that Hamza additionally observes several dissensions and contentions for enforcing the new inheritance system in the central part of the Caliphate.[103] In addition, the lack of control

[102] Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 458.
[103] Cf. Ibrahim Hamza, "Slavery and Plantation Society at Dorayi in Kano Emirate," 133.

mechanisms and bureaucracy for the inheritance procedure made it uncontrollable, at least unless some heirs complained to the judge (*alkali*).[104]

Consequently, two distinctive features in the land tenure system in the central part of the Caliphate after the 1850s, – the bush clearing process and inheritance system – experienced a marked change throughout the century. They stimulated a vast transformation and development in the accretion policies of the emirs to establish the new settlements and to encourage the craft sectors in the big cities. Therefore, it can be concluded that despite some fragilities engendered by the confiscations led by the Emirs, the land tenure system in the central part of the Caliphate yielded a promising potential and requisite base for growing agriculture as well as craft sector during the second half of the 19th century.

2.1.2- Cultivating the Land

The big-scale cultivation in the agrarian sector of the central part of the Caliphate had a long-lasting historical background since the soil and climate have purveyed proper conditions in the Hausaland throughout the centuries. Nevertheless, a dramatic change was also witnessed, not in terms of cultivation techniques and products, but in terms of the land and labor use after the 1850s. Considering the existing field research – that will be presented in the subsequent pages – it can be scrutinized that the determining factors in the agriculture sector of the central part of the Caliphate after the 1850s were shaped by new strategies of land use and intrinsic interdependencies among the Emirates in the Caliphate, while the old cultivation customs have rather existed.

This above-mentioned traditional and pervasive way of cultivation in the central part of the Caliphate, as Ibrahim observed in his field study, was based on the *gandun gida* (family farm) system.[105] Lovejoy describes this system as a simple activity that every member of the family – also if there were, the enslaved people – worked alongside and together.[106] However, the size of these family farms varied greatly, as it was heavily contingent on the number of family members and enslaved people. For instance, in one of the most detailed oral records concerning the late period of the Sokoto Caliphate, Baba of Karo, who was a member of a relatively rich

[104] There is no record so far concerning to prevent such cases that all heirs accept one of them as the principal owner of the household instead of dividing it, althout legeally it must be splitted.
[105] Cf. Abubakar Zaria Ibrahim, "The Economy of Pre Colonial Hausa Settlement Shika Area in Perspective," *Journal of African Languages (HARSHE)*, No. 7 (2013): 223–24.
[106] Cf. Paul E. Lovejoy, *Jihad in West Africa During the Revolution Age* (Ohio and Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 114.

family, furnishes rather concrete information being pertinent to the size of her family farm: "My grandfather Dara [in the 1880s around Kano] had four wives and twenty-three children, and he had as many as one hundred and thirty slaves; his younger brother Maidamishi had forty slaves. The slaves lived in their part of the hamlet (we call such hamlet of slaves rinji), and the slaves worked on the farm while their wives made porridge for them to eat."[107] These traditional family farms sometimes could be big enough, so that their size could be comparable to a plantation enterprise analyzed in the subsequent pages. But its fundamental characteristic relying on the co-work of all family members distinguishes it from other sectors.

In addition, the labor of enslaved people had special characteristics on these family farms. Take an example, various oral records declare that the enslaved people had their plots (*gayauna*) on the farmland of the family and were allowed to work there during some parts of the day.[108] Field studies also confirm this phenomenon for the different regions of the Caliphate's central part.[109] Baba of Karo explains this custom and its daily process as follows:

> Each slave had his own farming land… In the early morning the slaves and their sons would go to their own farms. They came back and went to the master's farm, the gandu fields… In the morning the slaves ate in their own compounds. At midday… [and] at the evening they all came to the front of our house and ate the gandu food of master's house… Whatever the slaves grew on their own farms-plots was their own, they took it to market to sell and bought gowns… The slaves didn't give their master and of their own farm produce.[110]

Hogendorn further says that these plots were exempted from tax – while all agricultural lands, depending on the production on them, were attached to a general tax called *kudin kasa* (Hausa) or *ḫarāǧ* (Arabic) – or any kind of payment to the owner, i.e., an enslaved person did not pay rent for them.[111] For Adamu this opportunity to acquire their goods from these plots and relatively broad tolerance – at least in Sokoto and Birnin Kebbi – made the enslaved people loyal to the owner not by violence but by personal interest, so that when slavery was abolished

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[107] Mary F. Smith, *Baba of Karo*: *A Woman of the Muslim Hausa* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1981), 38.
[108] See: Muhammadu Rabi'u, interview by Yusufu Yunusa, July 13, 1975, Fanisau; Testimonies; for another see: Emir of Bagirmi, interview by Yusufu Yunusa, August 23, 1975, Kura District; Testimonies; Yunusa's oral data collection is available in the archive of Tubman Institute of York University in Toronto.
[109] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 500; Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano c. 1894-1960," 27; Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 99; Jan S. Hogendorn, "The Economics of Slave Use on Two "Plantations" in the Zaria Emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol. 10, no. 3 (1977): 374.
[110] Mary F. Smith, *Baba of Karo*, 41–42.
[111] Cf. Jan S. Hogendorn, "The Economics of Slave Use on Two "Plantations" in the Zaria Emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol. 10, no. 3 (1977): 375; In the literature only Bill Freund remarks that the enslaved people had to pay tax as well as rent for these plots, however, available oral records confirm Hogendorn's argument. For Freund argument cf. Bill Freund, *Capital and Labor in the Nigerian Tin Mines* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), 11.

after the British invasion, many enslaved people preferred to stay with their old owners, but in this time legally in equal partnership relations.[112] However, Salau detects in this tradition deeper and more complex connections and interests than simple tolerance:

> Although slaves were generally happy to have use of these plots for their own purposes, masters had their own reasons for assigning them, namely in order to: 1) divert slaves' attention from their oppressed condition; 2) promote individualism in slaves, so as to undermine cooperation between them; 3) reduce the masters' expenditures, particularly during the dry season when relatively limited income often made it difficult for masters to support their slaves, and 4) allow slave to contribute to their own food requirements and earn resources to improve their standard of living, thereby allowing masters to transfer the costs of slave production onto the slaves themselves.[113]

These profound and elaborative remarks of Salau glosses the economic background of the use of the labor of enslaved people being connected to the understanding of governmentality[114], while the utilization of the labor of enslaved people owns its religious and political backgrounds as well.[115] By using the strategy of governmentality, slave owners have not to practice direct and absolute authority on the enslaved people by using violence, but they present themselves in the manner of a father who grants controlled freedom to the enslaved people. In this way, the enslaved people deliberately ignore the chance of escaping to ensure their relatively better conditions and become more loyal to the owner with the hope that if the owner appreciates their attitudes, they can get better conditions. Thus, the enslaved people willingly exercised the authority of the owner in their own life, i.e., they voluntarily followed the rules of the owner.

This governmentality feature is particularly observable and decisive in the examples of slave villages. There were several slave villages in the central part of the Caliphate, in which the enslaved people were working almost independently from their owners differently from the

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[112] Cf. Mahdi Adamu, "Slavery and Slave Trade in Sokoto and Kebbi States," in J. F. Ade Ajayi; Okon Uya, *Slavery and Slave Trade in Nigeria*, 21; although this factor was pronounced in the phenomenon in which the enslaved people preferred to stay with their old owner, that was not the only reason, as Adamu suggested. This is because, as in the chapter of Adamawa will be demonstrated, almost all enslaved people were deported from very far regions that it was almost impossible to find the way to return to their homelands after many years. In addition, they had not enough economic condition to take a risk for this sort of dangerous journey and unsecure future.

[113] Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 99.

[114] I am using this concept in the sense of Foucault's conceptual analysis rather than his historical analysis, i.e., my intention for this concept is as follows: "… avoir à l'égard des habitants, des richesses, de la conduite de tous et de chacun une forme de surveillance, de contrôle non moins attentive que celle du père de famille sur la maisonnée et ses biens." Michel Foucault, "La Gouvernmentalité," in *Dits Et Écrits, 1954-1988: Tome III: 1976-1979*, ed. Daniel Defert & François Ewald (Paris: Edition Gallimard - NRF, 1994), 624.

[115] I analyzed these backgrounds in one of my unpublished seminar papers, which was delivered for the seminar of "Ausbreitung und Formen des Islam in Afrika" at the University of Bayreuth on October 19, 2020. It is accessible in the following online link:
https://www.academia.edu/49313424/Slavery_in_the_Central_Region_of_the_Sokoto_Caliphate (last access 20.06.2021)

communal working characteristic of the family farms.[116] This type of labor of enslaved people unhampered by the direct authority of the owner seems suitable with the fact that no oral or traveler accounts have been found yet witnessing a material obstacle to prevent the enslaved people from escape, such as chain, fence, or camp organization in these farms and villages. Creating economic conditions to intercept for the enslaved people from taking a chance to escape was, in light of the existing sources, quite feasible and efficient in the central part of the Caliphate.[117] Besides, this governmentality characteristic put the exploitation of the enslaved people on strict limits, at least at the relatively big farms. The owners knew that if the conditions became unbearable for the enslaved people, the option of escape was always present. However, the farm owners did already not require intensive labor processes that may need heavy exploitation of the labor of enslaved people, since the agricultural production was fragmented and seasonal due to climatic conditions.[118] In this respect, this governmentality strategy in the use of the labor of enslaved people, in most cases, created relatively bearable conditions for enslaved people and relatively convenient affairs for owners.

Differently from these cultivation methods tied to slavery, other field research indicates that the slave ownership was not applicable for every farmer, since getting enslaved people depended on the existence of a slave market in the close areas – and of course the price of the enslaved people – as well as the economic conditions of the families. In these cases, various labor strategies arose. For instance, Bello mentions a crop sharing system named *kasa mu raba*, in which some commoners would work on the land of some owners who had an urgent need for labor and were getting a share from the harvest.[119] Regarding another strategy, Salau states that: "Individual farmers or small holders who faced temporary labor problems could mobilize extra-family labor known as *gayya*. The farmer who called a *gayya* often provided food, gifts, and the like to community members who showed up to help. Ideally, since *gayya* was based on

[116] Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 84.

[117] However, the slave owners also used several other strategies to prevent the enslaved people from escaping. For instance, "a slave, if acquired young enough, might be given the tattoo marks [on his face] of his master's people." Alan G. B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher, *Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa*: *The Institution in Saharan and Sudanic Africa and the Trans-Saharan Trade* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1970), 84; despite the pervasive governmentality feature of the use of the labor of enslaved people, Last accentuates that there were still many particular cases that if enslaved people does not follow the rules of the owner well or tries to escape, then they might have faced very cruel punishments as well as death. Cf. Murray Last, "Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital," 4–5.

[118] This feature of the cultivation in the central part of the Caliphate made farther possible some different agreement types between enslaved people and owners, as it will be analyzed ensuing chapter.

[119] Cf. Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano c. 1894-1960," 28.

mutual aid or reciprocal labor exchange, both rich and poor commoners were expected to participate."[120]

What is more, Mahadi mentions that peculiarly after the 1850s the central part of the Caliphate experienced a salient population increase that not only catalyzed the agricultural sector to produce more products but further sparked the prominent augmentation of wage labor.[121] Unfortunately, the proportion of diverse laborers in the central part of the Caliphate remains so far unexplored because of insufficient data. The heterogenous character of the Caliphate further makes it difficult to generalize the local observations.

Nevertheless, as alike Pritchett states, the intersection of the population growth in the central part of the Caliphate after the 1850s with the development of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate and its slave-raiding policy, which generated the huge amount of enslaved people, fostered a substantial transformation in the land usage called 'plantation system' by scholars.[122] Although some fragmented military operations against the people who inhabited the Ningi area created the observable number of enslaved people for some emirates such as Kano, Bauchi (Yakuba), and Zazzau (Zaria), these activities were triggered by security problems rather than slave-raiding expeditions.[123] Most of the time, the expenditures of military campaigns were higher than the value of captured people, i.e., the acquisition of enslaved people did not produce a surplus for the economy of the Caliphate's central part.[124] Apart from these historical details, the exportation of enslaved people of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate lasted for the entire second half of the 19th century. Their supply of enslaved people also had a huge surplus impact on the economy of the central part of the Caliphate.

Aside from this historical intersection in the development of inter-emirate relationships, Last scrutinizes a substantial background for the thriving plantation sector:

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[120] Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 117.

[121] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 483–84.

[122] Cf. Willis Pritchett, "Slavery and the Economy of Kano Emirate, 1810-1903" (MA Thesis, Southern Connecticut State University, 1990), 39; Salau discloses that the occurrence of plantation system in the central part of the Caliphate goes till the first years of the Caliphate, but until the 1850s this development was confined to very small numbers and the very central cities such as only Sokoto and Kano. Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 57.

[123] For instance, Patton observes how the Caliphate desired peace than the war against this area, i.e., slave gaining was not the primary interest. Cf. Adell Patton, "An Islamic Frontier Polity," 207.

[124] Because, as Patton enunciates in his field research concerning Ningi area, the political developments in the area as well as mountainous conditions were against the Sokoto Caliphate after the 1850s. Cf. Adell Patton, "An Islamic Frontier Polity," 202 s

> […] the caliphate lacked the sort of monopolies other states had, over gold or salt mines for example, or over specific crops like kola or oil palms; it lacked, too, a monopoly over licenses to trade, over transport, over a sole 'port of entry'. It lacked, I suggest, even a monopoly of force. If this general analysis of the caliphate's economy - characterized by a low degree of exploitation and control - is correct, then it suggests […] [t]he economic foundation for this expansion [after the 1850s] lay in the agricultural infrastructure built up under the caliphate. It was made possible by a considerable investment in labor, initially largely imported in the form of captives.[125]

Put differently, as distinguished from the historical overlap in the inter-emirate relationships, an additional intersection occurred between the sole monopolization of the Emirs on the slave market and their agricultural interests. As Suleiman observes in his field research in the Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate, while the agrarian sector prevailed as a common occupation for all different social groups from the enslaved people and commoners to the rulers, the monopoly over the slave market belonged entirely to the ruler groups.[126] Many scholars specifically emphasize that although some merchants traded enslaved people between the cities and markets, major acquisitions of enslaved people and mobilizing activities were performed under the patronage of the Emirs and Caliphs. In this way, they practiced undisputable control not only over the slave market but also over the investment enterprises by employing these enslaved people, especially in the agrarian sector.[127]

Different field studies from Kano and Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate likewise clearly demonstrate how after the 1850s the Emirs stood out as superior economic agents by using their monopolization on slavery. Salau, for instance, illustrates how in the late 1840s Ibrahim Dabo (1819-1846), the Emir of Kano, realized this advantage and began to invest agrarian sector.[128] Achi similarly observers that in the late 1850s Emir Mamman Sani (1846-1860) from Zaria was already the richest economic actor in the whole Zazzau (Zaria) Emirate.[129]

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[125] Murray Last, "The Sokoto Caliphate and Borno," in *General History of Africa: Africa in the Nineteenth Century Until the 1880s*, ed. J. F. Ade Ajayi, volume VI (Paris: UNESCO, 1989), 580.

[126] Cf. Usman Suleiman, "A History of Birnin Zaria from 1350-1902" (MA Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, April, 2007), 202; in addition, Mahadi expresses that the interest of the ruler groups in the agrarian sectors was very ancient that existed even before the Sokoto Caliphate. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 445; an old Hausa proverb also supports Mahadi's remarks: ""*Sana'a ta fi dukiyar gado*": Having an occupation is better than to inherit wealth." See: Roy C. Abraham, *Dictionary of the Hausa Language* (London: University of London Press, 1962), 775.

[127] Cf. Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 149; Lamont Dehaven King, "State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria," 353; Murray Last, "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-1968," 348.

[128] Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, "Slave Trading in Kano Emirate," in Olatunji Ojo; Nadine Hunt, *Slavery in Africa and the Caribbiean*, 41.

[129] Cf. Bala Achi, "The Gandu System in the Economy of Hausaland," *Nigeria Magazine* Vol. 57, 3-4 (1989): 54; but of course, his wealth was not his own property. As already mentioned earlier, legally speaking, this wealth owned by the emirate as institute.

An important fact in this historical transformation is that the Emirs of the central part of the Caliphate did not tend to canalize their auspices on the control of slavery into the exportation of enslaved people but were inclined to settle them into the big plantations. As a possible reason for that, Meek underlines the worldview of the rulers that the Emirs in the central part of the Caliphate did not see their slaves as a means of "capital", but labor.[130] More strictly, this understanding was so common that the value of the exportation of enslaved people in the central part of the Caliphate was almost unnoticeable compared to the value of the agricultural products that were exchanged in the local markets.[131]

Consequently, these historical and political overlaps, it seems, established the chief impulse for the development of the plantation sector on a large scale. But, due to these intersections, Salau accentuates that this sector was heavily dominated by the groups of rulers, and this special characteristic caused two crucial effects: "The Sokoto caliphate evidence indicates that most plantation were created by political authority and not by individual force; that the state prevented the collapse of the plantation system and, in turn, prevented the emergence of serfdom."[132]

While the "prevented emergence of serfdom" in the Caliphate is a conceptual debate that lies beyond this work, an aspect of this interpretation can be discussed, i.e., a decisive constraint on the development of the private sector. When viewed from this perspective, it can be asserted that these two phenomena – precluded collapse of the plantation system and restrained development of private sector – had additional specific historical meanings.

Regarding the first remark, while there was a thriving plantation sector in the central part of the Caliphate after the 1850s, to mention that the attendance of the ruling groups also averted the complete decline of this sector can be considered a paradox. But in fact, this systematic development was always threatened by natural forces. In 1856, Barth for example observed in his journey a pervasive famine in the central Caliphate.[133] Baikie and Kirk also witnessed another famine in 1867.[134] However, these external observations carry potential problems concerning their different worldviews, engendered by the differing understandings of the

[130] Cf. C. K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria*: *Volume I* (Oxford: Frank Cass and Co. LTD., 1971), 289–93.
[131] Cf. E. A. Ayandele, "Observations on Some Social and Economic Aspects of Slavery in Pre-Colonial Northern Nigeria," *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies* Vol. IX, no. 3 (1967): 331; Murray Last, "The Sokoto Caliphate and Borno," 580.
[132] Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 28.
[133] See: Heinrich Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, 445.
[134] See: W. Baikie and J. Kirk, "Notes of a Journey from Bida in Nupe, to Kano in Haussa, Performed in 1862," *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 37 (1867): 96

famine by these European travelers and the people who inhabited the Caliphate. In this respect, an existing collection of oral records related to Kano imparts many exact years of damaging famines to check these dates as well as to add details. Especially the custom of naming the famines renders it easier for the people to recall them. Dated in this way, the famines are known till the 1840s in the oral record. According to this collection, the famines in the central part of the Caliphate were as followed: the famine of *Dawara* in 1847, *Banga Banga* famine in 1856 – this date confirms the observation of Barth –, famine *Dogua* in 1863, famine *Sandi* in 1873, famine *Kachimi* in 1876, famine *Maidudu* in 1889, and one unnamed famine in 1891.[135]

Differing from these wide-affecting famines that were caused by the natural forces, as German traveler Paul Staudinger witnessed in 1886, in some cases big military operations were leading to famines as well, but with a more local impact: "[our resident companion] who feared every kind of war or fight, warned the farmer against calling out the sultan's soldiers, for now the country had full corn stores which could feed hundreds or even thousands of strangers. But the enormous armies of the sultan would consume everything so that no corn would remain for seed and the countryside would be afflicted by famine for many years."[136]

While the family farms were more fragile during pervasive famines, the plantation sector had the advantage to become resilient.[137] Ferguson remarks that these plantations were the only places in the time of famines that people demanded food in order to survive.[138] Apart from that, these plantations had additional predominancy compared to family farms in normal times, although some of these farms could be as big as a plantation area. Various oral records and field research strictly highlight that different from the monopoly on the labor of enslaved people, the ruler-owner of these plantations could demand and employ *corvée* labor (*aikin gayya*), which was not accessible for private plantation owners or family farms.[139] Because of that, many private farm owners began to be interested in possessing cattle herd instead of setting up farms,

[135] Paul E. Lovejoy, Abdullahi Mahadi, and Mansur Ibrahim Mukhtar, "C.L. Temple's 'Notes on the History of Kano' [1909]: A Lost Chronicle on Political Office," *Sudanic Africa* Vol. 4, 7-76 (1993): 66.
[136] Paul Staudinger, *In the Heart of the Hausa States,* Volume I (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1990), 304.
[137] Apart from their size and soil advantages – because most times the Emirs had power to confiscate best fertilized lands for the official plantations, the oral narratives also mention that they had the well-prepared organization technics and governance by learning from the intellectual sources concerning the cultivation. See: Muhammadu Rabi'u, interview by Yusufu Yunusa, July 13, 1975, Fanisau; Testimonies.
[138] Cf. Douglas E. Ferguson, "Nineteenth Century Hausaland Being a Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy, and Society of His People" (PhD Dissertation, UCLA, 1973), 61.
[139] Cf. Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano c. 1894-1960," 22; Muhammadu Rabi'u, interview by Yusufu Yunusa; Ibrahim M. Jumare, "Land Tenure in the Sokoto Sultanate of Nigeria" (PhD Dissertation, York University, 1995), 85.

since the operations in this occupation were not labor-intensive, i.e., they did not need supplementary labor of enslaved people which was under the monopoly of the ruler groups.[140]

Although it is of utmost difficulty to know the exact percentage of diverse labor uses in the plantation sector, the direct historical connection between the growing plantation production and the slavery system in the inter-emirate level yields a tenable argument that slavery was substantial for the plantation sector, if not for entire agrarian sector.[141] From this standpoint, Salau enunciates the political-economic transformation of slavery in the central part of the Caliphate as follows:

> 1) [...] political factors shaped the creation of slavery since the state played a key role in recruiting slave labor, in preventing slave exit from society, and in fostering slave discipline; 2) [...] slavery was partly created by social needs since some plantations slaves often provided sexual and other non-economic services, and since cultural factors are linked to enslavement and slave treatment; and 3) [...] slaves were not always passive actors, and it was the agency, including the recalcitrance, of many slaves that compelled many masters to adopt coercive and other labor control strategies to help create and sustain the caliphate plantation order.[142]

Concerning the third remark, governmentality strategies in the use of the labor of enslaved people were chiefly visible in the plantation sector. Specifically, in the case of the absence of the owners, some enslaved people were assigned bailiff (*bara*) to represent the owner and to control the ordinary functions of the plantation.[143] Nevertheless, when the owners were present on their land, no members of the owner's family worked in the plantation, significantly different from the family farming. Thus, they needed a well-organized sub-bailiff system to operate the huge lands and crowded labor, which similarly enslaved people were appointed for that.

To summarize these inquiries that pertain to cultivating the land in the central part of the Caliphate after the 1850s, it can be suggested that apart from the enduring cultivation tradition that was led in the family farms, the owners had many management strategies to mitigate the difficulties regarding labor and climate. Thus, some governmentality implications in the labor

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[140] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 513.

[141] In this respect, the remark that declares the slavery as an intrinsic part of all Caliphate's political economy, which was supported by some scholars, seems not entirely correct; more strictly, the slavery was crucial for the plantation sector rather than all economy. For this problematic interpretation, see: Kenneth Carlston, *Social Theory and African Tribal Organization*: *The Developments of Socio-Legal Theory* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968), 155; S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium*: *The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 115; M. G. Smith, *The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria*: *A Report to the Colonial Social Science Research Council* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1955), 106.

[142] Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 19.

[143] Cf. Ibrahim Hamza, "Slavery and Plantation Society at Dorayi in Kano Emirate," 125; besides, Mahadi expresses that the conditions of these slave bailiffs were much better than many free commoners, so that a number of free people endeavored to become a bailiff of an owner at the cost of losing their freedom. Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 480.

of enslaved people emerged even before the observable development of the plantation sector based on well-organized operations in cultivation. The plantation sector, on the other hand, also formed its different governmentality strategies. In existing sources, it is further argued that the historical development of the plantation sector, which was vital for the central part of the Caliphate for survival in the times of famine as well as for the economic accretion, was strongly linked to the emergence of inter-emirate relationships. Especially the rise of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate and the integration of its exportation of enslaved people into the central markets were principal in this development. However, the substantial character of the central emirates being related to the common interest for the agricultural production was rather an autonomous drive in the growth of the plantation sector.

2.2- Intertwined Growth in the Craft Sectors and Trade

The craft sectors and trade in the central part of the Caliphate had always a central role concerning the expectation for a thriving economy. In the earlier times of the Caliphate, for instance, protecting trade and reviving the craft sector were the principal reasons to erect *ribāṭ*.[144] With the second half of the 19th century, these attempts were underpinned by several historical transformations in the central part of the Caliphate. Some of these developments, analyzed in the former chapter, were the expanding plantation sector, the integration of the slave trade purveyed by the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, and the implementation of the Mālikī inheritance system. Particularly for the craft sectors, augmentation of wage laborers as a result of the population increases after the 1850s seems significant. However, before analyzing these impacts regarding the craft sector and trade, a unique process in the central part of the Caliphate, that gained importance in the historical development of craft sectors must be clarified: *murgu*.

Bargery's dictionary explains it as a "[p]ayment made by a slave in lieu of service."[145] But these services were not conducted for *their*[146] owners. For instance, British traveler Charles H. Robinson observed this process in the 1890s as follows: "If, as not infrequently happens, a master has no work for his slaves to do, it is customary for him to turn them adrift to provide

[144] Cf. John E. Philips, "Slavery on Two Ribat in Kano and Sokoto," in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, 111.
[145] George P. Bargery, "On-line Bargery Hausa-Englich Dictionary," The title of "saran tuji".
[146] Oral records state that also female enslaved people could make *murgu* agreement with the owner; for example see: Malam Bawa, interview by Yusufu Yunusa, July 31, 1975, Kano; Testimonies.

for themselves; in this case they have to pay a sort of monthly tax to their master..."[147] Although some scholars use the concept of "tax" to describe *murgu* as Robinson did, this payment was between the enslaved person and owner, i.e., this word is fairly misleading to disclose this custom.[148] Furthermore, Salau stresses that this fee was utterly tax exempted.[149]

The enslaved people under the *murgu* agreement with their owners faced fairly the same conditions in the labor market such as their free counterparts, as German traveler Gustav Nachtigal noticed in the 1870s.[150] After they completed their work for their owner, they could work in additional occupations like free people, and gain money as free people while paying their *murgu* to the owner. According to oral sources, this possibility to earn for their basic needs[151] and accumulate wealth made this custom a common way for the enslaved people to acquire their freedom.[152] However, Lovejey enunciates that this process had a different meaning than tolerance or work deficiency for the owners: "*Murgu* appears to have reflected a lenient form of slavery, but the price exacted for emancipation simply perpetuated the system by providing the master with the means to purchase new slaves. In short, *murgu* was a good investment. By freeing one slave, a master could acquire another and still retain the services of the freedman."[153] In addition, Lovejoy sees a governmentality strategy in this custom, since only very loyal enslaved people were granted this kind of agreement. Furthermore, after they gained their freedom, they became very qualified wage laborers for their former owners.[154] Although the question concerning the origin of this custom is a contested issue, its

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[147] C. H. Robinson, *Hausaland or Fifteen Hundred Miles Through the Central Soudan* (London: Sampson Low, Martson and Co. LTD., 1897), 132.

[148] For this problematic usage, cf. Douglas E. Ferguson, "Nineteenth Century Hausaland Being a Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy, and Society of His People," 230; Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 494.

[149] Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 104; however, Yunusa farther emphasizes that this agreement was not always in favor of enslaved people, because sometimes they could not gain so much in the labor market, while they still had to pay their fee to the owner. Cf. Yusufu Yunusa, "Slavery in Nineteenth Century Kano" (BA Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1976), 33–34.

[150] See: Gustav Nachtigal, *Saharâ Und Sûdân*: *Ergebnisse Sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika,* Vol. I (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung & Verlagshandlung Paul Parey, 1879), 672; but they had an additional disadvantage as well. Because they had to pay their fee to the owners as distinguished from the free commoner people.

[151] Oral records express that during the time that the enslaved people work in their occupation for *murgu*, they could not get food from the owner anymore, i.e., they had to gain first their basic needs such as food from their *murgu* work. See: Malama Hauwa, interview by Yusufu Yunusa, July 11, 1975, Kano; Testimonies.

[152] See: Idrisu Danmaisoro, interview by Yusufu Yunusa, August 7, 1975, Kano; Testimonies.

[153] Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery, Commerce and Production* (Trenton, Asmara: Africa World Press, 2005), 45; in addition, although it is peculiarly arduous to know the exact amount of *murgu*, Hill claims that in some cases the owners calculated the monthly percentage of *murgu*, as at least twice than the market value of an enslaved person. Cf. Polly Hill, "From Slavery to Freedom: The Case of Farm-Slavery in Nigerian Hausaland," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 18, no. 3 (1976): 399

[154] Cf. Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery, Commerce and Production* (Trenton, Asmara: Africa World Press, 2005), 46.

governmentality characteristic demonstrates a convenient dynamic together with other practices of governmentality in the central part of the Caliphate.[155]

As connected to the additional labor characteristic of *murgu*, the pervasiveness of this custom was chiefly restricted because it depended on the demand of the labor market. Hogendorn states that: "Murgu was little known at Biye and Hanwa because, according to informants, this practice was common only where the master did not want to farm the gandu lands. At neither place were slaves remembered as having ransomed themselves in this way. Murgu was probably far more common in locations such as Kano, where opportunities for craft and industry were more plentiful."[156] In other words, the prevailing application of *murgu* agreements was fundamentally tied to the development of the craft sector, and in turn, the application of these agreements was sparking the accretion in the craft sector by providing extra labor.[157]

Figure 3: Muslim Hausa women in the vicinity of Zaria in 1909. Due to the indirect rule of the British governor, the Mālikī School of Law was still valid in those years. Practicality of the traditional clothes were potentially favorable than to cover whole body, and this practice was possibly condoned by the rulers.

Regarding another factor underpinning the development of the craft sector, Shea underlies the implementation of the Mālikī School of Law, particularly in the case of dressing.[158] As Mālik ibn Anas and Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī clearly explained, there were strict rules

[155] For instance, Lovejoy utters that this custom was originally not connected with the implementation of the Mālikī School of Law, i.e., it was part of customary law in the Hausaland.Cf. Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery, Commerce and Production*, 213; however, although the concept is not directly mentioned in the principal sources of the Maliki School, the practices of it were presumably known. Mālik ibn Anas, for example, declares in his *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ* that all enslaved people can obtain wealth, furthermore, they can likewise get a loan from the free people. See: Mālik ibn Anas ibn Anas, *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ*, 31.2; similarly Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī expresses in *Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya* the possibility of acquiring property of enslaved people. See: Ibn Abi Zayd Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, *Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya*, 34.20b; without any agreement such as *murgu*, these practices would be nearly impossible.

[156] Jan S. Hogendorn, "The Economics of Slave Use on Two "Plantations" in the Zaria Emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate," 382.

[157] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 582; Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery, Commerce and Production*, 214.

[158] Cf. Philip J. Shea, "Big Is Sometimes Best: The Sokoto Caliphate and Economic Advantage of Size in the Textile Industry," *African Economic History*, No. 34 (2006): 6–7.

referring to dressing in the Mālikī School of Law, and presumably one of the most decisive of these rules was that women had to cover their whole body carefully.[159] In this respect, it seems plausible to expect an effect in the craft sector, especially in cloth production. However, the question concerning the extent of this rule's application is utterly unexplored so far. For instance, several photographs (for one of them see *Figure 3*) that were made by the journalists of the French newspaper *La Dépêche: coloniale illustrée* in Zaria, i.e., in the relatively central city and emirate, show that the implementation of this rule might not have been as pervasive as expected.

However, peculiarly in cloth production, the biggest sector was in Kano being connected to the thriving plantation sector after the 1850s.[160] For instance, Ferguson strictly highlights the distinguishable increase in the cotton and indigo productions in the plantation sector during the second half of the 19th century.[161] Of course, the majority of the plantations were held by the groups of rulers, they were exempted from tax in this aspect. But in the cases of demand for cotton could not be supplied by these plantations, as Mahadi illustrates some additional tax policies were arising: "[…] in order to encourage production of industrial crops, such as cotton, Emir Abdullahi (1855-1882) [in Kano] introduced a radical policy which involved the exemption of key industrial crops, notably cotton, from taxation."[162] In addition to these raw material supply policies, Shea expresses that the cloth sector had many privileges in the central part of the Caliphate, such as "special treatment, low taxes, excellent patronage, and other favors."[163]

The cloth production was strongly linked to the dyeing sector as well, Mahadi especially mentions the high reputation of Kano's indigos in Central Sudan.[164] Specifically, with the low tax policy on the dyeing sector, the size of the dye production was distinguishable in the central cities such as Kano, Zaria, and Katsina to supply cloth production. Shea claims that after the 1850s there were almost 50.000 dyers who utilized nearly 15.000 dye pits in Kano.[165]

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[159] See: Mālik ibn Anas ibn Anas, *Al-Mūwaṭṭaʾ*, 48.4; Ibn Abi Zayd Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, *Al-Risālat Al-Fiqhīya*, 41.5a.

[160] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 626.

[161] Cf. Douglas E. Ferguson, "Nineteenth Century Hausaland Being a Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy, and Society of His People," 80.

[162] Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 495.

[163] Philip J. Shea, "Big Is Sometimes Best: The Sokoto Caliphate and Economic Advantage of Size in the Textile Industry," *African Economic History*, No. 34 (2006): 16.

[164] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 546.

[165] Cf. Philip J. Shea, "The Development of an Export-Oriented Dyed Cloth Industry in Kano Emirate in the Nineteenth Century" (PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975), 162–63.



Figure 4: Usage of cloth as currency in West Africa.

Aside from the supportive factors for cloth production such as tax policies, raw material production, and labor supply, this extensive production was indispensably linked to the massive demand for cloth. To elucidate this enormous demand, peculiarly three phenomena stand out. The first is a prevailing tradition being related to the usage of cloth as currency. As Jonhson exhibits in his map (*Figure 4*), in the easter part of the Caliphate – more strictly, the Bauchi (Yakuba), Muri, Gombe, and Adamawa (Fombina) Emirates – cloth was a common means of exchange. Therefore, their demand for cloth was not only depending on the private utilization but alike the conduction feature of it in terms of economic transaction triggering the immense cloth trade between the Eastern and the Western parts of the Sahel Zone.

The second factor in this decisive demand was the presumably symbolic meaning of cloth. As several travelers and journalists realized in their visit to the Sokoto Caliphate, the cloth was one of the crucial indicators concerning the social status: take an example, three photographs that made by these journalists and travelers from the late period of the Caliphate demonstrates the differences between the cloths (*Figure 5*).

Figure 5: People from different social status in the Caliphate. On the left, a noble man from Bida in 1896, in the middle a dye pot owner in Kano in 1896, and on the left two commoners from Kano in 1909. In other word, cloth was a direct sign to determine the status of people.

From this standpoint, it can be argued that the demand for cloth was not only shaped by the basic needs of people but through the expectation of social norms alike.

Concerning the last factor for extensive demand, the cloth production with the intensive involvement of the dyeing sector was notably export-oriented, i.e., an external demand likewise existed, a process requiring a well-established and dense trade system.[166] Barth for example observed the size of the cloth production and its connection with the trade with great admiration at the end of the 1850s:

> The great advantage of Kano is, that commerce and manufactures go hand in hand, and that almost every family has its share in them. There is really something grand in this kind of industry, which spreads to the north as far as Murzak, Ghat, and Tripoli; to the west, not only to Timbuktu, but in some degree even as far as the shores of the Atlantic, the very inhabitants of Arguin, dressing in the cloth woven and dyed in Kano; to the east, all over Bornu […][167]

However, not all trade activities in exportation were restricted to cloth, the grain exportation in the central part of the Caliphate was also chiefly distinguishable.[168] In this respect, it can be assumed that these intensive trade activities would not have been possible without the plantation sector and its direct contribution as well as the raw material supply for the cloth and dyeing sectors thanks to the dense trade integrations.

Trading activities, on the other hand, had different functions and dynamics related to their distance and destinations. According to Suleiman's remarks, for instance, the chief feature of the internal trade, i.e., the inter-emirates trade between the Emirates in the central part of the Caliphate, was determined by competitive raw material supply.[169] Mahadi likewise observes an obvious case concerning this characteristic:

> In spite of the large quantities of cotton which was produced in Kano, this commodity continued to from a very important part of Kano's imports, especially from Zazzau, Katsina, and Zamfara. The explanation for this [...] is essentially economic. Since each state or region would concentrate upon its comparative advantage, an area of high population density like Kano could produce labour intensive goods more economically.[170]

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[166] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 579.

[167] Heinrich Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa,* Volume I (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1857), 511.

[168] Cf. Bala Achi, "The Gandu System in the Economy of Hausaland," 53; Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 541.

[169] Cf. Usman Suleiman, "A History of Birnin Zaria from 1350-1902," 210; although Suleiman does not circumscribe his observation with the central part of the Caliphate, in fact, the roles of Bida (Nupe) – Ilorion Emirates and Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate were entirely different in the trade relations with the other Emirates. They were not part of the raw material exchanging system. They supplied, as it will be demonstrated subseqeunt chapters, enslaved people, and weapon.

[170] Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 543.

This competitive feature of the internal trade was a conspicuous indicator of the intensive market integration between the Emirates of the central part of the Caliphate after the 1850s. Nevertheless, this market integration relied on the decisive development of the plantation sector in the central emirates, which was indispensably contingent on the supply of enslaved people of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate to produce a surplus.

In the contrast to these features of the internal trade, in the external or long-distance trade, a significant distinction is observable between the northern direction to Sahara and the southern direction to the Atlantic Ocean. However, the trade through the southern Sahara belt, i.e., the western and eastern regions of the Caliphate, was largely dominated by cloth exportation.[171]

Concerning the northern Sahara trade, the chief goods were "salt, slaves, ostrich feathers, tanned skins, and ivory..." according to Lovejoy.[172] Among these goods, salt was historically coming from northern Sahara, while others were coming from the Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu. The principal source of enslaved people, ivory, and ostrich feathers, on the other hand, was the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate.[173] The key activities of the Emirates in the central part of the Caliphate were salt importation and exportation of the tanned skins. For instance, the journalists of *La Dépêche: coloniale illustrée* encountered an Arab merchant in Kano in 1909 – i.e., closely after the dissolution of the Sokoto Caliphate – who purchased tanned skins and ostrich feathers before his departure to Tunis (*Figure 6*).


UN MARCHAND ARABE, ORIGINAIRE DE TUNIS, ÉTABLI A KANO,
PEAUX DE FILALIS ET PLUMES D'AUTRUCHE

Figure 6: A photograph of an Arab merchant, with a short explanation of the journalist in 1909. This picture clearly approves the statement of Lovejoy concerning the products in the Saharan trade.

[171] As it will be manifested before, because of the use of cloth as currency.
[172] Paul E. Lovejoy, "Commercial Sectors in the Economy of the Nineteenth-Century Sudan: The Trans-Saharan Trade and the Desert-Side Salt Trade," *African Economic History* Vol. 13 (1984): 110.
[173] For example, see: Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*: *Bericht Über Die Expedition Des Deutschen Kamerun-Komitees in Den Jahren 1893/94* (Berlin: Geographische Verlagshandlung Dietrich Reimer, 1895), 480-481.

Although the production of tanned skin in the central part of the Caliphate has not yet been fully explored in all details, the availability of these products for an export-oriented trade implies an advanced sector.[174]

The leading trade centers in this northern trade for the Sokoto Caliphate were, as Tambo denotes, Ghat (in today's Libya, very close to the Algerian border) and Ghadames (in today's Libya, notably near to the intersection of the Algerian and Tunis borders).[175] Besides, since these cities were the principal settlements in the Sahara Desert in the direction for Tunis, the trade routes were mostly target-oriented and rigid.

In the southern trade of the central part of the Caliphate, on the other hand, different functions and characteristics were observable. Firstly, the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were placed in the contact zone between the European merchants and central emirates, while they were maintaining endless wars against the local powers, and that engendered – as will be analyzed in the ensuing chapter – a strongly determined exchange of enslaved people and weapon. These enslaved people have been most transported from the central part of the Caliphate. Differing from these highly conditional trade necessities, further trade relationships existed with utmost variable goods, such as grain and cola nuts, and in the disparate routes.[176] Considering these routes, particularly three trade centers have been mentioned by available sources: while Ferguson is observing the significance of Salaga (in Gonja region of today's Ghana) for Hausa merchants, Bovill notes the intensive trade relations between Kano and Badagari (in today's Nigeria, between Porto-Novo and Lagos).[177] However, in 1904, an officer from the German Colonial Administration in Cameroon also noted that the Hausa merchants from Kano were even reaching Yaoundé (the capital of today's Cameroon) by moving throughout Yola, Tibati, and Yoko.[178]

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[174] However, a possible connection with the extensive cattle herding in the central part of the Caliphate and this sector seems plausible. Regarding the huge extent of cattle herding particularly two factors stand out: historically many Fulani people had already immense cattle herds and as it was before mentioned, the dominancy of the ruling groups in the development of the plantation sector catalyzed many private owners to possess herds after the 1850s.

[175] Cf. David. C. Tambo, "The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol. 9, no. 2 (1976): 207.

[176] For example, Ferguson explains how the merchants decided fortuitously for their routes depending on their various goods and political conditions in the areas. Cf. Douglas E. Ferguson, "Nineteenth Century Hausaland Being a Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy, and Society of His People" (PhD Dissertation, UCLA, 1973), 13.

[177] Cf. E. W. Bovill, *Caravans of the Old Sahara*: *An Introduction to the History of the Western Sudan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 254; Douglas E. Ferguson, "Nineteenth Century Hausaland Being a Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy, and Society of His People," 13.

[178] See: Thierry, Bundes Archive: Aktenzeichen: KA IV Gr. 26 Verwaltungssachen, Archivsignatur: R 1001/4228, 117.

As Bello denotes, these extensive internal and external trade possibilities also pawed the way for the rise "of wealthy merchants (Masu Dukiya) [in the Kano Emirate] who increasingly came to control certain facets of production through making direct credits to cottage producers, ownership of agriculture estates, livestock etc."[179] While craft production and trade were chiefly growing activities in all Emirates in the central part of the Caliphate, specifically the Kano Emirate turned into a hub for massive economic transactions and population growth.[180] Besides, according to an article in *La Dépêche: coloniale illustrée* in 1909, journalists observed that the population of Kano was six times bigger than Zaria, and two times bigger than in Sokoto.[181]

The distinctive economic development of the Kano Emirate as well as the thriving economies of other central emirates, thanks to the comprehensive market integration, became so predominant in Western Sudan that the permanent rival of the Sokoto Caliphate, Bornu, had to concentrate its all activities throughout Fezzan region (in today's central Libya) up to Tripoli.[182] Besides, Candotti notes that "[the] traders and craftsmen [of Bornu] started to emigrate [to the Sokoto Caliphate] and by 1900 most of its textile consumption was contained of imports from the Caliphate."[183]

Consequently, it can be concluded that the number of supplementary factors bolstered the development of the craft sector in the central part of the Caliphate after the 1850s, such as new labor strategies, effective tax policies, and efficient trade availabilities over immense distances. Furthermore, the historical transformations in the Caliphate in the manner of thriving plantation sector and extensive mobility of slave trade facilitated the growth of the craft sectors by providing the raw material. The role and function of trade for these central emirates were various depending on the regional conditions as well as the *triple system* of the Caliphate. While there were requisite trade activities for the enslaved people and weapon mobilities between three different components of the Caliphate, further economic interest-oriented trade activities

[179] Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano c. 1894-1960," 37–38.
[180] For instance, Mahadi mentions that: "Being the most prosperous Emirate in the Caliphate, the Emirs of Kano often made sure that Kano's "tribute" and contributions to the Caliphate were in consonance with its economic status." Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 585–86.
[181] See: *La Dépêche: coloniale illustrée*, September 15, 1909, 216.
[182] For example, after an intensive trade relation and subsequently political affairs between Bornu and Tripoli with the beginning of the 1850s, Ottoman Sultan Abdulmecid I (1823-1861) sent a letter to the Vali in 1854 to inform that as a strategic and economic allied, the merchants from Bornu must be exempted from tax. See: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA); Cevdet Maliye, Nr. 3230, 6 Şaban 1270; furthermore, uninterrupted dense trade relations between two countries for twenty years so well that Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz (1830-1876) sent a letter to the Emir of Bornu in 1871 to declare his pleasure to maintain the trade as it be. See: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA); Irade Dahiliye, Nr. 43982, 15 Safar 1288.
[183] Marisa Candotti, "Cotton Growing and textile production in northern Nigeria: from caliphate to protectorate, c.1804-1914" (PhD Dissertation, University of London, 2015), 128.

were distinguished, particularly within the internal market integration for raw material supply in the central part of the Caliphate. In this respect, it can be asserted that the central part of the Caliphate experienced an intricate development in the agricultural and craft sectors as well as trade activities after the 1850s, partly thanks to its autonomous potentials in form of governmental and governmentality strategies, and partly by its cooperation and interdependence with the other components of the Caliphate.

3- The Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates: Slavery in the War Economy

The Nupe and Ilorin Emirates is the smallest component in the *triple system* of the Caliphate compared to the central Emirates and the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate. However, their particular location has made them unique for the Caliphate in many facets. This specificity has not solely had an impact on trade and military activities, but likewise seriously altered their relationship with their environment. Thus, these Emirates developed an intricate heterogeneity, not only in their distinct parts but further apart from the other Emirates of the Caliphate.



Map 2: The position of the Nupe (Bida) – Ilorin Emirates by reference to the underlined cities (Rabba, Bida, Egga, Shonga, Ilorin, and Lokodja) that were under their direct control. The cities with stars (Sokoto, Katsina [Katsena], Kano, Zaria [Saria], Yakuba [Yakoba], and Yola) were the major cities in the Caliphate.

For instance, Ilorin and Bida were the capitals of the Emirates (*Map 2)*[184]. Rabba was the initial capital of the Nupe (Bida) Emirate, and historically it was a commercial center between the north and south.[185] Egga was one of the most active economic centers in the region. Shonga and Lokodja, however, were important mainly due to European merchants and their settlement

[184] This map is based on C. Perron's map of *Le Bassin du Niger – Afrique Nord-Occidental* from 1887. It was added the stars for some cities to stress their central importance in the Caliphate: Sokoto, Katsena [Katsina], Kano, Saria [Zaria], Yakoba [Bauchi], Yola. Besides, I inserted the town of Shonga, which was not on the original map.

[185] But after rising the city of Bida, it lost its earlier principal role in the economy.

policies that created a complex link between the two Emirates and European agents. In general, the Nupe (Bida) – Ilorin Emirates formed the southwestern frontier of the Caliphate, which tied their foundation role to the expansionist *ğihād* movement. Considering all exclusive features of these two Emirates, the question regarding their critical importance for the rest of the Caliphate arises further. What were the leading driving forces behind the establishment and maintenance of these two Emirates for the Caliphate?

3.1- The Importance of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates for the Caliphate

The Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin emirates played various roles for the Caliphate, notably in terms of politics, economy, political economy, and religion. During its whole existence, but specifically after the 1850s, the Caliphate suffered to get access to guns and gunpowder to strengthen its authority as well as to actualize its expansion policy. The primary reason for this was, as Smaldone examined, the complex historical relationships in Northern Africa:

> [T]he Mediterranean powers, Muslim and European alike, regarded the Sudan as a region for economic exploitation and potential conquest, and, not wanting to increase its capacity for military resistance, restricted the trade in munitions to the south... Bornu's access to firearms was restricted by the unwillingness states of the Turkish authorities in Tripoli to sell guns to the Sudanic states... The northern "gun-frontier" was still intact in 1850.[186]

Despite the emerging the Sanusiyya *ṭarīqa*[187] in Libya after the 1840s and the flourishing the arms trade through their *zāwiya*[188] networks in the eastern Chad Basin, Smaldone notes that this trade remained inaccessible for Bornu and the Sokoto Caliphate until their occupation by the European forces because of the political prevention of the Darfur and Wadai Emirates in central Sudan.[189] Thus, the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were the only opportunities for the Caliphate to attain the European gun and gunpowder. Besides, the direct observations support

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[186] Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 98–100.

[187] The *Grand Larousse encyclopédique* explains this concept as follows: “Communauté ou confrérie musulmanes, société initiatique soufie dont les membres participent, sous le contrôle d'un maître, à un rituel de prières et d'invocations d'Allah (dhikr).” “Grand Larousse Encyclopédique,” accessed May 15, 2021, https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/tariqa/76751, the titel of "tariqa".

[188] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* discloses this concept as “the place in which advance religious teaching (taṣawwuf) under the leader of the *ṭarīqa* takes place.” “Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi,” https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/zaviye, the title of "zaviye"; the translation from Turkish belongs to me.

[189] Cf. Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 101; in addition, there were rather religious dissimilarities between these political powers. Historically all rulers of the Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu were part of the Qadiriyya *ṭarīqa*, whose history in West Africa goes back until as early as the 16th century. Cf. Knut S. Vikør, “Sufi Brotherhoods in Africa,” in *The History of Islam in Africa* (Athen: Ohio University Press, 2000), 444.

that even at the end of the 1840s, the exportation of weapons from these emirates had firmly begun: for instance, British agents William Allen and T.R.H. Thomson witnessed the abundance of European gunpowder in the market of Egga in 1848.[190]

Smaldone and Mahadi further add that this trade continued for the rest of the 19th century.[191] The unwillingness of the European agents to sell the gun, in fact, was still present due to their colonial plans, but the easiness of trade transactions through the Niger river made smuggling possible. Although there is no precise data on the exact number of these transactions, the political importance of this arms trade for the Caliphate was always crucial, and they used every opportunity to gain access to weaponry.

As for the economic role of these two Emirates, Mahadi emphasizes the export of cowry from the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates to the rest of the Caliphate.[192] This trade connection, however, illustrates an indispensable dependency on the caliphal level, because cowry was the official currency in the whole Caliphate. The rulers operated it as well as introduced it to every region that they ruled or organized trade or even waged war. Lacroix, for example, found that when the establishment of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was chiefly completed, they introduced cowry to all Sub-Emirates after the 1860s.[193] Subsequent to the 1850s, cowry was already a common currency in the entire Sudan like in Borno and Bagirmi, which all imported cowry from the Sokoto Caliphate.[194] More exclusively, as Patton utters, when a relatively peaceful relationship with the Ningi area occurred in the 1870s, cowry likewise reached in this region and turned into a substantial currency.[195]

Nevertheless, a question arises: where did the Sokoto Caliphate obtain these cowries? Boomgaard observes that all cowries in West Africa have a very particular characteristic, and it is easy to classify them according to the scientific definition of their species. Hence, this yields a chance to determine their origins: "[...] a considerable proportion of C. Monera [one of the common kind of cowries in West Africa] came from one place only – the Maldive Islands,

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[190] Cf. William Allen and T. R. H. Thomson, *A Narrative of the Expedition*: *Sent by Her Majesty's Government to the River Niger in 1841* (London: Richard Bentley, 1848), 99.

[191] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 706; Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 59; for instance, in 1877, a British traveler John Whitford witnessed the desire of the Emirs in Bida to buy gunpowder and weapon by selling slave. See: John Whitford, *Trading Life in Western and Central Africa* (Liverpool: The "Porcupine" Office, 1877), 218.

[192] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 706.

[193] See: Pierre-Francis Lacroix, "Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des Peuls de l'Adamawa," Études camerounaises No. 37-38 (IFAN: Centre du Cameroun, Yaoundé, 1952), 37.

[194] Cf.Michael LaRue, "The Frontiers of Enslavements: Bagirmi and the Trans-Saharan Slave Routes," in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, 43.

[195] Cf. Adell Patton, "An Islamic Frontier Polity," 209.

a group of atolls to the southwest of southern India and Sri Lanka."[196] In addition to this scientific and geographic evaluation, Green elucidates the historical background of the process that brought these cowries to the West Africa: "[…] traders [in 17th century]... bought cloths woven in India and cowries from the Maldives; both of these items were used as currencies in the Bight of Benin, […], both belonged to the global currency trade."[197] In other words, the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were not only an open canal to gain contact with the Europeans but likewise the sole place to acquire cowry as means of currency.

But when the Sokoto Caliphate used the cowry as the official currency on an immense scale after the 1850s, this caused a critical supply problem. Tambo enunciates that the relatively stable exchange price of cowry changed dramatically in the late 1840s due to the enormous demand.[198] Furthermore, as Johnson detects, until the middle of the 1860s, the devaluation of cowry's exchange price was almost inevitable despite the regulatory attempts of the rulers; after the 1860s, although the devaluation decelerated, its depreciation continued until the last days of the Caliphate.[199] In other words, the export of cowry from the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates became more important for the Caliphate in the late 19th century. But with the integration of the European markets on Africa's western coasts, cowry lost its common use and its supply from the Maldives had almost ceased. Despite the intensive cowry exportation attempts from the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates, this was due to the general supply decrease from the Atlantic Ocean. Eventually, the Caliphate never completely solved this problem.

When it comes to the political-economic position and importance of these two Emirates for the Caliphate, trade had a further meaning. Bida, as one of the largest market centers in the entire region, was a substantial hub for provincial commerce. Antoine Mattei (1832-1894), who was the agent of *La Compagnie française de l'Afrique équatoriale*, was amazed when he saw the economic activities in the city in 1884. He also drew a picture of the city center (*Figure 7*). In 1880, British traveler John Milum, and in 1897, Seymour Vandeleur witnessed the existence of a nascent dyeing sector in the city.[200]

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[196] Peter Boomgaard, "Early Globalization: Cowries as Currency, 600 BCE-1900," in *Linking Destinies: Trade, Towns and Kin in Asian History* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), 15.

[197] Toby Green, "Africa and the Price Revolution: Currency Imports and Socioeconomic Change in West and West-Central Africa During the Seventeenth Century," *Journal of African History* Vol. 57, No. 1 (2016): 10.

[198] Cf. David. C. Tambo, "The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol. 9, no. 2 (1976): 191.

[199] Cf. Marion Johnson, "Cloth as Money: The Cloth Strip Currencies of Africa," *Textile History* Vol. 11, No. 1 (1980): 198.

[200] See: John Milum, "Notes of a Journey from Lagos up the River Niger to Bida, the Capital of Nupé and Ilorin in the Yoruba Country, 1879-80," *Proceedings of the Royal Geograpgical Society of London* Vol. 3, No. 1 (1881): 28; Seymour Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," 362.



Figure 7: The city center of Bida. Especially the vitality of the marketplace seems noteworthy. Besides visibility of the local products confirms the internal feature of trade in this region.

Although the rise of Bida interrupted the abundant economic activities in Rabba, this city was in many aspects still notable for the Caliphate.[201] In the 1880s, Flegel observed that for specifically private trade enterprises and local merchants Rabba was still an exchange place between the northern trade – to the central part of the Sokoto Caliphate – and southern trade – from the costal side.[202] In his letter to Malmesbury on 17 September 1858, Baikie likewise expressed that Rabba was one of the key places peculiarly for the rulers to trade between Kano and Ilorin.[203]

Although these trade transactions were maintained with various goods through dispersed routes, the involvement of rulers generated an exclusive feature. Mahadi, for example, utters that luxury goods were fairly dominant in this particular trade.[204] Flegel glosses this phenomenon with the connection to the slave trade because for him, the geographic features were not suitable for the long caravans due to the numerous rivers. In this respect the chief transportation possibility relied on what the enslaved people could carry. For instance, the town of Zungeru was the final destination of the caravans due to the big river outside of the town (*Figure 8*), afterwards, enslaved people were transporting the commodities. Thus, transporting the price of

[201] German traveler Gerhard Rohlfs witnessed the damage of carrying the capital of the Emirate to Bida in 1867: "Statt einer grossen volkreichen Stadt [Rabba], wie ich erwartet hatte, fand ich jedoch nur durch Brand geschwärzte, daclose, meist von ihren Bewohnern verlassene Hütten. Kaum 500 Menschen waren darin zurückgeblieben." Gerhard Rohlfs, *Quer Durch Afrika*: *Reise Vom Mittelmeer Nach Dem Tschad-See Und Zum Golf Von Guinea,* II (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1875), 241; Thomson similirly describe the city in 1886 as a "miserable village". Joseph Thomson, "Up the Niger to the Central Sudan," in *Good Words*, ed. Donald Macleod (London: Isbister and Company Limited, 1886), 250. In other words, the significance of the city was not its size but its location.

[202] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," 41.

[203] See: British Foreign Office, From W.B. Baikie to Earl of Malmesbury, 17 September 1858, FO 84/1062.

[204] Cf. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 725.

Figure 8: A caravan from Kano to Zungeru (between Zaria and Bida) in 1909. This photograph also shows the transportation capacity of an average caravan.

intensive light goods turned into the most plausible choice.[205] Similarly, Robinson witnessed a trading enterprise when he crossed a river in 1896, and he sketched out this process (*Figure 9*).

On the other hand, the city of Egga had a distinctive characteristic since it was positioned on the riverbank of Niger. Distinguished by the logistic difficulties of other cities such as Bida and Rabba, Egga's principal trade activities depended on the Niger river.[206] A photograph from 1897 depicts this feature (*Figure 10*).

Aside from these substantial roles of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates, their requisite existence was likewise bolstered by the religious discourse. One of the direct heirs of ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī, Ahmadu Bello, wrote in his autobiography in 1966: "[There was an] ancient prophecy, that the Fulani would dip the Holy Koran in the sea... A Fulani column penetrated south of Ibadan, but the fortune of was turned against them and the chance never came back..."[207] Johnson likewise encountered

Figure 9: A trade activity under the special conditions that animal could not be used. It is clear from the picture that a caravan could not be used in this area.

[205] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," 9.

[206] In addition, Rohlfs reported in 1867 that there was a branch office of the British factories in the city. See: Gerhard Rohlfs, *Quer Durch Afrika*, 240; British agent A.F. Mockler-Ferryman witnessed in his visit in 1892 that this branch office became a factory. See: A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*: *Narrative of Major Claude Macdonald's Mission to the Niger and Benue Rivers, West Africa* (London: George Philip & Son, 1892), 149.

[207] Ahmadu Bello, *My Life*, 16.

Figure 10: A canoe is transporting the trade goods in Egga. The photograph also shows the average capacity of a canoe, i.e., it is practical than transporting by people, but also relatively small compared to a caravan's capacity.

several narratives concerning this prophecy while he was inquiring about the history of the Yorubaland in 1921.[208]

This myth was likely based on the intellectual understanding linked to the world map in the Caliphate. For instance, it is known that Clapperton saw such a map in Bornu in the 1820s, which described the Atlantic Ocean as the end of the earth.[209] Concerning this map, Zehnle did not observe any direct comment or remarks in the manuscripts of the earlier caliphs such as ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī, ʿAbdāllah ibn Fūdī, and Muhammadu Belū.[210] However, peculiarly after the rise of the messianic millennial movements in the Caliphate in the 1880s claiming the end of the world very near, the narrative related to digging the *Qurʾān* into the ocean, i.e., at the end of the world, might have been grasped as a strong connection with this millennial discourse.[211]

Consequently, the significance of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates, were not confined to economic or political expectations neither interest. Rather, their existence and permanence were supported by a number of other factors such as the political-economic importance and religious discourse.

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[208] Cf. Samuel Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas*: *From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate* (Lagos: C.M.S (Nigeria) Bookshops, 1921), 288.

[209] Cf. James R. B. Lockhart, *Clapperton in Borno: Journals of the Travels in Borno of Lieutenant Hugh Clapperton, RN, from January 1823 to September 1824* (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe, 1996), 160.

[210] Cf. Stephanie Zehnle, "A Geography of Jihad," 80.

[211] These movements were especially strong and active in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate and beyond. The significance of these years was relied on the millennial turn in the Islamic calendar (*at-taqwīm al-hiǧrī*). The year of 1883 in the Gregorian Calendar was the year of 1300 in Hiǧrī Calendar.

3.2- Managing Endless Rivalries and Wars

3.2.1- The Governmental Attitudes of the Emirates

Reactions of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates to their surroundings and managing strategies for the intricate relationships shaped their exclusive governmental characteristic. They were not only placed among various political powers and diverse cultures but likewise, they regularly contacted European merchants and agents that strove to reinforce their economic as well as missionary interests. The most intrinsic feature of the Emirates regarding these complex affairs was the lack of political and military power, which headed them to benefit from the negotiations and ally strategies until gaining sufficient power. As Kolapo generally remarks: "The jihad leadership [in Ilorin and Bida] chose to engage them [resident political powers] various as allies, enemies, or joint-overlords, until an opportune time arrived when it could push them all of the stage."[212]

Several observations substantiate this overarching pattern in different contexts and places: for instance, a British missionary in the Nupe region, John Dalton, wrote to Samuel Crowth on 7 August 1875 that the Emir of Bida established an alliance with the Ilorin Emirates and non-Muslim Ibadan King against diverse local powers.[213] Belgian traveler Adolphe Burdo encountered in his journey in the Nupeland with the people of Imaha, during the end of the 1870s: "A l'encontre des autres tribus nègres fétichistes [*sic!*] qui ont tenu tête aux musulmans, le peuple d'Imaha a fait alliance avec eux. De là vient qu'ils l'ont épargné, de même que son roi. Tontefois celui-ci est vassal des Filanis [*sic!*], à qui il paye tribut, et subordonné à l'autorité suprême du sultan de Sokoto."[214] Besides, he further witnessed several canoes full of weaponry and ammunition in the king's place whose boxes were inscribed by Arabic scripts.[215] In other words, the alliance between the King of Imaha and Nupe (Bida) – Ilorin Emirates did not consist merely of promises but of direct cooperation. In another example, Flegel noticed in the 1880s that one of the rival brothers of the King of Bussang was accommodating in Bida, although

[212] Femi James Kolapo, "The Southward Campaigns of Nupe in the Lower Niger Valley," 70.
[213] See: Church Missionary Society, From John Dalton to Samuel Crowth, 7 August 1875, CMS: Reel 68; CA3 M3 Mission Book 1873-1876; the uniquness of this phenomenon springs up from the fact that Ibadan was, as Mockler-Ferryman described, the "sworn enemy" of Ilorin. For Ferryman's account, see: A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, 172.
[214] Adolphe Burdo, *Niger Et Bénué*: *Voyage Dans L'Afrique Centrale* (Paris: E. Plon Imprimeurs-éditeurs, 1880), 234.
[215] See: Adolphe Burdo, *Niger et Bénué*, 237–38.

there was no war between these two powers, Flegel remarks that by doing so the Emir of Bida was guaranteeing the peace and keeping the advantage.[216]

According to Kolapo, these intertwined alliance ties in the regions transformed the principal understanding of identity in the region during the second half of the 19th century:

> Once all the Nupe became citizens of the triumphant Bida emirate or were associated with it or with the other smaller emirates, the dynamics of identity changed [from jihadist versus Nupe] to focus on jihadist/Nupe versus pagan/non-Nupe. […] [However] there were moments when people made a distinction between who was full Nupe versus who was Fulani; who was Muslim Nupe versus non-Muslim; and who was Nupe versus who was Igala, Basa, or Eki. [217]

More strictly, several traveler accounts confirm that the majority of Ilorin's population was non-Muslim Yoruba, while the rest was Muslim Hausa and Fulani, which made Ilorin entirely unique because no other principal city in the whole Sokoto Caliphate existed by containing a majority of the non-Muslim population.[218]

These complex political and identical links and conflicts facilitated the presence of the European merchants, agents, and missionaries in the region. Because of the decisive military absence before the 1890s, European agents had to negotiate with all political powers in order to establish good relations. Until the arrival of their military forces in the late 1890s, their ostensibly pure economic and religious interests rendered them harmless in the eyes of many local rulers and people.[219] In this way, peculiarly British enterprises – united and renamed after the 1880s as *Royal Niger Company* – and *La Compagnie française de l'Afrique équatoriale* concentrated their activities on Lokodja whose position was crucial to control the rest of the Niger and Benue rivers together. While the chief economic activities in Lokodja were relying on the trade with the Nupeland throughout the rest of the Niger river, they further supported

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[216] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition."

[217] Femi James Kolapo, "Ethnicity and Identity at the Niger-Benue Confluence During the Nineteenth Century Nupe Jihad," in Olatunji Ojo; Nadine Hunt, *Slavery in Africa and the Caribbiean*, 22.

[218] Vandeleur specifically demonstrates the density of the Yoruba in the city on his city plan from 1897, see: Seymour Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," unnambered Page at the end of the text; Milum likewise witnessed the Yoruba majority in the city in 1881. See: John Milum, "Notes of a Journey from Lagos up the River Niger to Bida, The Capital of Nupé and Ilorin in the Yoruba Country, 1879-80," 35; Furthermore, Rohlfs noted in 1867 that the non-Muslim Yoruba could even practice their own religious rituals in the city. See: Gerhard Rohlfs, *Quer Durch Afrika*, 260.

[219] Here the account of Ferryman from 1892 yields a perfect example: "[...] the people of Ilorin, imagining that all white men are merchants, at first got it into their heads that we had come to their capital to make a commercial treaty and to open a large business for the purchase of shea butter, and this notion was only dispelled with difficulty." A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, 192.

trade with the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate through the Benue River.[220] For example, Mattei sketched out the following image while he was in Lokodja in 1890 (*Figure 11*).



Figure 11: The view of Mattei in Lokodja with his explanatory subtitle. The sizes of the steamboats furnish an insight about the capacity of their trade activity.

In particular, Mattei's testimonies impart several valuable details on the political relations between the French agents and Nupe (Bida) – Ilorin Emirates. In his account, he describes the process of how he met with the messenger of the Emir of Bida to negotiate for the establishment of a factory in Lokodja.[221] During his stay in the town, he likewise met the representative of the Emir of Bida and the missionaries in the town, as Lokodja was the only place in the Sokoto Caliphate where missionary activities took place.[222] Furthermore, the entire process of founding Lokodja was already planned by the British agents instead of the Emir of Bida. Knowles tells this event in 1864 as follows: "Masaba, the Mohammedan King of Nupé, granted him [Baikie] permission to choose this site, and has always been his protector and friend. There was formerly

220 British traveler Charles Knowles observed this exclusive feature of Lokodja that pertains getting access to the Adamawa (Fombina) region as well as Nupeland in 1864. See: Charles Knowles, "Ascent of the Niger in September and October, 1864," *Proceedings of the Royal Geograpgical Society of London* Vol. 9, No. 2 (1864-1865): 73.
221 See: Antoine Mattei, *Bas-Niger, Bénoué Et Dahomey* (Grenoble: Emprimerie, 1890), 42–43.
222 See: Antoine Mattei, *Bas-Niger, Bénoué et Dahomey*, 227.

a village here, called Egara; but it was deserted by the inhabitants before Dr. Baikie's arrival, as they were afraid of Masaba's people, and Lukoja has arisen in its stead."[223]

Another European settlement was the relatively small town of Shonga.[224] According to Mattei, a French factory was built there through a good relationship with the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates. The Emir's officers sometimes visited this town to meet the agents and merchants, and to discuss the new possibilities to advance the trade relations.[225] Obviously, what Mattei does not mention that he made an agreement on the arms trade in one of his meetings with the representative of the Emir of Bida in Shonga. Smaldone states that: "In 1882 he [Emir Maliki (1882-1895), the Emir of Bida] demanded and received 200 barrels of powder and 200 guns from Commandant Antoine Mattei as the price of a trading concession for the *Compagnie Française*, and in 1886 alone he received at least 400 guns and 400 barrels of powder as trade goods."[226]

Despite all these requisite negotiations between the various political powers, during the second half of the 19th century, the whole Nupeland underwent a corrosive war causing massive mobility of the population. The general coping attitudes of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates under these conditions turned into an extensive centralization policy through enslavement, while they were causing the dreadful depopulation in the rural areas. Several travelers and missionary accounts yield witnesses concerning this process: a letter that was sent to Mamesbury on 13 November 1858, mentioned a substantial reduction in the population in the rural areas of the Nupe province.[227] Flegel likewise observed during his journey from Rabba to Gwandu in 1882 that the northern frontier of Rabba was full of ruined villages.[228] Additionally, Ferryman noted in 1892 that the vicinity of Bida was comprising the old destroyed settlements,[229] after five years, in 1897, Robinson confirmed this observation.[230] British traveler Joseph Thomson's statements clearly describe the situation in 1886:

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[223] Charles Knowles, "Ascent of the Niger in September and October, 1864," 72.

[224] The First witness concerning this town comes from Milum in 1880. However, he utters that when he visited the town, many European factories already existed, i.e., the foundation of the town was probably quite earlier. See: John Milum, "Notes of a Journey from Lagos up the River Niger to Bida, The Capital of Nupé and Ilorin in the Yoruba Country, 1879-80," 31.

[225] See: Antoine Mattei, *Bas-Niger, Bénoué et Dahomey*, 90–91; But this was not the only factory in Shonga. Ferryman likewise mentioned a British factory in the city on his visit in 1892. A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, 168.

[226] Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 106.

[227] See: British Foreign Office, From May to Mamesbury, 13 November 1858, FO 2/27.

[228] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition." From the information of his map.

[229] See: A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, 147.

[230] See: C. H. Robinson, *Hausaland or Fifteen Hundred Miles Through the Central Soudan*, 131.

> To read the accounts which Clapperton gives of Northern Nupé some fifty years ago [in the 1830s], and contrast those with the facts of its present condition, is most melancholy. He speaks of great towns, inhabited by tens of thousands and astir with intense commercial activity... All that is now changed. You still pass the sites of great towns and numerous villages, but their inhabitants have been killed, sold as slaves, or driven from the country.[231]

Manson concludes that when this warfare continued without end during the many years, eventually resident people rather deliberately left their villages to settle in the "better defensive positions on hilltops."[232] In his annual colonial report in 1900, colonial governor Frederick Lugard wrote regarding the end of the situation: "[…] after the defeat of Bida [at the end of 1897], … [t]he relief came almost too late, for the Kabba country is depopulated, and hundreds of ruins attest the former existence of a population and a prosperity which have gone."[233]

In other words, the substantial pattern regarding the settlement expansion strategy in the central part of the Caliphate was not present in the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates.[234] Under the constant insecurity problems engendered by the diverse political rivalries, these two Emirates did not tend to make *ʾamān*[235] agreements or collect *ǧizya*[236], rather enslaved the resident groups.[237] In addition to this, encouraging newcomers to settle in the depopulated areas was also weak, because the security guaranty for an enduring settlement had never been possible.[238] Nevertheless, as Flegel observed, the rulers presumably discerned that these conditions had

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[231] Joseph Thomson, "Up the Niger to the Central Sudan," 253.

[232] Michael Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding'," 560–61.

[233] Frederick J. D. Lugard, *Colonial Reports - Annual: No. 346 Northern Nigeria*: *Report for the Period from 1st January 1900 to 31st March 1901* (London: Darling & Son LTD., 1902), 13.

[234] The historical records show that although the Emirs of Ilorin desired to ensure secure conditions and to rally the old settlements by granting depopulated lands to the loyal groups, these new settled groups could never constantly settle in the region. In every case, they had to retreat to Ilorin due to the threats of war. See: *NAK: ILORPOF* 4/814/1912, Land Tenure Afon, Case 34, Case 33, and Case 30.

[235] *ʾAmān* – or as written in modern Hausa, *amana* – agreement was a kind of negotiated peace situation under the promise of paying tribute. It was made most often between Muslim rulers and non-Muslim groups in the neighboring lands. In other words, *ʾamān* agreement was made with the groups that were not part of the Caliphate but beyond the frontier. Regarding the various applications of this agreement, see: Murray Last, "Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital," 5; Michael Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding'," 554; Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 91.

[236] *Ǧizya* was a tax levied from the non-Muslim residents inside of the Caliphate. For its application in the various cases see: Ibrahim M. Jumare, "Land Tenure in the Sokoto Sultanate of Nigeria," 129; Moses Ochonu, "Coloialism within Colonialism," 99; Halil Ibrahin Sa'id, "Revolution and Reaction: The Fulani Jihad in Kano and Its Aftermath, 1807-1919: Volume I" (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978), 180.

[237] Salahu demonstrates that although the Emirs strove to collect *ǧizya* instead of enslavement at the very earlier stage, they quickly left this policy because of the permanent war conditions. Cf. Mohammed L. Salahu, "Slave Factor in the Development of Bida Emirate: 1857-1900," *African Research Review* Vol. 11, no. 3 (2017): 18.

[238] For instance, in 1900, British traveler David Carnegie witnessed that during a short period of peace a small market occured in the Malete district of the Ilorin Emirate, but the Emir did not want to let this market grow and transported many goods to the city of Ilorin. For Carnegie, the main reason for that was the concern of the Emir regarding the possibility of losing these products in a war conditions in the near future. See: David W. Carnegie, *Letters from Nigeria, 1899-1900* (London: Black & Johnson, 1902), 70.

rather some benefits, particularly for the Fulani cattle herders.[239] Because these immensely depopulated endless grass-plots were not only ensuring the perfect conditions for the cattle herders but further, their substantial mobility skills and availabilities immunized them against insecure conditions.[240] Under security issues, they could very quickly retreat into fortified centers leaving no property behind. During his journey from 1881 to 1883, Flegel realized notable activities of the several cattle herders throughout the region.[241]

To sum up, the coping strategies and government attitudes of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were multi-dimensional. They took advantage of every opportunity to secure political, military, and economic benefits by negotiating, creating allies, and making agreements while seizing entire territory. Their entangled surroundings forced them to develop complex and pragmatic diplomatic practices as well as conditional governmental policies instead of inert Mālikī School of Law-oriented governance. However, their multi-dimensional importance to the Caliphate has made it easier for the other Emirates and the Caliphs – in Gwandu as well in Sokoto – to ignore their unprincipled attitudes, such as allowing the missionary activities in their territory.

3.2.2- From "Slaves from War" to "Slaves for War"

Around 1850 was also a decisive milestone for the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates as it was for the whole Caliphate. As O'Hear notes, in the 1840s, the expansion of these two emirates saliently ceased, because other regional political powers were involved in the war.[242] In the 1860s these emirates reached their further limits, and they realized that their offensive military strategy was coming to an end.[243] After this date, they stayed in the defensive position until the British invasion in 1897.[244] Their defensive strategy, however, as described by O'Hear, was so

[239] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," 46, 53.
[240] For example, Gegele states that after *ǧihād* movement, some Fulanis in the Matele district of the Ilorin Emirate returned their traditional occupation, cattle herding. Cf. Kehinde Galadima Gegele, "Ilorin Relations with Oloru, Malete and Paiye Districts 1823-1960" (BA Thesis, University of Ilorin, 1982), 22–23.
[241] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," 48, 53, 57.
[242] Cf. Ann O'Hear, "Ilorin as a Slaving and Slave-Trading Emirate," in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, 59.
[243] See: Michael Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding'," 558.
[244] Johnson in his study on Yorubaland, describe this transformation elaboratively, see: Samuel Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas*, 517.

successful that until the attacks of the British troops, they retained all the lands that they occupied 40 years ago.[245]

However, this necessary transformation of the military strategy has changed the whole political economy in the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates. This was partly due to the general military character in pre-colonial West Africa and partly to regional circumstances. Smaldones analyzed that since wars in pre-colonial West Africa seldom took place in the open fields, in the case that there is no protection wall around cities or towns of the defenders, the offensive side had always advantages, not only militarily but also political-economically.[246] Offensive strategy was mostly based on surprise attacks. Usually, these attacking troops were not encountering any army but civil resistance, which in the end resulted in the enslavement of the inhabitants of the settlement. The political-economic advantages of this strategy were the salient chance to capture the people for slavery and booty with a minor risk, as well as the unnecessity to form standing armies that would regularly need food and care. In this strategy, soldiers were normally farmers during the rainy season and during the dry season they conducted military campaigns, i.e., they were already producing what they would need during the military operation. Thus, as war expenses grew scarce, the gain of the war was decisive. As British travelers MacGregor Laird and R.A.K. Oldfield observed in 1837, that was the key process in the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates prior to the 1850s.[247] During this period they captured an extensive number of enslaved people and employed them as soldiers in the military actions, while during the rainy season these people were working in agriculture.[248]

However, in the case of that the defending side had protective walls around their cities or towns, the defenders had advantages depending on their preparations. As Smaldeone indicates, since the complex siege equipment did not exist in pre-colonial West Africa, the offensive side had to face various difficulties.[249] One of the most pressing issues was the length of the siege. When sieges took months or even years, feeding and caring for the army turned into an enormous burden for the rulers. Besides, in many cases all these attempts served no purpose, i.e., there was no economic gain such as enslavement or booty. There would therefore be a vital need for

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[245] Cf. Ann O'Hear, *Power Relations in Nigeria*: *Ilorin Slaves and Their Successors* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 21–22.
[246] Cf. Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 84.
[247] See: MacGregor Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield, *Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa,* Vol. II (London: Richard Bentley, 1837), 87.
[248] But as Ferryman observed in 1892, the situation after the 1850s was adverse. Against the endless attacks of Ibadan the Ilorin Emirate had to defend its frontier which was no protection fortification, since the entire frontier was the battlefield. See: A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, 190 and 198.
[249] Cf. Joseph P. Smaldone, *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 73.

extra food to support these permanent armies. Several observations determine this process in the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates after the 1850s: Knowles witnessed this kind of hopeless siege in the Ilorin territory in 1864,[250] Milum reported another similar ineffective siege in 1880,[251] Vandeleur detected a massive corn depot to supply the standing army in the Nupe (Bida) Emirate in 1897.[252] In addition, these kinds of sieges were not appropriate for the Emirates' armies, as they were forming their forces according to the traditional offensive strategy. Therefore, the principal part of the armies were cavalries, and they were ineffective in the siege attempt. Vandeleur, for example, photographed one of these cavalry forces in 1897, while marching with the British troops towards Bida for an invasion (*Figure 12*).

Figures 12: The cavalry forces of the Nupe (Bida) Emirate. The importance of the photograph is that it exhibits the use of cavalry troops. They are moving together with infantries, and this is an ineffective way to use them. Their significant strength stems from their rapidity; when their move was restricted by the infantries around them, they lost this advantage.

But the most destructive part of these sieges was that these besieged towns were part of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates, i.e., these wars had a defensive mode for these Emirates. In

[250] See: Charles Knowles, "Ascent of the Niger in September and October, 1864," 74.
[251] See: John Milum, "Notes of a Journey from Lagos up the River Niger to Bida, The Capital of Nupé and Ilorin in the Yoruba Country, 1879-80," 35.
[252] See: Seymour Vandeleur, "Nupe and Ilorin," 356.

other words, the Emirates did not attack these towns to extend their territories but to defend them as these towns were former subjects before the uprising. Consequently, the Emirates were not only facing enormous expenditures to supply their standing armies, but also loss of their tax revenues. Furthermore, these negative impacts and endless sieges rendered the soldiers and the military strategies of the Emirates crueler than before. Emirate's soldiers likewise began to confront being enslaved because of the unsuccessful military actions.[253] For instance, two British missionaries reported a rumor among the Muslims in 1858 that the Caliph in the Sokoto wrote some letters to the Emirs of Bida and Ilorin to cease the inhuman brutality that their soldiers practiced.[254] What is more, these atrocious treatments caused a perennial social trauma in the region. The governor of the British Protectorate in Nigeria, Frederick Lugard, complains in his annual report between 1900-1901 that he rather planned to redistribute the lands to the old resident groups after the dissolution of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates, "interminable feuds" among the groups resulted in this plan with a disaster: every group attacked to each other for revenge.[255]

To deal with the military problems and massive demand for procurement, these two Emirates charted a production system to alleviate the supply problems called *tungazi*[256]. Because of the immense distance from the central part of the Caliphate and logistical difficulties, the grain import, which was necessary for the permanent armies, was utterly limited. In this respect, they decided to create their own agricultural establishments in the vicinity of the protected cities to provide the required food.[257] The enslaved people were the chief source of labor for these settlements.[258] But while most of the available enslaved people were soldiers in the military operations, the Emirs needed additional procurement of enslaved people for their agricultural policy. Following this, an immense process of importing enslaved people became a central feature of the substantial trade relationships. During this period, for instance, Baikie observed

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[253] A British missionary encountered one of these enslaved Fulani soldiers in 1851. See: T. J. Bowen, *Adventures and Missionary Labors in Several Countries in the Interior of Africa from 1849-1856* (Charleston: Southern Baptist Publication Society, 1857), 133.

[254] See: S. A. Crowther and J. C. Taylor, *The Gospel on the Banks of Niger*: *Journals and Notices of the Native Missionaries Accompanying the Niger Expedition of 1857-1859* (London: Dawsons, 1859), 72.

[255] Frederick J. D. Lugard, *Colonial Reports - Annual: No. 346 Northern Nigeria*, 15.

[256] Although there is not this kind of word in the Bargery's dictionary, Salahu defines them as slave villages or slave settlements. Cf. Mohammed L. Salahu, "Slave Factor in the Development of Bida Emirate: 1857-1900," 19.

[257] Cf. Ann O'Hear, "The Economic History of Ilorin in the Nineteenth and Twenty Centuries," 236; Mason determines the emergence of these farms as the beginning of the 1850s, which this date perfectly overlaps with the transformation of the military strategy. Cf. Michael Mason, "Captive and Client Labour and the Economy of the Bida Emirate: 1857–1901," *The Journal of African History* Vol. 14, no. 3 (1973): 458; however, these agricultural settlements had never transformed to a plantation sector. They were fragmented and supply oriented. Cf. Ann O'Hear, "The Economic History of Ilorin in the Nineteenth and Twenty Centuries," 225.

[258] Cf. Ann O'Hear, "The Economic History of Ilorin in the Nineteenth and Twenty Centuries," 220.

almost 800 enslaved people were being sold in Bida every day in 1862,[259] Knowles farther reported in 1864 that despite the huge number of enslaved people in the city of Bida, there was no exportation of enslaved people, i.e., these people were largely imported and utilized in the region.[260] Numerous scholars manifest that peculiarly Kano and Abuja were the principal enslaved people suppliers of these two Emirates during the second half of the 19th century.[261] Besides, as O'Hear states, the Caliphs in Gwandu and Sokoto regularly sent large numbers of enslaved people to support these two Emirates, due to their importance mentioned earlier.[262]

In a conclusion, the historical transformation in the military strategy of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates at the beginning of the second half of the 19th century greatly changed their political economy, peculiarly in terms of slavery. Before the 1850s, capturing people for slavery was a usual result of the military campaigns operated by armies that consisted of temporal summoned soldiers, and most of these soldiers were enslaved people alike. During the second half of the century, on the contrary, the military actions required standing armies and increased the requests for enslaved people to wage the wars. However, these difficult conditions were presumably mitigated with the support of the central part of the Caliphate since the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates had the importance for the Caliphate, such as the substantial export of arm and the possibility of accessing European markets.

As a general remark, the multi-dimensional significance of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates for the Caliphate balanced with their dramatic need for the procurement of enslaved people from the central part of the Caliphate. Thus, due to this reciprocal interdependency, these two Emirates gained decisive autonomy in their territory unhampered by the Caliphs. But it was also this interdependence that, despite their close relations with the European agents, they never challenged the symbolic and religious authority of Gwandu and Sokoto. Eventually until the British occupation – although the Emirs had no hope against this new military power – they were adherent to their allegiance to the Sokoto Caliphate.

[259] See: British Foreign Office, From Baikie to Russel, 13 March 1862, FO 97/434.
[260] See: Charles Knowles, "Ascent of the Niger in September and October, 1864," 74.
[261] For instance, see: Alhaji Hassan and Mallam Shuaibu Na'ibi, *A Chronoicle of Abuja*, 79; Ann O'Hear, "Ilorin as a Slaving and Slave-Trading Emirate," in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, 60; Abdullahi Mahadi, "The State and The Economy," 724.
[262] Cf. Ann O'Hear, "Ilorin as a Slaving and Slave-Trading Emirate," 60.

4- The Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate: Economy of Exploitation

The Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was one of the most complex components of the *triple system* and of the whole Caliphate. Especially its size – among other factors that will be discussed in the subsequent pages – has made it utterly unique for the Caliphate. For instance, after the 1850s, the Emirate's territory was so immense that almost no one – including the Emirs and the Caliphs – exactly knew the area that they were exercising their authority. In many cases, the Sub-Emirates were considerably enlarging their control to the new regions without informing the Emir. That characteristic rendered the effort of mapping the Emirate more challenging than for the other parts of the Caliphate. With the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, the problem of mapping concerns not only the conceptual difficulties as it has been discussed in the first chapter but likewise the uncovering of the real expansion of the Emirate.



Map 3: Some towns and colonies of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate: The cities with stars are the capitals of other important Emirates, Muri and Bali were under the rule of the Muri Emirate, Gombe was the capital of the Gombe Emirate, Yola was the capital of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, the underlined towns (Maroua, Garoua, Rei Buba, Ngaoundéré, Tibati, and Banyo) were the centers of the Adamawa's principal Sub-Emirates, the villages underlined with dashed line (Lakka, Lamé, Koundé, Gaza, and Bania) were the colonies of the Ngaoundéré Sub-Emirate.

The oral accounts that were compiled by Mohamadou Eldridge in the 1960s impart some, if not all, information about the major Sub-Emirates.[263] According to these records, particularly Maroua, Garoua, Rei Buba, Ngaoundéré, Tibati, and Bayo were distinctive autonomous towns (*Map 2*). In addition, several traveler accounts report the observations concerning the colonies of Ngaoundéré, such as Lakka, Lamé, Koundé, Gaza, and Bania.[264]

However, this map is still far from asserting a correct and comprehensive representation of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate since much information about the other parts of the Emirate is missing. Its rough descriptions, on the other hand, furnish a useful framework for investigating the political economy in the Emirate. Through this map, the particularities of Adamawa (Fombina) within the Caliphate and in the Global networks can be more observable.

4.1- Particularities of the Emirate's Developments and Governance

4.1.1- Its Distinctive Features within the Caliphate

The Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate had several peculiarities and differences referring to the other parts of the Caliphate, not only after the 1850s but even in its process of foundation. It was established in an area where the residents were not Muslims, which is also similar to the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates. But differently from them, in the case of Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, the Fulani groups – who thereafter became the ruler groups in the Emirate – had already settled this region long before the *ǧihād* movement. Njeuma inquiries about these earlier non-Muslim Fulani cattle herders in the region before *ǧihād* and he traces their immigration routes from the north, i.e., from Bornu into all Fombina[265] region during the 17th and 18th centuries.[266]

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[263] See: Mohamadou Eldridge, "La Chronique De Bouba Njidda Rey," *ABBIA: revue culturelle camerounaise*, No. 4 (1963): 17–26.

[264] For Lakka and Lamé, see: Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*, 480; for Koundé, see: M. P. Charreau, "Un Coin Du Congo: Le Cercle De Kundé," in *Mémoires De La Société Natoinale Des Sciences Naturelles & Mathématiques De Cherbourg*, ed. M. L. Corbiére, Tome XXXV (Cherbourg: Emile Le Maout, 1905-1906), 167; Edmond Ponel, "La Haute Sangha," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie (Paris)* Série 7, no. 17 (1896): 203–4; Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*, 480; for Gaza, see: Edmond Ponel, "La Haute Sangha," 203–4; Eduard R. Flegel, "Vorträge: Bericht Über Seine Reise Nach Adamaua," in *Verhandlungen Der Gesellschaft Für Erdkunde Zu Berlin*, ed. Paul Güssfeldt, Band XI (Berlin: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, 1884), 355; for Bania, see: S. Guénot, "Chronique Géographique," *Sociéte de géographie de Toulouse* No 9 et 10 (1894): 413; E. Cholet, "La Haute Sangha (Congo Français)," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie (Paris)* Septième série, Tome Dix-Septième (1896): 192–93.

[265] The name of *Adamawa* comes from the first Emir Modibo Adama (1809-1847), it literally means "Adama-wa", "the people of Adama". However, the name of the region was *Fombina* among the resident groups and it indicates approximately today's northern Cameroon.

[266] Cf. Martin Zachary Njeuma, "The Rise and Fall of Fulani Rule in Adamawa 1809-1901," 33.

In this respect, apart from other Fulani groups in Hausaland who declared *ǧihād* at the end of the 18th century, they had not converted to Islam and had not tended to participate in sedentarization. Furthermore, as Abubakar states, their relationships with the resident groups were apparently stable and mutualist, because while fertilizing the field of the inhabitants' farms with their herds, the local rulers were ensuring their protection.[267] Njeuma further utters that this symbiotic relationship was also visible in the exchange between Fulanis and resident farmers: "The Fulani relied on their agricultural neighbors for their supplies of honey and fish, grain and other products from their farms. For these, the Fulani gave in return meat, butter, milk, and hides."[268] From another perspective, Masson concludes from his field research in the region that this relatively weak position of the Fulanis needing security oriented them to avoid an offensive attempt during the whole 18th century.[269]

According to Njeume, all these factors made the Fulanis in Fombina long time indifferent to the *ǧihād* movement, because the Islamic character of this undertaking was utterly unfamiliar to them and distinguished from the Fulanis in the Hausaland who experienced salient oppression from the resident rulers triggering the *ǧihād* movement, the Fulanis in Fombina had a more equable relationship with the inhabitant groups.[270] In addition, their long passive attitudes during the 18th century likely rendered for them hard to imagine starting an immense war. However, for Abubakar, a decisive conflict in the region was inevitable at some point. He argues that despite the stable and mutual relations, the condition in Fombina set rigid boundaries for the population of the cattle herders:

> ... Fulbe was the more northerly areas of the Savanna where they were large centralized states and societies where they lived together satisfactorily. The states maintained the security… The Fulbe, in turn, paid tribute, sold bovine products to the urban inhabitants... But the situation within Fombina was different. Large centralized states and urban communities did not exist and so there were no regular markets for milk, sheep, goats, and cattle. Manure was less needed, as the region was much more fertile than the north...[271]

In other words, the region's symbiotic conditions were available to the limited number of cattle herders and made formidable circumstances for the newcomers. Especially after *ǧihād*, when

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[267] Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 40.

[268] Martin Zachary Njeuma, "The Rise and Fall of Fulani Rule in Adamawa 1809-1901," 53.

[269] Cf. Georges Masson, Islamisation au Tchad et au Nord Cameroun, Centre des hautes études sur l'Afrique et l'asie moderne (1929-1968), 7.

[270] Cf. Martin Zachary Njeuma, "The Rise and Fall of Fulani Rule in Adamawa 1809-1901," 75.

[271] Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 42; Vereecke likewise support this remark, see: Catherine Vereecke, "The Slave Experience in Adamawa," 26; a German officer from German Colonial Administration wrote in 1904 that: "Alles [in Ngaoundéré] grünt and das Vieh ist voll und rund; Sieben Monate Regenzeit hier bedeutet ein vorzügliches Ackerland und gute Weide." Thierry, s 116.

several nomadic Fulani groups acquired potential for extensive mobility through the Caliphate, the former mutualist relationships turned into conflicts with this massive new immigration into Fombina. In summary, without war, the Fulani could no longer migrate to the area.

However, when *ǧihād* accelerated at Fombina after the 1820s, the scope of war had reached an unexpected scale. As Abubakar noted, the effects of this quick and decisive transformation in the region not only changed the conditions between the Fulanis and the resident groups but all dynamics in the area.[272] While the Fulanis got advantages in the region against the inhabitants by their successive military operations, they also destroyed the prior mutualist relationships by enslaving almost all local groups they vitally needed since none of the Fulanis in Fombina were sedentary or farmer. Besides, the massive scale of the entire area had coerced them to erect some military settlements to maintain the war towards the frontiers, so that they had built their capital Yola.[273] Thus, an intensive process of sedentarization had begun to take place.

When the expansion of *ǧihād* roundly reached its limits in the 1850s, this new occurred emirate appeared an exclusive characteristic. First of all, because of the large size of the Emirate and the myriad Sub-Emirs who conducted their mostly autonomous military campaigns, the power of the Emir in Yola was largely restricted. For instance, as the German traveler Eugen Zintraff observed in 1889, the position of Yola was symbolic, as was Sokoto's position amongst other Emirates.[274] Abubakar explains these intertwined ties between the Sub-Emirs and the Emir of Yola as well as the Caliph in Sokoto as follows:

> The structure of the emirate of Fombina was a replica in miniature of the Caliphate. The Lambe [ruler] of the sub-emirates were Modibbo Amada's [the first emir of Yola] flagbearer and the majority of them established the sub-emirates they governed through conquests, with themselves as local commanders... Thus, Yola government found its authority truly effective only in the areas which Modibbo Adama had conquered. All the sub-emirates had Lambe and similar structure of officials to those of the Yola government. Most Ardo'en [the ruler Fulani clan] preferred to regard as their overlord not Modibbo Adama, but the Caliph at Sokoto. Modibbo Adama was merely regarded as their senior, the intermediary between them and the Caliph.[275]

In this regard, the loyalty of the Sub-Emirs to Yola was conditional. For instance, Flegel tells that during one of his journeys in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate in 1883, he got two

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272 Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 83.
273 Cf. Bawuro M. Barkindo, "Slavery and Relics of Slavery in Bornu and the Three Emirates," 60.
274 See: Eugen Zintraff, *Nord-Kamerun*: *Schilderung Der Im Auftrage Des Auswärtigen Amtes Zur Erschlieszung Des Nördlichen Hinterlandes Von Kamerun Während Der Jahre 1866-1892 Unternommenen Reisen* (Berlin: Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, 1895), 291.
275 Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 75–76.

reference letters from the Caliph in Sokoto and from the Emir in Yola to guaranty his freedom traveling throughout the Caliphate; however, when he arrived at Tibati, the Sub-Emir did not recognize these letters and banned to him from moving forward.[276] According to Kirk-Green this was not a surprise, as the Tibati Sub-Emirate was almost entirely "independent" from Yola and Sokoto until the German invasion in 1899.[277] Burnham mentions similar remarks for Ngaoundéré: when Ngaoundéré expanded its power toward the areas in today's Central African Republic, its distinguishable wealth purveyed a decisive autonomy from Yola.[278] Particularly at the end of the 19th century, the dominant position of Ngaoundéré was so powerful in the region. For example, in 1893 the French newspaper *L'intransigeant* proposed that the French forces should settle in Ngaoundéré to control whole Adamawa (Fombina) instead of Yola.[279] Abubakar states the similar powerful autonomies in the Banyo and Rei Buba Sub-Emirates as well, since their wealth and power were sufficient enough to contest Yola's authority.[280]

Of course, at this point, the following question arises: how did these Sub-Emirates gain such affluence and strength while the Emir of Yola apparently could not reach similar achievements despite his foundational and symbolic powers? According to the observation of the German traveler Siegfried Passarge in the 1890s, this was due to the historical transformation of the Emirate's principal revenue after the 1850s.

> In den centralen Fulbestaaten [*sic!*] kam es bald zu einem Gleichgewicht, die Sklavenjagden [*sic!*] hörten auf oder brachten nur einen geringen Ertrag. Die Hauptquelle des Reichtums für den Fulbe versiegte, [und] die Viehseuchen der letzten Jahre haben den Viehstand vernichtet, der Fulla ist verarmt und verschuldet, der thätige Haussa und Kanuri dagegen reich geworden. Selbst die Fulbefürsten [*sic!*] befindet sich bereits in pekuniärer Abhangigkeit von ihnen und haben ihre Haussa-Bankgers, bei denen sie oft tief in der Kreide sitzen. Anders ging die Entwicklung der peripheren Staaten vor sich, wie von Tibati, Ngaumdere und Bubandjidda.[281]

Consequently, the development of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was utterly different from the other parts of the Caliphate. While in the central emirates the chief impulse for *ǧihād* was stemming up from the sedentary Muslim Fulanis, in Adamawa (Fombina), the process of sedentarization and Islamization of the Fulanis actualized after the intrinsic achievements of *ǧihād*. Besides, as Tambo indicates, in the other Emirates, the principal wealth accumulation

[276] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Vorträge," 357.
[277] Cf. A. H. M. Kirk-Green, *Adamawa: Past and Present*, 139; however, the concept of "independent" can be misleading the case of Sokoto Caliphate, these Sub-Emirates were, in fact, "autonomous."
[278] Cf. Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa," 175.
[279] See: Unnamed editor, "La Mission Mizon," *L'intransigeant*, Novembre 7, 1893, 2.
[280] Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 97.
[281] Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*, 516.

method of the Emirs was based on direct gains or goods that produced in the investments of the Emirs, such as "[acquisition of] slave, livestock, cloth etc."[282] But in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, the chief income was the export of enslaved people and ivory, which was contingent on the new expedition towards the frontiers. In this respect, the Sub-Emirates in the periphery of Yola gained vast affluence after the 1850s, while the proceeds of Yola were regularly diminishing, because the capital city was stuck in the middle of the Emirate so that its slave raids and access to the ivory sources stopped.

4.1.2- Its Position in the Global Networks

The Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was saliently special not only within the Caliphate but similarly regarding other global networks. Concerning this particular position, European travelers encountered first the various origins of the people in the Emirate. While the settled groups in the region were chiefly Margi, Sumeya, Bata, Chamba, Voute, Baya, and Fulanis, the myriad merchants were active and temporarily settled in the Emirate. [283] As Flegel witnessed in 1883, the majority of these traders were Hausa from the Caliphate and Kanuri from Borno.[284] In 1892, the French newspaper *Journal des débats politiques et littéraires* reported related to the expedition of Mizon that several Saharan merchants were conducting their business in the area.[285] Furthermore, Mizon photographed some of these Saharan merchants (*Figure 13*).

According to Flegel, the interest of these merchants was not simple commerce commodities since the immense distance from which they came forced this trade to exchange the special goods that had to be easy and with large quantity transportable as well as high-profitable.[286] Two major products, in this regard, were ivory and ostrich feather, which enslaved people transported.[287] As Abubakar states, these goods were flowing principally throughout three trade routes: the first route was the Benue River to the Atlantic Ocean, the second was the Sahara to

[282] Tijjani Garba, "Taxation in Some Hausa Emirates, c. 1860-1939" (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1986), 14.
[283] See the map of Njeuma: Martin Zachary Njeuma, "The Rise and Fall of Fulani Rule in Adamawa 1809-1901," 13.
[284] See: Eduard R. Flegel, *Lose Blätter Aus Dem Tagebuch Meiner Haussa-Freunde Und Reisegefährten* (Hamburg: L. Friedrichsen & Co., 1885), 15.
[285] See: L. T., "L'explorateur Mizon," *Journal des débats politiques et littéraires*, June 24, 1892, 2.
[286] See: Eduard R. Flegel, *Lose Blätter aus dem Tagebuch meiner Haussa-Freunde und Reisegefährten*, 15.
[287] Crowther observed this process even at the beginning of 1850s, see: Samuel Adjai Crowther, *Journal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers* (London: Church Missionary House, 1855), 119.

the Mediterranean coasts, and the third was the central Caliphate such as Kano, Zaria, and Sokoto.[288]

Figure 13: Three Saharan merchants in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate in 1895. Especially the way that they carry their turban shows their statues and origins. From left to right: Egypt, Libya, and Sudan.

The first route was operated by the European merchants and they were most interested in ivory instead of enslaved people and ostrich feather; this route was also intersected in the Lokodja with the trade from Egga and Bida, but as Flegel remarked, the predominancy of the transactions from Adamawa (Fobmina) was immense:

> Die Laird'schen Expeditionen [in 1854]... brachten zuerst größere Quantitäten dieses werthvollen Products [Elfenbein] nach Europa, dann wurde Eggan in Nufe der Elfenbeinmarkt des westlichen Sudan, wohin alljährlich von NW. [Nord-West] und N. [Nord] her ca. 5-8 Tons, von Adamaua, dem Eldorado der Elfenbeinhändler, ca. 60 bis 70 Tons gebracht und von Jahr zu Jahr mit besseren Preisen bezahlt wurden.[289]

The second route was the most intricate because of the volatile political conditions. For instance, as Erdem mentioned, until 1835 the Saharan trade from Sokoto and Bornu to the Mediterranean coasts ruptured due to problems of political integration.[290] Although until that time, Tunis and Tripoli in the Mediterranean coasts were under the *de jure* control of the

[288] Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 101.
[289] Eduard R. Flegel, "Die Flegel'sche Expedition," 139.
[290] Cf. Hakan Erdem, *Osmanlıda Köleliğin Sonu*: *1800-1909* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 79.

Ottoman Empire, the local *Paşalar*[291]*(sing. Paşa)* in the region were *de facto* successors of the *Karamanlı* dynasty and because of the political rivalries with Istanbul between 1820-1835, they overlooked the integration of the Saharan trade to the Mediterranean costs. But in 1835, Istanbul took control of the region after a short civil war in Tripoli and overthrew the dynasty.[292] After this date, the new Ottoman rule initiated a new trade era in the Sahara Desert, and LaRue utters that: "[…] the trade, and exports from Central Sudan continued [after 1835] and even reached a peak in the 1860s. The cotton boom in Egypt [because of the Civil War in the United States] required numerous workers, and many of these were newly imported slaves."[293]

However, this increasing volume of the slave trade throughout the Sahara, as Taşbaş analyzed, discomforted some European countries planning their colonial reign in Africa and did not want to obtain utterly depopulated lands in the future. [294] In this respect, Britain imposed serious pressure on the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire to ban the slave trade, and finally on 27 January 1857 the Ottoman Empire forbade slave trade through Tunis and Tripoli with a *ferman*[295]. But the *ferman* further clarified that this did not imply an abolishment. Besides, the slave trade to Hicaz, i.e., today's western Saudi Arabia, was exempted from this prohibition on the slave trade.[296] Therefore, peculiarly after the 1860s, the slave trade throughout the Sahara did not completely disappear – because the slave trade to Hicaz was still permitted – but, as Lovejoy noted, it declined decisively (*Table 1*).

ANNUAL TRANS-SAHARAN SLAVE TRADE, SUMMARY

Period	Austen's estimates for Tripoli and Benghazi	Revised estimates for Tripoli and Interior
1810-30	4,000	3,000-6,000
1830-70	4,000	4,000-8,000
1870-80	2,000	1,000-3,000
1880-90	2,000	500-1,000
1890-1900	1,000	500-1,000

Table 1: Paul Lovejoy's estimations for the Trans-Saharan slave trade.

As for other goods such as ivory and ostrich feathers, the integration of European merchants into the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate has changed some dynamics in the region. At the beginning of the 1850s, the European traders were

[291] *Paşa* was an honored title in the Ottoman administrative system, especially for the governors in the far provinces were granted with this title.
[292] Cf. L. J. Hume, "Preparations for Civil War in Tripoli in the 1820s: Ali Karamanli, Hassuna D'ghies and Jeremy Bentham," *The Journal of African History* Vol. 21, no. 3 (1980): 322.
[293] Michael LaRue, "The Export Trade of Dar Fur, Ca. 1785 to 1875," in *Figuring African Trade*, ed. G. Liesegang, H. Pascch, and A. Jones (Berlin: D. Reimer, 1986), 651–54.
[294] Cf. Erdal Taşbaş, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Ortadoğu'da Köle Ticaretini Engelleme Çalışmaları," *Akademik İnclemeler Dergisi* 13, no. 2 (2018): 136.
[295] *Ferman* – in this context – was a written order that was declared directly by the Sultan, and it was delivered all parts of the Ottoman Empire.
[296] Cf. Erdal Taşbaş, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Ortadoğu'da Köle Ticaretini Engelleme Çalışmaları," 37.

TRANS-SAHARAN TRADE IN SLAVES, IVORY, OSTRICH FEATHERS, AND TANNED SKINS (ESTIMATED ANNUAL VALUE BY DECADE)

Year	Ivory, Ostrich Feathers, Tanned skins	Slaves	Total
1862-71	£32,200	£61,000-126,000	£93,000-158,000
1872-81	£184,600	£16,200-46,600	£201,000-221,000
1882-91	£128,300	£9,000-18,000	£137,000-146-000
1892-1901	£114,200	£9,000-18,000	£123,000-132,000

Table 2: Paul Lovejoy's estimations for the Trans-Saharan trade in general.

conducting only a small portion of the trade in the Emirate, but in the 1880s, Zintraff observed that they dominated most of the trade activity in Adamawa (Fombina).[297] However, according to data that Lovejoy inquired, this domination did not cause a dramatic decrease in the Saharan trade, especially for the commodities such as ivory and ostrich feathers (*Table: 2*). One possible reason for this is the development of Ngaoundéré's colonies and the long-distance looting expeditions carried out by other Sub-Emirates after the 1860s.[298] In other words, the Saharan trade did not cease after an immense increase in the trade towards Europe, but it triggered an extensive expansion in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate to acquire more ivory and ostrich feather.

In addition, the strong restriction of the slave trade throughout the Sahara after the 1850s and a general absence of European demand for enslaved people likewise did not decrease the exportation of enslaved people from the Emirate. As Salau stresses, the development of the plantation sector in the central part of the Caliphate began to create a salient request for the regular supply of enslaved people from Adamawa (Fombina) after the 1850s.[299] Besides, Barth observed at the end of the 1850s that the merchants from the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate quickly reacted to these new conditions, and they turned their slave trade route toward the central part of the Caliphate such as Zaria, Kano, and Sokoto.[300]

Consequently, the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was deeply integrated into various global networks after the 1850s: to the Ottoman Empire through the Mediterranean coasts, to European markets through the Atlantic Ocean, and to all Caliphal provinces. Furthermore, the traders

[297] See: Eugen Zintraff, *Nord-Kamerun*: *Schilderung Der Im Auftrage Des Auswärtigen Amtes Zur Erschlieszung Des Nördlichen Hinterlandes Von Kamerun Während Der Jahre 1866-1892 Unternommenen Reisen* (Berlin: Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, 1895), 292; however, peculiarly after the 1890s, this European part of the trade likewise experienced a transformation. As Passarge witnessed in 1895, with the integration of the South African hinterlands – which brought a huge amount of ivory to the British merchants– and establishing some ostrich farms to produce ostrich feather in the costal side of South Africa purveyed easier way for the British merchants to obtain these goods; thus, their interest in Adamawa (Fombina) decreased after the 1890s, while Germans and French desperately depended on this region to get these goods. See: Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*, 481.

[298] For example, see: Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa," 156.

[299] Cf. Mohammed B. Salau, *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate*, 70.

[300] See: Heinrich Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, 132.

from the region and the rulers of the Emirate have managed the complex political and historical transformations by utilizing different possibilities of trade and exploitation. In this way, despite several difficulties, trade and exploitation did not experience any observable decline during the second half of the 19th century, rather most times, rulers solved the problems with alternative solutions that demanded more exportation and exploitation. Hence, the importance of the Emirate to the Caliphate and other political powers continued until the German invasion in 1903.[301]

4.2- Two-Dimensional Exploitation

4.2.1- The Looting Expeditions

From the foundation until the end, the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate had a crucial military advantage against the resident groups in the region. It was able to import horses from the central part of the Caliphate to form cavalry troops since these were not originally found in this area. In this regard, when some European agents visited the Emirate, the first thing the Emirs did was to expose their cavalry. Mizon encountered and thereafter sketched one of these ceremonies in the 1890s (*Figure 14*).

This military advantage and political disunity in the area against the Emirate's conquering attempt, according to Passarge, facilitated sweeping the entire territory by these forces and depopulating the entire region by enslavement.[302] For instance, Alis mentioned concerning the Mizon's exhibition in the 1890s that on the periphery of the Emirate, several

Figure 14: The exhibition of the cavalries for Mizon in Ngaoundéré. The picture further demonstrates the special armors of the troops, and this is probably an indication of their professional use.

[301] The invasion of Germans began in 1899 with Tibati and it ended only at the end of 1903 because of strong resistance.
[302] See: Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*, 484.

villages were striving to be isolated, and it was secreted to prevent being enslaved by the Emirate's forces.[303]

Nevertheless, as has been stated in the earlier chapter, this quick and dramatic change in the region's dynamics had coerced the Emirate to face some fundamental difficulties such as food supply, since till the 1850s, all Fulanis in the region were pastoral. The first response to this issue was to convert some pastoral Fulanis into a sedentary life on the farm. According to the observations of Ponel from 1890, this transformation uninterruptedly maintained during whole the 19th century; year after year more pastoral Fulanis became sedentary.[304] But this substantial social transformation presumably was not enough to solve the food supply problem, because the Fulani population in the area was few to provide a sufficient labor force for agriculture. Ababakar and Vereecke note that the second reaction of the Emirate for this procurement problem was to build *dumde* or *rumde*.[305] These slave farms – quite similarly with *tungazi* in the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates – were basically relying on the slave labor to produce food for the ruling groups, and for Burnham, that had solved the problem in the Emirate:

> The transport of bulky foodstuffs for long distances by human or donkey porterage was uneconomical, and the lightly populated Fulbe states of southern Adamawa had few difficulties in feeding their population in any case. The agricultural produce of the slave settlements was used to support the ruler's court and the related administrative and warfare apparatus, and the growth in the number of slave settlements around Ngaoundere during the nineteenth century was principally linked with a political and demographic strategy of increasing the manpower available to the state.[306]

These slave farms were a response to the food supply for the ruling groups. In this regard, as argued by Lacroix, these had no direct economic meaning for the Emirate such as generating additional revenue or products for export.[307] Their substantial function was to support the ruling groups, thus, they could conduct new slave raids, i.e., the principal impulse was to capture enough enslaved people to settle in the farms in order to guarantee the requisite food procurement so that the newly captured people could be directly exported. Burnham explains the whole process as follows:

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[303] See: Harry Alis, *Nos Africains* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1894), 272.
[304] See: Edmond Ponel, "La Haute Sangha," 206–7.
[305] Cf. Catherine Vereecke, "The Slave Experience in Adamawa," 35; Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 103; the concept of *dumde* or *rumde* was a Fulbe word, and Ababakar defines it as "slave farm" or "slave agricultural settlement." Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 89.
[306] Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa," 158.
[307] Cf. Pierre-Francis Lacroix, "Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des Peuls de l'Adamawa," Études camerounaises No. 37-38 (IFAN: Centre du Cameroun, Yaoundé, 1952), 32–33.

> The slave-raiding activities of Ngaoundere had their own in-built and self-perpetuating rationale. The majority of the slaves taken in raids were traded to other Fulbe states, and it was more as means of exchange than as means of production that slaves constituted the principal source of Ngaoundere's wealth. Captives who were resettled in slave villages at Ngaoundere primarily served to strengthen the slave-raiding machinery, by producing food to feed more warriors and/or by serving as warriours themselves.[308]

Given the complexity of this dynamic, several European travelers were confused about the actual occupation of the Fulanis. While Crowther described the ruling Fulanis in Adamawa (Fombina) as soldiers in 1855,[309] *Journal des débats politiques et littéraires* depicted them as farmers in 1892.[310] However, Passarge had finally noticed in 1895 that the ruling groups were occupying agriculture during the rainy season by settling their slaves on farms, in the dry season these farmers were quickly turned into military groups, and with the owners, these enslaved people were initiating looting expeditions.[311] As mentioned earlier, this is the main military model that has been successful in Sudan during the pre-colonial period. Therefore, Abubakar further underlies that the enslaved people had a "dual function" in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, in this way they maintained their slave raids with their slave armies that were farmers in the rainy season to produce their necessary goods.[312]

When the Emirate solved the food supply problem in the 1850s and developed an entangled system of slave use to support further looting expeditions, their relationships with the resident groups toward the frontier became utterly brutal, any kind of implementation of the Mālikī School of Law was unimaginable.[313] As Abubakar accentuates, they did not care about any possibility to make *ʾamān* agreements or tributary relationships with the inhabitants, their implacable military actions expanded until the natural frontiers and political frontiers.[314] Likely, these ceaseless expeditions of looting continued regularly until the German invasion.

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[308] Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa: Slavery as a Regional System," *Paideuma* Vol. 41 (1995): 158–59.

[309] See: Samuel Adjai Crowther, *Journal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers*, 117–18.

[310] See: L. T., "L'explorateur Mizon," 2.

[311] See: Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*, 484.

[312] Sa'ad Abubakar, "Slave Trade and Slavery in the North East Region of Nigeria," in *Slavery and Slave Trade in Nigeria: From Earliest Times to the Nineteenth Century*, ed. J. F. Ade Ajayi and Okon Uya (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2010), 36.

[313] For example, Last states that: "… non-Muslims eventually became the targets of choice and a crucial source of revenue to those stationed there - to such an extent that some non-Muslims beyond the frontier were not "allowed" to convert to Islam, although they could negotiate an agreement (amana) to pay tribute and enjoy peace." Murray Last, "Contradictions in Creating a Jihad Capital," 5.

[314] Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 91; additionally, the conditions of the slaves were utmost different than in the central part of the Caliphate. Vereecke collected several oral records concerning the everyday cruelty in slavery. Cf. Catherine Vereecke, "The Slave Experience in Adamawa," 35; presumably capturing slave was so easy and any implementation of the Mālikī School of Law was rare.

To conclude, the massive size of slavery in the Emirate was not confined to the exportation of enslaved people alone but further triggered their special use. The ruling groups used enslaved people in the farms to supply requisite goods, formed their armies with them, and as an output of this cyclic system, they captured a huge number of additional enslaved people by looting expeditions so that they maintained the exportation of enslaved people enduringly till the beginning of the twenty centuries.

4.2.2- Colonial System of the Slave and Ivory Supply

The expansion of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate after the 1850s developed differently on various frontiers. For instance, the Sub-Emirates such as Maroua and Garoua were quickly restricted by the crowded Borno forces in the Emirate's north, similarly, the Rei-Buba Sub-Emirate could not get so much chance to enlarge its looting expeditions because of the strong Bagirmi activities in the northeast.[315] In the south, the Sub-Emirates such as Tibati reached the equatorial forests making it impossible for them to advance further, that was due to the inappropriateness of the cavalry troops in such geography.[316] The only Sub-Emirates that did not face any political or geographical boundaries were Ngaoundéré and Banyo. As for the continuation of the Banyo Emirate's expansion, a certain lack of knowledge exists to this day.[317] However, the enlargement of Ngaoundéré has been carefully observed by many European travelers, as will be seen in the ensuing pages.

Ngaoundéré's expansion gained a particular characteristic at some point after the 1850s, which is named colonialism in this work. In fact, calling the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate a colonial occupation was a common attitude from 1855 by Barth to the present day.[318] But if the entire Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate would be referred to as colonial domination, then the exclusivity of Ngaoundéré's expansion would not be uncovered. Besides, if the definition of colonialism by Osterhammel is followed, one can realize that the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate is not an appropriate example. Osterhammel emphasizes three principal features of colonialism: the social hierarchy between the controlled periphery and the center, the racist worldview against

[315] See: Njeuma's map: Martin Zachary Njeuma, "The Rise and Fall of Fulani Rule in Adamawa 1809-1901," 33.
[316] Cf. Sa'ad Abubakar, *The Lamibe of Fombina*, 95.
[317] Crowther witnessed some of the possible colonies in the Djukun area in 1855, but his observations are not elaborative and there are no other supplementary observations so far. See: Samuel Adjai Crowther, *Journal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers*, 82.
[318] For Barth's account, see: Heinrich Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, 510; for a most recent remark: Stephanie Zehnle, "A Geography of Jihad," 438.

those who are dominated, and the ideological justification of domination.[319] The racist worldview and ideological justification were observable in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate,[320] but the social hierarchy did not exist, because in their society there was almost no one than the ruling groups and their alliances in the controlled territory when the process of enslavement destroyed everything. In this respect, the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was more marked by absolute exterminatory domination than the colonial hegemony.

The example of Ngaoundéré, for its part, has a number of nuances. While this Sub-Emirate extirpated its vicinity by enslavement such as other parts of the Emirate, their extensive expansion towards the east and southeast forced them to develop another ruling system since direct domination was no more efficient because of the immense distances. At that point, they abandoned their exterminatory enslavement policy and created a colonial system for more remote territories, such as Lakka, Lamé, Koundé, Gaza, and Bania. Burnham states: "[…] this continual military activity by the Ngaoundere state against the Gbaya [the region of Koundé and Gaza] owed little to a desire for further territorial conquests *per se* and was rather an expression of the commercial and demographic expansionism which was the principal dynamic of this political system."[321]

The center of this colonial system was Koundé.[322] Some Fulani and Hausa groups had also settled in the village[323] (*Figure 15*). Different from other parts of the Sub-Emirate they were presenting themselves as traders instead of rulers.[324] For example, Clozel described their

[319] Cf. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus*: *Geschichte - Formen - Folgen* (München: C. H. Beck, 1995), 19–21.
[320] As Zehnle remarked, the ruling groups were perceived themselves as carrier of the Islamic civilization to justify their hegemony, but in the case of Adamawa (Fombina) they further developed a racist worldview: "... the Jihadist soldiers and societies also mapped the absolute 'other' and antipole of even potential civilization. Those were the wild, animal-like cannibals who were declared incapable of ever becoming Muslims. This racist/speciesist view declared that in the "south" no civilizing progress was possible." Stephanie Zehnle, "A Geography of Jihad," 446; many obvious examples can be likewise found in the oral collection of Vereecke, one of them was as follows: "They are slaves because of their history not because of their work." Catherine Vereecke, "The Slave Experience in Adamawa," 42; furthermore, these oral records also demonstrate that this racist worldview relied on the Fulbe code of morality (*Fulaka*). They understood slaves in the same sense as their herd. Vereecke remarks that: "When asked why slaves children stayed with their mother and not their father one Fulbe elder explained: "Slaves are like cattle. Whenever one is born and grows up it stays with its mother the father is irrelevant." Catherine Vereecke, "The Slave Experience in Adamawa," 34.
[321] Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa," 164.
[322] See: E. Cholet, "La haute Sangha (Congo Français)," 203.
[323] See: Ponel observed in 1896 that the village was divided three different settlement groups: Fulani, Hausa, and Cirtas. Edmond Ponel, "La Haute Sangha," 203–4.
[324] See: M. P. Charreau, "Un coin du Congo," 11-12.

Figure 15: Two Hausas in Koundé in 1895. Their clothes signify their relatively low status. This might serve as an example for the function of the colonial system. Hausa and Fulanis did not presented themselves as rulers but as simple traders or settlers.

activities as "purement commerciale" in 1896.[325] However, as Mizion witnessed in 1895, there was a governor residence in the village to control the entire trade in the region from Bania and Gaza to Lamé and Lakka,[326] and Bunham states that this control did not only concern management but was also related to levying tax from the long-distance traders.[327] Furthermore, Cholet had clearly understood in 1896 that the group holding the real authority in this region, specifically in Koundé, was Fulani.[328] Regarding this indirect power, Charreau imparts further observations: "Les Houssas en grand nombre, 2.000 à 2.500, trafiquaient de tout; mais, après maintes transactions et transformations successives de leur pécule, terminaient toujours par l'achat d'un ou de plusieurs êtres humains qu'ils allaient revendre à N'Gaoundéré, Yola, Laï, Lamé, et même au Soudan."[329]

In Koundé there was also a market established by the Sub-Emirs of Ngaoundéré and of the principal commodities was ivory.[330] For instance, Chole witnessed a large caravan in Koundé in 1896 which included 175 big size of ivory and 22 loads of cola.[331] However, this trade was not carried out on equal conditions. Although the relationship between the resident groups and people from the Ngaoundéré Sub-Emirate was decisively better and tolerant than other destructed parts of the Emirate, the inhabitants were always under oppression and thread. For instance, while Mizon was observing a saliently peaceful relationship in this region in 1895,[332] in the same year, Passarge witnessed that these villages had to supply enslaved people and ivory

[325] F. -J. Clozel, *Les Bayas*: *Notes Ethnographiques & Linguistiques* (Paris: Joseph André, 1896), 7.
[326] See: Louis Mizon, "Itinéraire de la Source de la Benoué au Confluent des Rivières Kadei et Mambéré," 358.
[327] Cf. Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa," 169; for instance, Mozin's caravan had paid 6 000 cowries in his visit in 1895. See: Louis Mizon, "Itinéraire de la Source de la Benoué au Confluent des Rivières Kadei et Mambéré," 358.
[328] See: E. Cholet, "La haute Sangha (Congo Français)," 202.
[329] M. P. Charreau, "Un coin du Congo," 13.
[330] See: M. P. Charreau, "Un coin du Congo," 167.
[331] See: E. Cholet, "La haute Sangha (Congo Français)," 204.
[332] See: Louis Mizon, "Itinéraire de la Source de la Benoué au Confluent des Rivières Kadei et Mambéré," 365.

demands of the Hausa merchants, otherwise the Sub-Emirate's forces were initiating slave raids against them.[333] These kinds of military operations were also sending a quite clear message to other villages. Nevertheless, despite this visible repression and relatively amicable relationship under certain conditions, it did not prevent the resistance against Ngaoundéré's domination. While for the central villages such as Koundé, Lakka, Lamé, Gaza, and Bania the situation was profitable, for the peripheral villages the circumstances were horrific.


VILLE DE GAZA.
Dessin de Mme Paule Crampel, d'après une photographie de M. Mizon.)

Figure 16: The sight of Gaza in 1895. The picture clearly illustrates the village characteristic of the settlement. In other words, the village itself was unimportant in terms of political economy, but its location was crucial to control the trade.

These central villages conducted slave raids and ivory pillages on behalf of the Ngaoundéré Sub-Emirate and then sold these to the Hausa merchants. Accordingly, the surrounding villages rebelled several times against these central villages and their protectorate from Ngaoundéré. Flegel witnessed one of these revolts near Gaza in 1884.[334] At the end of the 1880s, another uprising occurred between Bania and Gaza, and according to the hearings of Cholet and Ponel in 1896, this revolt was so successful that the Fulani and Hausa settler escaped from these two center villages.[335] However, when Ngaoundéré's forces entered the region with their strong cavalries, the forces of the resistance had not much chance and after a quick battle, the Hausa settlers came back.

Despite these uprisings in the southern part of the area, Burnham stresses that the colonial system worked quite efficiently for Ngaoundéré.[336] Besides, Passarge reported in 1895 that Ngaoundéré was applying the colonial system utmost systematically and profoundly so that their indirect hegemony with the loyalty of the residents from the central villages was

[333] See: Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*, 297.
[334] See: Eduard R. Flegel, "Vorträge," 355.
[335] See: E. Cholet, "La haute Sangha (Congo Français)," 192–93; Edmond Ponel, "La Haute Sangha," 192–93.
[336] Cf. Philip Burnham, "Raiders and Traders in Adamawa," 161.

unbreakable.[337] The decisive loyalties of these central villages were likely grounded in a variety of factors. Although the economic factor seems utterly clear at the first sight, the colonial system of Ngaoundéré was more complex.

For example, Kukah and Ababakar utter that they deliberately reject the spread of Islam in this region to maintain the *societal hierarchy*[338] between inhabitant groups and themselves.[339] The diffusion of Islam also meant the implementation of the Mālikī School of Law which refuses any type of racist hierarchy. On the other hand, the application of the Mālikī School of Law was already rare even the whole Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, as Vereecke mentions, due to the disagreement with the booty share system in this Law. However, while the Ngaoundéré Sub-Emirate was creating a deep societal gap between its people and the inhabitants, it also used a strategy to gain their loyalty. One of the unique reports that were written by French agent Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza in the 1890s remarks that Ngaoundéré's forces were taking the sons of the villages' chiefs to Ngaoundéré and educated them in accordance with the Fulani traditions; when they reached the adult ages, they were sent back to their villages and they became the new chiefs.[340] Their peculiar focus on village leaders, according to Harttmann, was likewise related to avoiding any possible unity among the Baya people.[341] In other words, although Koundé was a kind of center for these colonies, there was not one comprehensive colonial unity, rather they managed their domination by gaining the allegiance of the villages' chiefs.

In conclusion, the occurrence and development of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate had visible distinctions from the other parts of the Caliphate such as their uncommon reaction to *ğihād*, their Fulani custom-based governance attitude, and the immense integration to the global networks. Nevertheless, this connection to the various global markets with some chief goods such as ivory and ostrich feather, as well as with the supply of enslaved people, brought several problems engendered by the historical and political changes in whole West Africa. The Emirate managed intricate relationships with the European traders and agents, with the Saharan traders,

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[337] See: Siegfried Passarge, *Adamaua*: *Bericht Über Die Expedition Des Deutschen Kamerun-Komitees in Den Jahren 1893/94* (Berlin: Geographische Verlagshandlung Dietrich Reimer, 1895), 275.

[338] I am especially using the word of "societal" instead of "social", because in the case of Ngaoundéré's colonies, the hierarchy was not inside of the society – since there was not one comprehensive society – but between clearly separated societies in the villages.

[339] Cf. M. H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics, and Power in Northern Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1993), 2; Sa'ad Abubakar, "Slave Trade and Slavery in the North East REgion of Nigeria," 45.

[340] See: Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, Rapport sur Gaza de M. de Brazza à M. le Sous-Sécretaire d'Etat aux Colonies, Section Outre-Mer: Gabon-Congo: III. Explorations et Missions : 13.

[341] See: Hermann Harttmann, "Ethnographische Studie Über Die Baja," *Zeitschrift für Ethonologie* Vol. 59, 1/2 (1927): 44–45.

and with the Hausa merchants of the central part of the Caliphate. In doing so, they quickly responded to the regional and global changes and ensured that their exports continued. This integration and the enormous volume of transactions, however, resulted in massive enslavement and depopulation of the region up to the political and natural frontiers. The size and demand of trade were so extreme that in the case of the Ngaoundéré Sub-Emirate, the rulers developed even a colonial organization to maintain enslaved people and ivory transportation into the central markets. This extensive exploitation system through the market demand continued until the crumbling of the Emirate following the four-year resistance war against the German invasion.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate was examined in the framework of the proposed *triple system* and its dynamics were elaborated with an interdisciplinary approach. In doing so, the main investigation was divided into two parts: the preliminary inquiry (*Part I*) and the core analysis (*Part II*).

The principal requirement for preliminary inspection stemmed from the need of mapping the Caliphate's political economy for adequate research. However, an attempt of mapping the Caliphate's political economy arises on the indispensable link with the temporal and spatial frameworks.

In this respect, at the beginning of Chapter 1: *Mapping the Political Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate*, the key justification for choosing the period between the 1850s and 1910s has been yielded and the crucial importance of the 1850s as a turning point in the history of the Caliphate has been accentuated. Secondly, a spatial framework for the Sokoto Caliphate has been questioned, especially because of the decisive differences between the understanding of land and maps among diverse groups, such as resident elites in the Caliphate, the European travelers, and scholars from the history of West Africa. A methodological classification (*emic perspective* and *etic perspective*) has been furnished for the analysis of these dissimilar perspectives.

Under this classification, the spatial understanding of the Caliphate's elites – as the emic perspective – was sought by looking closely at the map of Belū from the 1820s. Regarding the etic perspective, one of the most detailed maps of the Sokoto Caliphate, created by Smaldone, has been inspected and its problematic points have been uncovered through a critical approach against the homogenous depiction of the Emirates and allegedly exact borderlines of the Caliphate.

In addition to these two fundamental ingredients for any mapping attempt, the socio-political features of the Caliphate in terms of settlement and territorial control were discussed. Particularly the open district understanding of the Emirs marked the mapping of the Caliphate's political economy. Similarly, the decentral characteristic of the Caliphate has been brought into question to unveil its role in political-economic operations. This has been categorized as *autonomies* and *interdependencies* by an analytical approach.

After these methodological clarifications related to the mapping of the Caliphate's political economy, the *triple system* was presented as the general scheme. In this respect, first of all, to

purvey an important clarification being pertinent to determining its different components, three key criteria have been stressed: *the governance attitudes*, *the system of slavery*, and *the settlement strategies*. According to the distinct features of the Emirates in the Sokoto Caliphate for these criteria, three distinctive patterns stood out. With these patterns, three principal components of the *triple system* have been defined: (1) the central part of the Caliphate, (2) the Nupe (Bida) – Ilorin Emirates, and the (3) Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate. However, the potential gap in this system was also highlighted, as three Emirates could not be placed in these patterns due to the lack of information about them. Therefore, the *triple system* was described as a dynamic and ongoing model.

Adherent to this political-economic mapping, in the second part of the thesis, three components of the triples system were carefully analyzed. The first component was the central part of the Caliphate which was inquired in Chapter 2: *Central Part of the Caliphate: Agriculture and Craft Production with Trade*. After three dominant political-economic patterns in this part of the Caliphate were noted, their historical transformation and dynamics were taken into consideration.

In this regard, the first, agricultural production in the central part of the Caliphate was investigated under two analytical categories: *possessing the land* and *cultivating the land*. Concerning land tenure in the central Caliphate, three substantial methods of obtaining land were emphasized: *bush clearing*, *land granting*, and *heritage*. These methods were analyzed in the framework of their historical transformations that were influenced by traditional practices, the Mālikī School of Law, and the policies of the Emirs.

As for the cultivation of land in the central part of the Caliphate, two different patterns were analyzed: *traditional family farms* and *the plantation system*. The unique characteristics of the traditional family farm, peculiarly in terms of labor use, have been scrutinized historically and sociologically in order to uncover the governmentality strategies of the Emirs and slave owners for the labor of enslaved people. Regarding the plantation system, it was underlined that the chief exclusiveness of this system relied on the immense size of these estates, which could only be possible through the enduring slave supply of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate since slave raids had no durable political-economic significance in the central part of the Caliphate. However, the Emirs established most of the plantations and control the entire sector through their decisive monopoly on the supply of slaves, because these enslaved people had mostly been brought under the control of the Emirs and provided to the local markets by them.

In addition to the agricultural production, the development of craft sectors and trade has been studied in the context of their mutual relations. From this point of view, it was in the major cities, such as Kano, Zaria, and Katsina, where commercial activities were extensive, that the remarkable growth of the craft sectors was born. Among these sectors – such as tanning, forging, and carpentry – the principal one was cloth production, which was supported by the dyeing sector. It was argued that in this prominent development of cloth production, trade had multiple functions, such as cheap raw material supply thanks to the market integrations at the trans-emirate level and massive export possibilities through the immense range of long-distance trade.

As a second component of the triples system, the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates were discussed in Chapter 3: *The Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates: War Economy*. Prior to its in-depth analysis, the unique features and importance of these Emirates for the Caliphate were scrutinized, and four salient specificities – in terms of politics, economics, political economy, and religion – were distinguished.

Concerning the economy, the indispensable cowry supply of these Emirates to the Caliphate was examined. For the politics, the desperate need of the Caliphate to the weaponry in order to ensure its domination was stressed, and the unique position of these two Emirates related to accessing European arms was indicated. When it comes to the political-economic importance of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates for the Caliphate, their decisive control on the trade throughout the Niger and Benue rivers was scrutinized. Lastly, it was accentuated that the significance of these two Emirates also stemmed from a common religious prophecy after the 1870s related to digging *Qurʾān* into the ocean, and the Ilorin Emirate was the merely possible Emirate to realize this expectation.

As for the core analysis on the principal political-economic characteristic of these Emirates, it was discussed that this differed from the central part of the Caliphate in several ways. Due to the harsh condition of the regions, they were coerced to negotiate with the various political actors and to form practical alliances. Nevertheless, the destructive facet of the wars was so decisive that these Emirates did not tend to pursue a policy of settlement expansion. With an immense enslavement process, they caused centralization throughout the region by deserting rural settlements.

However, it was emphasized that the political economy of the Nupe (Bida) and Ilorin Emirates experienced a dramatic change around the 1850s due to the necessary transformation in their military strategies. Prior to the second half of the 19th century, these Emirates took several

advantages of offensive military actions for them, such as the unnecessity of forming standing armies, low war expenditure, and the huge amount of captured people for slavery. But when they reached the limit of their power in the region around the 1850s, two Emirates were forced into defense. Thus, they lost their all advantages with the requisite change in their military strategy. Their slave raids radically ceased. They needed to build permanent armies to secure their territories. Expenditure of war dramatically increased, and a crucial supply problem occurred. To cope with these problems, they regularly asked supply of enslaved people from the Caliphate and imported enslaved people from different regions. Consequently, this decisive historical transformation in their political economy is characterized as *from "slaves from war" to "slaves for war."*

In Chapter 4: *The Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate: Economy of Exploitation*, the last component of the *triples system* was studied. In this analysis, firstly, the exclusive characteristics of the Emirate for the Caliphate were asked. This question was examined under two different temporal frameworks in the manner of prior and subsequent to the 1850s. With regard to before the 1850s, the Fulani community-based feature in the earlier development of the Emirate was investigated and their unique understanding related to the *ğihād* movement was stressed. Concerning after the 1850s, the complex heterogeneity of the Emirates in terms of the autonomies of the Sub-Emirates unhampered by the Emir of Yola was analyzed. Besides, the export of enslaved people to the Caliphate was discussed pertinent to the development of the plantation sector in the central Emirates, such as Kano, Zaria, and Sokoto.

Aside from these unique features of the Emirate inside of the Caliphate, it was argued that it also had an utterly important position in the global networks. The export of enslaved people, ivory, and ostrich feather from the Emirate rendered it a commercial center for several merchants from various regions, such as North Africa and Europe. For this immense exportation, three key trade channels were underlined: (1) the route toward Mediterranean coasts, especially to Tripoli which was under the control of the Ottoman Empire, (2) the route toward the central part of the Caliphate, particularly for the supply of enslaved people, and (3) the route toward the Atlantic Ocean through the Benue river, which this channel was under the control of European merchants, such as British, French, and Germans, who competed to monopolize this trade.

After these decisive characteristics and the position of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, the key political-economic background of all these immense economic and political activities was analyzed. From this standpoint, two crucial features stood out: *looting expeditions* and *the*

colonial system. It was argued that the most significant advantage of the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate was its supporters in Sokoto and the political conditions in Fombina. The Emirate forces were supplied with the decisive number of horses by the Caliph at Sokoto, whose animals were new to this area. Besides, the clear disunity among the inhabitants of Fombina facilitated their military campaigns. Hence, the Emirate benefited from this military advantage to the last point by enslaving all groups in the region and looting every settlement.

Around the 1850s, the range of the Emirate's domination reached extreme limits, so that at some point the massive distance made it impossible to maintain the looting expeditions. At this stage, it was discussed that one Sub-Emirate seized the opportunity to establish a new policy that was entirely identical to the colonial system, and the colonies of Ngaoundéré furnished immense economic and political power to compete with other Sub-Emirates and the Emir of Yola. Despite some revolts against the authority of the Sub-Emirate in the colonial area, the Ngoaudéré Sub-Emirate retained power over its colonies until the German invasion.

In conclusion, three salient political-economic patterns – (1) *agriculture and craft production with trade*, (2) *war economy*, (3) *economy of exploitation* – in the Sokoto Caliphate have been inquired under the *triple system* by scrutinizing their similar and dissimilar features, their autonomous and interdependent characters, and their connected and disconnected specificities. In doing so, the complex dynamics and functions of the Caliphate's decentral political economy were analyzed within its intricate form, and the research perspective attentively oscillated between the global and local scale by traversing various disciplines. Thus, it was tried to combine all different case studies concerning the political economy of the various parts of the Caliphate into a political-economic model not by reductionism and generalization but by following the overlapped patterns. Besides, this model was further tested and improved with the deep analysis of the primary sources, such as archival reports and letters, traveler accounts, oral collections, and juristical texts.

Nevertheless, the key arguments and interpretations of this thesis have brought some questions into being for future research since as it was beyond the limit of this work to uncover them. What was the place of three Emirates, Kontogora, Muri, and Gombe, in this *triple system*, or do they have entirely unique features that would force to revise this model? Did all the minor Emirates in the central part of the Caliphate exhibit similar political-economic characteristics to those of the major Emirates? Had the Banyo Sub-Emirate in the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate established a similar colonial system in its frontier domain such as Ngaoundéré or did

it follow a different strategy? Lastly, the framework of this thesis is neither rigid and nor complete; rather, it calls for new research projects to these open questions, so that the chief arguments of this work can be further tested or revised if necessary.

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Figure 3: La Dépêche coloniale illustrée. 15 semptembre 1909, Paris, 221.

Figure 4: Marion Johnson, *Cloth as Money*, 194.

Figure 5: (Left) Charles H. Robinson, *Hausaland or Fifteen Hundred Miles Through the Central Soudan* (Sampson Law, Marston and Company, London, 1897), 234; (Middle) 187; (Right) La Dépêche coloniale illustrée, 15 août 1909, Paris, 197.

Figure 6: La Dépêche coloniale illustrée, 15 août 1909, 195

Figure 7: Antoine Mattei. *Bas-Niger, Bénoué et Dahomey*, inserted between pages 80 and 81.

Figure 8: La Dépêche coloniale illustrée, 15 août 1909, 200.

Figure 9: Charles H. Robinson, *Hausaland*…, 67.

Figure 10: Seymour Vandeleur, "*Nupe and Ilorin*," 355.

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Figure 12: Seymour Vandeleur, "*Nupe and Ilorin*," 361.

Figure 13: (Left) Harry Alis. *Nos Africains*, 227; (Middle) 229; (Right) 243.

Figure 14: Harry Alis, *Nos Africains*, 331.

Figure 15: M. P. Charreau. "*Un Coin Du Congo: Le Cercle De Kundé*," 8.

Figure 16: Harry Alis, *Nos Africains*, 334.

Table 1: Paul E. Lovejoy, *Commercial Sectors in the Economy of the Nineteenth-Century Central Sudan*, 94.

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