

Afroglobal History of Siyasa in the Central Sudan During the 19th Century

Der Fakultät für Geschichte, Kunst- und Regionalwissenschaften

der Universität Leipzig

eingereichte

DISSERTATION

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

DOCTOR PHILOSOPHIAE

(Dr. phil.)

vorgelegt

Kerem Duymus

Gutachter:

Prof. Dr. Dmitri van den Berseelaar
Prof. Dr. Andreas Eckert

Verteidigungsdatum
03.07.2025

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement	I
Abbreviations	III
Glossary	VII
Map of the Central Sudan	XII
 Introduction	 1
1. Afro-Islamic Epistemology on Governance in West Africa before the 19th Century	20
1.1. Formative background of the principles of <i>riasa</i> , <i>tadbir</i> , and <i>idara</i>	21
1.2. Legacy of West African scholars on <i>riasa</i> , <i>tadbir</i> , and <i>idara</i>	26
1.3. Legislative Background	36
 PART I: The Era of Reform	
Introduction: New Contents with Old Frames	45
2. Challenges with Global Entanglements: The Transformation of Governance in Ottoman Tripoli.....	49
2.1. From <i>Garb Ocakları</i> to <i>paşalık</i> : Historical Background	50
2.2. Rule of Yusuf <i>paşa</i>	54
2.2.1 <i>Tadbir</i> als Marine Diplomacy: Ottoman Foreign Jurisdiction in Practice	54
2.2.2. When <i>Ray</i> Tended to <i>Riasa</i> : Yusuf <i>paşa</i> 's Experiments in the Domestic Policy of Tripoli	62
2.2.2.1. Administrative Sphere	62
2.2.2.2. Economic Sphere	71
2.2.2.3. Era of <i>Riasa</i> -Tendency	77
2.3. Involvement of the Ottoman Empire in Tripoli: Changing Regime, Remaining Governance	89
2.3.1. Historical Background of the Ottoman-Islamic Epistemology on <i>riasa</i> , <i>tadbir</i> , and <i>idara</i>	89
2.3.2. Ottoman Involvement in Tripoli and <i>tadbir</i> Policy	97
Conclusion.....	111
3. Islamic “Revivalism” (<i>riasa</i>) vs Vassalage System (<i>tadbir</i>): Separations and Convergences in the Governance of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, Bornu, and Wadai	113
3.1. Sokoto Caliphate and Experience of Governance from <i>riasa</i> to <i>idara</i>	113
3.2. From <i>idara</i> to <i>tadbir</i> : Rise of al-Kanemi in Bornu	137
3.3. From <i>idara</i> to <i>ray</i> -based <i>tadbir</i> in Wadai	152
Conclusion	159
4. Sahrawi Side of Governance: Patterns and Changes in the Trans-Sahara Dynamics	162
4.1. Applying <i>idara</i> with <i>hisba</i> : The Unique Way of Ghadames	162
4.2. <i>Tadbir</i> as Tradition: A Bornu-style Sultanate in Tripolitania - Fezzan (Murzuq)	169
4.3. When <i>dairat al-siyasa</i> Corresponds to the Communal Law: Case of Ghat and Kavar (Bilma)	172
4.3.1. Kel Azgher and Ghat	173
4.3.2. Teda-Tibesti and Kavar (Bilma)	180
4.4. <i>Idara</i> Tended <i>tadbir</i> : Sultanate of Air	184
4.5. Patterns and Dynamics of the Trans-Sahara Trade in the Central Sudan During the 19 th Century	190
Conclusion	196
 PART II: The Era of Expansion	
Introduction: New Frames with Old Contents	199
5. From <i>idara</i> to <i>islah</i> : Administrative Complexities of the Ottoman Empire in the Central Sudan	203
5.1. New <i>idara</i> system of Abdulhamid II and the Sanusiyya	203

5.1.1. Complex Legacy of Abdulhamid II	203
5.1.2. The Role of Sanussiyya in the Central Sudan during the 19th Century	206
5.2. The Transformation of the Economy and Trade in Tripolitania after the 1850s	216
5.2.1. Complications of <i>islah</i> in Tripolitania	216
5.2.2. New Dynamics and Development in the Trans-Sahara trade.....	226
Conclusion	241
6. Ambivalent Expansion of the Ottoman Empire towards the Sahara and Conflict with France	242
6.1. Expansion of the Ottomans in the Sahara and Beyond	242
6.1.1. Rule of <i>idara</i> and <i>mutawalliyat</i>	243
6.1.2. Experimenting with <i>tadbir</i> and Expansion of <i>mutawalliyat</i>	254
6.1.3. New Challenges, Old Ambivalences	265
6.2. Ottoman-French Conflict in the Tripolitania and Sahara	269
6.2.1. Level of Strategies in the Conflict	270
6.2.2. Level of Diplomacy in the Conflict	279
Conclusion	286
7. Expansion and Economic Boom: Political Economic Affairs of Utmaniyya, Bornu, and Wadai	289
7.1. New Dynamics of Governance in Sokoto	289
7.1.1. The First Wave of Rebellion: Losing Side of the Caliphate	294
7.1.2. Second Wave of Rebellion: Winning side of the Caliphate	298
7.1.3. Never-Coming Expansion: Western Frontier of the Caliphate	303
7.1.4. Never-Ending Expansion: Caliphate's southern-eastern Periphery	306
7.1.4.1. Era of the Expansionist Establishment	306
7.1.4.2. Era of Political and Economic Expansion	312
7.1.5. The case of Ilorin	322
7.2. New Actors, New Challenges: Changing Dynamics in Bornu	328
7.2.1. New <i>Shehus</i> of Kuka	328
7.2.2. New Actors on the Play: Muniyo and Damagaram	332
7.3. Political and Economic Expansion of Wadai	335
7.3.1. Expansion and Stagnation of the Central Authority	336
7.3.2. Peripheral Expansion: Case of Kuti	343
Conclusion	349
Conclusion: Afroglobal History of <i>siyasa</i> in the Central Sudan during the 19 th Century	353
Bibliography	358
Declaration of Autonomous Work (Erklärung).....	397

Additional Maps

Map of the Ottoman Africa	282
---------------------------------	-----

Acknowledgment

This thesis became possible through the collaboration of several institutes and people around the world. The archival staff at the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul and the National Archive in Tripoli were especially kind and helpful. They opened an entirely new world for me, allowing me to better understand my research era. Several libraries provided me with a myriad of valuable secondary sources that are very hard to find. Thanks for the help of Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt in Halle, Universitätsbibliothek Bayreuth, Bibliotheca Albertina - Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, Bibliothek von Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin, Istanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Maktabat Jamiyat Benghazi, Maktabat Jamiyat Sebha, Kenneth Dike Library - University of Ibadan, and Kashim Ibrahim Library - Ahmadu Bello University.

It would be impossible to bring the history of the Sahara without great kindness of several families in Algeria, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, that opened their precious private family archives for my research. Thank you very much Abubakr ag Bashir, Abubakr ibn Hasan Katili, Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Thani, Bashir Qasim Yusha, Muhammad al-Faqih, Mustapha ibn al-Akhdar Othman, Muhammad ibn Khalifa Ahwal, Ibrahim bin Al-Jilani al-Awamer, Abu Bakr Benu Zefer, Abu Bakr Mustapha, Abu Hasan bin al-Jabbar, Muammar bin Bashir, Awlad bin Kabah, Awlad Al-Mukaysari, Bin Hamza al-Majabri, Muhammad ibn Al-Tuwir, Awlad Masud, Muhammad al-Zaruq, Abubakar Laka, Yusuf Dereq, Awlad al-Falali, Abdullah al-Wanshi, Abdulhafiy Hamud, and Hajj Musa al-Nafar. I have to thank Ahmad Ain Muhammad Mustafa, Jarmah Abd al-Rahman, Muhammad Hasan bin Suwawi, Abu Bakr Mustapha, Ahmad al-Titiwi, Malam Abubakr, Seydou Kawsen Mayaga, al-Hajj Muhammad al-Burkani, Babagana Abubakar, Mohammad Tijjani Zanna Laisu, Ahmad Muhammad Shanab, Sharif Abdullah, Musa Bakri, Yusuf Lawal, Musa al-Sanussi, Salahuddin al-Tarqi, Abubakr Harun, Hajj al-Hadi al-Tawhami, Hussein al-Mazdawi, Muhammad bin Abubakr, and Ali bin Abubakr for answering my very ignorant questions with great patient. I'm deeply indebted to the inhabitants of Ghadames, Ghat, Sokna, Murzuq, and Al-Qatrun, who gave me protection and hospitality despite very harsh political and economic conditions that they have in Libya.

I am very thankful for the support and endless encouragement of Dmitri van den Bersselaar, Ismail Warscheid, and Yacine Daddin-Addoun. I would also like to thank Natalia Álvarez Malebrán for her company during such a stressful period in my life.

II

I conducted this research as a part of the Graduate School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Leipzig, which includes the Research Academy of Leipzig. I had the opportunity to present each chapter to experts and fellow Ph.D. students in seminars at this graduate school. This gave me the chance to receive valuable feedback to revise my work.

Lastly, I'm grateful for the financial support from the Hans Seidle Stiftung that made this research possible for me.

Abbreviations:

- A.E.F.:** Archives des Affaires Etrangères françaises [D'Orsay, France]
A.H.A.: Arewa House Archive [Zaria, Nigeria]
A.H.N.: Archivo Histórico Nacional [Madrid, Spain]
A.H.U.P.: Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino de Portugal [Lisboa, Portugal]
A.I.C.P.: Archive Institut Catholique de Paris [Paris, France]
A.I.F.: Archive Institute de France [Paris, France]
A.L.I.L.: Archive von Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde [Leipzig, Germany]
A.M.A.E.: Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores [Madrid, Spain]
A.N.C.: Archives nationales du Cameroun [Yaoundé, Cameroon]
A.N.F.: Archives Nationales de France [Paris, France]
A.N.O.M.: Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer [Aix-en-Provence, France]
A.N.T.: Archives Nationales de Tunisie [Tunis, Tunisia]
A.N.T.T.: Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [Lisboa, Portugal]
A.S.M.A.E.I.: Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri d'Italia [Roma, Italy]
A.S.L.: Archivio di Stato di Livorno [Livorno, Italy]
A.S.T.: Archivio di Stato di Torino [Torino, Italy]
A.U.S.M.E.: Archivo del'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito [Roma, Italy]
B.M.D.: La Bibliothèque de Manuscrits de Djenné [Djenne, Mali]
B.N.F.: Bibliothèque Nationale de France [Paris, France]
B.N.L.: Bibliotheca Nacional de Lisboa [Lisboa, Portugal]
B.N.T.: Bibliothèque Nationale tunisienne [Tunis, Tunisia]
B.O.A.: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri [İstanbul, Türkiye]
B.P.R.O.: British Public Record Office [Kew, England]
C.A.D.: Center of Arabic Documentation, University of Ibadan [Ibadan, Nigeria]
C.H.E.A.: Centre des Hautes Études Administratives sur l'Afrique et Asie-Moderne [Paris, France]
C.M.E.I.S.: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies [Bergen, Norway]
C.C.M.: Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille [Marseille, France]
C.M.S.A.: Church Mission Society Archive [Birmingham, England]
D.R.: Danmarks Rigsarkiv [København, Denmark]
D.K.W.K.: Dar al-Kutub wa-l-Watayiq al-Kawmiyyat [Cairo, Egypt]
D.M.T.L.: Dar al-Mahfuzat al-Tarikhiyya al-Libiyya [Trablus, Libya]
G.S.P.K.: Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz [Berlin, Germany]
H.A.: Hariciye Arşivi [İstanbul, Türkiye]
H.L.C.: The Huntington Library of California [California, USA]
H.S.D.: Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [Darmstadt, Germany]
I.A.S.A.C.: Institute of African Studies Arabic collection, University of Ghana [Legon, Ghana]
I.F.A.N.: Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire [Dakar, Senegal]
I.R.S.H.: Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines [Niamey, Niger]
İ.Ü.N.K.: İstanbul Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi [İstanbul, Türkiye]
J.G.T.M.: Jami'at Ghadamisli-l-Turath wa-l-Makhtutat [Ghadames, Libya]
J.M.: Jos Museum [Jos, Nigeria]
K.S.C.B.: Kano State History and Culture Bureau [Kano, Nigeria]
L.B.W.: Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg [Stuttgart, Germany]
L.C.W.: Library of Congress Washington [Washington DC, USA]
L.U.I.: Library of the University of Ibadan [Ibadan, Nigeria]
M.B.D.A.: Markaza Al-Buhuth wa-l-Dirasat Al-Afrikiyat bi Jamiat Al-Malik Faysal [Njamena, Chad],

M.G.: Maktubat Al-Ghazali [Sokna, Libya]
M.J.L.D.T.: Markaz Jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasat al-Tarikhiat [Trablus, Libya]
M.M.A.: Muthaf Madina Al-Qatrun [Al-Qatrun, Libya]
M.M.J.B.: Al-Maktabat al-Markaziyya Jamiyat Benghazi [Benghazi, Libya]
M.M.L.: UW-Medison Memorial Library [Wisconsin, USA]
N.A.N.: Nationaal Archief van Nederland [Den Haag, Holland]
N.A.U.I.: National Archive in the University of Ibadan [Ibadan, Nigeria]
N.H.R.S.: Northern History Research Shema [Zaria, Nigeria]
N.N.A.: Nigerian National Archive [Kaduna, Nigeria]
N.R.O.S.: National Record Office of Sudan [Khartoum, Sudan]
N.U.A.: Northwestern University Archive [Evanston, USA]
Ö.S.A.: Österreichische Staatsarchive [Wien, Austria]
P.A.B.K.: Prefecture Archive Basse-Kotto [Mobaye, République Centrafricaine]
R.S.: Riksarkivet Sverige [Täby, Sweden]
S.A.D.U.: Sudan Archive of Durham University [Durham, England]
S.B.: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin [Berlin, Germany]
S.K.: Sülaymaniye Kütüphanesi [İstanbul, Türkiye]
S.S.: Stadtarchiv Stralsund [Stralsund, Germany]
T.B.M.M.A.: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Arşivi [Ankara, Türkiye]
U.B.L.: Universitaire Bibliotheken Leiden [Leiden, Holland]
U.S.N.A.: The U.S. National Archives [Washington DC, USA]
Z.S.A.G.: Zawiyat Sheikh Abubakar Gonimi [Maiduguri, Nigeria]

P.A.1: Private Archive of Abubakar ag Bashir [Djanet, Algeria]
P.A.2: Private Archive of Abubakar ibn Hasan Katili [Ghat, Libya]
P.A.3: Private Archive of Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Thani [Ghat, Libya]
P.A.4: Private Archive of Bashir Qasim Yusha [Ghadames, Libya]
P.A.5: Private Archive of Muhammad al-Faqih [Tarhuna, Libya]
P.A.6: Private Archive of Mustapha ibn Al-Akhdar Othman [Murzuq, Libya]
P.A.7: Private Archive of Muhammad ibn Khalifa Ahwal [Sabha, Libya]
P.A.8: Private Archive of Ibrahim bin Al-Jilani Al-Awamer [Souf, Algeria]
P.A.9: Private Archive of Abu Bakr Benu Zefer [Ouargala, Algeria]
P.A.10: Private Archive of Abu Bakr Mustapha [Dirku/Kawar, Niger]
P.A.12: Private Archive of Abu Hasan bin Al-Jabbar [Trablus, Libya]
P.A. 13: Private Archive of Muammar bin Bashir [Benghazi, Libya]
P.A. 14: Private Archive of Awlad bin Kabah [Sebha, Libya]
P.A. 15: Private Archive of Awlad Al-Mukaysari [Awjila, Libya]
P.A. 16: Private Archive of Bin Hamza al-Majabri [Abeche, Chad]
P.A. 17: Private Archive of Muhammad ibn Al-Tuwir [Ndamena, Chad]
P.A. 18: Private Archive of Awlad Masud [Ndamena, Chad]
P.A. 19: Private Archive of Muhammad al-Zaruq [Abeche, Chad]
P.A. 20: Private Archive of Abubakar Laka [Ndamena, Chad]
P.A. 21: Private Archive of Yusuf Dereq [N'Djamena, Chad]
P.A. 22: Private Archive of Awlad Al-Falali [N'Djamena, Chad]
P.A. 23: Private Archive of Abdullah Al-Wanshi [Ghadames, Libya]
P.A. 24: Private Archive of Abdulhafiyy Hamud [Ghadames, Libya]
P.A. 25: Private Archive of Hajj Musa Al-Nafar [Awjila, Libya]
P.A. 26: Private Archive of Al-Habib Al-Tariqi [Awjila, Libya]
P.A. 27: Private Archive of Abubakar Al-Sarahna [Awjila, Libya]

- P.C. 1:** Private Collection of Muhammad Basheer [Senna, Sudan]
P.C. 2: Private Collection of Essuyuti [Timbuktu, Mali]
P.C. 3: Private Collection of Mamma Haidara [Bamako, Mali]
P.C. 4: Private Collection of Muhammad bin Abubakr Al-Miskin [Maiduguri, Nigeria]
P.C. 5: Private Collection of Malam Abubakr bin Saadu [Kano, Nigeria]
P.C. 6: Private Collection of Wadai Sultan's Palace [Abeche, Chad]
P.C. 7: Private Collection of Mohamed Anako [Agadez, Niger]
P.C. 8: Private Collection of Mahaman Souleymane [Agadez, Niger]
P.C. 9: Private Collection of Mohamed Hamzata [Agadez, Niger]
P.C. 10: Private Collection of Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Ibn Yunus [Abuja, Nigeria]
P.C. 11: Private Collection of Malam Usman Dikwa [Maiduguri, Nigeria]
P.C. 12: Private Collection of Hassan Al-Mubarik [Khartoum, Sudan]
P.C. 13: Private Collection of Mohamman Abubakr [Ndjamena, Chad]
P.C. 14: Private Collection of Alhaji Boyi [Kano, Nigeria]
P.C. 15: Private Collection of Malam Ahmadu [Durbi Takusheyi, Nigeria]

- Interview No.1:** Meeting with the elders of Murzuq in Sebha, 2023
Interview No.2: Meeting with the elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023
Interview No.3: with Ahmad Ain Muhammad Mustafa in Ghat, 2023
Interview No.4: with Jarmah Abd al-Rahman in Ghat, 2023
Interview No.5: with the elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023
Interview No.6: with Muhammad Hasan bin Suwawi from Murzuq in Sebha, 2023
Interview No.7: Meeting with the elders of Al-Qatrun in Al-Qatrun, 2023
Interview No.8: with Abu Bakr Mustapha from Kawar in Al-Qatrun, 2023
Interview No.9: Meeting with the elders of Sokna in Sokna, 2023
Interview No.10: with Ahmad Al-Titiwi in Hun, 2023
Interview No.11: with Malam Abubakr in Kano, 2023
Interview No.12: with Seydou Kawsen Mayaga in Agadez in 2023
Interview No.13: with Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Burkani in Benghazi, 2023
Interview No. 14: with Babagana Abubakar online, 2022
Interview No. 15: with Mohammad Tijjani Zanna Laisu online, 2024
Interview No. 16: with Ahmad Muhammad Shanab online, 2022
Interview No. 17: with Sharif Abdullah in Kano, 2023
Interview No. 18: with Musa Bakri in Kano, 2023
Interview No. 19: with Yusuf Lawal in Kankia (Katsina), 2023
Interview No. 20: with Musa al-Sanussi in Benghazi, 2023
Interview No. 21: with Salahuddin Al-Tarqi in Ghat, 2023
Interview No. 22: with Abubakr Harun in Tripoli, 2023
Interview No. 23: with Hajj Al-Hadi Al-Tawhami in Ghadames, 2023
Interview No. 24: with Hussein Al-Mazdawi in Tripoli, 2023
Interview No. 25: with Muhammad bin Abubakr online, 2024
Interview No. 26: with Ali bin Abubakr online, 2024
Interview No. 27: With Mohamed Ghabdouwane in Agadez in 2023

- O.A.C. 1:** Oral Account Collection of Usman Suleiman [Zaria, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 2: Oral Account Collection of Milafiya Filaba [Keffi, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 3: Oral Account Collection of Aliyu Idrees [Abuja, Nigeria]

- O.A.C. 4:** Oral Account Collection of Tiwugi Sheshi [Bida, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 5: Oral Account Collection of Kyari Mohammad [Yola, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 6: Oral Account Collection of Chérubin Banda Ndele [Bangui, République Centrafricaine]
O.A.C. 7: Oral Account Collection of Issa Saibo [Maroua, Cameroon]
O.A.C. 8: Oral Account Collection of Julius Adenkule [Monmouth, USA]
O.A.C. 9: Oral Account Collection of Richard Kuba [Frankfurt, Germany]
O.A.C. 10: Oral Account Collection of Idrissa Kimba [Niamey, Niger]
O.A.C. 11: Oral Account Collection of Maïkoréma Zakari [Niamey, Niger]
O.A.C. 12: Oral Account Collection of Ibrahim Nahid [Khartoum, Sudan]
O.A.C. 13: Oral Account Collection of Mordakai Dansanko [Wukari, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 14: Oral Account Collection of Nadir Nasidi [Zaria, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 15: Oral Account Collection of Fatimah Bello [Zaria, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 16: Oral Account Collection of Ahmadou Sehou [Ngaoundere, Cameroon]
O.A.C. 17: Oral Account Collection of Hadi Saad [Ilorin, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 18: Oral Account Collection of Abubakr Tsangarwa [Wukari, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 19: Oral Account Collection of Isofou Djardaye [Zinder, Niger]
O.A.C. 20: Oral Account Collection of Hassimi Alassane [Niamey, Niger]
O.A.C. 21: Oral Account Collection of Isyaku Yandaki [Sokoto, Nigeria]
O.A.C. 22: Oral Account Collection of Hamoua Dalailou [Ngaoundere, Cameroon]
O.A.C. 23: Oral Account Collection in Sudan Notes and Records Volume 23, University of Khartoum, 1940 [Khartoum, Sudan]
O.A.C. 24: Oral Account Collection of Mansur Wara [Katsina, Nigeria]

Glossary

Romanization of the Arabic scripts from the Ottoman Turkish sources, I followed the rules of *Türk Dil Kurumu Yazım Kılavuzu (TDK)*. For the romanization of Arabis scripts from the Arabis sources, I used two different methods. As the first chapter of the thesis deals with highly specific topics from the Islamic studies, I followed the rules of *DIN 31635* method for most exact results. The Same is true for some authentic manuscripts to ensure the accuracy. However, the rest of thesis deals with a historical analysis. For this reason, I used a highly simplified method of romanization, Qalam transcription, to increase the readability of the text. The summary of these methods are as follows:

	ا	ب	ت	ث	ج	ح	خ	د	ذ	ر	ز	س	ش	ص	ض
DIN 31635	ā	b	t	ṭ	ǧ	ḥ	ḫ	d	ḏ	r	z	s	š	ṣ	ḍ
Qalam	a	b	t	th	j	h	kh	d	dh	r	z	s	sh	s	d
TDK	a/e/i	b	t	s	c	h	h	d	z	r	z	s	ç/ş	s	d

	ط	ظ	ع	غ	ف	ق	ك	ل	م	ن	ه	و	ي
DIN 31635	ṭ	ẓ	g	ġ	f	q	k	l	m	n	h	ū/w	ī/y
Qalam	t	z	ea	gh	f	q	k	l	m	n	h	u/w	i/y
TDK	t	z	o/ö/ğ	g	f	k	k	l	m	n	h	ü/u/v	i/ı/y

Ar. – Arabic
 Fl. – Fulfulde
 Ha. – Hausa
 Kn. – Kanuri
 Td. – Teda
 Tm. – Tamasheq
 Tr. – Turkish
 Mb. – Maba

Terms used in Arabic texts:

Alamat: Literally, “extracted knowledge”. It implies a particular orientation system in the Sahara.

Aman: Literally, “security”. It is the legal status of people or ships, received the guaranty of security by an Islamic ruler or state.

Amin al-sunduq: Municipal treasurer.

Bayt al-mal: Community treasure

Emir: A specific kind of ruler, under a caliphal hierarch.

Emirate: A sub-state under the rule of an emir, who is ruled by a caliph.

Dar al-Harb: Literally, “abode of war”. A legal term implies regions beyond the Islamic world.

Dar al-Islam: Literally, “abode of Islam/peace”. A legal term denotes the regions of the Islamic world.

Dimni: Literally, “protected”. It is the legal status of non-muslim people, living in an Islamic state.

Fatwa: Legal advice to *qadi*, issued by a jurist.

Gharamat: Literally, “fine”. A kind of tribute, paid by merchants in the Sahara.

Hajj: Pilgrimage.

Hakim: “Ruler” in general sense, and “authority” in Islamic legal system. It mostly denotes a ruler or administrative who applies *idara*.

Hukm: Verdict.

Ibadat: A term, implies main religious obligation. (See *huquq al-Allah*)

Ijtihad: Interpretation of sharia

Jihad: Literally, “effort, struggle”. It also implies waging war on name of Islam.

jihad al-bahr: It means “a war in the sea on behalf of religion”. (See *deniz gaziliği*)

Jizya: A kind of tax, paid by non-Muslim communities to Islamic states.

Qadi: Judge in Islamic legal system.

Qarasan: Privateering. (See *korsanlık*)

Haram: Sinful, forbidden.

Huquq Allah: A legal term in Islamic legal system. It denotes main religious obligation. (See *ibadat*)

Huquq al-Nas: A legal term in Islamic legal system. It denotes main ethical rules between individuals. (See *muamalat*)

Khabir: A kind of expert, worked in caravan.

Kharaj: Land tax.

Kufr: A legal term in Islamic legal system, implying rejection of Allah.

Madhab: Any school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence.

Mahkama al-istinaf: Court of appeal.

Makruh: A legal term in Islamic legal system. It means “discouraged”.

Maksu: Literally, “covered”. It used for a kind of tribute, paid by merchants in the Sahara. (See *mudara* and *gharamat*).

Malik: Ruler, owner.

Malikiyya: Maliki school of law.

Mandub: A legal term in Islamic legal system. It means “recommended”.

Muamalat: A term, implies ethical rules between individuals. (See *huquq al-nas*)

Mubah: A legal term in Islamic legal system. It means “not obligatory also not forbidden”.

Mudara: Literally means “hospitality”. It also denotes a kind of tribute, paid by merchants in the Sahara. The terms linguistically comes from *idara*.

Mufti: Chief religious officer

Muhtasib: Literally “one who keep the account”. In Islamic legal system it implies a particular kind of market inspector.

Muqaddam: Religious official.

Muta’awwil: One who interprets Islamic law, which may be subject to error but cannot be dismissed as unbeliever.

Mutawalli: Trustee of a foundation.

Mutawalliyat: A special kind of governance invented in the 19th century.

Naqib al-asharf: deputy of the chamber of merchants.

Radd al-mazalim: Literally “redressing the grievances”. It implies a particular kind of court, presided by ruler, instead of *qadi*.

Ribat: Walled town.

Sadik: Literally, “friend”. It used for people worked in caravan trade.

Salih insan: Supreme human.

Sariqat al-bahriyat: Piracy. (See *deniz gaziliği*)

Shahadat al-naql: A juristic term, meaning the confirmation of a testimony.

Sharia: Islamic law.

Sheikh: Religious leader, also a honorific title for elderly people.

Sulh: Literally “reconciliation”. In Islamic legal system it means a kind of contractual agreement take place without involvement of legal procedures.

Sultan: Literally, “one who has authority”. It implies a ruler who applies *tadbir* in most case.

Sultanate: A state under the rule of a sultan.

Tariqa: Islamic sect.

Tasir: Fixing prices in the market.

Taqlid: Direct execution of sharia without interpretation

Ujrat: Literally, “fee, price”.

Ujrat al-tahrir: Literally, “liberation-fee”. It also denotes a kind of tribute, paid by merchants in the Sahara.

Ushr: A kind of tax, taking mostly ten per cent of income.

Waqf: Foundation.

Zakat: A religious obligation for Muslim people who have an income above some limit. It implies an annual payment to poor people.

Zawiya: Religious lodge.

Fulfulde terms:

Dumde: Slave farm.

Lamiida: The equivalence of sultan.

Lamidat: The equivalence of *paşalık* rather than *emirate*, as it does not denote any caliphal reference.

Modibbo'en: Islamic scholar.

Hausa terms:

Hakimai: The equivalence of *hakim*. It implies mostly an administrative office.

Jangali: Cattle tax.

Sarkin: The equivalence of sultan.

Shugabanci: Equivalent of *riasa*. It also implies a kind of leadership.

Tafiyar: Equivalent of *idara*. It also denotes a kind of management.

Taka tsantsan: Equivalent of *tadbir*. It also means taking measures.

Kanuri terms:

Kazalma: A specific kind of *lawal* office, created for Kazal region.

Lawal: The equivalence of *hakim*. In many cases, it also means fief holder.

Mahram: Officially granted privilege.

Mai: The equivalence of sultan.

Shehu: Kanuri version of sheikh. It was used as title by al-Kanemi dynasty.

Shettima: A special group of elites, mostly scholars, received an office for some administrative duties.

Maba terms:

Aqeed: Fief holder.

Kolak: The equivalence of *sultan*.

Tamasheq terms:

Amonakl: The equivalent of *sultan* in the hierarchical rank in compare with *amchar*. Yet, the term does not have any connotation regarding the application of *tadbir*, as it is the case in Arabic.

Amchar: The equivalent of *hakim*. Still, the term does not clearly imply the application of *idara*, as an *amchar* can also apply *tadbir* or *riasa*.

Amid: Literally “friend”. It used for people worked in caravan trade.

Attarag: Enslaved people.

Sebdar: a gift given to a souvenir by an individual comes from a journey.

Teda terms:

Derde: The equivalence of *hakim*.

Mayna: The equivalence of *sultan*.

Terms used in Ottoman and modern Turkish texts:

Amir: Director

Bab-ı Ali: Literally “Sublime Port”. It denotes the Ottoman government, mainly formed after the Tanzimat reforms in the 1830s.

Baş ağa: An ancient title given for leaders of *yeniçeri* divisions. (Synonym with *ocak ağası*)

Bey: A honorific title given to the elites, mostly to wealth businessman. It also used for administratives to name them in their personal life.

Deniz gaziliği: It means “a war in the sea on behalf of religion”. (See *jihad al-bahr*)

Deniz haydutluğu: Piracy. (See *sariqat al-bahriyatu*)

Eyalet: An Ottoman province. (Synonym with *vilayet*, *sancak*).

Ferman: An official decree issued by the Ottoman *padişah*.

Garp Ocakları: Official name of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania in the Ottoman jurisdiction.

İltizam: Tax-farming.

İttihad-ı islam: Literally, “union if Islam”. A particular political agenda in the 19th century.

Kafile başı: Literally, “leader of the caravan”. It used for people worked in caravan trade.

Kale altı: Literally, “coast of the castle”. It used in military terminology to imply the distance of a canon’s range from the coast.

Kapudan Paşa: Marine minister in the Ottoman Empire.

Kaymakam: 2. rank administrative. Different from *müdür*, a *kaymakam* has possibility to apply *tadbir* or *riasa*.

Kaymakamlık: A district governed by a *kaymakam*.

Korsanlık: Privateering. (See *qarsana*)

Kuruş: Ottoman currency.

Layiha: Report written by the Ottoman officials.

Meclisi bilad: City parliament.

Müdür: 3. rank administrative. It implies a particular administrative office that only the application *idara* is allowed. In many cases, it fits as the equivalent of *hakim*.

Müdüriyet: A district governed by a *müdür*.

Nizam-ı cedit: New order.

Nizam-ı kadim: Old order.

Padişah: Official title that Ottoman rulers used. It stresses a superior office, combining title of caliph and sultan.

Paşa: A honorific title giving to the elites, mostly army generals, who also overtook administrative duties

Paşalık: A specific kind of sub-state under the Ottoman autonomy.

Saliyane: A special kind of sub-state in the Ottoman bureaucratic system. Rather than sending tax collection to Istanbul, it only pays an annual sum.

Sancak: An Ottoman province. (See *vilayet*, *eyalet*)

Tezkere: An official document, issued by a governor.

Ocak ağası: An ancient title given for leaders of *yeniçeri* divisions. (Synonym with *baş ağa*)

Vali: 3. rank administrative. It has a very similar meaning to *kaymakam*, only becoming over it in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Vezir: A special minister, working as personal assistant of a *padişah*.

Vilayet: An Ottoman province. (Synonym with *eyalet*, *sancak*)

Yeniçeri: An ancient Ottoman armed division.



Map of the Central Sudan

Cities with red dots are the important centres of the Central Sudan. Cities with black dots are crucial trade partners.

Introduction

For the people of Central Sudan,¹ the year 1874 marked the beginning of the end of an age as they knew it. The incursion of Zubayir's forces, operating under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, into Darfur during this year was not particularly noteworthy for many residents of Central Sudan. However, the frontier vassal states of Wadai, including Dar Tama, Dar Qimr, and Dar Runga, were compelled to engage with this nascent regime. Inhabitants of this peripheral region referred to this epoch as the “*era of Turkish riasa*“ (*earr al-riasiyat al-turkiyya*).² The subsequent capture of Darfur by Muhammad bin Abdullah, who declared himself the Mahdi in Sudan around 1883, did not significantly alter the system of governance. Abdullah's forces advanced into the territories of Dar Tama and Dar Qimr, and the local population responded similarly to their reception of Zubayir, designating Abdullah's rule as the “*long regime of riasa (nizam tawil min al-riasa)*.”³ Following the British invasion of Darfur in 1895, the system of governance experienced by the local populace remained largely unchanged, leading them to characterize the period of British rule as “*the time of endless Christian riasa*“ (*zaman al-riasiyat al-nasaran al-laamutanahia*).⁴ This terminology was similarly applied to Rabillah by Kanuri scholars when he seized Bornu in 1893,⁵ as well as to British colonial rule by scholars in Kano following the collapse of the Uthmaniyya caliphate in 1904.⁶ These very different actors received the same consideration from the people of Central Sudan, not because they radically changed the political sphere by invading countries, but because of the system of governance they applied. Consequently, for the inhabitants of Central Sudan, the 19th century is distinctly categorized as the period *before the riasa regimes* and *after the riasa regimes*. But what is the *riasa*? What type of governance system rendered these disparate actors comparable in the eyes of the Central Sudanese? If these were indeed *riasa* regimes, what classification did they apply to the Uthmaniyya caliphate, Bornu, or Wadai? How is it possible that these questions have not been raised in the centuries-old Anglophone research literature on Central Sudan to date?

1 The term “Central Sudan” is a concept used by Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources. While its core region were shaped by the geographical definition, its frontier was defined by the political powers. The extent of the rule of the Central Sudanic states were the extents of the Central Sudan. See, Map of the Central Sudan.

2 ‘Interview with Ahmad Abu Lafta [Khartoum] by Ibrahim Nahid in 1981. O.A.C. 12’.

3 P.A. 19: Private Archive of Muhammad al-Zaruq [Abeché, Tchad], a letter dated as 1885.

4 A Wadain merchants, called Ibra Dereq, who visited Al-Fashir in 1903 wrote his uncle in Abeche that people in Al-Fashir told him, they are now in the time of Christian *riasa*. P.A. 21., uncategorized. Dated as 1903.

5 Liman Ali Arkwoyami, „Zikr wuku Rabillah“ P.C. 11, uncategorized.

6 „Zaman al-Nasara“, P.C. 5, uncategorized.

“This book had to be written 100 years ago!...”⁷

Muhammad ag Muhammad's frustration is not an isolated experience. Several historians joined him, including Usman Dalhatu, Adnan Bawa Bello, Al-Shawi Amahin, and Abdullah Erdem Taş, who have conducted extensive research utilizing under-explored Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources. These scholars share a common discontent, considering they uncover numerous concealed narratives that reveal the intricate and globally interconnected nature of the societies in Central Sudan during the 19th century.⁸ They pose a critical inquiry regarding the extensive time invested in analysing European traveller accounts authored by individuals lacking a genuine understanding of the region's complexities. This concern is further amplified when researchers discover in Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources explicit evidence indicating that the authors of these traveller accounts engaged in covert espionage activities and gathered information through bribery, without the means to verify its accuracy.⁹

As a result, these newly emerging bodies of research establish a distinct trajectory for future investigations, advocating for an archival and epistemological shift rather than digging further in deeply problematic sources that, due to their intricate nature, cannot be adequately disentangled from their imperial, colonial, and inherently Eurocentric foundations. In this context, the initial research question of this thesis is fundamentally grounded in this emerging decolonial historiography, which extends the decolonial perspective across various dimensions, including epistemology, methodology, and fieldwork.

My initial inquiry for this doctoral research project was, "Are there any relevant documents pertaining to Central Sudan in Libya and Turkey?" This question was informed by preliminary insights gained during my master's thesis, which I completed at the University of Bayreuth in 2021. However, proposing a PhD project based on the potential existence of such documents entailed a degree of risk. Ultimately, this uncertainty evolved into a significant aspiration following my

⁷ Muhammad Ag Muhammad, *Al-Shier al-Arabiyyu Ind al-Tawariq: Kal Al-Suq* (Amman: Dar Fadat li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi, 2020), 9.

⁸ This kind of new ground-breaking works are mainly written in Hausa, Arabic, and Turkish. For instance, see: Usman Dalhatu, Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu (Zaria: Woodpecker Communication Service, 2016); Adnan Bawa Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa* (Kano: Bayero University Press, 2019); Al-Shawi Al-Lallah Al-Bakkay Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, ed. Islah Muhammad Al-Bukhari Hamuda (Benghazi, 2007); Abdullah Erdem Taş, 'Osmanlı Garp Ocaklarından Trablusgarp Eyaleti: Karamanlılar Dönemi (1711-1835)' (Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2016).

⁹ Notably, the Ottoman archives contain a wealth of documentation regarding the espionage activities of various European travellers, including Heinrich Barth, James Richardson, Gerhard Rohlfs, and Gustav Nachtigal. See: B.O.A., Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Umum Vilayat Evrakı, 341/5.

research expedition to Libya (and an additional but unplanned brief trip to Algeria) and Turkey. I had hoped to uncover pertinent materials, yet the vast quantity of documents written in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish soon inundated me concerning Central Sudan.

This discovery has directed my subsequent research efforts, resulting in the identification of three key research focal points: 1) the exploration of under-researched materials around the world, 2) the analysis of spatial conceptions within these original sources to enhance the framing of the research area, and 3) a thorough examination of the epistemological foundations of the materials, which are notably underrepresented in the Anglophone and Francophone research literature. These three research trajectories have culminated in three significant contributions to the *global research literature* on the Central Sudan.

1) Linguistic Diversity of the Research

My first research trip primarily focused on the exploration of Ottoman documents. The outcome of this journey was entirely unforeseen. The Ottoman archives (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri*) located in Istanbul contain over 2,000 administrative documents in Ottoman Turkish from the 19th century that pertain directly to Central Sudan. Additionally, the Süleymaniye Library (*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi*) and the Manuscript Collection of the Istanbul University (*İstanbul Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi*) provided significant manuscripts that are essential for comprehending the epistemological complexities of the subject. Notably, the Parliament Archive (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Arşivi*) in Ankara also housed valuable records of parliamentary discussions from the early 20th century concerning Central Sudan. However, the most remarkable discovery was the identification of over 15 travel accounts written in both Ottoman and contemporary Turkish. It appears that Ottoman officials and agents traversed various regions of the Central Sahara, including Ghat, Murzuq, Kufra, and Bilad Sudan, extending their travels to areas such as Kano, Yola, Kuka, and, in some instances, as far as Lokodja and Lagos. Libyan archives, on the other hand, exhibit a distinct character. The National Archives (*Dar al-Mahfuzat al-Tarikhiyya al-Libiyya*) in Tripoli contains a substantial collection of court registers dating from 1500 to 1911 in Arabic, which illuminate the political and economic conflicts within the region. There are also more than 1,500 related administrative documents in Ottoman Turkish. A portion of these documents is housed not at the National Archives but rather at the Centre of Historical Studies (*Markaz Jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasat al-Tarikhiyyat*) in Tripoli, which possesses an extensive collection of manuscripts and

correspondence in Arabic. This access enabled me to examine approximately 500 personal letters from the 19th century. Nevertheless, most of the letter collections are still in the possession of their respective families. To gain access to these collections, I undertook travels throughout Libya and eastern Algeria. In certain cities, small municipal archives have been established, which consolidate family archives and local court records, as observed in Ghadames (*Jami'at Ghadamisli-l-Turath wa-l-Makhtutat*), Sokna (*Maktubat Al-Ghazali*) and Al-Qatrun (*Muthaf Madina Al-Qatrun*). Yet, in many instances, I was required to reach out to families to obtain permission to examine their private archives. Consequently, I was able to access private family archives in various cities and regions, including Ouargala, the Souf Valley, Djanet in Algeria, as well as Ghat, Ghadames, Tarhuna, Sebha, Murzuq, Tripoli, Benghazi, and Awjila in Libya. In one case, Mr. Abubakr Mustapha graciously transported his family archive from Dirku in the Kawar Valley of Niger to meet with me in Al-Qatrun. Throughout this extensive journey across the Sahara, I was able to investigate 18 private family archives from the 19th century. However, a comprehensive understanding of these letters necessitates a profound knowledge of their historical and contextual background, which is often best possessed by the inhabitants of the region. Therefore, I conducted 16 interviews to enhance my understanding of the local networks and references pertinent to these materials.

This unexpected discovery prompted me to refine my research question to focus on specific issues related to governance and political economic affairs, thereby enabling a more effective utilization of these sources. This eye-opening experience from Turkey and Libya led me to consider whether I might encounter similar materials in countries with linguistic heritages distinct from English and French, given that sources in these two languages have been extensively studied. To pursue this inquiry, I undertook an extensive journey across Europe, visiting archives in Portugal,¹⁰ Spain,¹¹ Italy,¹² France,¹³ Holland,¹⁴ Germany,¹⁵ Denmark,¹⁶ and Sweden.¹⁷ These countries were not selected

10 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [Lisboa], Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino de Portugal [Lisboa], Bibliotheca Nacional de Lisboa.

11 Archivo Histórico Nacional [Madrid], Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores [Madrid].

12 Archivio di Stato di Livorno, Archivio di Stato di Torino, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri d'Italia [Rome], Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito [Rome].

13 Archives Nationales de France [Paris], Bibliothèque Nationale de France [Paris], Archive Institute de France [Paris], Archive Institut Catholique de Paris, Centre des Hautes Études Administratives sur l'Afrique et Asie-Moderne [Paris], Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer [Aix-en-Provence].

14 Nationaal Archief van Nederland [Den Haag], Universitaire Bibliotheken Leiden.

15 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz [Berlin], Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Stadtarchiv Stralsund, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg [Stuttgart], Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, Archive von Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde [Leipzig].

16 Danmarks Rigsarkiv [København].

17 Riksarkivet Sverige [Täby].

arbitrarily; during my research in Libya, I discovered that each of these states maintained a consulate in Tripoli during the early 19th century. At the end, it was plausible that they possessed reports from their consuls in the city, a hypothesis that my travels ultimately validated. While the volume of findings was not as substantial as that encountered in Libya and Turkey, I was nonetheless surprised to uncover a significant number of documents directly related to my research, which had not been adequately explored within the context of Central Sudan's history. The most noteworthy aspect of the materials derived from these archives is the distinct perspectives they offer in contrast to those of British and French consuls. Driven by their imperial ambitions and objectives to expand into Africa, British and French consuls adopted a notably aggressive political posture towards local populations and the Ottoman Empire. Racist and colonialist rhetoric frequently accompanied this approach, which derogatorily labelled Tripolitan merchants as "bloody pirates" and local traders as "dirty Arabs," considering them as "pure dangers to civilized trade."¹⁸ In a compelling counterpoint, consuls from other European nations predominantly aligned themselves with Tripoli, viewing the hegemonic policies of Britain and France as the true threat to trade, not the people of the region. Hence, the consul reports from these states, except Britain and France, present a markedly different picture, transcending the prevailing narratives of "piracy" and "slave trade" that continue to dominate Anglophone and Francophone scholarly discourse to this day.

Equipped with this comprehensive array of materials, I embarked on my third research trip across Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon. My initial objective in Niger was to visit Niamey, specifically the IRSH (*Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines*), to gain access to their extensive collection of Arabic manuscripts. Subsequently, I travelled to the historic city of Agadez, which once served as the capital of the Air Sultanate, where I encountered three private family collections containing numerous manuscripts, including historical chronicles. Additionally, I conducted an in-depth interview in the city. The abundance of materials in Nigeria, on the other hand, was immense. Especially the institutional collections and archives located in Ibadan,¹⁹ Jos,²⁰ Kaduna,²¹ Kano,²² and Zaria,²³ yielded a significant number of documents. Furthermore, I was able to explore six family collections: two in Kano, one in Abuja, two in Maiduguri, and one in Katsina. In Chad, however, the institutional collections proved to be inadequate for sourcing useful materials pertaining to the

18 For instance, see: A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 34, 1815; B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 84, 1816.

19 National Archive in the University of Ibadan, Library of the University of Ibadan, Center of Arabic Documentation, University of Ibadan.

20 Jos Museum.

21 Nigerian National Archive [Kaduna].

22 Kano State History and Culture Bureau.

23 Northern History Research Shema [Zaria], Arewa House Archive [Zaria, Nigeria].

19th century. Yet, there was something unexpected for me in Ndjamena, where I met numerous families from Sudan who had fled due to war and genocide. Many of these families brought their private archives to Ndjamena, which provided invaluable insights into the political and economic landscape of Wadai during the 19th century, considering their ancestors from Khartoum engaged in trade with Wadai. Consequently, I was able to investigate five such private family archives in Ndjamena. Following this, I travelled to Abeche, the former capital of the Wadai Sultanate, where I was pleasantly surprised to find a detailed chronicle of Wadai within the personal collection of the current sultan. Additionally, I conducted research on two private family archives from Abeche. My final destination was Cameroon, where I visited the National Archives (*Archives nationales du Cameroun*) in Yaounde. During my time in the city, I had the privilege of meeting an exceptional independent researcher, Chérubin Banda Ndele, who possesses a profound interest in the history of his region, Kuti, which was formerly part of the Wadai Sultanate and is now situated within the Central African Republic. He generously provided me with access to his personal collections of oral accounts from Bangui and Ndele, as well as copies of archival documents from Basse-Kotto (*Perfecture Archive Basse-Kotto*) in the Central African Republic. A significant outcome of this extensive research trip was not only the establishment of valuable academic networks and access to a plethora of secondary sources that are largely unavailable in Europe, but also the acquisition of a substantial number of oral account collections. Over the past two decades, historians and independent researchers in Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon have been remarkably active in gathering oral histories, resulting in collections that exceed expectations. With their remarkable generosity, these historians and independent researchers allowed me access to their oral account collections, thereby enriching my research database with more than 20 distinct oral account collections.

The extensive research conducted during three prolonged research trips yielded a substantial collection of materials in various languages, including Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish language, as well as Fulfulde, Tamasheq, Kanuri, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, German, Danish, and Swedish. In addition to them, many colleagues in the USA,²⁴ England,²⁵ Austria,²⁶ Norway,²⁷ Tunisia,²⁸ Ghana,²⁹

24 UW-Medison Memorial Library [Wisconsin], The U.S. National Archives [Washington], Library of Congress Washington, Northwestern University Archive [Evanston], The Huntington Library of California.

25 British Public Record Office [Kew].

26 Österreichische Staatsarchiv [Wien].

27 Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies [Bergen].

28 Archives Nationales de Tunisie [Tunis], Bibliothèque Nationale tunisienne [Tunis].

29 Institute of African Studies Arabic collection, University of Ghana [Legon].

Senegal,³⁰ Mali,³¹ Egypt,³² and Sudan³³ contributed archival documents from their respective countries. At one point, I even accidentally encountered three utterly unexpected accounts concerning the Sahara, one written in Bulgarian,³⁴ another in Russian,³⁵ and the last in the Hebrew language.³⁶ Ultimately, the volume of material obtained from these diverse sources significantly surpassed the available resources in English and French. In this regard, although my first initial objective was to juxtapose these new sources with Anglophone and Francophone scholarly literature, I soon recognized that it would be unproductive to verify and amend every piece of information in the English and French texts, since they now constituted only a minor fraction of the total sources. Therefore, I came to the conclusion to utilize the Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish materials as the foundational basis for my thesis, given their comprehensive documentation in this field, while incorporating additional sources as deemed relevant. This fundamental shift in source selection profoundly influenced the structure and nature of the thesis. Rather than correcting numerous inaccuracies and prevalent misconceptions within the Anglophone and Francophone research literature, I opted to present the information derived from all available materials in its original form.

This thesis, contributing to the Anglophone research literature due to its English composition, fundamentally serves as an introductory work. This characterization arises not only from the novel materials presented in this research but also from the extensive engagement with a variety of secondary sources in Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish, primarily authored by historians from Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Niger, and Turkey. My surprise for the existence of such well established research literatures outside the Anglophone, Francophone, and German research literature illuminated a significant limitation in my previous perspective, which had been overly confined to *local research literatures* in English, French, and German, despite my assertions of maintaining a global outlook in my research inquiries. Along this line, my aim evolved to contribute to the *global research literature*, irrespective of the language or academic institutions involved in my writing. This ambitious goal necessitated that the thesis function as an introductory work not only for Anglophone research literature, but all others as well. The issue extends beyond the neglect of the

30 Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire [Dakar].

31 La Bibliothèque de Manuscrits de Djenné [Djenne], Private Collection of Essuyuti [Timbuktu], Private Collection of Mamma Haidara [Bamako].

32 Dar al-Kutub wa-l-Watayiq al-Kawmiyyat [Cairo].

33 National Record Office of Sudan [Khartoum].

34 Pavel P. Shatev, *Zatochenieto vu Sakhra-Fezanu* (Sofia: Pechanitsa P. Glushkovu, 1910).

35 Alexander Eliseev, *Po Belu Svetu! Puteshestviya Doktora Aleksandra Yeliseyeva*, vol. Vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: P.P. Soykina, 1898).

36 Hagid Mardechi, *Toldot Yahodi Tripuli*, unedited manuscripts from the 1890s.

substantial advancements in Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish research literatures over the past two decades by Anglophone, Francophone, and German scholars; it also highlights a significant gap that persists within the Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish research literatures themselves. In this context, this thesis aims to contribute to all these research literatures in various capacities and levels, with the primary objective of establishing an introductory framework for the emerging *global research literature* concerning the Central Sudan.

This situation has resulted in two significant consequences. Firstly, the extensive availability of material not only facilitated the development of this thesis but also, in many instances, conferred an authoritative tone. Due to their lack of sources to clarify, various research literatures propose differing theories, speculations, or assumptions for many particular issues, whereas I had the opportunity to deliver precise answers for them, thereby resolving certain speculations or correcting prevalent misconceptions. Such precision, however, can be indicative of a deficiency in research literature, which often lacks sufficient sources, potentially leading to the perception that the author possesses an unfounded sense of authority. Nonetheless, the accuracy of this work on various issues does not imply that it represents the definitive conclusion on research pertaining to Central Sudan. As will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, numerous new questions emerge throughout this study. For this reason, it is crucial to emphasize the introductory character of this thesis; while it is really putting an end for many long speculated or assumed issues, it simultaneously introduces new questions that can only be thoroughly examined through future research within global research literature.

The second consequence of this introductory nature is the absence of a comprehensive *state-of-the-art* part in the analytical chapters. Typically, it is methodologically essential to present a *state-of-the-art* overview prior to any analysis to clarify the contribution of the work. However, in this thesis, the question was determining the *state-of-the-art* according to which research literatures? Ideally, this would entail summarizing the Anglophone, Francophone, German, Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish research literatures, a task that would constitute a thesis in its own right and would be both intriguing and, to some extent, necessary. Nevertheless, considering this work serves as an introductory contribution to the global research literature—of which we are still in the nascent stages—there is no traditional state-of-the-art section included. This absence does not imply a lack of discussion regarding the issues and debates present in various research literatures throughout the thesis. Their local contributions were still important for the whole analysis, since they found their

places in many chapters. In instances where long-standing speculations or misleading assumptions were identified, I included extensive footnotes to elucidate the issues and present new findings.

2) New Spatial Frame for Analysis

Constructing a thesis in Germany, articulated in English, and primarily utilizing Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources presents several significant challenges. The foremost challenge I encountered pertained to the spatial framework of my research. My inquiry fluctuated between the Central Sahara and *Bilad Sudan*, which includes contemporary Niger, Chad, northern Nigeria, and northern Cameroon. However, the original materials I examined revealed a different reality. It is indeed no more secret that the idea of the division between “North Africa/Maghreb” and “Sub-Saharan Africa” was a European invention, rooted in racism and colonialism, which continues to influence academic disciplines and research paradigms within African Studies around the world.³⁷ Still, it was enlightening to observe how original Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources delineated their regions beyond the confines of contemporary conceptualizations. In this regard, it became evident that an analysis of the history of governance and political economy in Hausaland, Bornu, and Wadai necessitates an examination of the governance and political economy of Tripolitania. It is well-documented that these regions were interconnected through the renowned trans-Saharan trade:³⁸ however, it was less apparent that their connections extended beyond economic ties to encompass political, governmental, and epistemological dimensions. For instance, the reform movements occurring in Tripolitania during the first half of the 19th century were seldom contextualized alongside the concurrent reform movements in Hausaland, notwithstanding their interrelatedness. This profound interconnectedness, as evidenced in the Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources, extends beyond Central Sudan to include cities such as Istanbul, Damascus, Cairo, Sanaa (present-day Yemen), and even as far as Java in Indonesia. Thus, the history of Central Sudan in the 19th century can be characterized as a global history, not only due to extensive political and economic

37 Abdelmajid Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb Between Africa and the Middle East* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

38 Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, ‘Introduction. Neither a Divide nor an Empty Space: The Sahara as a Bridge’, in *Bridges Across the Sahara: Social, Economic and Cultural Impact of the Trans-Sahara Trade During the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).

interconnections³⁹ but also because of the expansive scholarly networks that existed.⁴⁰ In this thesis, I will refer to this global dimension as *Afroglobal History*.⁴¹

The spatial frame that the original materials were implying was the region of the Central Sudan (Ar. *Sudan al-Awsad*; Ha. *Sudan ta Tsakiya*; Tr. *Merkezi Sudan*), as they named. This region extends from Tripoli and Benghazi to Hausaland, Bornu, and Wadai, traversing the areas of Kel Tamasheq (in Anglophone research literature, Tuareg) and Teda (in Anglophone research literature, Tibu or Toubou). In this context, the connections established were not limited to two poles within the region; rather, all different areas were connected to each other in various ways. Hence, there existed a complex web of political, economic, governmental, and epistemological networks that traversed the Sahara in all directions. This shared spatial frame also explains why there are so many sources, including several personal correspondences between rulers, scholars, agents, and merchants, in Libya and in the Ottoman archives in Turkey about Hausaland, Bornu, and Wadai.

3) Analysing with the Afro-Islamic Epistemology

The second challenge, which also serves as a significant contribution to this research, pertains to the complexities involved in understanding Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources, which are shaped by their unique epistemological frameworks. Although this challenge could potentially hinder comprehensive analysis in other contexts, it proved to be an advantageous opportunity in the context of my study. A key observation that emerged was the prevalent use of the Arabic term

39 For instance, Lafi already stated in 2008 that “The stake today is... to reinsert the study of so-called “non-western” societies into a global history that is global not only in its geographical extent, but also, and mainly, by its use of global concepts...” Nora Lafi, ‘Mediterranean Connections: The Circulation of Municipal Knowledge and Practices at the Time of the Ottoman Reforms, c.1830-1910’, in *Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850-2000*, ed. Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen (Springer, 2008), In digital version, 6.

40 For instance, as Warscheid clearly stated in 2020: “It seems... important... [to] ask what such [Arabic scholarly] texts may teach us about the global evolution of ideas and concepts within the intellectual landscape of the Islamic West.” Ismail Warscheid, ‘The West African Jihād Movements and the Islamic Legal Literature of the Southwestern Sahara (1650–1850)’, *Journal of West African History* 6, no. 2 (2020): 36.

41 The concept of “Afroglobal history” was first coined by Joël Glasman during a session at the Historian Conference held in Leipzig in 2023. Glasman's primary emphasis was on the significant contributions of Africa to the historical developments that facilitated the emergence of the notions of globality and global history, which he encapsulated under the term Afroglobal history. In my formal report on this session, I contended that, in addition to Glasman's perspective, there exists a history of globality that was either established or actively utilized by African actors prior to the onset of colonial invasions, which has rendered its historical presence less perceptible in contemporary discourse. In essence, there exists a largely under-explored Afroglobal history that was not shaped or propagated by European powers, who instead played a role in its obliteration. Consequently, uncovering this history necessitates extensive archival research in languages such as Arabic, Hausa, Swahili, and Turkish; see: Kerem Duymus, ‘Afroglobale Geschichte Der Gegenwart (Beiträge Zur Theorie Der Globalgeschichte)’, Session Report, Historiker Tag (Leipzig: H-Soz-Kult, 2023).

"*siyasa*" within the primary sources. Although my primary research focus was the history of governance in Central Sudan during the 19th century, I soon recognized its profound connection to political-economic matters. Consequently, my research began to navigate the interplay between governance and political-economic affairs. Upon further examination of the epistemological dimensions, it became evident that the term "*siyasa*" effectively encompasses both themes. Actors in Central Sudan during the 19th century, particularly in the first half of the century, employed this term primarily to denote "governance." A notable example is Muhammad Bello's text, *Usul al-Siyasa* [*Principle of Governance*]. By the latter half of the 19th century, the term's association with "political economic affairs" became increasingly pronounced, as illustrated in Al-Bakkay's work *Siyasa bayn Masina wa Sokoto* [*Political Economic Affairs between Masina and Sokoto*]. In other words, for these actors, the term "*siyasa*" facilitated a conceptualization that integrated governance and political economic affairs, establishing it as a foundational element of this thesis.

Furthermore, the real contribution of the epistemological research to the thesis goes much deeper. Indeed, the consideration of "local" perspectives or epistemologies is not a new approach within anthropological or historical studies in Africa; yet, the application of these epistemologies is hindered by a methodological dichotomy that distinguishes between emic and etic perspectives. In this context, "local" epistemologies provide valuable insights into indigenous viewpoints (emic perspective). However, these epistemologies are often regarded as subjective and culturally specific, leading researchers to adopt an etic perspective, which is perceived as an objective and scientific framework for analysis.⁴² This methodological classification has faced criticism within decolonial studies for several reasons.⁴³

Firstly, the etic perspective lacks a clearly defined epistemology, considering there is no singular, universal, objective, or scientific epistemology; rather, epistemologies are shaped by cultural and historical contexts, this classification implicitly positions European history-based epistemology as the standard for objectivity and scientific rigour. Secondly, it establishes a stark distinction between European history-based epistemology, which is deemed suitable for analytical purposes, and other epistemologies that are considered lacking in objectivity and scientific validity, thereby rendering them inappropriate for analysis. These underlying assumptions within the methodology complicate the seemingly straightforward task of analysing the history of *siyasa* in Central Sudan through its

42 T. Mostowlansky & A. Rota, Emic and etic, In *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Anthropology* (eds) F. Stein, S. Lazar, M. Candea, H. Diemberger, J. Robbins, A. Sanchez & R. Stasch, 2020.

43 Claudio Maldonado Rivera, 'Introducción: Apuntes Sobre Descolonización Epistémica En El Pensamiento Comunicológico Regional', *Chasqui. Revista Latinoamericana de Comunicación* 131 (2016): 39–46.

own epistemological lens. Notably, in the research literature pertaining to Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish contexts, this approach (analysing the Central Sudan with its own epistemology) is often taken for granted, requiring no further elaboration.

Nevertheless, the works in Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish literatures contain also several generalization and reductionist problems. This can be attributed to the nascent stage of comprehensive research on Afro-Islamic epistemology. Although many scholars engaged in Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish research literatures recognize the diverse dimensions of this epistemology, the systematic and thorough integration of these insights remains a significant challenge. The primary reason for this is that, while the existence and scope of Afro-Islamic epistemology are well-documented within these research traditions, its systematic analysis is often contingent upon access to rare, unedited manuscripts located in various parts of the world. Therefore, researchers face considerable obstacles in acquiring a holistic understanding of this epistemology, since they must travel to multiple countries to access the necessary manuscripts.

Another challenge lies in the accurate translation of this epistemology into English. The primary sources of Afro-Islamic epistemology are predominantly in Arabic, with additional materials available in Hausa and Turkish. Consequently, the terminology employed to articulate specific principles and arguments poses significant translation difficulties. Although I will offer translations for certain terms and provide comprehensive explanations, I will retain the original terms throughout the thesis. The reason for this is the fact that translations of the terms have a quality that is only proper for an introduction, rather than in-depth analytical discourse. For instance, translating the term *tadbir* as “ruling through interventions”, does not imply a similarity with what “interventionism” means in the European history based epistemology. The same is true for the term *riasa*, as its translation “ruling through leadership” does not necessarily mean “authoritarianism”. These concepts—“interventionism” and “authoritarianism”—are embedded within their own historical and cultural frameworks in European epistemologies, which cannot be directly equated with the historical and cultural contexts of “*tadbir*” and “*riasa*.” In other words, there are also some challenges for the readers, considering they are asked to be open to the development of new conceptual frameworks in their understanding.

Another difficulty in using Afro-Islamic epistemology is the ambiguity in understanding an epistemology in the context of African history. The longstanding dismissal of the analytical nature of this epistemology—similar to the treatment of other epistemologies globally—within

Anglophone and Francophone scholarly literature has fostered a tendency to reduce Afro-Islamic epistemology to either an abstract intellectual exercise or to a “local” phenomenon, without having any real implementation for a whole region.⁴⁴ In reality, one can even analyse the history of Europe with the Afro-Islamic epistemology, which would not be less problematic than analysing African history with European history based epistemologies. Inasmuch as the term of “epistemology” implies a system of knowing and thinking, the notions that are used to explain various ways of thinking in this epistemology are more than simple models or theories. This is particularly evident in historical analyses of European contexts. For instance, when examining the economic policies of a 19th-century kingdom that adhered to protectionist principles, it is not requisite for the ministers or the monarch to have engaged with the extensive scholarly literature on protectionism. The alignment of its economic management with the foundational principles, assumptions, arguments, and propositions of protectionism serves as a clear indicator of the state's economic policy orientation. Similarly, the assertion that Yusuf *paşa* in Tripoli implemented the principle of *tadbir* does not imply that he meticulously studied all scholarly works on the subject. Rather, the governance strategies he employed reflect the core assumptions, arguments, and propositions associated with *tadbir*, irrespective of whether Yusuf *paşa* explicitly acknowledged this alignment.

Indeed, during the 19th century, numerous instances in Central Sudan demonstrate that rulers, governors, and scholars employed the terminology of the Afro-Islamic epistemology and engaged in discussions surrounding its concepts. This also illustrates the dynamic character of the Afro-Islamic epistemology and the agency of every actor. It is accurate to conclude that no actor in Central Sudan operated in isolation; rather, their actions were passed through the Afro-Islamic epistemological framework. However, this does not imply that such frameworks were rigid or monolithic. As illustrated throughout the thesis, nearly all participants interacted with this epistemology in ways that reflected their unique backgrounds, needs, and interests. In this regard, it was not unusual for rulers to adapt their governance strategies, transitioning from *riasa* to *tadbir*, or to tailor their governance systems to meet specific requirements. In certain instances, rulers applied the principle of *tadbir* to particular domains, such as economic and internal matters, while employing the principle of *idara* in political and external affairs. Additionally, there were cases where actors developed their own distinctive interpretations of governance, thereby contributing to the evolution

44 For the same problem in Latin American epistemologies, see: Rosa O'Connor Acevedo, ‘El Giro Epstémico Decolonial: Ctrítica Da La Colonialidad-Modernidad Hacia Un Proyecto Transmoderno’, *Diálogos* 99 (2016): 127–37.

of Afro-Islamic epistemology and significantly influencing its historical transformation for subsequent generations.

Apart from this, the 19th century represented a distinctive period for Central Sudan in terms of epistemological interactions. Following the significant expansion of Ottoman rule into and beyond the Sahara after the 1840s, reaching as far as Bornu, a complex interplay emerged between Afro-Islamic and Ottoman-Islamic epistemologies. Given their shared Islamic foundation, numerous concepts and principles were translatable; for instance, *idara* applying *hakim* in Afro-Islamic epistemology, became *idara* applying *müdür* in the Ottoman-Islamic epistemology. This interaction also revealed notable differences that occasionally led to misunderstandings or conflicts. A particularly intriguing example is the invention that resulted from the intersection of these two epistemologies. In the case of Bornu, the Ottomans invented an entirely new principle of governance, the *mutawalli* system, which had not been present in either Afro-Islamic or Ottoman-Islamic epistemology prior to this development. Furthermore, the rulers of Bornu not only embraced this unique system but also implemented it in their governance. In other words, this constituted a novel contribution to both Ottoman-Islamic epistemology and Afro-Islamic epistemology.

With these three essential contributions, the research questions were also re-shaped, focusing on following topics: Who were the determining actors in the Central Sudan in terms of *siyasa* during the 19th century? What kind of epistemological background did they act on? What were the dynamics, changes, and patterns of *siyasa* in the region throughout the century? To answer these questions, the following structure is built.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured in two primary parts of historical analysis, accompanied by an epistemological chapter that elucidates key analytical terms.

The first chapter is *Afro-Islamic Epistemology on Governance in West Africa before the 19th Century*. This chapter begins by introducing the new academic approaches to the Afro-Islamic epistemology and its development. Subsequently, it provides an explanation of several significant concepts. After establishing the analytical context of these concepts during the formative period of Islam, the following sub-chapter explores the contributions of notable West African scholars who

played a pivotal role in shaping these concepts within the Central Sudan leading up to the 19th century. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, the selection of scholars discussed in this sub-chapter is deliberate; they were the most cited, and therefore most influential, actors in the Central Sudan by various rulers and scholars.

Following a comprehensive exploration of the epistemological foundation, the thesis shifts its focus to a historical analysis. The *First Part* of this analysis pertains to *The Era of Reform*. This section investigates the diverse reform movements that emerged concurrently across Central Sudan during the early 19th century, which were interconnected in numerous respects. Given that these reforms sought a fundamental transformation in governance structures, this period was predominantly characterized by discussions and aspirations regarding the system of governance, representing the initial aspect of the concept of *siyasa*.

In this *First Part*, Chapter 2 sheds light on the transformation of governance in Tripolitania with the title *Challenges with Global Entanglements: The Transformation of Governance in Ottoman Tripoli*. The chapter centres on the visions and ambitions of key figures such as Yusuf paşa, Muhammad al-Mukni, and Hassuna Dagayyis, who were instrumental in shaping the region's political landscape. The intricate relationships among these individuals, along with their negotiations with Central Sudan and broader global interactions, present a nuanced understanding of West African history and its connections to global historical narratives. Recent discoveries from various European archives, particularly a wealth of documents from Turkey and Libya, reveal previously obscured aspects of this history, thereby illuminating the complex dynamics of governance that extend beyond traditional narratives focused on "piracy" and "slave trade."

Chapter 3, titled *Islamic “Revivalism” (riasa) vs Vassalage System (tadbir): Separations and Convergences in the Governance of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, Bornu, and Wadai*, redirect the analytical inquiry towards south following many references to this part of the Central Sudan in the Chapter 2. The chapter's core content consists of an examination of the reform plans and transformation of these plans devised by the various actors who significantly influenced the region during the first half of the nineteenth century. The revivalist jihad movements led by the dan Fodiyo family, including prominent figures such as Uthman dan Fodiyo, Abdullahi dan Fodiyo, and Muhammad Bello, are examined in conjunction with the political and economic contexts, revealing the intricate nature of their governance strategies, since they transitioned between different principles. The robust scholarly tradition associated with these figures offers a precious lens to

understand the reception of diverse legacies of Afro-Islamic epistemology within the region. Notably, the diplomatic relationship between Muhammad Bello of Sokoto and al-Amin al-Kanemi of Bornu exemplifies the "differences in similarities" regarding the reception of Afro-Islamic epistemology, influenced by various scholarly networks and their legacies throughout West Africa. Furthermore, al-Kanemi's vision for a reformed Bornu state underscores the profound interconnectedness of Central Sudan with Egypt, Hijaz, and the Ottoman Empire. A similar ambition is evident in Abdulkadir Sabun's endeavours in Wadai, considering he sought to establish a formidable sultanate, following al-Kanemi's example with his own aspiration. The extensive materials available in Arabic and Hausa sources facilitate a comprehensive understanding of these complex dynamics within the chapter.

Chapter 4 with the title *Sahrawi Side of Governance: Patterns and Changes in the Trans-Sahara Dynamics*, shifts the focus to the Sahara, specifically analysing the merchant communities in Ghadames and Murzuk, alongside their Kel Tamasheq counterparts in Azgher and Air, as well as the Teda neighbours in Tibesti and Kavar. These regions and their inhabitants played a pivotal role in facilitating connections between the northern and southern parts of the Sahara. However, the internal dynamics of these communities were far more complex than merely serving as intermediaries or simply being *in-between*. Through a detailed examination of various local manuscripts, letters, and personal interviews, the chapter illustrates that each local region and its actors developed distinct visions and governance strategies to navigate the political and economic challenges posed by the harsh desert environment. For instance, the governance systems in Ghadames and Murzuk exhibited markedly different characteristics and dynamics. The roles and influences of the Kel Tamasheq and Teda communities within these systems were also significantly divergent. Importantly, as highlighted in the chapter, the distinctions between the Kel Tamasheq and Teda communities extended beyond mere "ethnic" differences; they each possessed unique political and economic frameworks for engaging with other actors traversing their territories. Another crucial point is the active engagement of various actors in the changing power dynamics in the region, such as the al-Ansari family in Ghat and Abdulkarim Salih in Bilma, shaping the future of the region in terms of governmental shift. In this context, the Sahara was not an exception to the broader trends of reform during this period.

The Second Part of analysis is *The Era of Expansion*. Although the conclusion of the reform era exhibited minor regional variations, it can be generally observed that, during the latter half of the

19th century, discussions surrounding reforms and governance largely diminished. Instead, various stakeholders redirected their focus towards political and economic matters and territorial expansion within their respective regions, rather than pursuing alterations to the governance system. In this respect, in being shaped by the political economic affairs, this era was about the second meaning of the *siyasa*.

Chapter 5, titled *From idara to islah: Administrative Complexities of the Ottoman Empire in the Central Sudan*, proceeds to examine the various other aspects of the Ottoman Empire in the Central Sudan during the latter half of the 19th century. This period was characterized by a significant division within the Empire, marked by two distinct visions: one articulated by reformist officers associated with the later *Ittihat Terakki* movement, and the other by Sultan Abdülhamid II. The reformist movements primarily directed expansionist policies, whereas Abdülhamid II concurrently formulated his own strategy for Central Sudan, which aligned with the emergence of the Sanussiyya religious brotherhood (Ar. *tariqa*). As a result, Abdülhamid II and the Sanusiyya played a multifaceted role in the region, at times supporting expansionist efforts, at other times paralleling them, and occasionally opposing them. The vision of Abdülhamid II, which sought to promote the expansion of Islam, transcended various imperial entities, including the Ottoman Empire itself, with the objective of establishing a global Islamic federation under the leadership of the Ottoman caliph (that is to say himself), devoid of any formal imperial structure. These divergent visions within the Empire frequently led to internal conflicts within the Ottoman bureaucracy, significantly influencing the Empire's actions in Central Sudan. Furthermore, the influence of reformist Ottoman officers, Abdülhamid II, and Sanusiyya extended beyond religious or political matters, providing a crucial impetus for the region's trade development. In this regard, the trans-Saharan trade experienced an unprecedented transformation during the latter half of the 19th century.

Chapter 6, *Ambivalent Expansion of the Ottoman Empire towards the Sahara and conflict with France*, explores the Ottoman Empire's territorial expansion into the Sahara and its subsequent confrontations with French involvement in Central Sudan. This chapter highlights a distinctive episode in the history of the Ottoman Empire, wherein the Empire experienced significant territorial growth in the Sahara despite its overall decline in other regions. This phenomenon perplexed European powers, particularly France and Britain, which harboured their own colonial ambitions in Central Sudan. They struggled to comprehend how the so-called "sick man of Europe," a term used to describe the Ottoman Empire, could engage in such ambitious expansionist policies during the

twilight of its existence. However, the underlying dynamics of this expansion were markedly different; local actors played a crucial role in facilitating the Ottoman Empire's growth, often possessing aspirations that the central authority in Istanbul could not envision. Hence, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire was primarily a non-military response to the initiatives of local actors, rather than a manifestation of imperialist colonial ambitions akin to those of France and Britain. This non-aggressive approach ultimately led to the voluntary incorporation of regions such as Bornu and Wadai into the Ottoman Empire by the end of the century. The distinct nature of this expansion resulted in various complications between the Ottoman Empire and French colonial forces, particularly as the latter sought to assert control over the entire Sahara. Consequently, local communities and villages became focal points of contention between the French and Ottoman foreign offices, transforming Central Sudan into a significant arena of international discourse once again.

Chapter 7, *Expansion and Economic Boom: Political Economic Affairs of Utmaniyya, Bornu, and Wadai*, shifts the focus to the southern region of Central Sudan, analysing the expansionist policies of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate through its sub-emirates, as well as the dynamics of Bornu and Wadai in relation to their vassal states. Following a period of reform, these states experienced an expansion reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire. Local and peripheral actors articulated their own visions and ambitions for expansion on behalf of their respective states, often surpassing the expectations of Sokoto, Kuka, and Abeche. These expansions were executed with a strategic approach aimed at preventing conflicts between the emerging peripheral sub-emirates and their central states, notwithstanding instances where these peripheral entities temporarily eclipsed the authority of their central counterparts and came into a conflict. Similarly, Sokoto, Kuka, and Abeche adeptly navigated these expansions, ensuring that their growth did not conflict with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, to a certain extent, facilitated the southern expansions. Accordingly, the whole region created a decentral political bloc acting mutually in its unique expansionist politic, while also creating several losing sides in this expansion. This chapter demonstrates that by the end of the nineteenth century, the Central Sudanic states were at their apogee in terms of power and expansion, a period which has been erroneously assumed by Anglophone and Francophone research literature to be one of decline and chaos.

In conclusion, the final chapter synthesizes the findings from two analytical sections to present a comprehensive overview of the Afroglobal history of *siyasa*, which encompasses governance and political economic matters, in Central Sudan during the 19th century.

1. Afro-Islamic Epistemology on Governance in West Africa before the 19th Century

Following the 1990s, IRCICA initiated a series of international conferences aimed at fostering systematic analyses of global Islamic epistemologies, particularly among scholars from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. These efforts not only resulted in significant publications that advanced the field of Islamic studies but also contributed to the broader discipline of global history. Through these conferences and subsequent publications, numerous scholars from the Islamic world have illuminated various regional epistemologies, including Afro-Islamic epistemology,⁴⁵ Ottoman-Islamic epistemology,⁴⁶ Asian-Islamic epistemology,⁴⁷ and Balkanian-Islamic epistemology.⁴⁸ These scholarly contributions enhance our understanding of Islam's global influence through both academic inquiry and political-economic interactions. They also highlight the unique regional characteristics of these epistemologies, which, despite their distinctiveness, continue to engage with one another.

In the case of Africa, the dissemination of the Afro-Islamic epistemology not only established a distinct identity separate from other Islamic epistemologies but also fostered regional characteristics across West Africa,⁴⁹ Central Africa,⁵⁰ East Africa,⁵¹ and South Africa.⁵² In Central Sudan, a complex interplay of scholarly networks and traditions from both West and Central Africa emerged, wherein

45 Halit Eren, ed., *Buhuth Al-Nadwat al-Dawliyat Hawl Tarikh al-Hadarat al-Islamiyat Fi Sharq Ifriqiya* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2018); Abdu Kasozi and Sadık Ünay, eds., *Islamic Civilization in Southern Africa. History, Contemporary State & Future Perspectives* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006); Seyni Moumouni and Hamadou Adama, eds., *Islamic History and Civilization in West Africa, Bilad as-Soudan* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2020); Mahmud Erol Kılıç, ed., *Islamic Civilization in Southern Africa. History, Contemporary State & Future Perspectives* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2024).

46 Halit Eren, ed., *History of The Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2001); Arian Kadiu and Ramiz Zekaj, eds., *The Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in the Balkans* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2007).

47 Tavfik Abdullah, ed., *Proceedings of the International Seminar on Islamic Civilisation in the Malay World* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999); Halit Eren, ed., *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in South Asia* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2013); Halit Eren, ed., *History and Governance of Awqaf in South and Southeast Asia: Colonial Interventions and Modern States* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2019).

48 Kadiu and Zekaj, *The Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in the Balkans*; Damir Ishaqov, ed., *Tatar History and Civilisation* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2010).

49 Samba Dieng, ed., *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999).

50 Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb, eds., *Al-tarikh wa-l-hadariyat al-islamiyat fi wasat Ifrikiya* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021).

51 Abdu Kasozi and Sadık Ünay, eds., *Proceedings of the International Symposium on "Islamic Civilisation in Eastern Africa"* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006).

52 Mahomed Haroon and Essop Dangor, eds., *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in Southern Africa* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2009).

scholars engaged in debates on similar issues, employing diverse arguments and scholarly references. These networks and traditions were instrumental in the development of Afro-Islamic epistemology, since they interacted with other Islamic epistemologies while addressing local conditions. In addition, this epistemological heritage received various receptions during the 19th century. The objective of this thesis is not to explore all facets of Afro-Islamic epistemology, nor to focus solely on governance, as such an endeavour would constitute a separate doctoral project. Instead, this thesis concentrates on a specific aspect of Afro-Islamic epistemology, particularly the reception in Central Sudan during the 19th century. It is important to note that various concepts, principles, and ideas were already being debated and utilized in different regions of West Africa across various centuries. However, in Central Sudan during the 19th century, the three key principles of *siyāsa*—namely *ri'āsa*, *tadbīr*, and *'idāra*—significantly influenced the entire governmental and political-economic landscape.⁵³

Scholars extensively examined and significantly influenced the principles during Islam's formative period, from the 8th to the 15th century.⁵⁴ In West-Central Africa, these principles were reinterpreted and assimilated into Afro-Islamic epistemology concerning *siyāsa* through scholarly networks and traditions. Therefore, prior to analysing the reinterpretations by West African scholars, it is essential to understand the fundamental perspectives and arguments associated with these principles.

1.1. Formative background of the principles of *ri'āsa*, *tadbīr*, and *'idāra*

***Ri'āsa*: Ruling through Leadership**

The term *ri'āsa*, derived from *ra's* (Ar. head) through *ra'īs* (Ar. leader), can be translated as "leadership." In classical texts, it primarily conveys the direct authority of the ruler.⁵⁵ The principle of *ri'āsa* is fundamentally based on the premise that individuals lacking a leader in the community/state would descend into disorder, considering they need a paternal figure such as a father or shepherd. This principle sees individuals as having an inferior and unruly nature in

53 For more details, see my forthcoming article: "A Discursive Analysis of Debates on Governance in the Classical Age: *riasa*, *tadbir*, and *idara*"

54 For more details concerning the debates on these concepts in the formative period, see my forthcoming article: "Eine kumulative diskursive Analyse von *Siyasa* in den klassischen Texten: Was Bedeutet *ri'āsa*, *tadbīr*, and *'idāra*?"

55 For instance, see: 'Abū Ḥammū Mūsā al-Zayyānī, *Wāsiṭat Al-Sulūk Fī Siyāsāt al- Mulūk*, ed. Amendine Lefol, vol. 2 (Paris: Ph.D. Thesis, 2019), 38.

governance.⁵⁶ In this regard, it is unequivocally prohibited to rebel against the existing rulers, irrespective of the extent of their despotism, injustice, or deviation from Sharia law.⁵⁷ This indicates that the manner in which a ruler governs his domain is of secondary importance, provided that he possesses unquestionable authority, which is the most important. Additionally, this principle considers the caliph to be the solemn religious leader of all Muslims in the world. Consequently, the possibility of multiple caliphs existing concurrently is unequivocally dismissed.⁵⁸

In more specific cases, the principle of *ri'āsa* incorporates two additional terms to clarify the nature of rulership. The fundamental premise of this principle centres not on the methods employed by a ruler in governance, but on the means by which the ruler acquires absolute authority. The first avenue through which rulers may legitimize their position is by invoking the concept of *sulṭa* (Ar. authority), which posits that rulership must be grounded in a legal foundation, such as the endorsement of a preceding ruler or election by elite members of society. In this scenario, rulers possess a legitimate basis for their authority, thereby granting them the right to exercise *ri'āsa* within their domain without any limit.⁵⁹ The second avenue involves the acquisition of authority through sheer force or power, referred to as *ṣawka* (Ar. force, power), wherein a ruler may suppress rival candidates through violent means. In this case, the ruler's military strength makes him unassailable, thus conferring upon him the right to govern.⁶⁰ In conclusion, the chief characteristic

56 An example from 'Abū al-Qaṣīm Ibn Riḍwān (d. 1381), see: 'Abū al-Qaṣīm Ibn Riḍwān, *Al-Šuḥub al-Lamī'a Fī al-Siyāsa al-Naḥī'a* (Casablanca: Dar al-tafih, 1984), 38; for an example from Al-Kinānī al-Baṣrī ('Al-Ġāhiz') (d. 869), see: Charles Pellat, 'L'Imamat Dans La Doctrine de Ġāhiz', *Studia Islamica* 15 (1961): 40; for an example from Ibn 'Abd Rabbih (d. 940), see: Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, *Al-'Iqd al-Farīd*, vol. Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1983), 33–35; for an example from Ibrāhīm al-Ḥayr baytī (d. 1440), see: Ibrāhīm al-Ḥayr baytī, *Kitāb Al-Durrah al-Gharrā' Fī Naṣīḥat al-Salāṭīn Wa-al-Quḍāt Wa-al-Umarā'* (Riyadh: Maktabat nizar mustaf'a al-baz, 1996), 23.

57 for an example from Abū Bakr aṭ-Ṭurṭūshī (d. 1127), see: Abū Bakr aṭ-Ṭurṭūshī, *Sirāj Al-Mulūk*, ed. Ja'far al-Bayātī (London: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1990), 147; Badr al-Dīn ibn Ġamā'a, 'Taḥrīr Al-Aḥkām Fī Tadbīr Ahl al-Islām', in *Islamica*, 6, ed. H. Kofler, 1934, 349–414; for an example from Badr ad-dīn ibn Ġamā'a (d. 1333), see: Badr al-Dīn ibn Ġamā'a, 355; for an example from Ibn Ali al-Qal'ī (d. 1233), see: Ibn Ali al-Qal'ī, *Tahdīb Ar-Ri'asa Wa Tartīb as-Siyāsa*, ed. Ibrahim Yusuf 'Ajjū (Zarqa: Maktabat al-manar, 1985), 108–16; for an example from Aḥmad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī (d. 1066), see: Aḥmad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī, *Al-Ġāmi'a Liš'ab al-'iyimani*, vol. Vol. 9 (Riyadh: Maktab al-Rushd, 2003), 476.

58 For an example from Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013), see: Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, *Al-Tamhīd Fī'l-Radd 'Alā'l-Mulhidat al-Mu'attala*, ed. M.M Khudayrī & A. Abū Rīda (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1947), 181; for an example from Muḥammad ar-Raḥbī ('Al-Simnānī') (d. 1100), see: Muḥammad al-Raḥbī ('Al-Simnānī'), *Rawḍat Al-Quḍāh Wa Ṭarīq al-Naja*, ed. S..D. Al-Nahi, vol. Vol 1 (Baghdad: Matba'at As'ad, 1970), 58.

59 For an example from Ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī (d. 1058), see: Ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya Wa-l-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyya*, trans. Asadullah Yate (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996), 12; for an example from Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ġuwaynī (d. 1085), see: 'Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ġuwaynī, *Al-'irṣād*, ed. J. D. Luciani (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1938), 231.

60 For an example from Keikāvus Ibn Iskandar (d. 1087), see: Keikāvus Ibn Iskandar, *Qabus-Nama*, trans. Reuben Levy (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1951), 228; for an example from 'Abū Bakr al-Tilimsānī ('Ibn Marzūq') (d. 1380), see: 'Abū Bakr al-Tilimsānī ('Ibn Marzūq'), *Al-Musnad al-Šaḥīḥ al-Ḥasan Fī Māṭar Wa Maḥāsin Mawlānā 'abī al-Ḥasan*, ed. Maria J. Bigera (Algeria: Al-Maktabat al-Wataniyat al-Jazariyat, 1981), 99.

of the principle of *ri'āsa* is the provision of comprehensive authority to rulers, extending even beyond the confines of sharia, in the execution of their duties.

***Tadbīr*: Ruling through Intervention**

The word *tadbīr* literally implies “precaution” and, in a more general sense, “prudence”, however, in the context of classical texts, it appears in several cases as a synonym of “governance.”⁶¹ The principle of *tadbīr* advocates for a cautious approach to power, positing that power can serve as a basis for legitimate rulership, whereas it may also incite rebellion and can be both beneficial and perilous. Along this line, it is imperative to exercise power wisely, preferably through indirect means and subtle interventions, irrespective of the ruler's justification for the authority.⁶² In essence, the manner in which rulers obtain authority is of lesser consequence than the manner in which they govern. The fundamental tenet of this principle emphasizes the importance of compromise in addressing issues, rather than adhering strictly to the rule of sharia or granting absolute authority to a ruler. In this context, the populace retains the right to revolt against an unjust, tyrannical, or ineffective ruler, but they must have a clear chance to dethrone him.⁶³ The same follows in the question of more than one caliph. As usual methodology of this principle, there is no absolute prohibition against the existence of more than one caliph concurrently; rather, the legitimacy of such a situation is contingent upon specific conditions. If significant geographical separation exists between two Muslim communities, making it impractical for them to be governed by a single caliph or imam, then the presence of multiple caliphs or imams is deemed legitimate.⁶⁴

For more specific cases, there are also two additional terms to explain and apply *tadbīr*. The first case is ruling through making political and economic reforms, named *ʾiṣlāḥ* (Ar. reform). In this scenario, rulers are encouraged to concentrate on the underlying conditions rather than the immediate issues of governance. Their objective should be to establish optimal conditions that

61 For instance, see: 'Abū Ḥammū Mūsā al-Zayyānī, *Wāsiyat Al-Sulūk Fī Siyāsāt al-Mulūk*, 2:38.

62 For an example from Al-Ṭa'ālībī (d. 1038), see: Al-Ṭa'ālībī, *Ādāb Al-Mulūk* (Beirut: Dar al-garb al-Islami, 1990), 49–50; for an example from Ibn 'Alī Tūsī ('Nizām al-Mulk') (d. 1092), see: Ibn 'Alī Tūsī ('Nizām al-Mulk'), *Siyasat-Nama*, trans. Hubert Darke (London: Routledge, 2002), cp. 50.

63 For an example from Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī (d. 1111), see: Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī, *Iqtisād Al-i'tiqād* (Beirut: Dar al-nashr dar wamaktabat alhila), 295; for an example from Al-Bazdawī Faḥr al-Islām (d. 1099), see: Al-Bazdawī Faḥr al-Islām, *Kaṣf Al-Asrār 'alā Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyyah, 1997), 92; for an example from Ibn Ḥaldūn al-Ḥaḍramī (d. 1406), see: Ibn Ḥaldūn al-Ḥaḍramī, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), 421–23.

64 For an example from 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037), see: 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl Al-Dīn* (Istanbul: Matbaat Al-daylat, 1928), 275–275; for an example from 'Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ġuwaynī (d. 1085), see: 'Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ġuwaynī, *Giyāt Al-Umam f-Ilṭiyāt al-Ḍulam* (Alexandria: Dar Al-Daw'a, 1979), 257.

facilitate problem-solving without resorting to coercive measures. It is posited that if rulers adeptly manipulate the hopes and fears of the populace, they can effectively employ a combination of incentives and deterrents to maintain control without the necessity of overt displays of power.⁶⁵ In the second case, the personal engagement of the ruler is asked, which may require transcending the boundaries of sharia, whilst remaining consistent with its principles, a process referred to as *ra'y*, (Ar. personal reasoning). In this scenario, rulers are expected to develop a parallel legal framework to sharia that aligns with their interests, known as *radd al-mazalim* (Ar. redressing the grievances). With this delicate strategy, rulers are allowed to argue that they are addressing issues based on their personal reasoning rather than adhering strictly to legal protocols, just to facilitate a more effective application of sharia.⁶⁶ Through similar strategies, rulers can circumvent various bureaucratic, social, political, or military constraints, engaging in a complex interplay that positions them as acting in accordance with existing power dynamics while simultaneously augmenting their own authority.⁶⁷ In conclusion, the fundamental characteristic of the *tadbīr* principle is a way of governance through indirect interventions, thereby aligning sharia with the interests of the rulers.

'Idāra: Ruling through Administration

The term *'idāra* corresponds to “management” or “administration”, signifying a particular mode of governance that emphasizes the self-regulation of sharia and the operational administration through the collaborative efforts of individuals at the core of governance. This perspective is encapsulated in the assertion that “an unjust ruler in a regulated system is preferable to a just ruler in an unregulated system.”⁶⁸ In this context, the concept of rulership is largely detached from the individuals in power, who are viewed merely as administrators tasked with the execution of sharia.⁶⁹ Even the presence of a ruler is not an absolute necessity, considering the ruler functions as a minor component within the

65 For an example from Abū Bakr al-Murādī al-Ḥaḍramī (d. 1095), see: Abū Bakr al-Murādī al-Ḥaḍramī, *Kitāb Al-Iṣāra Ilā Adab al-Imāra*, ed. Ridwan Al-Sayid (Beirut: Dār al-Talī'a, 1981), 155; for an example from Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā (d. 1310), see: Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, *Al-Faḥrī Fī al-Ādāb al-Sulṭāniyyah* (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1966), 41.

66 For an example from 'Abū Ḥammū Mūsā l-Zayyānī (d. 1389), see: 'Abū Ḥammū Mūsā al-Zayyānī, *Wāsiṭat Al-Sulūk Fī Siyāsāt al-Mulūk*, 2:90–92; for an example from Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Kāfiyaḡī (d. 1474), see: Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Kāfiyaḡī, *Saif Al-Mulūk Wa-l-Ḥukkām*, ed. Jordan Abdulaziz (Marburg: Ph.D. Thesis, 2015), 151.

67 For an example from Abū Bakr al-Murādī al-Ḥaḍramī (d. 1095), see: Abū Bakr al-Murādī al-Ḥaḍramī, *Kitāb Al-Iṣāra Ilā Adab al-Imāra*, 228–30; for an example from Ibn Simāk Al-'Amīli (d. 145?), see: Ibn Simāk Al-'Amīli, *Rawnaq Al-T'abīr Fī Uqm al-Siyāsa Wa-l-Tadbīr*, ed. S. Al-Qureshi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ilmiyya, 2004), 30.

68 See: Abū Bakr aṭ-Ṭurṭūshī, *Sirāj Al-Mulūk*, 174.

69 For an example from 'Alī Ibn al-Ġawzī (d. 1201), see: 'Alī Ibn al-Ġawzī, *Al-Miṣbāḥ al-Muḍī' Fī Ḥilāfāt al-Mustadī*, ed. Ibrahim Najjiyya (Baghdad: Matba'at al-awqaf, 1979), 298–99; for an example from 'Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī (d. 1131), see: 'Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī, *Nāmah-Ha*, ed. Alinaqi Munzawi and Afif Usayran, vol. 1 (Tehran: Manūchihrī, 1983), 234.

broader framework of sharia, which is upheld by various scholars and judges who can be chosen by the community. Therefore, the essence of governance is fundamentally anchored in sharia and its appropriate implementation, which can be realized through scholars who resist oppression from rulers, or without necessarily needing a ruler.⁷⁰ This principle extends to the possibility of multiple caliphs coexisting simultaneously, as a caliph is essentially an administrator responsible for the application of sharia. In that regard, the existence of several caliphs concurrently is deemed legitimate even without any additional condition.⁷¹ In this framework, should a despot or unjust ruler arise, it becomes an obligation for all Muslims to revolt against such tyranny in accordance with sharia.⁷²

In specific cases, this principle encompasses some further terms. For instance, the term of *dā'irat al-siyāsa* (Ar. circle of *siyāsa*) is commonly employed within this principle to elucidate the essential dynamics of administrative operations through collaborative efforts. The governance framework is perceived as a self-regulating system, wherein the role of rulers is primarily to uphold justice for the uninterrupted maintenance of the entire system.⁷³ It is posited that what truly governs a state is not the ruler, but rather justice; a state can endure without a ruler or a religious framework, but cannot sustain itself without justice.⁷⁴ Another pertinent term frequently utilized to illustrate the self-regulatory nature of sharia is *ḥisba* (Ar. accounting, checking). This is an individual obligation of every Muslim to adhere to sharia regulations and the official designation of *muḥtasib* (Ar. inspector), who undertakes essential administrative responsibilities to ensure that the state operates independently of any ruler. In contrast to the foundational assumptions of the *ri'āsa* principle, which views individuals as inferior and inherently prone to chaos, these terms distinctly characterize individuals as competent and skilful subjects of sharia, capable of managing their

70 For an example from Al-Qāḍī 'Abd Al-Ġabbār (d. 1025), see: Al-Qāḍī 'Abd Al-Ġabbār, *Al-Muġnī Fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd Wa-l-'adl* (Cairo: Dar al-Misriyah lil-Ta'lif wa-al-Tarjamah, 1965), 51; for an example from Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Kāfiyaġī (d. 1474), see: Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Kāfiyaġī, *Saif Al-Mulūk Wa-l-Ḥukkām*, 145.

71 For an example from Al-Numayrī al-Ḥarrānī ('Ibn Taymiyyah') (d. 1328), see: Al-Numayrī al-Ḥarrānī ('Ibn Taymiyyah'), *Minḥāġ As-Sunna*, vol. Vol 1 (Cairo: Būlāq edition, 1903), 27–30.

72 For an example from Abū Hilāl al-'Askarī (d. 1010), see: Abū Hilāl al-'Askarī, *Kitāb Mā Aḥtaqam Bih Al-Ḥalifa 'i 'ila' al-Qudā*, ed. Mathieu Tillier (Paris: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 2011), 45; for an example from Muḥammad ar-Raḥbī ('Al-Simnānī') (d. 1100), see: Muḥammad al-Raḥbī ('Al-Simnānī'), *Rawḍat Al-Quḍāh Wa Ṭarīq al-Naja*, Vol 1:517.

73 For an example from Ibn Manṣūr ibn al-Ḥaddād (d. 1275), see: Ibn Manṣūr ibn al-Ḥaddād, *Al-Ġawhar al-Nafīs Fī Siyāsat al-Ra'īs*, ed. R. Said (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1983), 67; for an example from Ibrāhīm al-Ḥayrbaytī (d. 1440), see: Ibrāhīm al-Ḥayrbaytī, *Kitāb Al-Durrah al-Gharrā' Fī Naṣīḥat al-Salāṭīn Wa-al-Quḍāt Wa-al-Umarā'*, 15.

74 For an example from 'Abu Yūsuf (d. 798), see: 'Abu Yūsuf, *Kitāb Al-Ḥarāġ* (Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Salafya, 1927), 138; for an example from Ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī (d. 1058), see: Ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *Tashīl Al-Nazar Wa-Ta'ġīl al-Zafar Fī Aḥlāq al-Malik Wa Siyāsat al-Mulk* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahda-l 'arabiyya, 1981), 161; for an example from Al-Ṭa'ālibī (d. 1038), see: Al-Ṭa'ālibī, *Ādāb Al-Mulūk*, 51.

affairs in accordance with sharia without necessitating state intervention.⁷⁵ In some scenarios, a *muhtasib* can also overtake the role of ruler; yet, being a simple administrative with some scholarly skills who just applies the rules of sharia.⁷⁶ As a result, the primary tenet of *'idāra* principle is governance through the rigorous enforcement of sharia, coupled with an administration grounded in justice.

The discursive context of the aforementioned principles, along with their associated terms, anecdotes, and arguments, was reinterpreted and disseminated in West Africa through the engagement of various scholars. Consequently, some of these scholars, particularly through their steadfast advocacy for certain legal, political, or social principles, established a lasting legacy that significantly impacted both scholars and rulers in Central Sudan during the 19th century. In this respect, a crucial subsequent step in comprehending the epistemological framework surrounding *siyāsa* in Central Sudan during the 19th century is to understand how the previously mentioned concepts and debates were received and reinterpreted by West African scholars.

1.2. Legacy of West African scholars on *ri'āsa*, *tadbīr*, and *'idāra*

Tradition of *Ri'āsa*: Abd Al-Karīm Al-Maḡīlī (d. 1504)

Al-Maḡīlī was born in Tilimsan (today's Algeria) at the end of the 15th century and received an education in Islamic Sciences there until he became a scholar; however, he conflicted with the sultan of Morocco at his time due to his radical views and immigrated to Tuwat.⁷⁷ After his contested anti-Semitic influence on the community of Tuwat, he travelled to cities such as Takida, Gao, Katsina, and Kano in Central Sudan.⁷⁸ At the end, he returned to Tuwat and died in 1504. Through his three significant texts, Al-Maḡīlī contributed one of the earliest considerations related

75 For an example from Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī (d. 1111), see: Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī, *Al-mustasfā Min 'ilm al-Uṣūl*, vol. Vol. 1 (Cairo: al-Amīriya, 1904), 3–4; for an example from Abī Zayd al-Quraṣī („Al-Uḥuwwa“) (d. 1329), see: Abī Zayd al-Quraṣī („Al-Uḥuwwa“), *M'aālīma Al-Qurba Fī Aḥkām al-Ḥisbah*, ed. Reuben Levy (London: Luzac & Co, 1938), 153.

76 for an example from Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Naṣr aṣ-Ṣaizarī (d. 1193), see: Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Naṣr al-Ṣaizarī, *Kitāb Nihāyat Al-Rutbah Fī Ṭalab al-Ḥisbah*, ed. Al-Baz Al-'Arīnī (Cairo: Maṭb'a laḡnat al-t'alīf waltarḡamat walnaṣr, 1946), 6; for an example from Al-Tuḡībī ibn 'Abdūn (d. 1134), see: Al-Tuḡībī ibn 'Abdūn, *Risālah Fī Al-Qaḍā' Wa-l-Ḥisbah* (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm lil-Ṭibā'ah wa-al-Naṣr wa-al-Tawzī', 2009), 27; for an example from Ibn Bassam Al-Muḥtasib (d. 13??), see: Ibn Bassam Al-Muḥtasib, *Nihāyat Al-Rutbah Fī Ṭalab al-Ḥisbah*, ed. Husam Al-Samaraie (Baghdad: Al-Maarif, 1968), 324; for an example from Al-Zur'ī l-Dimaṣqī („Ibn Qayyim al-Ġawziyya“) (d. 1350), see: Al-Zur'ī l-Dimaṣqī („Ibn Qayyim al-Ġawziyya“), 'Hisbah', in *Qritical Study and Edition of Al-Ṭuruq al-Ḥukmiyya Fi'l-Siyāsa al-Ṣar'iyya Ḥisbah Chapter*, ed. Abdulhamid Al-Shaiji, vol. Vol. 2 (PhD Thesis: Univerity of Wales, 2001), 79, 86, and 287–88.

77 See: Abdulaziz Batran, 'A Contribution to the Biography of Shaikh Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd-Al-Karīm Ibn Muḥammad ('Umar-A 'Mar) Al-Maḡhīlī, Al-Tilimsānī', *The Journal of African History* 14, no. 3 (1973): 386–87.

78 See: Batran, 390.

to *siyāsa* in Central Sudan, mainly leaving a legacy in the Hausaland rather than Central Sahara and Bornu.⁷⁹ Especially his correspondence with the Masa of Songhay, Askiya Muhammad, who ruled from 1493 to 1528, regarding the issue of declaring jihad against a group or even ruler, who consider themselves Muslim, made him one of the most prominent supporter of *ri'āsa* principle.

The most detailed treatise of Al-Maḡīlī on *siyāsa* is *Tağ al-dīn fīmā yağib 'alā-l-mulk*. In the text, he clarifies the religious and legal grounds of rulership and his duties as well as his rights. He opens his treatise with a very typical argument of the principle of *ri'āsa* to elucidate the legal justification of the ruler; he says, one can be ruler only with the will of God, i.e., if someone becomes ruler through *sulṭa* or *šawka*, then he is an entirely legal ruler.⁸⁰ Then, he continues by saying, “The duties of the ruler are keeping the order of the country (*tartīb al-mamlakah*) and providing governance (*siyāsa*) in its development as leader (*ra'īs*).”⁸¹ He then employs another characteristic metaphor in the principle of *ri'āsa*, by portraying the ruler as a shepherd of his flock.⁸² Although he emphasizes the importance of law (Ar. *šarī'a*) for a good and long-living rulership by clarifying some strict rules that rulers should keep, such as not collecting additional taxes apart from *'uṣr* and *ḥarāğ*, and trying to apply low tax policy, he does not present a manual book regarding good governance as was the case for the principle of *tadbīr* and *'idāra*.⁸³ He gives only some advice to the ruler, e.g., holding court in his yard and trying to be visible in the public spheres.⁸⁴ These would be similar to the features of the principle of *tadbīr* if they had been proposed for practical purposes, such as averting any potential social unrest, which can cause a rebellion; however, Al-Maḡīlī imparts this advice only for moral issues that rulers should decide personally whether they should fulfil them.

A similar attitude appears in his other text, *Waṣīyat al-Maḡīlī li-muḥamad bin Ya'qūb*. Here, Al-Maḡīlī utters that rulership is a divine office that a tyrant should not occupy, because only “unbelievers” act tyrannically.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, again, Al-Maḡīlī does not mention this for practical reasons but as moral advice to the ruler. In other words, if rulers act tyrannically anyway, for Al-

79 Ahmad Murtaza, ‘Al-Imam al-Maghili Wa Ishamuh Fi Bina al-Hadarat al-Islamiyat Fi Bilad al-Hausa’ (Al-Hawadir al-Ilmiyat al-Jazariyat wa afrikiya, Biskra, 2014), 8–10.

80 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maḡīlī, ‘Tağ Al-Dīn Fīmā Yağib ‘alā-l-Mulk’, in *The Life and Teaching of Al-Maghili with Particular Reference to the Saharan Jewish Community*, ed. Hassan I. Gwarzo (London: Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1972), 274.

81 ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maḡīlī, 276.

82 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maḡīlī, 280.

83 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maḡīlī, 285.

84 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maḡīlī, 282–86.

85 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maḡīlī, ‘Waṣīyat Al-Maḡīlī Li-Muḥamad Bin Ya'qūb’, ed. Hassan I. Gwarzo (London: Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1972), 298–99.

Mağīlī, they still do not face any legal or social consequences. It is quite clear that Al-Mağīlī never alludes to the right of insurrection against a ruler. This view becomes much obvious in *Taḥlīf fī mā yağīb ‘alā salaḥ al-muslimūn min ‘ityānāb al-kuffār*.

Despite the fact that the core issue of this text is concerning the legal discussion of Jews living together with Muslims, Al-Mağīlī touches upon some intriguing points pertinent to the ruler and his relationship with the community. In several anti-Semitic stories, he proclaims that it is absolutely forbidden for Muslims to live together with Jews; what is more, for him, they should be insulted and killed in any instance.⁸⁶ He further declares that their synagogues should be destroyed, and they would never be allowed to build again.⁸⁷ In this point, an interesting case arises, since Al-Mağīlī remarks, if a ruler or judge tolerates Jews and their activities in the country, then the Muslim common people should ignore the decision of their ruler or judge and attack Jews anyway, but still, for Al-Mağīlī, even this cannot be a reason for any kind of insurgency against the ruler.⁸⁸ In other words, Al-Mağīlī, by exhibiting a quintessential characteristic of the principle of *ri’āsa*, firmly dismisses any possibility of rebellion against the ruler even in extreme circumstances. However, as will be discussed in the ensuing chapters, this legal treatise was predominantly used by scholars of 19th-century Central Sudan to claim their recent rulers as “unbelievers” by delineating their cooperation with “non-Muslims” and they rebelled against them by declaring *ḡihād*, although Al-Mağīlī almost categorically rejected any uprising against a ruler, if not against minorities.

Consequently, it can be plainly concluded that Al-Mağīlī does not cite any scholar from the formative period of Islam, who contributed to the principle of *ri’āsa*, whereas he employs almost all arguments and anecdotes of this principle to provide an Islamic model of *siyāsa* in his age and region.

Tradition of *Tadbīr*: Sayidī Al-Muḥtār Ibn ‘Ahmad Al-Kūntī (d. 1811) – via his son Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Sağīr (d. 1847)

Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī was born in 1729 in the vicinity of Mabrouk (present-day Mali) as part of the Kunta family, which was known for its prestige in Islamic scholarship but also trading activities.

86 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Mağīlī, ‘Taḥlīf Fī Mā Yağīb ‘alā Salaḥ Al-Muslimūn Min ‘ityānāb al-Kuffār’, in *The Life and Teaching of Al-Maghili with Particular Reference to the Saharan Jewish Community*, ed. Hassan I. Gwarzo (London: Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1972), 142.

87 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Mağīlī, 147–48.

88 See: ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Mağīlī, 148.

After earning religious education from his family members, he established his quasi-nomadic settlement in northeastern Timbuktu and acted as a scholar as well as a mediator between various contest groups; he died in the same place in 1811.⁸⁹ Although he wrote numerous texts concerning various themes, particularly his understanding of *siyāsa* rather appears in a text that was written by his son and successor Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr (d. 1847): *Kitāb Al-Ṭarāʾif wa-l-Ṭālaʾid*.

In this text, Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr describes an exhaustive biography of Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī. He explains not only what he did but also why he did it and what he generally thought. In this respect, although the text is not precisely related to governance (*siyāsa*), Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr discloses how his father managed/governed his affairs with other local chiefs and rulers, and how he justified his stance through scholarly discussions.

One of his primary arguments through his father's views on *siyāsa* is a justification for why it is allowable and even honourable to engage in commerce as a scholar. According to him, it is significant to continue to be economically active as a scholar for two reasons; first, the prophet Muhammad was also a merchant—which makes this job even more prestigious, second, it is the duty of all Muslims to manage their worldly affairs along with preparing for the “hereafter”.⁹⁰ With this view, Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr in fact proposes the vitality of acting as an economic agent for all, not only for scholars but also for rulers as well. This is a typical opinion in the principle of *tadbīr*. On another topic, he states his father's position on the current situation and discussion of his time, which revolves around a so-called protection tax levied on merchants by nomadic groups in the Sahara.

Although this tax was unambiguously condemned as illegal by Abd Al-Karīm Al-Maḡīlī (d. 1504), and he named this payment *maks*,⁹¹ the matter was not as simple for Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī as Al-Maḡīlī put it. As Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr narrated, Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī once wrote a letter to a group that was collecting protection tax from merchants on behalf of another powerful group, and he said “I would not advise you to levy this payment, because then I would be a sinner if I confirmed such an unlawful act. If, however, I say you stop imposing it on merchants, then you will have trouble more than merchants before your masters [i.e. other powerful groups]. I hope that you will be able

89 See: J. O. Hunwick, ‘Mukhtar Ibn Ahmad, Al-’, in *Holy People of the World: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia* (California: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 613.

90 See: Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, ‘Kitāb Al-Ṭarāʾif Wa-l-Ṭālʾid’ (Lisbon), fol. 415, M.S. Arabic 6755, BNP.

91 Cf. Melvin Hiskett, ‘An Islamic Tradition of Reform in the Western Sudan’, *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies* Vol 25, no. 1/3 (1962): 585.

to choose the first one.”⁹² In further deliberation, according to Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī formulates this view by developing another argument; he claims, if they tried stopping this business model – which was clearly illegal in terms of *ṣarīʿa*, then it would trigger a brutal civil war and uncertainty throughout whole Western Sahara, which would bring more anguish to merchants rather than pay this unlawful tax; so, for Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī, it is better to tolerate this practice.⁹³ This reasoning appears almost identically in the consideration of rebellion against the unjust ruler in the principle of *tadbīr*; because for this argumentation, the scholars recommend that if an insurrection would cause more suffering than obedience to unjust rulers, it is better to maintain an obligation to them even though it is not legally permissible.

At this point, Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī even introduces an intriguing concept to uncover this illegal act in an acceptable context: *Mudāra*.⁹⁴ This word literally means “something that is managed” and originates from the word *ʿidāra*. Nonetheless, Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī’s interpretation of this term does not exhibit any familiarity with the principle of *ʿidāra*. In another text, *Al-Risāla al-Ghallāwiya Al-Musamāh*, for instance, Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, elucidates his father’s notion further: “*mudāra* [means]... doing good and showing kindness to people in need by sacrificing own wealth and by using own power. It is the counterpart oppressing people or ignoring the one who is in need.”⁹⁵ Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr also mentions a similar argument in his *Kitāb Al-Ṭarāʾif wa-l-Ṭalāʾid*; according to the telling of his father, he utters, there are two ways for scholars to fall into an “evil” deed: 1) they can concentrate only on their scientific learning and ignore injustice around them, 2) they can strive to gain more and more political power in order to establish their own authority (*riʾāsa*).⁹⁶

With this assertion, Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī demonstrates a characteristic feature of the principle of *tadbīr* with regard to a critical understanding of power. He renounces any full authority as *riʾāsa*, but neither is he content with simply applying the law, as is the case in the principle of *ʿidāra*; the best is to use power wisely, as is the case in the principle of *tadbīr*. For instance, Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr claims that Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī once explained why scholars should not categorically deny

92 Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, ‘Kitāb Al-Ṭarāʾif Wa-l-Ṭālāʾid’, fol. 300.

93 See: Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, fol. 316.

94 Cf. Abdulaziz Batran, ‘Sidi Al-Mukhtar al-Kunti and the Recrudescence of Islam in the Western Sahara and the Middle Niger c. 1750-1811’ (Ph.D. Thesis, Birmingham, University of Birmingham, 1971), 268 (footnote 4). For Batran, Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī was the first one who proposed this word to explain – though not only – the protection tax.

95 Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, *Al-Risāla al-Ghallāwiya Al-Musamāh*, ed. Hamallah Salim (Beirut: Dar Al Kotob Al Ilmiyah, 2013), 127.

96 See: Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, ‘Kitāb Al-Ṭarāʾif Wa-l-Ṭālāʾid’, fol. 307.

any collaboration with tyrants; for him, if it ends up bringing goodness to the people and the community, scholars should work with unjust rulers, or they should contact tyrants to avoid further unjust acts by negotiating with them.⁹⁷

A key issue to consider here is how Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī situates scholars in a hierarchy of power; thereby, his opinions of scholars also become a model for *siyāsa*. For example, he never overlooks the importance of rulership, nor does he reduce its role to that of a simple administrator; but strives to establish his religious/legislative power as scholar and leader (Ar. *ṣayḥ*) in the Qadiriyya Sufi order (Ar. *ṭarīqah*) within a complex hierarchy of power with political and social authorities. By doing so, Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī, in fact, proposes the instrument of *ʿiṣlāḥ* in the principle of *tadbīr*; because, as is the case in this instrument, he observes his environment as an apparent disharmony, and it is needed to (re)connect each component of power, such as military groups, local rulers, scholars, etc. to fulfil goodness and order.⁹⁸ In this respect, he gives the scholars the role of mediator between various power components to diminish disharmony and improve welfare for all, and that should be a model for rulers as well.⁹⁹

His understanding of scholarship also shows another crucial tendency towards the principle of *tadbīr*, considering he delineates his scholarship more in terms of his role as a Sufi leader (*ṣayḥ*) in the Qadiriyya *ṭarīqah*. Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, for example, relates how his father was reluctant to act as a judge to apply the law, preferring to remain in the position of *ṣayḥ* by recommending to people who have trouble with each other to make *ṣulḥ*, i.e., to resolve their problem by agreeing without the involvement of a court process.¹⁰⁰ This inclination of Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī marks another good example of the instrument of *ʿiṣlāḥ* in the principle of *tadbīr*; for the primary objective of this instrument is to solve problems before they have arisen, in more local cases, which means to make *ṣulḥ* by evading any court process, thereby the problem can be settled without any judicial procedure.

From this, it can be plainly concluded that Al-Muḥtār Al-Kūntī tends primarily to uphold and propose the principle of *tadbīr* for effective and good governance. He carefully frames his discourse by disallowing any absolute authority, as is the case in the principle of *riʿāsa*, and by discarding the simple application of the law, as is suggested in the principle of *ʿidāra*. Furthermore, he expresses

97 See: Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, fol 346–347.

98 See: Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, fol. 560.

99 see: Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, fol. 118.

100 Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, tells how his father always acted as an intermediary in every crisis situation, for instance, see: Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saḡīr, fol. 559.

several classic reasoning of the principle of *tadbīr* to criticize the possible arguments of the other two principles by highlighting the practicality and complexity of the real world and the power relations in it.

Tradition of 'Idāra: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī (d. 1627) and Muhammad Yanbu (d. 181?)

Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī (d. 1627)

Ahmad Bābā was born in Araouane (present day Mali) in the mid-16th century, and moved to Timbuktu to learn Islamic Sciences; however, when he became a scholar, he was detained for political reasons on the orders of the Moroccan sultan and imprisoned in Marrakesh, where he lived for many years after his arrest.¹⁰¹ He died in Timbuktu in 1627 after a pilgrimage to Mecca. He had already left a strong impact on the political understanding of scholars in the 19th-century Central Sudan (but more specifically in the Hausaland, rather than the Central Sahara and Bornu) through his famous *fatwa*-s (advisory legal opinion) related to slavery and *ġihād*. Furthermore, he further wrote a very detailed book on *siyāsa*; *Ġalb al-ni'ma wa daf' al-niqma bi muġānabat al-wulāt al-zalama*.

Although the key topic of the text is regarding the permissible relationship between scholars and rulers –particularly with tyrannical rulers– Ahmad Bābā manifests a thoroughly complex picture of his view on *siyāsa*. Additionally, apart from the treatises of Al-Maġīlī, Ahmad Bābā clearly cites several authors of different genres from the Islamic Classic Age, such as Abū Bakr aṭ-Ṭurṭūshī, Ibn al-Muqaffa', Ibn Rušd, and Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī.¹⁰²

Ahmad Bābā begins his examination by clarifying the duties and responsibilities of a scholar, stating that scholars should teach and clarify the (Islamic) law as well as the religion, it is not, however, their business to work with rulers; furthermore, whoever collaborates with a tyrannical ruler, also bears the “sins” of his tyranny.¹⁰³ This view represents a characteristic feature of the principle of 'idāra, which refers to the rejection of any tyrannical rulership. Ahmad Bābā continues with another typical opinion in the principle of 'idāra by accentuating the importance of scholars; he asserts that scholars are responsible only before the prophet,¹⁰⁴ and if a scholar cooperates with a

101 Cf. J. O. Hunwick, 'A New Source for the Biography of Aḥmad Bābā Al-Tinbuktī (1556-1627)', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 27, no. 3 (1964): 569–70.

102 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, *Ġalb Al-Ni'ma Wa Daf' al-Niqma Bi Muġānabat al-Wulāt al-Zalama* (Casablanca: Markaz al-turath al-thawafi al-maghribi, 2011), 147, 182, 199, 170.

103 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 116.

104 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 120.

ruler as being assigned to a title or a duty, then he would be responsible before the ruler, not before the prophet; in this respect, he would no longer be a scholar.¹⁰⁵ Ahmad Bābā even takes his argument to the extreme by manifesting that the judgments of any scholar or judge who receives a salary from a ruler are illegitimate,¹⁰⁶ and he states that God has prepared a special place in “hell” for scholars who collaborate with rulers.¹⁰⁷ His great insistence on the importance of scholars appears in his another untitled manuscript in Timbuktu on the virtue of acquiring knowledge; in this manuscript, he expresses that in the “Judgement Day” the ink of scholars will have the same value as the blood of “martyrs”.¹⁰⁸

Back in his main text, Ahmad Bābā points out a leading argument pertinent to *ḥisba* in the principle of *’idāra*; for him, the key aim of the scholars as protectors of the law is to work for the welfare of the community, not for the ruler.¹⁰⁹ With this view, he obviously discards the role of the ruler in administering and guiding the community since it is only the proper application of the law by the scholars through *ḥisba* that matters. With this clear position against rulership, as a strong element of the principle of *’idāra*, Ahmad Bābā indicates the real meaning of a ruler in his understanding of *siyāsa*; since for him the only true ruler is God, a ruler in this world is nothing more than a simple administrator.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, Ahmad Bābā paints a firmly negative picture of rulership; he claims that money and power corrupt everything, and rulers as part of the corruption in this world, do not respect people –such as scholars– unless they obey him unconditionally,¹¹¹ in this aspect, he considers it entirely forbidden for imams to mention the names of rulers in Friday prayer or to call on people to respect and obey them.¹¹²

After this sharp negative depiction of rulership, Ahmad Bābā explains the case of the presence of an unjust ruler. For him, an unjust ruler is a rebel against God,¹¹³ and in such cases, God sends terrible punishments to the whole country; in this regard, if people do not want to suffer this punishment, they should either dethrone the unjust ruler or leave the country – as an exit option in the instrument of *dā’irat al-siyāsa* in the principle of *’idāra*.¹¹⁴ In this point, Ahmad Bābā further refuses an argument in the principle of *ri’āsa* by signifying that an unjust ruler has no right to decide on the

105 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 129.

106 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 163.

107 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 137.

108 Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, ‘-Untitled-’ (Timbuktu), M.S. 776, IHERI-AB.

109 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, *Ġalib Al-Ni’ma Wa Daf’ al-Niqma Bi Muğānabat al-Wulāt al-Zalama*, 133.

110 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 166.

111 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 183.

112 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 167.

113 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 127.

114 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī, 127 and 133.

next ruler through his testament – in the principle of *ri'āsa* it does not matter whether the ruler is unjust or not, his testament is the legitimate source for the new ruler.¹¹⁵

Consequently, Ahmad Bābā presents all the arguments of the principle of *'idāra* to disclose his understanding of *siyāsa*. He rigorously criticizes and disapproves of several arguments of rulership in the principle of *ri'āsa* and *tadbīr* by underlining the importance of the scholars and the law, and portraying rulers in a completely negative image.

Muhammad Yanbu (d. 181?)

Muhammad Yanbu was a member of the Sayfawa dynasty in Bornu, serving as a prince and the son of Mai Ahmad ibn Ali, who reigned from 1793 to 1808.¹¹⁶ Unlike his siblings, who assumed administrative responsibilities at a young age, Yanbu focused on scholarly pursuits, receiving education from various scholars in both Bornu and Egypt.¹¹⁷ One of his most significant and influential works, primarily known in the Central Sahara and Bornu rather than in Hausaland, is titled *Kitāb al-'idāra fī Nizām Mamlakah wa-l-'Imārah*. In this text, Yanbu articulates fundamental principles of governance and essential Islamic practices pertinent to ruling a state. The title of the book indicates that Yanbu posits the system of *'idāra* as the sole Islamic method of governance.

Yanbu delineates ten ways for the proper application of *'idāra*. As a defining characteristic of *'idāra*, he proposes the imposition of stringent regulations on the ruler. The ruler is not regarded as the sovereign of the community; rather, he is entrusted with the duty of guiding the community in accordance with the principles of "God" and "His law."¹¹⁸ In this regard, nine of the proposed methods for applying *'idāra* draw upon traditional narratives from classical scholars, emphasizing the importance of heeding the counsel of learned individuals, diligently striving to uphold justice throughout the realm, and refraining from actions that contravene sharia.¹¹⁹ However, in one instance, Yanbu explicitly advocates for the application of *ra'y* in *tadbīr* to enhance the effectiveness of *'idāra*. In situations of social, political, or economic crises, the ruler is expected to take personal initiative to address the issues, even if this necessitates deviating from Islamic law. Nonetheless, Yanbu considers this a rare exception, asserting that the application of *ra'y* should ultimately aim to restore the previous system of *'idāra*.¹²⁰

115 See: Ahmad Bābā at-Tinbukti, 210.

116 'Interview No. 25: With Muhammad Bin Abubakr Online, 2024'.

117 'Interview No. 26: With Ali Bin Abubakr Online, 2024'.

118 Muhammad Yanbu, 'Kitāb Al-'idāra Fī Nizām Mamlakah Wa-l-'Imārah', N.H.R.S., MS 126/8, fol. 12-14.

119 Muhammad Yanbu, fol. 15-20.

120 Muhammad Yanbu, fol. 20-28.

A Unique Case: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505)

Al-Suyūṭī was born in Cairo in 1445, and became one of the most prominent, albeit contentious, scholars of his time.¹²¹ Unlike the previously mentioned scholars, he did not travel to West Africa; however, he maintained an active correspondence with various scholars and rulers from the Central Sudan, including Sultan Muhammad Sattafan of Air, who reigned from 1487 to 1493, and provided them with *fatwas*.¹²² In 1484, he had a personal meeting with Ali Dunama, the *mai* of Kanem/Bornu, who ruled from 1465 to 1497, during the latter's pilgrimage to Mecca. A similar encounter occurred when Askiya Muhammad, the *masa* of Songhay, visited Cairo in 1498 as part of his pilgrimage journey.¹²³ Al-Suyūṭī's connections with the Central Sudan through various channels significantly influenced his reception in that region. Nevertheless, his legacy in the Central Sudan exhibited a distinct character when compared to his influence in Egypt. In Egypt, his political views were largely associated with his renowned work, *Mā rawāhu al-asāṭīn fī 'adam al-majī' ilā al-salāṭīn*, which recounts various anecdotes regarding the relationships between rulers and scholars, resonating with the arguments of Ahmad Bābā concerning *'idāra*.¹²⁴ Conversely, the perception of Al-Suyūṭī's political stance in Hausaland and the Central Sahara/Bornu was markedly different.

In the Hausland, his views on *tajdid* (Ar. revivalism) gained significant traction, resulting in a legacy that was predominantly aligned with the *ri'āsa* interpretation, whilst his other ideas were largely overlooked. This selective emphasis contributed to a legacy in the Hausaland that was heavily influenced by the *tajdid* genre.¹²⁵ In the Central Sahara and Bornu, Al-Suyūṭī was recognized primarily through his letters and *fatwas*. Notably, some of these correspondences were exchanged with Muhammad b. Muhammad b. 'Alī al-Lamtunī (d. 15??) from Agadez, who maintained connections with scholars in Bornu.¹²⁶ Although the format of these letters bears a resemblance to the inquiries posed by Askiya Muhammad of Songhay to Al-Maḡīlī regarding the legitimacy of declaring jihad within the *ri'āsa* framework, Al-Suyūṭī's responses diverge

121 For his full biography, see: Abdulhafiz Al-Karani, *Al-Hafz Jalal Al-Din Al-Suyuti* (Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr, 1990).

122 Murtaza Ahmad, 'Athar Al-Harakat al-Ilmiyat Wa-l-Thaqafiyat Fi Irsa al-Hadarat al-Islamiya Fir al-Sahil al-Afrikiya', in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 112.

123 for more details, see: E.M. Sartain, 'Jalāl Ad-Dīn al-Suyūṭī's Relations with the People of Tākūr', *Journal of Semitic Studies* 16 (1971): 193–98.

124 See: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Mā Rawāhu Al-Asāṭīn Fī 'adam al-Majī' Ilā al-Salāṭīn* (Beirut: Dar ibn Hazm, 1992).

125 Rebecca Hernandez, *The Legal Thought of Jalal Al-Din al-Suyuti: Authority and Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2017), 125–28.

126 J. O. Hunwick, 'Notes on a Late Fifteenth-Century Document Concerning 'al-Tākūr'', in *African Perspectives: Papers in the History, Politics and Economics of Africa Presented to Thomas Hodgkin*, ed. C. Allen and R.W. Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 7–33.

significantly from Al-Maḡīlī's *ri'āsa* perspective. In his replies, Al-Suyūṭī emphasizes the importance of a centralized state authority, contrasting with Ahmad Baba's *'idāra* viewpoint. Rather than readily granting the right to declare jihad to groups deemed insufficiently Muslim, as suggested by Al-Maḡīlī's *ri'āsa* stance, Al-Suyūṭī seeks to broker a compromise to mitigate conflict, reflecting a typical approach of *tadbīr*. This pattern is similarly evident in his communications with the Sultan of Air, where he primarily addresses the tension between *urf* (Ar. custom, tradition) and sharia.¹²⁷ Different from his text and *tajdid* works, in these letters, Al-Suyūṭī ardently supported the notion that, in the absence of explicit sharia rulings, customs could hold equivalent authority to sharia.¹²⁸ Therefore, his interpretation, which favoured compromise, contributed to a *tadbīr*-oriented perspective on governance through his writings. Al-Suyūṭī played a pivotal role in shaping the legacy of *tadbīr* in the Central Sahara and Bornu.

In summary, Al-Suyūṭī's legacy presents a multifaceted case across various regions, encompassing concepts such as *ri'āsa*, *tadbīr*, and *'idāra*. This complexity is particularly evident in the political and scholarly disputes between the Uthmaniyya caliphate and the Bornu Empire, where both factions invoked Al-Suyūṭī's work to substantiate their respective positions on *ri'āsa* and *tadbīr*.

Apart from the legacies these above-mentioned scholars, the implementation of sharia has demonstrated a similarly intricate role. Islamic scholars frequently refer to the application of sharia in their writings, portraying it as a universally applicable and static framework, whereas the reality is that it is contingent upon a complex and dynamic context. This intricacy also influences its interpretation and application in governance.

1.3. Legislative Background

Indeed, the above-mentioned scholars' contribution to the discussion of *siyāsa* is vital to grasping the governmental discourse in Central Sudan during the 19th century; yet, scholars and rulers of this region and era also relied on the jurisprudential texts of the *Mālikiyya* School of Law for crucial decisions,¹²⁹ considering the intellectual contributions were more on a theoretical level. Hence,

127 Harry T. Norris, *The Tuareg: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel* (Warminster: Aris & Philips, 1975), 41.

128 See: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Al-Ashbāh Wa-l-Naẓā'ir Fī l-Qawā'id al-Fiqhiyya* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Thaqafi li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi', 2007), 127–29; For more details, see: Gideon Libson, *On the Development of Custom as a Source of Law in Islamic Law* (Brill, 1997), 142.

129 The only exceptions were Ottoman overseas dominions such as Tunis and Tripoli. Although the vast majority of locals in the region were of the *Mālikiyya madhhab*, meaning they followed the *Mālikiyya* School of Law, a tiny

jurisprudential texts were, in two ways, utterly important for the governmental discourses: 1) they offered concrete and exact answers for very peculiar cases, 2) they furnished additional considerations for governance that were not explicitly mentioned by scholars.

Nevertheless, it is of the utmost challenge to determine the governmental understanding in the jurisprudential texts in Central Sudan. The first problem is knowing the exact texts available in the region and used by scholars, since there are several texts in the *Mālikiyya* School of Law. Although these texts are almost identical in their content on many issues, when it comes to critical and disputed topics –such as governance– they can be quite different from each other.¹³⁰ The second problem, however, is the theoretical structure of these texts because Islamic Law consists mainly of two components, though not always clearly defined: Rights of God (*ḥuqūq Allāh* or *al-‘ibādāh*) [rights/duties of an individual before God] and Rights of Individual (*ḥuqūq al-nās* or *mu‘āmalāt*) [rights/duties of an individual before other individuals]. In other words, the discussion of rulership or the duties and rights of rulers does not appear in these jurisprudential texts as a component or a chapter. Some scholars, such as Bernard Weiss, argue that *ḥuqūq Allāh* in many ways denotes a kind of “public law” that the state or ruler involves in cases – such as executions for “crimes against God” in the case of “blasphemy”, and *ḥuqūq al-nās* remains a state or ruler-free realm.¹³¹ Still, at least in the case of the *Mālikiyya* School of Law, such a generalization seems highly inaccurate. For instance, the *Māliki* scholar Šihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) strictly conveys that since *al-‘ibādāh* is germane to the “afterworld”, there is no place where the decision of authority (Ar. *ḥukm al-ḥākim*) can be included.¹³² What is more, if rulers interfere in the issues concerning *ḥuqūq Allāh*

minority of Turkish governors, administrators and merchants were in the *Ḥanafīyya maḏhab*. In this context, for instance, an important question is what would happen if Turkish and Arab merchants quarrel over a matter and decide to go to court. Should they be judged according to the *Mālikiyya* or the *Ḥanafīyya* School of Law? The famous *Māliki* scholar Ibn Rušd (d. 1126) sees here not a real problem and advises to choose the court arbitrarily. See: Ibn Rušd, *Bidāyat Al-Muḡtahid Wa-Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid*, Halid at-Tar Edition (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 2008), 345. Nevertheless, it really matters for cases that are regulated differently in the various Schools of Laws. In this respect, Šihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī (d. 1285), for example, endeavours to define this issue clearly; and he maintains that in such cases, *al-barā’ah al-aṣliyah* (Ar. the principle of presumption of innocence) should be considered as the core criterion. This means that the defendant should have the right to choose the court, as he holds a position of priority according to the principle of presumption of innocence. Furthermore, if he sees any advantage, he can choose even a court from another School of Law that he actually is not adherent to. See: Šihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī, *Anwār Al-Burūq Fī Anwā’ Al-Furūq*, vol. IV (Beirut: Alam Al-Kutub, 1985), 74–76. According to Salim Rustum Al-Lubnani, the opinion of Al-Qarāfī has been largely accepted and applied. Cf. Salim Rustum Baz Al-Lubnani, *Šarḥ Al-Maḡallah*, 3. (Beirut: Dar Ihya Al-Arabi, 1984), 1171.

130 Cf. Knut Vikor, *Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law* (London: Hurst and Company, 2005), 1. As Vikor clearly manifested that “[t]here is no such thing as a, that is one, Islamic Law, a text clearly and unequivocally establishes all the rules of a Muslim’s behaviour. There is a great divergence of views, not just between opposing currents, but also between individual scholars within the legal currents.”

131 Cf. Bernard G. Weiss, *Spirit of Islamic Law* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 181–84.

132 See: Šihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī, *Kitāb Al-Iḥkām Fī Tamyīz Al-Fatāwā ‘an Al-Aḥkām Wa Taṣarrufāt Al-Qāḍī Wa Al-Imām*, ed. Abdalfattah Abu Ghuddah (Aleppo: Maktabat Al-Matbuat Al-Islamiyah, 1967), 23–24.

anyway, according to Al-Qarāfī, people have the right to ignore the order of the ruler.¹³³ Besides, Johannes Wichard accentuates that in the Islamic legal system, some more moral categories exist such as *makrūh* (Ar. discouraged), *mubāh* (Ar. neutral, i.e. not obligatory also not forbidden) and *mandūb* (Ar. Recommended); thus, there is not always direct transmission from the legislative field to the executive realm.¹³⁴ In this regard, an examination of governmental discourse in the jurisprudential texts remains as a fragmented analysis rather than structural, that is to say, although there is no direct chapter or structural design pertaining to rulers, in many particular case discussions one can find a direct reference to the duties and rights of rulers.

When it comes to determining related sources, Ousmane Kane provides a list of jurisprudential texts that are observable in the private archives of scholars throughout the West Africa; these are: *Al-Muwattaʿa* of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795), *Al-Mudawwanat Al-Kubra* of Saḥnūn ibn Saʿīd at-Tanūḥī (d. 854), *Al-Risāla* of Ibn Abī Zaid al-Qairawānī (d. 996), *ʿIršād Al-Sālik ʿila ʿAšraf Al-Masālik* of ʿAbd Ar-Raḥmān ibn ʿAskar Al-Baġdādī (d. 1332), *Al-Muḥtaṣar* of Ḥalīl ibn Ishāq Al-Ġundī (d. 1365), and *Tuḥfat Al-Ḥukkām* of Ibn ʿĀṣim Al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 1426).¹³⁵ In addition, particularly two other jurisprudential texts are very frequently cited in the writings of scholars in the 19th-century Central Sudan: *Al-Muḥtaṣar Al-Fiḥi* of Ibn ʿArafa Al-Warġamī (d. 1401) and *Al-Fawakih al-Dawānī* of ʿAhmad bin Ġunayim Al-Nafrāwī (d. 1713). Apart from these jurisprudential texts, there is one utmost prevailing and well-known *fatwa* collection in Central Sudan: *Al-Miʿyār Al-Muʿrib* of Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanṣarīsī (d. 1508). Jurisprudential texts examine legal issues in a structured system and with more normative discourse, whereas these kinds of *fatwa* collections provide enormous details with regard to daily problems and legal answers for them. In this respect, they demonstrate legal attitudes and answers for extremely specific cases that contain the relationship between individuals and rulers.

Back in the jurisprudential texts, one of the most striking features of them dealing with the governance and rulership is that while they do not say as much about the sources and limits of power in rulership in general, they are most interested in the political-economic roles and rights of

133 See: Šihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī, *Anwār Al-Burūq Fī Anwāʾ Al-Furūq*, IV:48.

134 Cf. Johannes C. Wichard, *Zwischen Markt Und Moschee: Wirtschaftliche Bedürfnisse Und Religiöse Anforderungen Im Frühen Islamischen Vertragsrecht* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), 73–74. In fact, as Chafik and Johansen stressed, there are already two different principles in Islamic Law: Moral and Legal. Although in theory they are one and same thing, it is not rare that while some cases are morally wrong, there is no legal consequences for them. Cf. Chehata Chafik, *Etudes de Droit Musulman*, vol. I (Paris: PUF, 1971), 11; Baber Johansen, 'Die Sündige, Gesunde Amme: Moral Und Gesetzliche Bestimmung (Hukm) Im Islamischen Recht', *Die Welt Des Islams* XXVIII (1988): 270–71.

135 Cf. Ousmane Oumar Kane, *Beyond Timbuktu: An Intellectual History of Muslim West Africa* (London: Harvard University Press, 2016), 83.

rulers. For instance, there is almost an overall consensus in Sunni Islamic jurisprudence regarding the legal taxes –these are ‘*uṣr*, ‘*ḥarāğ*, and ‘*ğizya*– which strictly defines the legal limits of levying for rulers. However, in the above-mentioned texts, scholars have opened a new sphere for this topic. Firstly, Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795) devotes a long chapter to the *zakāh*¹³⁶, in which he especially stresses its calculation.¹³⁷ However, the calculation formula proposed by Mālik ibn Anas is so complex that he implicitly hints, only a scholar or imam can calculate it for each person or family. Hence, he already allows the imam the authority to calculate and control this procedure. Furthermore, since the imam has no executive power, Mālik ibn Anas designs collaboration between the ruler and imam by implying that once the imam has calculated the amount of *zakāh*, it is the ruler’s duty to collect it from individuals or families and share it with the people in need.¹³⁸ Although in theory, this money is not a tax or income for the state since it should be paid to the people in need, once the ruler has the right to collect it, it is only his moral responsibility to use it accordingly. What is more, even if it is properly distributed by the ruler, it also gives authoritative power to him in terms of controlling the large amount of money as well as grants him social prestige, since he will be seen as helping the people.

This right and power permitted to rulers by Mālik ibn Anas do not lead to a consensus in the following jurisprudential texts. For example, Saḥnūn ibn Sa‘īd at-Tanūḥī (d. 854) and ‘Abd Ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Askar Al-Bağdādī (d. 1332) claim that only an imam can collect *zakāh*, they do not give the ruler the right to levy it.¹³⁹ Whilst Ibn ‘Āṣim Al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 1426) does not even clearly explain *zakāh* in his text,¹⁴⁰ Ibn Abī Zaid al-Qairawānī (d. 996), Ibn ‘Arafa Al-Warḡamī (d. 1401) and ‘Ahmad bin Ġunayim Al-Nafrāwī (d. 1713) provide a long chapter on this, but they add nothing related to the collecting procedure, as is the case in the text of Mālik ibn Anas.¹⁴¹ Only Ḥalīl ibn Iṣḥāq Al-Ġundī (d. 1365) seems to follow the opinion of Mālik ibn Anas, and he takes the discussion even into an extreme case by saying that if individuals hesitate to pay or do not pay

136 *Zakāh* is a proportion of wealth that should be given to the people in need by all Muslims who can earn more than their subsistence. This is an personal obligatory duty for all Muslims that they should do it once a year. See: Mehmet Erkal, ‘İslam Ansiklopedisi’ (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı), chap. zekat, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/>.

137 See: Mālik ibn Anas, *Al-Muwatta’*, Aisha Bewley Edition, chap. 17.

138 See: Mālik ibn Anas, chap. 17.

139 See: Saḥnūn ibn Sa‘īd at-Tanūḥī, *Al-Mudawwanat Al-Kubra*, vol. I (Beirut: Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyat, 1994), 334–35; ‘Abd Ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Askar Al-Bağdādī, *Iršād Al-Sālik ‘ila ‘Aşraf Al-Masālik*, Mustafa Qasim At-Tahtawi Edition (Cairo: Al-Fadilah, 2006), 64.

140 See: Ibn ‘Āṣim Al-Ġarnāṭī, *Tuḥfat Al-Ḥukkām*, Muhammad Abdulsalam Edition (Cairo: Dar Al-Afaq Al-Arabiya, 2011).

141 See: Ibn Abī Zaid al-Qairawānī, *Al-Risāla*, Aisha Bewley Edition, chap. 25.26; Ibn ‘Arafa Al-Warḡamī, *Al-Muḥtaşar Al-Fiqhi*, Abdul Rahman Muhammed Al-Khair Edition, vol. I (Dubai: Al-Farooq Center, 2014); ‘Ahmad bin Ġunayim Al-Nafrāwī, *Al-Fawakih al-Dawānī*, vol. I (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1995), 499.

properly, then the ruler can levy it by force,¹⁴² whereas Mālik ibn Anas does not grant the ruler the right to use force to collect *zakāh* because it is an individual duty for Muslims.¹⁴³

Since the issue seems to be controversial among various scholars, Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī (d. 1508) was asked whether an individual could share his *zakāh* personally without any involvement of a ruler or even an imam. He says that it is allowable for an individual to distribute his *zakāh* personally, and if he has poor relatives, he can even give it to them without any involvement of the imam and ruler.¹⁴⁴ Following this question, it was also asked whether it is permissible to give *zakāh* to a ruler if he claims the right to exact it. Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī's answer to this question seems quite interesting; he utters that it is only the custom in the land of *'ifrīqiyah*¹⁴⁵ where the rulers collect *zakāh*; if the people are in their land for any reason, it is permissible to give *zakāh* to the ruler. But if they do not see the ruler distributing it properly, then they should refuse to hand it over to the ruler.¹⁴⁶ In this respect, Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī covers the issue in a rather broad frame by offering people different options for choosing how they would want to share their *zakāh*, individually or through the ruler. However, he clearly excludes Ḥalīl ibn Ishāq Al-Ġundī's (d. 1365) view related to enabling the ruler the right to exact it by force.¹⁴⁷

Consequently, the general tendency in the above-mentioned texts is that it is not illegal for rulers to collect *zakāh* as long as they do not use force to levy it and distribute it properly. By doing so, these scholars enable the rulers to gain the advantage of control over this money and to benefit from it for their social prestige. The legal and strict definition of allowable taxes leaves the rulers virtually no room for manoeuvre in terms of revenue possibilities – and this approach reduces the role of rulers into an administrator, as is the case in the principle of *'idāra*, whereas the tendency of the above-mentioned scholars related to collecting *zakāh* gives to rulers a carefully designed space. Inasmuch

142 See: Ḥalīl ibn Ishāq Al-Ġundī, *Al-Muḥtaṣar*, French Edition, chap. III.IX.S6.

143 See: Mālik ibn Anas, *Al-Muwatṭa'*, chap. 17.18.

144 See: Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī, *Al-Mi'yār Al-Mu'rib*, Muhammad Hajji Edition, vol. I (Wizarat Al-Awqaf wa-lshuwuwn Al-Islamiyat lil-Mamlakat Al-Maghribia, 1981), 368–69.

145 Although this word literally means Africa, in these classical Arabic texts, it indicates today's Tunis and the region of Tripoli.

146 See: Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī, *Al-Mi'yār Al-Mu'rib*, 1981, I:378.

147 Yet, it must be stressed that although the *fatwa* of Al-Wanšārīsī seems to solve the problem in practice, it does not mean that his answer solves the problem at all. As Šihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) states, these kinds of legal opinions are useful for a practical solution, whereas they cannot suspend the disputable nature of the question; the contested question, in this regard, still exists as a matter of contention. See: Šihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī, *Kitāb Al-Iḥkām Fī Tamyīz Al-Fatāwā 'an Al-Aḥkām Wa Taṣarrufāt Al-Qāḍī Wa Al-Imām*, 76. In other words, the exclusion of Ḥalīl ibn Ishāq Al-Ġundī by Al-Wanšārīsī does not mean his arguments have been refuted or he lost his availability.

as Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī (d. 1508) comprehensively expressed, if a ruler acts shrewdly in the case of levying *zakāh*, e.g., does not use force and share it with the people in need as intended, he can legally derive many benefits from this procedure; the only point is that he should use his executive power judiciously. This reasoning seems very similar to the views in the principle of *tadbīr* dealing with the wise use of power.

This example illustrates the awareness of the above-mentioned scholars regarding the possibility of using the principle of *tadbīr* in some cases for a good *siyāsa*, while the overall tendency pertains to the application of the principle of *ʿidāra*. This awareness can be found even more directly in the case of the slavery discussion in the jurisprudential texts, as some scholars specify a contract between enslaved people and “master”, which is also called *tadbīr*.¹⁴⁸ Saḥnūn ibn Saʿīd at-Tanūḥī (d. 854), Ibn Abī Zaid al-Qairawānī (d. 996), ʿAbd Ar-Raḥmān ibn ʿAskar Al-Baġdādī (d. 1332), and Ibn ʿArafa Al-Warġamī (d. 1401) yield an almost identical definition for this term, stating that if a “master” enters into a contract with an enslaved person by declaring that the enslaved person will be free after death of “master”, then this is legally allowable and is called *tadbīr*.¹⁴⁹ These scholars recommend this practice with two reasons in particular: 1) In this way the enslaved person becomes more loyal by hoping and waiting for his future freedom, and not planning to escape, 2) by doing so “master” also gets religious advantages by freeing –though the only end of his life– an enslaved person as redemption for his “sins” in this world. Although the scholars generally advise the “master” to treat enslaved persons well and set free them frequently for redemption by limiting the authority of the “master” on enslaved persons, this time precisely using the word *tadbīr*, they leave a realm of action for “masters” to use their authority wisely, so that neither the enslaved persons try to escape nor the “master” misses the opportunity of release enslaved persons for redemption.

In other words, the above-mentioned scholars’ awareness of the potential effective application of the principle of *tadbīr* in varied cases enables them to employ it in a legal context regarding quite particular situations. In this way, they open up a new space of governance for rulers and, in general, for people who have authority. However, when it comes to critical issues such as the possible involvement of rulers in the market by setting prices, the above-mentioned scholars seemingly do not want to take the risk. With the exemption of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795), for instance, none of the

148 For a comprehensive discussion of the concept, see: Rainer Oßwald, *Das Islamische Sklavenrecht* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2017), 248–51.

149 See: Saḥnūn ibn Saʿīd at-Tanūḥī, *Al-Mudawwanat Al-Kubra*, vol. II (Beirut: Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyat, 1994), 510; Ibn Abī Zaid al-Qairawānī, *Al-Risāla*, chap. 35.2; ʿAbd Ar-Raḥmān ibn ʿAskar Al-Baġdādī, *ʿIršād Al-Sālik ʿila ʿAšraf Al-Masālik*, 217; Ibn ʿArafa Al-Warġamī, *Al-Muḥtaṣar Al-Fiḥi*, Abdul Rahman Muhammed Al-Khair Edition, vol. VI (Dubai: Al-Farooq Center, 2014), 357.

above-mentioned scholars even hints at the ruler's interference in the market in their jurisprudential texts.¹⁵⁰ Mālik ibn Anas narrates only a briefcase, he says that if there is already price constancy in the market by nature and a merchant decides to sell his product at an extremely low price, thereby his plan would cause overall suffering to all other merchants, then the ruler or *muḥtasib* (Ar. market inspector) should tell the merchant to either increase the price of his products or leave the market.¹⁵¹ However, this single recognition of the ruler's involvement in the market still seems appropriate for the principle of *'idāra* and its core argument pertaining to the preservation of the free market; for in this case, the ruler or *muḥtasib* interferes in the market to protect the stability of the market, not for the benefit of consumers.¹⁵² Although in the principle of *tadbīr* it is recommended for rulers to intervene in the market to protect consumers by minimizing prices through indirect interference, in the principle of *'idāra* the key goal is to protect the stability and freedom of the market rather than the consumer welfare, by avoiding any involvement.¹⁵³

Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanṣarīsī (d. 1508) was further asked an interesting question on this topic. The questioner, who is probably a *muḥtasib* in the state, says that consumers always call them to fix prices in the market because they fear that the absence of a fixed price policy, especially for

150 Oberauer emphasizes that this seems to also be a general tendency in other Sunni Islamic legislative texts; cf. Norbert Oberauer, *Islamisches Wirtschafts- Und Vertragsrecht: Eine Einführung* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2017), 92. Although it is a common opinion that the *Mālikiyya* School of Law is one of the schools in Sunni Islam that clearly tends to tolerate any interference of the ruler or *muḥtasib* in the market, at least in the case of available texts in Islamic West Africa, this seems keenly incorrect. For this opinion, see: Adam Sabra, 'Prices Are in God's Hands: The Theory and Practice of Price Control in the Medieval Islamic World', in *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts*, ed. Michael Bonner, Ener, and Singer Amy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 76; Kristen Stilt, 'Price Setting and Hoarding in Mamluk Egypt: The Lessons of Legal Realism for Islamic Studies', in *The Law Applied: Contextualizing the Islamic Sharia*, ed. P. Bearman, Heinrichs, and B.G. Weiss (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2008), 60.

151 See: Mālik ibn Anas, *Al-Muwaṭṭa'*, chap. 31.24.

152 In this point, a discussion of the concept of *ḡabn fāḥiṣ* (Ar. outrageous overprice) by Ibn Ruṣd (d. 1126) seems fairly interesting. Using this concept, he attempts to rigorously define "outrageous" overprices for economic transactions; i.e., although he does not call for a fixed price system, he proposes precisely defined limits for prices. See: Ibn Ruṣd, *Bidāyat Al-Muḡtahid Wa-Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid*, 135. However, his views do not reach the real application for two reasons: 1) this notion defines price only in a reciprocal transaction, not in the market, that means, if prices in the market are already unbearably high, then the limit for an "outrageous" overprice should be even higher, which does not help for the problem, 2) even if a scholar or ruler would use this concept to claim certain limits for prices, as long as buyers are legally responsible subjects (not children, or mentally ill, etc.), there are no legal consequences if they sell goods beyond these limits, i.e., this can only be a moral duty for sellers. Even term such as *ḡabn fāḥiṣ*, which is clearly aimed at protecting buyers and consumers, cannot overcome the legal strength of the free market advocacy.

153 Two case studies concerning Cairo in the 13th century exhibit very clearly how rulers applied the principle of *ri'āsa* (by fixing prices, and this almost never worked) and *tadbīr* (by acting as economic agents providing goods from importation, and in many cases, it apparently worked) at the time of crises and famines (in another word, in the time of a public outcry by consumers), while it was always convenient for them to apply the principle of *'idāra* in normal times. See: Stilt, 'Price Setting and Hoarding in Mamluk Egypt: The Lessons of Legal Realism for Islamic Studies', 66–69; Sabra, 'Prices Are in God's Hands: The Theory and Practice of Price Control in the Medieval Islamic World', 87.

bakeries, butchers and textile producers, would lead to a disaster, considering these producers and merchants can easily abuse consumers by speculating on prices; in this context, he asks whether it is permitted to fix prices in the market. Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī answers this question with two arguments: 1) for him, it is the duty of all Muslims to follow the “right path” of the prophet; as long as they do so, they should not worry about any shortage or crisis because God always gives enough goods for good Muslims, 2) and more concretely, he claims that Mālik ibn Anas, once said, “there is no goodness in fixing prices (Ar. *al-tas‘īr*) over people.”¹⁵⁴ In short, any application of the principle of *tadbīr* and *ri’āsa* in the relationship between the market and rulers is clearly ruled out, since they propose the intervention of the rulers.

From these few examples, since the discussion of authority or rulership occurs very rarely in these texts, at least one conclusion can be drawn that jurisprudential texts of the *Mālikiyya* School of Law available in Central Sudan exhibit a clear tendency towards the principle of *’idāra*, though they also provide some flexibility for the potential applications of *tadbīr* – if not all its applications; but they show no tolerance for the principle of *ri’āsa*, since they strictly define political-economic role of the rulers. It can be projected that it is a formidable challenge for the rulers in Central Sudan who adopt the principle of *ri’āsa* to negotiate with the law because they are almost categorically opposed to each other. In such cases, as will be seen in the following chapters, rulers should either declare messianic claims, e.g., being a *mahdī* to suspend the law, or they must apply this principle only for a short period of time, such as in famine or war situations. For rulers who are adherent of the principle of *tadbīr*, it is more of an intellectual challenge to negotiate with the law since the law tolerates this principle in some cases. For rulers who follow the principle of *’idāra*, the law is, in fact, not a legislative power that must be challenged, but already a useful instrument to rule without little involvement.

In summary, it can be posited that three fundamental principles of governance significantly influenced the intricate dynamics of 19th century Central Sudan, often characterized by conflicting assumptions and foundational beliefs. Additionally, the interpretation of legal texts pertaining to these principles varied markedly, complicating their practical application. Nevertheless, these complexities only illustrate the overarching trajectory that rulers and scholars in 19th century Central Sudan had to navigate in their oscillations between the regional conditions and own personal aspirations.

¹⁵⁴ Ahmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanšārīsī, *Al-Mi’yār Al-Mu’rib*, Muhammad Hajji Edition, vol. VI (Wizarat Al-Awqaf wa-lshuwuwn Al-Islamiyat lil-Mamlakat Al-Maghribia, 1981), 409.

PART I: ERA OF REFORM

Introduction: New Contents with Old Frames

Siyasa in the Central Sudan during the first half of the 19th century was significantly influenced by a variety of actors and their reformist aspirations. Between 1800 and the 1830s, Yusuf *paşa* and Hassuna Dagayyis implemented transformative changes in Tripolitania. In the 1810s, Muhammad al-Mukni emerged as a pivotal figure in initiating a reform era in Fezzan, simultaneously facilitating the reform initiatives of al-Kanemi in Bornu and Yusuf *paşa*. The regions of Wadai and Hausaland also experienced notable developments; Muhammad Sabun took the initial steps to elevate Wadai to a regional power during the 1810s by establishing a new trade route with Benghazi, a city partially governed by Tripolitania. Fodiwa elites, such as Uthman dan Fodio, Abdullahi dan Fodio, and Muhammad Bello launched a revivalist jihad movement in the 1800s, which profoundly impacted the political, economic, and intellectual relations within Central Sudan. The al-Ansari family in Ghat and Abdulkadir Salih in Bilma also played significant roles in shaping the dynamics of the Sahara. Each of these actors pursued their own motivations and ambitions to reform the governance structures in their respective regions, whilst concurrently drawing upon a shared Afro-Islamic epistemological framework.

Yusuf *paşa* recognized an opportunity to enhance state revenue by transitioning from the traditional *idara* system to a *tadbir* system. Al-Mukni also played a pivotal role in this transformation. In the south, al-Kanemi and Muhammad Sabun shared similar aspirations for reform with Yusuf *paşa*. Al-Kanemi attributed the prolonged decline of Bornu to the *idara* system and sought to establish a new *tadbir* system to safeguard the state from the encroaching political influence of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. Similarly, Sabun believed that as long as the *idara* system remained in place, his state would be unable to attain regional power status; thereupon, he aimed to implement a *tadbir* system. In contrast, the Fodiawa dynasty pursued a markedly different reform agenda. Tripolitania, Bornu, and Wadai had long been governed under the *idara* system. Hausland, on the other hand, had been under the *tadbir* system that Yusuf *paşa*, al-Kanemi, and Sabun envisioned. However, the Fodiwa elites perceived the prolonged implementation of the *tadbir* system as having led to a significant decline in religious life and pervasive corruption across all political spheres. They argued that the

economic and political power sought by other actors in the *tadbir* system came at a considerable societal cost. Consequently, they aimed for a radical overhaul of the entire social and political structure through the application of *riasa*, resulting in a reformist movement characterized by aggression and violence.

Around the 1830s, after having opportunity to actualize their reform plans, all these actors had divergent outcomes, which led them to either persist with or reevaluate their system of governance. Yusuf *paşa*, having achieved significant wealth in the initial decade, encountered substantial corruption and social unrest by the 1830s. Ironically, these issues mirrored the criticisms levied by the Fodiwa elites against the implementation of *tadbir*. In Tripolitania, this turmoil culminated in a severe civil war, prompting the Ottoman Empire to intervene in 1835. Their involvement aimed to not only resolve the civil conflict but also to introduce their own reform agenda, which had been in development for several years. The Ottoman reform agenda was similarly influenced by the desire to implement *tadbir*, and led to further conflicts in Tripolitania, considering the populace was already discontented with the outcomes of this system. Notably, the Ottoman approach to *tadbir* differed significantly from that of Yusuf *paşa*. After two decades of conflict with local communities, by approximately 1850, the Ottomans had established a stable *tadbir* system.

Tadbir application of al-Kanemi yielded results comparable to those observed in the Ottoman Empire. Despite encountering numerous conflicts, al-Kanemi ultimately succeeded in halting the incursions of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate and in establishing a stable governance framework, thereby transforming Bornu from a declining state into an ascending one. Interestingly, the application of *tadbir* by both Yusuf *paşa* and al-Kanemi facilitated their collaboration, particularly affording Bornu a significant opportunity to engage in strategic manoeuvring against the Uthmaniyya Caliphate and Wadai.

The outcomes of *tadbir* in Wadai mirrored those in Tripoli. Although Sabun managed to amass considerable wealth and political influence during the initial decade of the 19th century, Wadai soon descended into civil strife. Nonetheless, akin to the Ottoman Empire's involvement in Tripoli for the effective implementation of *tadbir*, the engagement of Muhammad Sharif in the 1820s, following his return from the pilgrimage, ultimately led to the establishment of the *tadbir* system in Wadai.

In summary, by the conclusion of the reform era in the 1840s and 1850s, Tripolitania, Bornu, and Wadai experienced a tumultuous period in the application of *tadbir*, characterized by unrest, conflicts, and civil wars. Nevertheless, they ultimately succeeded in devising a modified approach to *tadbir* that fostered stability. The Uthmaniyya Caliphate similarly adjusted its strategies. The implementation of the *riasa* system initially facilitated unprecedented success by consolidating control over the entire Hausland, whereas it soon became evident to the Fodiwa elites that this system, although effective for inciting revolt, proved inadequate for establishing stable governance. A prolonged transformation ensued within the Caliphate, as Uthman dan Fodiyo, Abdullahi dan Fodiyo, and Muhammad Bello explored various strategies to address the shortcomings of the *riasa* system in fostering stable governance. Ultimately, Abdullahi dan Fodiyo abandoned the *riasa* framework in favour of an *idara* system in the western region of the Caliphate. However, he also modified the application of the *idara* system, resulting in distinct outcomes for the western segment of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, that is chiefly different from the ancient *idara* system in Tripolitania, Bornu, and Wadai. In contrast, Uthman and Bello in the eastern part gradually transitioned from *riasa* to *tadbir*, recognizing that notwithstanding the previous system's corruption, it had certain beneficial aspects that helped maintain stability. Hence, he adapted the *tadbir* system to enhance stability while striving to avoid corruption and social unrest. As a result, by the conclusion of the reform era, the Uthmaniyya Caliphate had adopted two divergent governance systems, ultimately moving away from the *riasa* system. These transformations, characterized by various challenges and adjustments, culminated in the establishment of a significant *tadbir* bloc across Central Sudan by the mid-19th century, extending from Tripoli to the eastern regions of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, Bornu, and Wadai. Only the western part of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate and the Air Sultanate remained outside this governmental framework, maintaining their distinct *idara* system. Al-Ansari family in Ghat and Abdulkadir Salih in Bilma further noticed this trans-regional dynamic and subsequently initiated a transition from *idara* to *tadbir* within their respective regions, thereby establishing a close relationship with the Ottoman Empire.

These new reforms have engendered new relationships within the region. Historically, Bornu has maintained an economic partnership with Tripoli; however, following the reforms instituted by Yusuf *paşa*, al-Mukni, and al-Kanemi, a novel political and military alliance emerged for the first time, aimed at countering the threats posed by Wadai and the newly established Uthmaniyya caliphate. Although the Uthmaniyya Caliphate found itself in opposition to this coalition, the revivalist initiatives spearheaded by the Fodiwa fostered unprecedented scholarly connections

between Sokoto and Tripoli, considering Tripolitan scholars began to visit Sokoto for advanced education. The implementations of these reforms extended beyond the Central Sudan, influencing various external actors. European states engaged in Mediterranean trade were compelled to negotiate with the new governance system implemented by Yusuf *paşa*. The Ottoman Empire was similarly affected, as the political ramifications of the reforms in Tripolitania necessitated the development of a revised strategic approach. Additionally, the reverberations of the revivalist jihad movement led by dan Fodiwa elites transcended the Central Sudan, giving rise to another revivalist movement in Masina, which culminated in the establishment of the Hamdallahi caliphate. A further revivalist movement emerged even in Brazil, where enslaved Muslims from the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, transported by European slave traders to Bahia, sought to establish their own Islamic state in emulation of Uthman's jihad. In that regard, the transformation of *siyasa* in the Central Sudan during the first half of the 19th century acquired a distinctly global dimension. Nevertheless, the most significant outcome of these reforms was the formation of a substantial *tadbir* bloc in the Central Sudan, which catalysed a new phase of expansionism in the latter half of the 19th century. Whilst these reforms introduced new ideas/contents and aspirations to the discourse surrounding governance, they did little to alter the existing political frames and boundaries.

2. Challenges with Global Entanglements: The Transformation of Governance in Ottoman Tripoli

„Nothing can be more palpable than the general ignorance of the rulers here. They are so totally unacquainted with the most simple maxims of government, and of turning their numerous resource to any advantage, that I am astonished how they have been able to exist so long as an independent state.“
E. Blaquiere, in 1811

The “astonishment”¹⁵⁵ of the British agent regarding the governance in Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli was not an exceptional case in the early 19th century. It was not uncommon for European consuls¹⁵⁶ to portray the *paşa* of Tripoli as “bloodthirsty despot”¹⁵⁷ and “*un souverain barbaresque ignorant les principes qui gouvernent les nations civiliséss*”.¹⁵⁸ However, they were also required to report to their central offices on the states' unprecedented economic growth and administrative development since the 1790s.¹⁵⁹ This ambivalence remained unresolved for many European consuls and travelling agents, resulting in contradictory statements in their reports and creating a significant discrepancy between Anglophone/Francophone research literature (which has exclusively been relied on these sources) and Arabic/Turkish research literature.

Nevertheless, this profound animosity in the non-Afro-Islamic sources¹⁶⁰ also reveals a crucial facet of the system of governance in the *paşalık* of Tripoli. During the 18th and 19th centuries, several European states celebrated their rise to power, surpassing the influence of the great empires of that time, such as the Ottoman, Qing, Maratha, and Mughal empires. In contrast, their position in Tripoli was markedly distinct. It was their responsibility to pay an annual tribute to the *paşalık*, as well as give presents to *paşa*, and his ministers as well as relatives to gain their favour and amity. Despite conviction among non-Afro-Islamic agents of their own cultural and military superiority, they were compelled to vie with one another in Tripoli to become the *paşa*'s preferred associate. This vulnerability was a consequence of the system of governance in place in the *paşalık* of Tripoli. In this regard, the issue of governance in Tripoli had implementations, considering the *paşas* were able

155 E. Blaquiere, *Letters from Meditterreanean: Containing a Civil and Political Account of Sicily, Tripoly, Tunis, and Malta* (London: Henry Colburn, 1813), 218.

156 In Tripoli, there were several consulars from the European states. Some of them were: Sweeden, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, French, England, Sardinna, Sicilly, and Venetia.

157 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Túnez, L. 6247

158 Dr. Frank, ‘Tunis: Description de Cette Régence’, in *L’Universe Pittoresque*, ed. J.J. Marcel (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1850), 70.

159 R.S, Konsulatarkiv Tunis, SE/RA/231/231158, 1814

160 In Tripoli, there was also a consular from the United States of America. Afro-Islamic sources in this thesis are mainly in Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish, as the actors in the Central Sudan regularly used these three languages.

to outclass the power of several European empires in the middle of Mediterranean while their overlord, the Ottoman Empire, was crumbling against the invasive attacks of the European empires. In this respect, the *paşalık* of Tripoli serves as an anti-narrative example in the early 19th century due to its efficient application of governance, challenging the European-centric domination of the global order. Still, in order to fully comprehend the success of the *paşalık* of Tripoli and its system of governance, it is essential to have a firm grasp on the historical and epistemological background.

2.1. From *Garb Ocakları* to *paşalık*: Historical Background

The Ottoman Empire established control over Algiers, Tunisia, and Tripoli in the 16th century, driven by its expansionist ambitions to end the Spanish occupation in northern Africa.¹⁶¹ These re-captured regions were registered by the Ottoman administration as *Garb Ocakları* (Tr. western *yeniçeri*¹⁶² camps), as the Ottoman *padişah* designed the new rules in the region as temporary military supply camps for further expansion.¹⁶³ The secondary role of these military camps was to be a response to the offensive marine activities of Malta against the Muslim merchants.¹⁶⁴ In other words, they were not initially considered as a governing body in the region. However, they had the right to collect tribute from local communities to fund their “holy war” (Ar. *ihad*) against Spain, Venice, and Malta – which the Ottoman sources refer to as the Catholic coalition – without providing any governmental functions.¹⁶⁵ From the Ottoman perspective, this new ruling structure in the region was regarded as an overseas dominion, since the generals of the camp (Tr. *ocak ağaları*) were responsible before the chief admiral of marine (Tr. *kapudan paşa*), rather than before an administrative body such as vizier (Tr. *vezir*).¹⁶⁶

The Ottoman *padişah* reorganized the structures in the region when, in the early 17th century, the militant marine activities of *Garb Ocakları* – by capturing mainly the merchant ships from Venice – began to create wealth for the generals of the camp. Algiers, Tunisia, and Tripoli were incorporated into the *saliyane* system, which entailed the payment of annual tribute to İstanbul, whereas the

161 Saydi V. Toprak, ‘Osmanlı Yönetiminde Kuzey Afrika: Garp Ocakları’, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Türkiyat Mecmuası* XXII (2012): 225–26.

162 *Yeniçeri* was a traditional military unit in the Ottoman Empire.

163 Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), 711.

164 Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), 646.

165 Kola Folayan, *Tripoli During the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli* (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1979), 3.

166 Ibn Abi'l Diyaf, *It'haf Ahl al-Zaman Bi-Akhbar Muluk Tunis Wa 'Ahd al-Aman*, vol. III (Tunis: Publications du Ministere de la Culture, 1963), 28–29.

padişah permitted them to maintain their autonomy in managing their internal affairs.¹⁶⁷ This was also the result of the Ottoman's military plans, considering the *padişahs* were no longer inclined to pursue further expansion in the western Mediterranean. Consequently, the military functions of *Garb Ocakları* gradually diminished, and the *padişahs* began contemplating supplementary revenue from the region. Nonetheless, this transformation was short-lived. The Ottoman Empire underwent a significant administrative restructuring in the 1650s, adopting a more decentralized governance structure.¹⁶⁸ This shift had a profound impact on *Garb Ocakları*, conferring upon them a considerable degree of autonomy while still maintaining their juridical submission to the *padişah*.¹⁶⁹ By the end of the 17th century, for instance, the Danish sealers were, misleadingly, describing North African coasts as full of local "republics".¹⁷⁰ The loss of the common aim—as "holy war" against the Catholic coalition—and the necessity of collaborating with the local communities to identify new methods of tribute collection led *Garb Ocakları* to establish fundamental administrative structures. From the 1690s to the 1730s, the generals of the camps in Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli underwent a significant transformation, evolving from a military camp to a governing body with a highly intricate administrative structure. The transformation was not merely structural; new interests also emerged. During this period, the military rulers of the *Garb Ocakları* began to engage in competition and even warfare with one another.¹⁷¹ The reaction of the Ottoman *padişah* to these conflicts was limited to issuing a *ferman* (Tr. order with *padişah*'s seal) that reminds some verses from the Qur'an, underlying that it is shameful for Muslims to fight against each other.¹⁷²

In the wake of the 1710s, the control of the nascent governing bodies in Tunisia and Tripoli shifted to the local communities, paving the way for the advent of new dynasties. That was also a reaction to the Ottoman Empire's inability to resolve the conflicts. In particular, under the great oppression of Algerian general, exerted significant control over the Tunisian and Tripolitan communities, compelling them to prioritize the consolidation of their own power and regional control, instead of waiting for compensation from İstanbul.¹⁷³ Initially, the Ottoman *padişah* refrained from

167 Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), 111–12.

168 See: Orhan Kılıç, 'Ocaklık Sancakların Osmanlı Hukukunda ve İdari Tatbikattaki Yeri', *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 11/1 (2001).

169 Muhammad al-Hilali Al-Mili, *Tarih Al-Cezayir Fi-l-Kadim Wa-l-Hadis* (Maktab al-Nahdatil al-Cezayirriye, 1938), 189–90.

170 C.F. Wandel, *Danmark Og Barbareskerne* (København: Bianco Lunos, 1919), 4.

171 Al-Zavi, *Al-Mu'cam al-Buldani al-Libiyya* (Tablus: Maktab al-Nur, 1968), 22.

172 B.O.A., *Divân-ı Hümayûn Mühimme Defteri*, 105/333.

173 Abdullah Erdem Taş, 'Garp Ocaklarında Birliğin Bozulması: 18. Yüzyılda Cezayir-Tunus-Trablusgarp İlişkileri', *İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırma Dergisi* 9 (2) (2020): 1087.

recognizing these emerging local authorities as legitimate rulers of these provinces (Tr. *eyalets*). In 1718, however, was compelled to appoint them as *paşa*.¹⁷⁴ In spite of this, the *padişah* subsequently issued several *fermans* to these newly recognized local *paşas*, stipulating that they were to refrain from seeking to enhance their own domains and instead collaborate with one another in opposition to the Catholic coalition.¹⁷⁵ By 1725, he realized the fact that these local *paşas* were beyond of his power; yet, still obedient to his religious and legal authority.¹⁷⁶ At this juncture, the Ottoman Empire initiated a new policy regarding these provinces that lasted until 1835; this was the *idara*. Especially the instruments of *dairat al-siyasa* in the principles of *idara* became characteristic for Tripoli. As this governing principle and instrument assumed, the Ottoman *padişah*, directly or indirectly, did not involve the cases, but instead sought to preserve the existing power balances, that is to say, the Ottoman Empire was not interested in taking these provinces under its direct authority, but in tying them to the existing power chains within the Empire. This strategy allowed these provinces to remain part of the Empire, affording them numerous advantages. They recruited soldiers from the Anatolian coast and demanded high-tech cannons from Istanbul for their wars against the "Christians." Yet, they retained considerable autonomy within their own domains. This policy ensured long-term stability in relations between the Ottoman Empire and the *paşalık* of Tripoli for the rest of the 18th century and in the early 19th century,¹⁷⁷ until the Ottoman Empire occupied Tripoli in 1835.¹⁷⁸

174 B.O.A., Nişan-Tahvil Defteri, 1355/22.

175 B.O.A., Divân-ı Hümâyûn Mühimme Defteri, 132/1054, and 132/1055.

176 In 1725, Venice and Austria made a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, obliging the Padişah to protect their merchant ships in the Mediterranean from attacks by the Garb Ocakları. The Sultan sent a ferman to the ocaks to explain the situation, but the Garb Ocakları rulers easily ignored it and continued to attack Venetian ships. Ultimately, the padişah decided to negotiate additional treaties with Venice, Austria, and the Garb Ocakları. To this end, he sent an intermediary to North Africa. See: B.O.A., Divân-ı Hümâyûn Mühimme Defteri, 132/1199.

177 For instance, in 1816, a congress convened by several European states aimed to deliberate on strategies to curtail the influence of the *paşalık* of Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli. Upon learning of this assembly, the Ottoman *padişah* corresponded with his vizier to inquire whether any action should be taken in response. The vizier's detailed reply exemplifies the continuity of the Ottoman Empire's governing approach towards Tripoli. He articulated that it was indeed problematic for European states to discuss the *Ocaks*—referring to Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli—without the involvement of the Ottoman Empire, as these territories are integral to the Empire. However, he acknowledged that the political dynamics of the *Ocaks* differ from those of the Empire, and it has been a longstanding practice for the Empire to refrain from entangling its own diplomatic relations with those of European states. The vizier concluded that the Ottoman Empire should not intervene, as the discussions and proposed actions by the European states would not undermine the *Ocaks*. He reasoned that Britain possesses the capability to occupy these territories, whereas it is unlikely to do so due to concerns over potential backlash in the Islamic world, particularly given its intricate interests in India. Consequently, the vizier advised that the Ottoman Empire should simply disregard the congress. B.O.A., Hatt-ı Hümâyûn, 457/2253.

178 In Italian, English, and French research literatures, it has been believed that when Tripoli was occupied by Cezayirli Ali Bulgurlu in 1793 for just 1 year, that was organized by the Ottoman Empire. For instance: Rodolfo Micacchi, *La Tripolitania Sotto Il Dominio Dei Caramanli* (A. Airoldi Editore: Intra, 1936); Folayan, *Tripoli During the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli*; Ettore Rossi, *Storia Di Tripoli e Della Tripolitania: Dalla Qonquista Araba al 1911* (Roma: Istituto per L'Oriente, 1968). According to these sources, Cezayirli Ali Paşa was sent from Istanbul with a ferman declaring him the new Paşa of Tripoli. Yet, the documents in the Ottoman archive clearly demonstrate that

The ascendancy of the local *paşas* – which rapidly evolved into dynasties – in the 1730s intersected with another great transformation in Europe. The radical decline of the Spanish hegemony in the 18th century not only gave a large margin of manoeuvre to the new dynasties of Tunisia and Tripoli, which they greatly profited, but also opened up the Mediterranean to the other European states apart from Venice and Malta.¹⁷⁹ Swedish diplomats and merchants, for instance, were among those who visited in 1736 Tunisia and Tripoli in order to conclude the peace treaties, and this was followed by several other European states.¹⁸⁰ This intersection of the new global conditions became determinate for the remainder of the 18th century, and was inherited by Yusuf *paşa* in Tripoli in 1800. In this respect, whilst still adhering to the principles of Ottoman foreign jurisdiction in his external relations, he enjoyed a degree of autonomy that enabled him to conclude peace or war agreements with various European states, in accordance with his own interests.¹⁸¹ For example, the Ottoman Turkish title¹⁸² that Yusuf *paşa* used for himself in a letter that he wrote to the King of Sweden in 1808, for instance, exemplifies this intricate dynamic:

*“Ocağul-cihad Trablusgarp-ı hamiiyet-i min külli şiddetin ve kerbin eyaletinin Mutasarrıf ve Valisi min abdi Rabbihi Sübhanehu Emirü’l-mü’minin ve Nasıru’d-din el-mücahid fi sebili Rabbi’l-alemin olan Yusuf paşa bin Ali paşa bin Mehmed paşa bin Ahmed paşa-yı Karamani...”*¹⁸³

He describes the city of Tripoli as *ocak* of *jihad*, i.e. military camp for “holy war”, and defines himself as *vali* – i.e. the governor of the Ottoman Empire – but also as the leader of Muslims as an independent Emir.¹⁸⁴ This three-dimensional complexity was the core basis for the governance in Tripoli after 1800. The new politics and strategies raised up on the oscillation of following the

he was neither sent by the Ottoman *padişah* nor received any *ferman* from him, while for the Ottoman *padişah* he was definitely more preferable than the Karamanli dynasty in Tripoli. See: B.O.A., Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 14337. In fact, the wife of the British consul in Tripoli noted in her diary that the *ferman* (sic!) that Cezayirli Ali Bulgurlu read seemed not authentic, and many people suspected its originality. See: Richard Tully, Narrative of a Ten Years’ Residence at Tripoli in Africa (London: H. Colburn, 1816), 334. Nevertheless, the Ottoman *padişah*’s quick recognition of Ali Bulgurlu gave people the impression that Bulgurlu was in Tripoli on a special mission on behalf of the *padişah*. Furthermore, the *padişah* was so dissatisfied with the Karamanli family that when he heard about the massacre of the Jewish community, which had been protected by the Karamanli family, carried out by Ali Bulgurlu, he easily ignored it. See: Tully, 359.

179 Chater, *Dépendance et Mutations Précoloniales: La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis: Publications de L’universite de Dunis, 1984), 31.

180 J.H. Kröger, *Sveriges Förhållanden Till Barbaresk Staterna I Afrika* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1856), 355.

181 Muhammad Mustafa Bazama, *Al-Diblumasiyat al-Libiyat Fi al-Qarn al-Uthamin Eashr: Abd Al-Rahman Agha (1720-1792)* (Benghazi: Maktabat Qurina li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziya), 29.

182 Yusuf *paşa* could not speak Ottoman Turkish. Yet, he mostly ordered his scribes to prepare texts of treaties with other states in Ottoman Turkish, to show that in foreign relations he is under the Ottoman Jurisdiction.

183 Nehicüddin Efendi, *Tarih-i İbn-i Galbun Der-Beyânı Trablusgarp* (Dersaadet [İstanbul], 1867), 80.

184 Although this title can at first glance sound paradoxical, it was, in fact, a clear example of the *idara*. With this governing principle, the *paşa* of Tripoli was part of the Ottoman Empire as an independent ruler.

Ottoman International Jurisdiction, waging religious wars against various “Christian States”, and acting as an independent ruler depending on the case. One of the most widely – but wrongly – known and contested strategies of governance implemented by Tripoli – which was built on this three-dimensional complexity – was their marine diplomacy, and profoundly influenced their other policies.

2.2. Rule of Yusuf Paşa

2.2.1 *Tadbir als Marine Diplomacy: Ottoman Foreign Jurisdiction in Practice*

The emergence of *Garb Ocakları* in European sources during the late 17th century occurred within a persistent context of piracy. This theme remained a focal point in European consular reports and travel narratives until 1835, with these provinces being characterized as “pirate states” by Europeans.¹⁸⁵ Accordingly, the phenomenon of so-called “piracy” in Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli has been widely accepted as a fact in Anglophone and Francophone research literature. In contrast, Arabic and Turkish academic discourse recognized the more nuanced reality of this issue. As previously analysed elsewhere, piracy (Tr. *deniz haydutluğu*; Ar. *sariqat al-bahriyatu*) had been prohibited under Ottoman law since the 14th century. What is referred to as “piracy” in Anglophone and Francophone literature is more accurately described as privateering (Tr. *korsanlık*; Ar. *qarsana*) and “holy war at sea” (Tr. *deniz gaziliği*; Ar. *jiḥād al-baḥr*).¹⁸⁶ The distinction between these terms lies in the juridical options of the ruler: if a ruler designates specific captains to attack vessels from a “non-Muslim nation”, this constitutes privateering; conversely, if a ruler permits any individual to assault such vessels, it is classified as holy war at sea. However, any attack on the ships of a non-Muslim country that has been granted *aman* (Ar. security) status by the ruler is deemed piracy. Despite the fact that numerous European states and the U.S.A. regularly paid tribute to secure *aman*, thereby protecting themselves from privateering and holy war, they continued to label vessels from Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli as pirates until the 1830s, utilizing this characterization to justify their imperial incursions.¹⁸⁷

A significant issue within the Anglophone and Francophone research literature is the lack of recognition regarding the Ottoman Foreign Jurisdiction, which was adhered to by the *Garp*

185 See for example one of the most cited French chronicles regarding Tunisia: A. Rousseau, *Anales Tunisiennes* (Tunis: Bouslama, 1985), 317–18.

186 Kerem Duymus, ‘Tadbir as Marine Diplomacy: Ottoman Foreign Jurisdiction in Practice and the Debate of Piracy in Case of Tripoli between 1790s-1835’, *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 23, no. 2 (2024): 85.

187 Duymus, 86.

Ocakları from its inception. By the conclusion of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire had established a dominant presence in the Mediterranean, granting the *padişah* the requisite power and authority to delineate "international law"¹⁸⁸ within this region. Although this authority was largely disregarded by Spain, Venice, and Malta for an extended period, by the late 17th century, these states began to acknowledge and comply with this legal framework. One of the earliest articulations of this Ottoman Foreign Law occurred in 1670, following a complaint from the Venetian Consulate regarding assaults on their merchant vessels in the Mediterranean. In an official proclamation, the Ottoman *padişah* asserted that vessels located within *kale altı* (Tr. distance of a canon's range from the coast) were under the Empire's protection, whereas in the open sea, the principles of *dar al-harb* (Ar. abode of war) prevailed, i.e. at open sea, there is a war situation by nature, and safety could not be guaranteed.¹⁸⁹ Following the occupation of the island of Crete, the Ottoman Empire moved closer to its objective of controlling all Aegean Sea coastlines. By the 1700s, this body of water began to be classified as *dar al-Islam* (Ar. abode of peace/Islam), signifying a state of peace by nature, with the *padişah* held accountable for any potential losses. For instance, in 1740, the *padişah* issued a declaration to France asserting that the *kale altı* of the western Greek coasts and the entirety of the Aegean Sea between İstanbul and Crete fell under the Empire's protection, thereupon categorizing it as *dar al-Islam*, albeit the remainder of the Mediterranean continued to be regarded as *dar al-harb*.

The concept of "International Law," which remained unchanged until the Tanzimat Reforms of the 1830s, served as the foundation for the tributary system implemented by the *paşalık* of Tripoli from the 1700s to 1835.¹⁹⁰ Separation between *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* within this legal framework

188 The concept of "nation" existed within the Ottoman Empire as "*millet*" since the 14th century, functioning as a legal term. Ottoman jurisdiction recognized other European states primarily as "*ecnebi milletler*" (Tr. "foreign nations"), in contrast to domestic nations such as Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians. Consequently, the European-centric interpretation of "nation" emerged later and differed from this earlier usage. By the 15th century, the notion of "international law" was already present within Ottoman jurisdiction. Over the subsequent centuries, the international law based on Ottoman foreign law competed with the European-entered international law in the Mediterranean.

189 B.O.A., *Düve-i Ecnebiye*, 16/1.

190 Bazama, *Al-Diblumasiyat al-Libiyat Fi al-Qarn al-Uthamin Eashr: Abd Al-Rahman Agha (1720-1792)*, 28. The enforcement of this legal framework in Tripoli was overseen by Hanafi *muftis* (Ar. chief religious officers), appointed from İstanbul. In Tripoli, there were typically two muftis: one Hanafi, responsible for international matters, including maritime policy and Ottoman administrative affairs, and one Maliki mufti, selected from local scholars, who addressed issues pertaining to the local populace. Although their areas of jurisdiction were distinctly delineated, instances of tension occasionally arose. For example, during the 1770s, the Maliki *qadi* of Tripoli, Sheikh Abdula Karim Al-Awusi (d17??) inquired of Sheikh Omar Al-Sudani (d. 1767), who was Maliki *mufti* of the whole Tripolitania, regarding a statement he allegedly made asserting that a Maliki individual praying behind a Hanafi *imam* would forfeit his/her faith. Al-Sudani clarified that his statement had been misrepresented; he had indicated that praying behind a Hanafi *imam* was a source of disgrace, showing a tension between two schools of law. Al-Hadi bin Yunis, 'Al-Hayat al-Ilmiyat Fir Tarablus Fi al-Qarn 12hu/18m, Al-Sheikh Omar Al-Sudani Nashatah Fo al-Fiqh Wa-l-Qada', in Amal Al-Mutamar al-Awal Li-l-Wathayiq Wa-l-Makhtutat Fi Libiya Waqiyahu Wafaq al-Amal Hawlaha, Zliten 1988, ed. Omar Jahidar, Vol.1, 216–20.

pertained not only to the nature of maritime activities but also to the status of vessels owned by European states. In *dar al-Islam*, the European ships were granted *dimni* (Ar. protected) status, meaning they were afforded protection not under Islamic law (Ar. *sharia*) but through the peace established by the ruling authority, specifically the Ottoman *padişah*. Consequently, acts of piracy, as well as privateering and holy war, were explicitly prohibited against these ships. In *dar al-harb*, however, a different status known as *aman*, was applicable. Given the inherent conditions of warfare in *dar al-harb*, the only means to mitigate potential conflicts during maritime encounters was to seek *aman* by entering into a treaty beforehand.¹⁹¹ In this context, vessels from the *paşalık* of Tripoli were entitled to engage in privateering and holy war against ships whose owners had not established a treaty with them, and piracy remained strictly forbidden. Similarly, European vessels were permitted to attack Tripolitan ships if no treaty existed with the *paşa*, a situation that occurred regularly.¹⁹² To formalize a treaty, the *paşas* required tribute from European states in exchange for the *aman*, security, he provided. Notably, the regulation of *aman* applied to all foreigners, irrespective of their religious affiliation. For example, Yusuf *paşa* issued *aman* (via a document called *senet*¹⁹³) for pilgrims from West Africa travelling to Mecca via Tripolitania.¹⁹⁴

For this reason, when the *padişah* received grievances from European states regarding alleged "piracy," he initially sought to ascertain the precise location of the incidents to determine whether they constituted genuine piracy or were merely acts of privateering or holy warfare. In two cases, one in 1734 and the other in 1810, for example, the *padişah* concluded, following his investigations, that the assaults conducted by the *paşalık* of Tunisia and Tripoli occurred within *dar al-Islam* (that is to say, these attacks were piracy), thereby categorizing them as acts of piracy. As a result, he issued a *ferman* to these leaders to communicate the findings of his inquiry and to demand reparations for the attacks, a request that was complied with by the *paşa* of Tunis and Tripoli.¹⁹⁵ A typical misunderstanding regarding jurisdiction arose in the case of Prussia. Between 1799 and 1807, Prussian authorities sought sea passports from the Ottoman Empire, which were exclusively

191 For more details, see: Abdullah Erdem Taş, 'Osmanlı Garp Ocaklarından Trablusgarp Eyaleti: Karamanlılar Dönemi (1711-1835)' (Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2016), 323. For example, the discussion between Holland and Ottoman in 1712 regarding *dimni* and *aman* status: U.B.L., Oosterse handschriften, C. 1589, 132-133.

192 For instance, see: Ammar Jahidar, 'Al-Bahriyat al-Libiyat Wa-Harb al-Yunan (1821-1828)', *Majallat Al-Tarikhiyyat Al-Arabiyyat Li-l-Dirasiyyat Al-Uthmaniyyati* 1, no. 2 (1990): 243-49.

193 For example, in 1808, Yusuf *paşa* issued a *senet* for security for 9 people from Ghadames, who were willing to go pilgrimage. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a register dated as 1808.

194 D.M.T.L., Qaramanli, uncategorized, an official document dated as 1829.

195 For the case in 1734, see: B.O.A., Divân-ı Hümâyûn Mühimme Defteri, 140/529, and 530. For the case in 1810, see: B.O.A., Hatt-ı Hümâyûn, 31789.

issued within *dar al-Islam*; however, the Prussians erroneously believed that such passports were available throughout the entirety of the Ottoman domain, including the *paşalık* of Tripoli.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, there were instances in which the Ottoman *padişah* sought to exploit the inherent advantages of *dar al-harb*. In 1798, he directed the *paşas* of Tunisia and Tripoli via *ferman* to terminate their treaty with France—specifically, to revoke its *aman* status—and to engage in hostilities against French vessels, as France was at war with the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹⁷

Despite multiple celebrations by European states regarding the abolition of "piracy" in the Mediterranean, these nations continued to seek the regulation of *aman* from the *paşas* of Tripoli by paying tribute to ensure the safety of their merchant vessels. This raises the question of why European states were unable to terminate the regulation of *aman* in Tripoli through force; yet, persisted in paying tribute and negotiating for a legal resolution without success?

The answer to this inquiry is rooted in the governance system employed by the states of *Garb Ocaks*. A historical example that illustrates this complex relationship is the conflict between the United States of America and Yusuf *paşa* of Tripoli during the 1790s and early 1800s.¹⁹⁸ Following its independence from the British Empire, the U.S.A. sought to expand its trade in the Mediterranean, considering trade in the Caribbean remained dominated by Spain and France. During the 1790s, American merchant ships were actively engaged in trade within the Mediterranean. However, they lacked experience with Ottoman Foreign Jurisdiction and the distinctive governance strategies implemented by the Tripolitan *paşa*.

For instance, U.S.A. military officials were unaware that Tripoli was designed with a strategic vision (Ar. *Islah*) under *tadbir* system that rendered any marine assault on the city ineffective.¹⁹⁹ The city's harbour was safeguarded by shallow waters, which only a local captain could navigate due to their knowledge of the concealed channels leading to the harbour.²⁰⁰ The seaward side of the city was fortified by a high and impenetrable wall, such that any bombardment from the open sea

196 G.S.P.K., I. HA GR, Rep. 68, Nr. 575, 576, 577, 578. That was the reason of their confusion when in 1805 one of their ships was captured by the Tripolitan marine forces. See: G.S.P.K., I. HA Rep. 81 Vatikan, Nr. 398.

197 B.O.A., Divân-ı Hümâyûn Mühimme Defteri, 207/216, and 217.

198 Unfortunately, even today, historians in the US refer to this conflict as the "Barbary Wars," which is far from any academic ethics.

199 Khalifa Muhammad Al-Dhuwaybi, *Al-Awde al-Askariyat Fi Tarablus al-Gharb Qubayl al-Ihtilal al-Itali* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasat al-tarikhayat, 1999), 64.

200 The submerged topography of these shallow waters consisted of an abundance of submerged rocks. For those lacking experience at sea, these waters posed a significant hazard. For example, in the 1880s, a particularly strong wind struck the harbour at night, resulting in the sinking of multiple vessels that had collided with the submerged rocks. As a result, the Ottoman authorities resolved to construct a series of light towers in the vicinity. Shatev, *Zatochenieto vu Sakhra-Fezanu*, 145.

resulted in cannonballs either striking the wall or passing over the city, landing in the uninhabited fields beyond. In the end, regardless of the strength of the naval forces, aggressors were unable to inflict damage on the city through military force. .

Between 1802 and 1803, the U.S.A. marine forces conducted multiple bombardments of the city from the open sea, operating under the assumption that they were inflicting significant damage, and *paşa* would soon capitulate.²⁰¹ However, the bombardments proved to be largely ineffective, to the extent that neither the Tripolitan merchant al-Faqih nor any European consular representatives were aware of the attacks occurring against the city.²⁰² Furthermore, Yusuf *paşa* remained confident in the efficacy of traditional application of *islah* through visionary building of the city. Due to the ineffectiveness of the U.S.A. bombardments, he departed the city during this period to engage in a military campaign in the Gharyan region.²⁰³

In 1804, American naval commanders began to recognize the ineffectiveness of their bombardment strategy and opted to implement a maritime blockade of the city until the *paşa* surrendered. To establish an effective blockade, the U.S.A. was required to deploy several additional warships, incurring an estimated cost of approximately 1 million dollars.²⁰⁴ The primary objective of these blockades was to disrupt the supply lines of the *paşa*, thereby precipitating an economic crisis. However, the large American vessels were constrained to remain in open waters, as they were unable to access the harbour, which posed significant challenges in terms of controlling a vast maritime area. This necessitated a substantial number of ships, leading to elevated supply costs over an extended period. Therefore, the sustainability of such operations hinged on economic viability. From *paşa's* perspective, the blockade posed minimal risk. Despite the presence of American ships in the open sea, he could use smaller vessels to navigate the shallow coastal waters. Accordingly, the blockade inflicted negligible economic damage on Tripoli, whereas the U.S.A. faced considerable financial strain due to the high costs associated with maintaining the blockade. For instance, the estimated expenditure for a couple of months of blockade amounted to approximately

201 United States Office of Naval Records and Library, *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, vol. Vol II (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 435.

202 A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 29-31. Also see: B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 5/32.

203 Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb* (Trablus: Maktab al-Farjani, 2008), 314.

204 United States Office of Naval Records and Library, *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, vol. Vol IV (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 142.

500,000 dollars for the U.S.A., whereas the economic conditions in Tripoli remained largely unchanged.²⁰⁵

The efficacy of this strategy was consistently acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, by European consuls. Driven by imperialistic ideologies, certain European states persistently attempted to bombard and blockade the city of Tripoli, albeit without success. Ultimately, these states quickly recognized that such endeavours were economically unfeasible, and that paying tribute to the *paşa* was significantly more profitable.²⁰⁶ This realization constituted the fundamental dynamic underpinning the success of the tributary system implemented by the *paşalık* from the 1790s to 1835. The effectiveness of their *tadbir* application proved nearly insurmountable for European powers,²⁰⁷ who repeatedly learned this lesson through numerous unsuccessful attempts to exert military pressure on the *paşa*.²⁰⁸ Likewise, the U.S.A. diplomat Eaton observed this dynamic during his mission from 1801 to 1805; however, from his nationalistic viewpoint, prioritizing economic considerations over "national honour" was deemed unacceptable.²⁰⁹ The consequences of this nationalism for the U.S.A. were, nonetheless, quite costly.²¹⁰ By 1805, it became evident that

205 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 5/32.

206 For instance, the Danish Foreign Office began keeping records of annual tribute payments to the *paşas* after 1794. Despite the tribute payments, they calculated that trade in the Mediterranean was always lucrative. See: D.R., Den Kongelige Afrikanske Konsulatsdirektion, 4187.

207 There exists a singular instance in which a European state successfully circumvented this governance strategy. In 1825, Sardinia orchestrated a specialized operation aimed at compelling the *paşa* to negotiate a more advantageous peace treaty. To this end, they meticulously assessed the strengths of the *paşa's* strategy and employed similar tactics against him. The Sardinians constructed small vessels modelling Tripolitan ships for the operation and, utilizing their network of spies, identified a local captain to guide them to the harbour. Under the cover of night, they approached the harbor stealthily, setting fire to all of the *Paşa's* ships and detonating several harbor depots. See: A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 35. According to the account of Tripolitan merchant Al-Faqih, this incident marked the sole occasion on which the city's residents suffered casualties, as numerous Tripolitan civilians lost their lives due to the explosions. Al-Faqih, *Al-Yavmiyat Al-Libiyya*, vol. I (Bengazi: Markaz jihad al-Libiyyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhia, 2001), 325. According to Al-Faqih's notes, when Yusuf *Paşa* noticed the effectiveness of the attack, he immediately made peace with Sardinia and took further measures to prevent a similar attack. See: Al-Faqih, I:333.

208 For the case of Denmark, see: D.R., Rapporteur fra konsulatene, 1803; D.R., Korrespondance, 1. For the case of Sweden, see: R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1797. For the cases of Spain, Naples, and Tuscany see: A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L. 6242; A.S.L., Archivo Consular Toscana, Corr. M.G.M., let. 67, 1828. For the case of Portugal, see: A.N.T.T., Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Tunes L. I, M. 157. For the case of Hansa cities, see: S.S., Rep. 5, Nr. 120. For the case of Britain, see: Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers 1817-1818, vol. V (London: Piccadilly, 1837), 611. For the case of France, see: R. Al-Imam, *Siyasat Hammuda Basha Fi Tunis* (Tunis: Manshurat al-Jami'a al-Tunisiyya, 1980), 422–23.

209 Charles Prentiss, *Life of the Late General Eaton* (Massachusetts: Brookfield, 1813), 170.

210 In 1804, American admirals and diplomats found themselves in a dire predicament, prompting them to devise a retaliatory strategy that involved a senseless civil massacre in Tripoli. See: N.A.N., Ministerie von Buitenlandse Zaken (1796-1810), inv. nr. 356. However, this initiative ultimately proved to be a significant failure. Subsequently, they shifted their focus to orchestrating a military coup by seizing control of Derna, a small city in eastern Libya. This marked the first instance of a military coup plan endorsed by Washington in the history of the United States. This plan failed entirely due to inexperience and poor coordination. United States Office of Naval Records and Library, *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, vol. Vol V (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 547–53.

coercing Yusuf *paşa* into signing a treaty through military means was futile, leading to the acceptance of a financial settlement after expending approximately 6 million dollars on various operations.²¹¹ In fact, a French consul had advised the American diplomat in 1799 that a treaty with the *paşa* could be secured for a mere 500,000 dollars.²¹² Furthermore, when British and Danish consulars noticed in 1801 that the U.S.A. aimed to compel the *paşa* into a treaty through bombardment and blockade, they encouraged American admirals through correspondence, firmly believing that such an operation would result in an economic catastrophe for the U.S.A., thereby diminishing their presence and competition in the Mediterranean.²¹³

The Tripolitan *paşa* maintained a steadfast confidence in the efficacy of his *tadbir* application for marine diplomacy, notwithstanding numerous aggressive attempts by European states employing military force. This confidence enabled him to transform the tributary system imposed on European states into a lucrative business model. Unencumbered by fears of military retaliation, he strategically adjusted tribute demands based on the prevailing global economic conditions and transactions within the Mediterranean region. States lacking a central role in the global context and exhibiting limited engagement in Mediterranean trade were assessed to pay relatively lower tribute. Furthermore, it was crucial for the *paşa* to discern which states were independent—thus obligated to pay tribute—and which were part of larger empires, considering the *paşa* could then demand increased tribute from these empires for these states.

To acquire such intelligence and remain informed regarding global developments, the *paşa* of Tripoli routinely dispatched envoys throughout Europe and Africa, in some cases accompanying the envoys of the *paşa* of Tunisia. For geographically proximate states such as Morocco, France, and Spain, the arrival of a *paşa*'s envoy was not particularly surprising. However, the appearance of

211 The economic catastrophe represented merely one aspect of the profound failure of the United States in its conflict with Yusuf *paşa*. Following 1802, the U.S. government reframed its military engagement against the *paşa* as a campaign against "piracy" in order to secure substantial funding for operations. However, by 1805, they faced the challenge of justifying to Congress and the public why, after several years of warfare, they found themselves in a position analogous to that of 1797. The resolution of this predicament involved a process of historical revisionism. U.S. diplomats and government officials opted to assert that they had achieved a significant victory over *paşa* by compelling him to negotiate peace, which was not true. Furthermore, the government awarded the Distinguished Service Medal to the admirals involved in the bombardment and blockade of Tripoli in 1805, commemorating their efforts with a grand ceremony See: United States Office of Naval Records and Library, *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, 1939, Vol V:38.

212 United States Office of Naval Records and Library, *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, vol. Vol I (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 181.

213 B.R.P.O., Foreign Office, 5/32; D.R., Korrespondance, 1.

paşa's ships and envoys in cities such as London,²¹⁴ Hamburg,²¹⁵ and Copenhagen,²¹⁶ constituted a significant event for these states. For instance, the Swedish consul in Tripoli consistently sought to obstruct Yusuf *paşa*'s efforts to send an envoy to Stockholm, aiming to prevent the *paşa* from gaining insight into Sweden's wealth and thereby mitigating potential excessive tribute demands.²¹⁷

The *paşa*'s awareness of global events often caught European consuls off guard. For instance, upon learning of Mexico and Colombia's independence from Spain in the 1820s, Yusuf *paşa* swiftly mobilized his naval forces to Gibraltar, prepared to engage any vessels from these newly independent states, as they lacked treaties with him, thereupon rendering them legitimate target of privateering.²¹⁸ Similarly, when the Tunisian *paşa* became aware of Britain's prohibition on the slave trade post-1807, he dispatched his ships together with Tripolitan vessels to the Atlantic to inspect merchant vessels for contraband slaves, justifying any confiscations in form of privateering by asserting his alliance with Britain and his commitment to upholding the law.²¹⁹ In addition, Yusuf *paşa* maintained permanent representatives in İstanbul and İzmir as well. In 1799, for instance, Yusuf *paşa* received information through his representative in İstanbul regarding the French occupation of Venice, prompting him to demand increased payments from France.²²⁰

The economic base of the *paşa*'s *tadbir* application practised significantly complicated the circumstances for European states. In 1795, a Sicilian agent observed that, due to competition among European powers, these states sought to negotiate more advantageous treaties with the *paşas*, distinct from those established with other nations, rather than collectively opposing the *paşalık* to eliminate the tributary system.²²¹ Furthermore, the *paşa* recognized this underlying dynamic and strategically leveraged it to prevent any single power from achieving dominance in the Mediterranean. For instance, when either France or Britain exhibited excessive hegemonic tendencies, the *paşa* would suddenly demand exorbitant tributes to counterbalance their influence.²²² Consequently, the *paşa* consistently posed a limitation on the ambitions of France and

214 D.R., Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898

215 H.S.D., D 4, 568/4

216 Ömer Ali İsmail, *Inhiyar Hukm Al-Usrat al-Qaramanlitte Fi Libya: 1795-1835* (Trablus: Maktab al-Farjani), 410–11.

217 R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tunis, SE/RA/231/231158, 1797

218 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L. 6242.

219 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Túnez, L. 6247.

220 Nehicüddin Efendi, *Tarih-i İbn-i Galbun Der-Beyânı Trablusgarp*, 67.

221 B. Forteguerra, *O Piu Pace o Piu Guerra: Memoria Riguardante Il Sistema Di Pace e Di Guerra Che La Potenza Europee Praticano Con Le Regenze Di Barberia* (Palermo, 1795).

222 Al-Imam, *Siyasat Hammuda Basha Fi Tunis*, 422–23.

Britain. Conversely, states such as Denmark benefited from the tribute system, considering it enabled them to maintain their economic viability within the Mediterranean region.²²³

In conclusion, the distinctive implementation of the *tadbir* as a form of marine diplomacy by the *paşalık* of Tripoli enabled the state to emerge as a pivotal actor in the Mediterranean region without resorting to significant military force between the 1790s and 1835. Additionally, they transformed their influential role in Mediterranean diplomacy into an effective tributary system, thereby creating a business model that not only generated wealth but also maintained the balance of power in the Mediterranean by eschewing hegemonic policies. However, the domestic and economic strategies employed by the *paşas* of Tripoli diverged from their marine diplomatic approach. In these domains, they not only adopted varied strategies utilizing different governing instruments but also implemented distinct principles of governance.

2.2.2. When Ray Tended to *Riasa*: Yusuf *paşa*'s Experiments in the Domestic Policy of Tripoli

2.2.2.1. Administrative Sphere

Upon assuming power in Tripoli in 1795, Yusuf *paşa* inherited the system of *idara* in the domestic affairs that had been largely consistent with the longstanding *idara* tradition established since the inception of the *Garb Ocaks*. However, the structure and conditions of this *Idara* rule were notably more intricate than those observed in Tunisia and Algeria prior to the 1790s, particularly in terms of the administrative system. Unlike the Tunisian and Algerian *paşas* who wielded unilateral authority over their domains, Tripoli was characterized by the presence of an additional ruler, the emir of Fezzan, based in Murzuq. Under the *idara* system implemented by the Tripolitan *paşas*, the emirs of Fezzan were obligated to remit an annual tribute to Tripoli; nonetheless, they maintained complete autonomy within their own territory.²²⁴ Another unique example of the *idara*-based administration was the district (Tr. *Sancak*²²⁵) of Benghazi, which encompassed a significant area that included key cities such as Benghazi, Derne, Tobruq, and Awjila. The administrator of this district was appointed by Tripoli; yet, it served a unique role as a quasi-exile or seclusion site for the Karamanlı dynasty. Although it is typical within the *tadbir* system to assign administrators from the

²²³ Wandel, *Danmark Og Barbareskerne*, 91.

²²⁴ Friedrich Hornemann, *Fr. Hornemanns Tagebuch Seiner Reise von Cairo Nach Murzuck Der Hauptstadt Des Königreichs Fessan in Afrika in Den Jahren 1797 Und 1798; Aus Der Teutchen Handschrift Desselben*, ed. Carls König (Weimar: im Verlage des Landes-Industrie-Comptroirs, 1802), 79.

²²⁵ A smaller unit than *Eyalet* in the Ottoman administrative structure.

central authority, being entirely different for the *idara* system, the appointments in Benghazi often involved the exile of members from the Karamanlı family or their forced seclusion in this district. Along this line, Benghazi emerged as a strategically designed locale for a distinctive application of *idara*. The administrators of this district were predominantly, though not exclusively, the sons or brothers of the Tripolitan *paşas*, and while they exercised a degree of autonomy within their territory, they remained under the oversight of the central authority in this remote region.²²⁶

Yusuf *paşa* maintained a consistently positive view of the administrative structure of the *idara* for an extended period. Nevertheless, this perspective began to evolve around 1811, influenced significantly by a key figure: al-Mukni. He was a distinguished merchant in Tripoli and had established a close relationship with Yusuf *paşa* from the outset. His reputation was particularly linked to his extensive knowledge of Central Sudan, encompassing regions from Hausaland and Bornu to Tripoli and Benghazi. Thanks to his experience in the Saharan trade and his enthusiasm for further economic opportunities beyond Murzuq, Yusuf *paşa* appointed him in 1807 to lead a substantial caravan from Tripoli to Bornu.²²⁷ Initially, this expedition appeared to be a standard trading venture, with al-Mukni participating with his own goods. However, al-Mukni's intentions extended beyond mere commerce; he sought to negotiate a direct trade relationship between Yusuf *paşa* and the *mai* of Bornu, circumventing intermediary local actors. Reports from the British Secret Service indicate that al-Mukni endeavoured to persuade the *mai* to establish this direct connection.²²⁸ This initiative underscores Yusuf *paşa*'s recognition of the dual significance of Fezzan: it was not only the wealthiest region in Tripolitania, contributing a substantial annual tribute, but it also served as a crucial hub for trans-Saharan trade. This trade was a primary motivation for European states and the U.S.A. to establish consulates in Tripoli and to pay annual tributes.²²⁹ Although this plan ultimately failed, as secret agents of Emir of Fezzan influenced the *mai* of Bornu, the mission marked a pivotal moment for al-Mukni.²³⁰ During the extensive journey, he had the opportunity to observe and analyse the economic and administrative frameworks in both

226 For example, see: Hornemann, *Fr. Hornemanns Tagebuch Seiner Reise von Cairo Nach Murzuck Der Hauptstadt Des Königreichs Fessan in Afrika in Den Jahren 1797 Und 1798; Aus Der Teutschen Handschrift Desselben*, 45–47.

227 Hugh Clapperton, *Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa* (London, 1829), 170–71.

228 B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/9.

229 For more details, see: Khalifa Ibrahim Daw Ahmad, *Tijarat Al-Raqiq Fi Wilayat Tarabulus al-Gharb Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasi Eashr* (Trabulus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2014), 47; Hasan Al-Madani Ali Karim, *Al-Aqat Libya Bi Buldan Wa Wara al-Sahra Fi Eahd Yusif Basha al-Qaramanli, 1759-1832* (Trabulus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2009), 196–99.

230 Karim, *Al-Aqat Libya Bi Buldan Wa Wara al-Sahra Fi Eahd Yusif Basha al-Qaramanli, 1759-1832*, 68–69.

Fezzan and Bornu. Armed with this valuable information, al-Mukni emerged as a significant figure in Tripoli, fundamentally altering the trajectory of the state in subsequent years.

Upon the completion of his extensive mission in 1809, al-Mukni approached Yusuf *paşa* not with a formal agreement from the *mai* of Bornu, but rather with a conceptual proposal. During his stay in Murzuq, he observed a significant disparity between the actual wealth of Fezzan and the annual tribute that the Emir of Fezzan remitted to Tripoli. He asserted that the appointment of an administrator by Tripoli with clear instructions, that is to say ending *idara* system in Fezzan and creating a *tadbir* system, could substantially increase the annual revenue derived from this territory, surpassing the tribute currently paid by the Emir of Fezzan.²³¹ His conviction in the efficacy *tadbir* in the administrative structure was so profound that he offered his personal services to Yusuf *paşa* for the implementation of this initiative. Al-Mukni pledged that, should the *paşa* permit him to lead a military campaign against the Emir of Fezzan and capture Murzuq, he would be able to remit to Yusuf *paşa* nearly three times the annual tribute compared to that of the Emir of Fezzan.²³² Furthermore, Yusuf *paşa* already harboured a pre-existing mistrust towards Fezzan, particularly due to the Emir's provision of refuge to the Awlad Sulaiman following their insurrection against the *paşa*.²³³ In 1811, Yusuf *paşa* granted al-Mukni the authorization to pursue this initiative.

Al-Mukni's endorsement of the application of *tadbir* was not an isolated incident. His extensive experience in trade and his scholarly knowledge of the region led him to rely on personal reasoning (Ar. *ray*), to address challenges rather than adhering to established systems. For instance, as documented in the Arabic chronicle of al-Ansari, during his 1811 encounter with Murzuq, al-Mukni opted for a strategy based on *ray* rather than resorting to violent measures to seize the city. This approach proved effective, considering the local populace aligned themselves with al-Mukni rather than the Emir, despite far fewer soldiers of al-Mukni.²³⁴ Following the successful capture of the city with a minimal force and an increase in annual payments to Yusuf *paşa* in the subsequent years as promised, the integration of *tadbir* through *ray* emerged as the most effective governance strategy for the *paşa*.

This significant shift was particularly evident in the campaign against Ghadames. A year prior to al-Mukni's successful implementation of *ray* as *tadbir* in Murzuq, Yusuf *paşa* had launched a military

231 M.G., Family Collection, a letter dated as 1812.

232 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 2/8.

233 Cf. Saladdin Hasan Al-Suwri and Hamid Said Ali, *Buhuth Wa Dirasat Fi Al-Tarikh al-Libiyu Mundh Aqdam al-Easr Hata Sanat 1911m* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2011).

234 Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, 319.

operation in Ghadames in 1810.²³⁵ However, as noted in the Turkish chronicle of Nehicüddin Efendi, the motivation behind this operation was not the application of *tadbir*, since the *paşa* did not appoint any administrative to the city, but rather the need to ensure the annual tribute from Ghadames to Tripoli. Accordingly, the city had shown allegiance to the *paşa* of Tunisia and ceased its payments to Yusuf *paşa* around the 1800s.²³⁶ This crucial detail indicates that prior to al-Mukni's notable success with *ray* in the context of *tadbir* after 1811, Yusuf *paşa* exhibited little interest or intention to apply *tadbir* in his administrative practices. It was only after 1811 that the *paşa* began to adopt *tadbir* in Ghadames by reforming the traditional *idara*-based administration within the city.²³⁷

Furthermore, with the deep influence of the al-Mukni's case, the *paşa* not only decided to apply *tadbir* in the administration but also quickly tended to the use of *ray* rather than *islah*, considering he had a tangible example of its effectiveness and success.²³⁸ Concurrently, Muhammad (I) Bey, the eldest son of the *paşa* and regarded as the prospective successor to him, adopted a divergent policy approach. During the military campaigns conducted between 1810 and 1811, Muhammad (I) Bey played a crucial role, and by the end of 1811, the *paşa* dispatched him to the district of Benghazi to address the regional unrest; this operation represented the most significant initiative undertaken by Muhammad (I) Bey.²³⁹ His extensive military engagements and numerous accomplishments within a brief timeframe led him to develop a belief in the efficacy of employing brutal force. During his campaign in the district of Benghazi, he not only quelled the disturbances but also conducted a subversive campaign against local factions that were actually reluctant to fulfil their annual tribute obligations, resorting to the plundering of their livestock.²⁴⁰ Following this extensive and forceful intervention, characteristic of *riasa*, the Muhammad (I) Bey returned to Tripoli, and his actions constantly inclined to apply *riasa* in every case that he involved.²⁴¹ Although Yusuf *paşa* also moved

235 Al-Naib al-Ansari, 318.

236 Nehicüddin Efendi, *Tarih-i İbn-i Galbun Der-Beyânı Trablusgarp*, 78.

237 A British spy who travelled to Ghadames in 1825 documented significant transformations in the city resulting from the newly applied *tadbir* administrative system under the *paşa*. For example, it was customary for properties of individuals who died without heirs to be designated as *waqf* (Ar. foundation) within the city. However, following the establishment of the new *tadbir* administration, these properties were instead allocated to Yusuf *paşa*, who subsequently sold them to local merchants. This indicates that Yusuf *paşa* functioned not only as a political figure but also as an economic agent, a characteristic that exemplifies the utilization of *ray*. See: B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/20.

238 Interestingly enough, around the same time, the *Paşa* of Tunisia was also shifting the administrative system from *idara* to *tadbir*. However, his focus was not on implementing *ray*, but rather *islah*. For more details see my forthcoming article: "De l'échec ottoman à la réforme : La Siyasa en Tunisie au début du 19ème siècle".

239 D. Viviani, *Viaggio Da Tripoli Di Barberia: Alle Frontiere Occidentali Dell'Egitto*, ed. D.P. Della-Cella (Genova: A. Ponthenier, 1819), 20.

240 A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 33.

241 Viviani, *Viaggio Da Tripoli Di Barberia: Alle Frontiere Occidentali Dell'Egitto*, 20.

away from the traditional *idara* policy around the same period, his implementation of *tadbir* was fundamentally distinct from *riasa*. Furthermore, Yusuf *paşa* regularly refrained from resorting to brutal force unless absolutely necessary. When his son began to apply *riasa*, his actions were considered as he was challenging the authority of the *paşa*. As a result, when his son began to adopt *riasa*, his actions were perceived as a challenge to the *paşa*'s authority. In response, the *paşa* appointed him as the administrator of the district of Benghazi, thereby diminishing his military responsibilities within the state.²⁴²

In the years following 1811, the *paşa* increasingly relied on the utilization of ray in administrative matters. Al-Mukni, who had assumed the position of Bey of Fezzan, embarked on several military plunder campaigns in the Borgu region, predominantly inhabited by Teda groups, considered by Fezzan communities as “non-Muslim”.²⁴³ Particularly between 1811 and 1817, reports from British Secret Service spies indicate that al-Mukni's military endeavours across the Sahara, particularly in the southern territories, were so extensive that they extended to the northern regions of Bornu and Wadai during his plundering activities.²⁴⁴ These continuous campaigns yielded for al-Mukni many enslaved individuals from Teda communities, which he sent to Yusuf *paşa* as evidence of the “efficiency” of ray, since the number of enslaved people transported from Hausaland and Bornu to Tripoli was very limited.²⁴⁵ In 1812, when the rebellious Awlad Sulaiman attempted to disrupt trade routes by attacking cities between Tripoli and Murzuq, al-Mukni achieved a swift and decisive victory.²⁴⁶

When al-Kanemi asked for military aid from Yusuf *paşa* in 1817, that granted al-Mukni another opportunity, when he was entitled for this mission, which culminated in the enslavement of several individuals.²⁴⁷ This collaboration was primarily strategic, considering that the forces of both authorities did not operate in unison. During the time that al-Mukni was fighting against Baghirmi, al-Kanemi could focus on the eastern emirates of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. Nonetheless, the outcome of this collaboration proved satisfactory for both parties involved. For Yusuf *paşa*, this was

242 De Agostini, *Le Popolazioni Della Cirenica* (Bengasi: Governo della Cirenica, 1923), 26.

243 Interview No.7: Meeting with the elders of Al-Qatrūn in Al-Qatrūn, 2023.

244 B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/9.

245 For more details, see my article: Kerem Duymus, ‘Contribution au rôle de la traite des esclaves dans le Sahara tripolitain au XIXe siècle : nouvelles découvertes en Libye et en Turquie’, *Revue d’Histoire Méditerranéenne* 6, no.2 (2024): 195–208

246 Muhammad Mustapha, *Tarikh Bariqat Fi Al-Eahd Al-Qirmanili*, vol. Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar Al-Hiwar, 1994), 220.

247 Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-‘adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, 319.

yet another demonstration of the effective application of *ray*, and subsequently, his inclination towards *tadbir* became a crucial element of his future policy initiatives.

The *paşa*'s firm conviction in the principle of *tadbir* manifested in a tangible situation in 1817, when he was apprized of the insurrection led by his son, Muhammad (I) Bey, in Benghazi. During the period from 1811 to 1817, al-Mukni was reporting to the *paşa* on the outcomes of "significant success," whereas Muhammad (I) Bey was engaged in the application of *riasa* within his district. Many nomadic and semi-nomadic groups had enjoyed a degree of autonomy due to the "exit option" provided by the *idara* system they adhered to; however, when subjected to the *riasa* politics enforced by Bey, these groups ultimately vacated the territory by the late 1810s.²⁴⁸ In particular, the petitions received by Yusuf *paşa* from Benghazi in 1817 were replete with accounts of the *riasa* rule applied by Muhammad (I) Bey, leading the populace to label him as a "despot."²⁴⁹ Notably, a well-known folk poem from the Uqbiyat community around Benghazi recounts the hardships endured by the Uqbiyya people under the *riasa* rule of Muhammad (I) Bey and his allies from the Awlad Ali. Consequently, they resolved to dispatch a representative to Tripoli to persuade the *paşa* to undertake military action, with the Uqba community expressing their readiness to participate.²⁵⁰ In response to the potential for further unrest, the *paşa* opted to send his other son, Ahmad Bey,²⁵¹ along with an army to Benghazi. This military operation serves as a significant illustration of the divergent perspectives within the Karamanlı family regarding governance.

Upon Ahmad Bey's arrival in Benghazi with his forces, local communities had swiftly renounced their allegiance to Muhammad (I) Bey and had risen in rebellion against him. Following this, Muhammad (I) Bey initially retreated to Derna; however, when Ahmad Bey pursued him further into Derna, Muhammad (I) Bey fled the country and sought refuge in Egypt.²⁵² Nevertheless, Ahmad Bey was compelled to address the factions that had allied with Muhammad (I) Bey until the very end. In contrast to the prolonged implementation of *riasa* by Muhammad (I) Bey, Ahmad Bey exhibited a surprising application of *idara* by forgiving those who had supported Muhammad (I) Bey.²⁵³ However, whilst Yusuf *paşa* opposed the *riasa* system instituted by Muhammad (I) Bey, he

248 De Agostini, *Le Popolazioni Della Cirenica*, 27–29.

249 Viviani, *Viaggio Da Tripoli Di Barberia: Alle Frontiere Occidentali Dell'Egitto*, 19.

250 Salah al-Din Jibril, *Tajridat Habib: M'a Kitab Khalil Wa Qasaid Khazliyya* (Benghazi: Maktab al-Qurina, 1924), 35.

251 Ironically, in 1826, Yusuf Paşa also sent Ahmad Bey into exile in Benghazi after he was accused of conspiring against his father. See: A.S.L., Archivio Consular Toscana, Corr. M.G.M., let. 8, 1826.

252 For the details, see the account of an Italian doctor who joined the campaign of Ahmad Bey: Viviani, *Viaggio Da Tripoli Di Barberia: Alle Frontiere Occidentali Dell'Egitto*.

253 Viviani, 173.

also opposed Ahmad Bey's application of *idara* in the region. Unlike Yusuf *paşa*'s administrative strategies, Ahmad Bey endorsed the *idara* system to foster a more stable governance structure. This divergence in approach culminated in a significant incident. Following the successful military campaign, Ahmad Bey prepared to return to Tripoli, intending to bring several leaders and representatives from various local communities within the district of Benghazi, that were once allies of Muhammad (I) Bey, to fulfil their obligations directly to the *paşa*, thereby establishing a promise of long-term, stable relations. However, upon learning of Ahmad Bey's approach with numerous local leaders and representatives, the *paşa* perceived this as an opportunity to eliminate these individuals without engaging in further conflict, a tactic characteristic of his *tadbir*. Thus, he ordered Ahmad Bey to execute all of them, leaving the Bey with no option to refuse or disregard this command.²⁵⁴ This incident further illustrates Yusuf *paşa*'s complete abandonment of the *idara* strategy in his policies, considering he sought opportunities to orchestrate plots to achieve his objectives without resorting to overt warfare.

Yusuf *paşa*'s *tadbir* system reached a critical juncture in 1820, when he presented an unexpected proposal to the British Consulate. According to the consular report, particularly following the strategic alliance formed in 1817 with al-Kanemi, *paşa* was convinced that he could successfully depose al-Kanemi with a relatively small military force. Hence, capturing Bornu would enable him to exert control over the entirety of southern central Sudan. However, the execution of such an operation would necessitate approximately 25,000 piastres. *paşa* posited that if Britain were to extend this amount as a loan, he would not only be able to repay it within a few years but could also take measures to abolish the slave trade in the Sahara, recognizing Britain's vested interest in this matter.²⁵⁵ Interestingly, that was also exactly the same period that Khedive of Egypt was starting his invasion of Sudan towards south.²⁵⁶ The inability of *paşa* to secure the required funds from his own resources was closely linked to his approach to *tadbir*. Between 1817 and 1820, he was compelled to conduct numerous military operations to facilitate the integration of *ray* into the administrative framework, since local communities largely resisted such governance changes.²⁵⁷ Likewise, *paşa* undertook the construction of new fortifications around Tripoli to safeguard the advantages gained

254 Viviani, 207.

255 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/14.

256 In fact, Egypt also underwent a complex transformation from a *idara* system to a *tadbir* system after end of the Napoleon's invasion. Yet, the path of Egypt was shaped by the implementation of *islah*, not *ray*. Doğançan Bay, 'Mısır'ın Modernleşme Sürecinde Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşânın Reformlarının Yeri', *Uluslararası Toplumsal Bilimler Dergisi* 7, no. 2 (2023): 127–41.

257 A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 35.

from the application of *tadbir* in maritime diplomacy.²⁵⁸ In spite of these financial constraints, *paşa* exhibited a profound confidence in the efficacy of the *tadbir* policy, demonstrating a willingness to allocate all available resources to expedite its implementation across the administration, with the expectation that this would yield greater revenue in the future. In other words, the financial issue was fundamentally a matter of timing for him. The response from the British Foreign Office regarding *paşa's* plans, however, was unfavourable. This changed radically when, after one year, he received a collaboration request from al-Kanemi in 1821.²⁵⁹

This time, the collaboration was even denser, considering they created a common army to attack and plunder Baghirmi. Reports from a British Secret Service agent, who conducted interviews with a Ghadamesian merchant involved in the mission, indicate that the combined forces of Yusuf *paşa* and al-Kanemi successfully repelled the Baghirmi forces and looted villages that had been under Baghirmi control for an extended period. Al-Kanemi expressed considerable satisfaction with Yusuf *paşa's* support, to the extent that he sent one of his sons to accompany the *paşa's* army to Murzuq for further education, as a gesture of goodwill.²⁶⁰ Despite facing economic challenges that hindered his ability to organize an army for an invasion of Bornu, Yusuf *paşa* utilized collaborative efforts as a means to gain a deeper understanding of the region. For instance, in 1822, he began dispatching small Arab contingents to the area, notwithstanding the absence of any request from al-Kanemi for further collaboration. However, due to the recent amicable relations, these contingents were perceived not as an invading force in Bornu, but rather as supplementary military resources that al-Kanemi could deploy to quell dissenting factions in the outskirts of Bornu.²⁶¹ What the *paşa* was not entirely aware of the fact that al-Kanemi was also applying similar *tadbir* system, thereupon having his own plans to canalize these forces from the north. For instance, at the end of 1822, when al-Kanemi sent a newly arrived Arab division from Tripoli to the territory controlled by the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, the entire division was annihilated by the formidable caliphal army.²⁶² This catastrophic event showed the *paşa* that al-Kanemi could not easily allow him to increase his power indirectly in the region. Accordingly, in 1823, Yusuf *paşa* ordered the Bey of Fezzan²⁶³ to prepare

258 Al-Zavi, *Al-Mu'cam al-Buldani al-Libiyya*, 55.

259 B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/13.

260 For all details, see: B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/13.

261 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/17.

262 For more details, see: B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/17.

263 After 9 years of service, al-Mukni was no more Bey of Fezzan. According to the diary of Al-Faqih, Yusuf *paşa* was using the "3 years rule", which was applied by the Ottoman Empire to the *paşa*. According to this regulation, every 3 year the *paşa* had to send an envoy to İstanbul to renew his title and recognition. B.O.A., Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 1030. In the case of al-Mukni, Yusuf *paşa* had renewed his title twice, and end of his 3 term, he was appointed a much younger administrator. Al-Faqih, *Al-Yavmiyat Al-Libiyya*, I:281.

for an invasion using his own resources, as the *paşa* was experiencing financial difficulties. However, he subsequently received intelligence regarding al-Kanemi's defensive preparations, and in 1824, even an envoy from Bornu arrived.²⁶⁴ Having lost the opportunity for a surprise attack and recognizing al-Kanemi's determination to defend his territory with his own *tadbir* system, Yusuf *paşa* was compelled to abandon his plans for an incursion into Bornu and southern Central Sudan.

In spite of his strong belief in the efficacy of *ray* in *tadbir*, the recent changes implemented by Yusuf *paşa* did not yield the anticipated outcomes. A defining characteristic of his approach to administration was the selection of administrators primarily from his trusted family or close associates, a typical example for *ray*, rather than from qualified technocrats, as is the case in *islah*.²⁶⁵ In other words, the *paşa* was not only applying a new *tadbir* system but applying a very particular mode of it through his extreme inclination to *ray*. The administrative affairs of these family members and close associates in their domains were significantly marred by corruption, considering the *paşa* lacked genuine oversight over their actions. This lack of control allowed these administrators to exploit their proximity to the *paşa* to rationalize their largely illicit tax collection methods.²⁶⁶ The *paşa* confronted this reality when he sought to introduce innovative agrarian techniques and new seed varieties to enhance agricultural productivity, inspired by the successful *islah* implementation in Tunisia around the same years. In spite of the *paşa*'s willingness and several attempts,²⁶⁷ they did not take the initiative to pursue such advancements within their domains. Furthermore, given their substantial authority in their regions, these administrators exhibited a pronounced lack of coordination and a general disinterest in facilitating further change.²⁶⁸ At its core, the issue was systemic; systematic visionary reforms are not only characteristic of *islah* but also require the integration of *islah* principles within the administrative structure, such as appointing experts as administrative with clear instructions. The fundamental challenge faced by Yusuf *paşa* lay in his attempt to incorporate certain aspects of *islah* within a *ray*-oriented administrative system.²⁶⁹

264 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/18.

265 Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, 332.

266 D.R., Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898.

267 The pasha's first attempt was in 1809, and he tried again several times. However, at that time, the entire administration was still based on *idara*, and the local leaders ignored such centralist attempts.

268 For instance, Swedish Consul stated that around the year 1827, the inhabitants of Ghadames successfully reinstated the practice of *idara* in their city by providing sufficient tribute to the administrator, who was appointed by the Yusuf *paşa* but never even went to Ghadames, thereby ensuring that he did not actively engage in their local affairs. Consequently, the administrator exhibited a lack of genuine interest and oversight regarding his domain. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia', *Antologia* XXVII (1827): 90.

269 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/6.

2.2.2.2. Economic Sphere

The systematic challenges faced by the *paşa* regarding the implementation of the *ray* system were also evident in the economic domain. Aside from the prolonged application of *idara* system in administration before the 1810s, in the economic field, Yusuf *paşa* was even at the very beginning critical of the *idara* system. For instance, he perceived an opportunity for reform when France prepared to invade Malta in 1797. Malta represented not only a historical adversary of Tripoli but also posed a significant obstacle to the *paşa*'s efforts to expand his trade relations, since Maltese naval forces were engaged in privateering against Tripoli and frequently attacked its vessels. Upon learning of France's plans, Yusuf *paşa* initially supported the invasion for political reasons. He soon recognized that Napoleon's forces were inadequately supplied from Marseille quickly after the invasion of Malta. In this respect, the *paşa* identified an economic opportunity and began supplying Napoleon's forces—particularly with wheat and oxen—from Tripoli, acting as an economic intermediary.²⁷⁰ In exchange for this support, French authorities promptly released all Tripolitan captives in the jails of Malta.²⁷¹ This mutually beneficial political and economic relationship persisted even after Napoleon's forces invaded Egypt later that same year. In 1799, Yusuf *paşa* received an envoy from İstanbul with a *ferman* from the Ottoman *padişah*, instructing him to assemble an army to reclaim Egypt from Napoleon's forces.²⁷² To preserve his advantageous relationship with France while also complying with the *padişah*'s directive, he organized an army but, under various pretexts, ultimately refrained from deploying it to Egypt. This incident marked the first instance in which Yusuf *paşa* began to employ *tadbir* in his diplomatic interactions with the Ottoman Empire.

In 1800, during Britain's invasion of Malta in response to Napoleon's occupation, the circumstances became significantly more advantageous for Yusuf *paşa* than they had been previously. Similar to the situation faced by French forces, British troops were in urgent need of adequate supplies, which Yusuf *paşa* promptly addressed by facilitating substantial food exports from Tripoli, utilizing his personal resources to procure goods from the local market.²⁷³ Concurrently, Yusuf *paşa* emerged as the sole source of supplies for Napoleon's forces stationed in Egypt, exporting a considerable

270 R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1797.

271 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, ed. Yılmaz Kurt (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları), 412.

272 B.O.A., Cevdet Askeriye, 27064-1, 12.Ca.1214 and 35969, 24.Ca.1214.

273 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/7.

volume of goods, at extreme prices, to Alexandria through his personal accounts, with a caravan from Benghazi. In 1801, even a Maltese merchant travelled to Tripoli to engage with Yusuf *paşa* on behalf of France, seeking assistance for Napoleon.²⁷⁴ Following this meeting, the agent secured significant commitments from Yusuf *paşa*, who subsequently composed a personal letter to Napoleon, assuring him of his capacity to supply the army regardless of the prevailing political circumstances.²⁷⁵ These diplomatic efforts created considerable wealth for the personal account of the *paşa*. In order to implement his strategy of *tadbir*, utilizing *ray* in foreign trade, Yusuf *paşa* also had to navigate his diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire through similar means. Upon receiving Yusuf *paşa*'s letter, Napoleon mistakenly inferred that the *paşa* disregarded the authority of the Ottoman *padişah*. In reality, Yusuf *paşa* was orchestrating and managing the entire export operation to Alexandria with considerable discretion, employing *tadbir* rather than *riasa* in his diplomatic dealings with the Ottoman Empire, contrary to Napoleon's assumptions.²⁷⁶

Following the conclusion of France's invasion of Egypt, the economic benefits previously enjoyed by the *paşa* diminished significantly. Additionally, the subsequent invasions of various European states by Napoleon's forces after 1805, which had been tributaries to Yusuf *paşa*, further eroded the profitability of the relationship between Tripoli and France, ultimately leading to financial losses for the *paşa*. Consequently, around 1808, Yusuf *paşa* identified Napoleon as an adversary and shifted his focus towards strengthening relations with Britain, which had no intentions of relinquishing control over Malta.²⁷⁷

Until 1806, Yusuf *paşa* held a monopoly on the supply of goods to Malta. According to a British agent, the *paşa* procured goods in Tripoli at market prices but sold them to British forces in Malta at significantly inflated prices due to his monopolistic control.²⁷⁸ This monopoly did not arise from traditional monopolistic practices; rather, it was a consequence of his diplomatic advantages, which

274 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb* (İstanbul: Tercüman-ı Hakikat Matbaası, 1330), 141.

275 "Essai Sur l'histoire Des Karamanlis, Pachas de Tripolitaine de 1714 à 1835", VII (1919), Part 1, *Revue de l'Histoire Des Colonies Françaises*, VII (1919): 286–88.

276 This misunderstanding even culminated in a significant incident in 1801. Under the impression that the *paşa* was acting entirely independently and in a friendly manner towards France, Napoleon instructed one of his generals to deploy supply forces by landing in Derne, which was part of the district of Benghazi, without seeking the *paşa*'s permission. The *paşa* himself did not object to this action, whereas the local administrator of Benghazi and the residents of Derne were unaware of any alliance with France due to the secrecy surrounding the arrangement. Consequently, the local forces perceived this operation as a French invasion and prevented the French general from landing his troops in the harbour of Derne.. For more details, see: İsmail, *Inhiyar Hukm Al-Usrat al-Qaramanlitte Fi Libya: 1795-1835*, 97.

277 Taş, 'Osmanlı Garp Ocaklarından Trablusgarp Eyaleti: Karamanlılar Dönemi (1711-1835)', 2016, 311.

278 Blaquiére, *Letters from Mediterreanean: Containing a Civil and Political Account of Sicily, Tripoly, Tunis, and Malta*, 50–51.

allowed him to gain insights into international operations prior to civilian merchants and to engage in diplomatic initiatives related to military activities—initiatives that posed risks for civilian traders. By 1806, the conflict in Malta and Egypt had subsided, and numerous merchants had begun to recognize new export opportunities to Malta. Additionally, in that same year, Britain began to pressure *paşa* to permit Maltese merchants, now considered British subjects, to participate in foreign trade in Tripoli. The British Consul claimed to *paşa* that his intention was to foster amicable relations between Malta and Tripoli, whereas he explicitly noted in his report to the British Foreign Office that the inclusion of Maltese merchants in foreign trade would undermine *paşa*'s monopoly and exploit Britain's administrative vulnerabilities in Malta.²⁷⁹

In response to the aforementioned changes, the *paşa* reinstated an old regulation of a system called *appalto*.²⁸⁰ This is a special kind of permission granted by the ruler to some privileged merchants to run their businesses in some fields, paying a personal tribute to the ruler. The reason for calling this practice with an Italian term was the fact that initially only Venetian merchants received such permission. In fact, even Yusuf *paşa* learned this old *appalto* system from Venetian merchants in 1795, a year during which Venice dispatched an envoy to Yusuf *paşa*, who was entirely new on the throne, to renew a prior contract for permission. This contract had previously granted the Venetian merchants permission from an earlier *paşa* to conduct business in one of the salt lakes near Tripoli, thereby securing a monopoly on salt production and export. In exchange for this privilege, the merchants were obligated to pay customs duties as well as an annual tribute directly to the *paşa*.²⁸¹ According to records from the sharia court, the property allocated to the Venetian merchants for salt production was owned by the Karamanlı family, indicating that the permission and contract were personal in nature, thus constituting a private enterprise, without being part of any *ray* implementation.²⁸² However, Yusuf *paşa* first time extended this regulation towards public spheres, bringing it under the *ray* system. This ostensibly minor discrepancy was, in fact, the consequence of a novel approach to governance. In the *idara* system, rulers were at liberty to interact with their personal assets as they saw fit. However, it is inconceivable that rulers would utilize public resources for their own personal gain. Such actions are characteristic of the *tadbir* system, which allows rulers to exercise authority in accordance with their personal discretion, exploiting power relations to advance their own interests.²⁸³ In that regard, around the 1810s, Yusuf *paşa* extended

279 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/6.

280 This is an Italian word, meaning “contract”.

281 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 161/10.

282 D.M.T.L., Al-Sijiliyat al-shariat, R. 7A.

283 For more details, see Chapter 1.

this regulatory framework to the importation of wine and spirits.²⁸⁴ Given that the trade of alcohol is publicly prohibited for Muslims in Tripoli,²⁸⁵ the *paşa* authorized *appalto* to certain merchants from the Jewish community to engage in this trade. This permission conferred upon them a monopoly on the importation of these goods, allowing them to manage the entire import process independently or to collaborate with other merchants for an additional fee.²⁸⁶ Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the application of this regulation concerning export was restricted solely to the salt exports of the Venetian merchants.

In 1806, when the British consul came to the *paşa* to force him to allow Maltese merchants to participate in foreign trade, the consul referred to the free-trade treaty. As British subjects, the Maltese had the right to freely engage in trade by paying a 3-5% customs duty. Yusuf *paşa* sought to circumvent this condition through the implementation *appalto*. During the same period, Tunisia was grappling with similar challenges posed by the increasing influence of Britain in Mediterranean trade. Although the *paşas* of Tunisia were also employing *tadbir*, their emphasis on the execution of *islah*, as opposed to *ray*, resulted in divergent policies and outcomes. For instance, around 1810, numerous European and Maltese merchants were required to obtain permission to conduct business in Tunisia. However, this permission did not confer upon them the ability to establish a monopoly or to pay tribute to the *paşa*. The primary objective was to prevent monopolistic practices by foreign merchants and to support local traders. In contrast, the regulation of *appalto* in Tripoli, under Yusuf *paşa*'s *ray* system, produced entirely different implementations. The chief aim of the *appalto* regulation was not to promote or enhance the interests of Tripolitan merchants, but rather to secure the economic privileges and profits of the *paşa*.²⁸⁷

Indeed, non-Afro-Islamic agents characterized Yusuf *paşa*'s approach as indicative of his “egoist bad character”;²⁸⁸ yet, the underlying reasons for his actions were far more systematic. Yusuf *paşa*'s

284 In the meantime, the primary implementation of this regulation had disappeared. When Venice was occupied by France in 1798, Yusuf *paşa* confiscated the properties of Venetian merchants and cancelled the *appalto* they had. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia: Art II, Del Commercio Marittimo Di Tripolia:’, *Antologia* XXX (1828): 15.

285 Yusuf *paşa*, for instance, constantly fought to stop the production of *lagbi* (Ar. alcoholic drink produced from palm tree), while its trade was already illegal. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 11.

286 According to the estimations of the British agent, only the revenue of *appalto* on wine and spirit in 1811 was much more than the annual tribute that all EU states paid. See: Blaquiére, *Letters from Meditterrean: Containing a Civil and Political Account of Sicily, Tripoly, Tunis, and Malta*, 124.

287 Swedish Consular, for instance, compared the differences between these two regulations in 1827. For him, the involvement of Tunisian *paşa* more invisible and smooth, whereas Yusuf *paşa*'s regulation was more aggressive. See: Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia’, 82.

288 Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia’, 82.

inclination to utilize *ray* in foreign trade and economic matters, despite his awareness of the application of *islah* in Tunisia, was not an arbitrary decision. The primary economic activities in Tripoli were markedly different from those in Tunisia. In Tunisia, the agrarian and artisanal sectors had historically and geographically established strengths and potential for further development. Conversely, in Tripoli, the predominant economic activity was the Saharan trade.²⁸⁹ Inasmuch as the two principal routes of the Saharan trade – Katsina-Agadez-Ghat-Ghadames-Tripoli and Kuka-Bilma-Murzuq-Tripoli²⁹⁰ – ended in Tripoli, the city was the “port of the dessert” for Europeans and Ottomans. Along this line, Tripoli historically and geographically functioned as a “gatekeeper” to Central Sudan.²⁹¹ In this regard, expectations for economic growth were linked to the monopolization of Saharan trade rather than to local agricultural and artisanal development. In other words, Yusuf *paşa*’s preference for *ray* over *islah* was not merely a personal choice; it was profoundly shaped by the historical and geographical contexts and potentials of the region. Furthermore, when the *paşa* successfully used *ray* with his trade relations with Britain and France between 1797-1806, and was eager to use it further in the whole economic field, he had already sufficient historical and geographical reasons for that.

Yusuf *paşa*’s implementation of the *ray* system through *appalto* in the entirety of his export operations circumvented the free-trade treaty with Britain without entering any conflict. In allowing any merchant to engage in business activities, he effectively terminated his own monopoly. However, by selling permission for monopolies in various economic sectors, he also ensured that Britain received the same market prices in Malta while simultaneously enhancing his personal wealth through tribute payments. This strategy was not given sufficient consideration by the British consul. For instance, in 1810, the consul even reported that thanks to his diplomatic efforts, Yusuf *paşa* had successfully dismantled the monopoly and profit he held over exports, resulting in a substantial revenue loss for him.²⁹² Still, contrary to this assertion, the actual circumstances were

289 The production of wheat and barley, as well as olive oil, was insufficient to meet domestic demand. The only notable export of artisanal products was carpets, yet this sector failed to gain significant traction Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia: Art II, Del Commercio Marittimo Di Tripolia:’, 8–10.

290 According to Tripolitan sharia court records, after 1800, ostrich feathers and ivory were the main goods in this trade. D.M.T.L., *Al-Sijiliyat al-shariat*, R.6. Swedish Consular states in 1828, that also the dates was a significant product in this trade, they were mostly coming from Ghadames and Murzuq. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia: Art II, Del Commercio Marittimo Di Tripolia:’, 11.

291 Nora Lafi, ‘Tripoli de Barbarie: Port de Mer Port Du Desert 1795-1835’, in *Méditerranée, Mer Ouverte: XIXe et XXe Siècles*, vol. T. II, Actes de Colloque de Marseille (21-23 Septembre 1995) (International Foundation, 1997), 666.

292 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/7. In fact, the consul was not the only actor who worked hard to cause an economic loss for the *paşa*. Also, British spies were running secret operations to sabotage Tunisian ships and come to the *paşa*

quite different. Following 1806, British officials in Malta continued to purchase exported goods from Tripoli at prices significantly higher than those in Tripoli itself. The distinction from the perspective of British diplomats was that they were now compensating Maltese merchants rather than Yusuf *paşa* directly. In fact, the regulation of *appalto* only allowed Maltese merchants to procure goods in Tripoli exclusively from those merchants who had received personal authorization, i.e. *appalto*, from the *paşa* to monopolize the export of these commodities. These merchants, in return, had to pay a considerable amount of tribute to Yusuf *paşa*. To ensure their profitability, they were compelled to sell the products at inflated prices to the Maltese merchants. Therefore, a substantial portion of the revenue generated from exports continued to enrich the personal treasury of the *paşa*. It was not until 1813 that the British Consul became fully aware of this reality.²⁹³ For instance, the profits accrued by the *paşa* from this regulatory framework were so extraordinary that he was able to extend a significant loan to the Spanish consulate during that year.²⁹⁴

In this context, British consular officials and diplomats opted to modify their diplomatic strategies, considering their hope for getting better prices was increasingly disconnected from the realities following the implementation of the *appalto* system. After 1814, they initiated diplomatic efforts to persuade Yusuf *paşa*—albeit with the provision of certain bribes—to grant *appalto* rights for specific goods of particular interest to British merchants.²⁹⁵

From the perspective of Yusuf *paşa*, this was still a favourable outcome, since he was not concerned with the identity of the monopolist in specific sectors but rather with the revenue generated from the sale of the contract. With the confirmation of the *paşa*, the long diplomatic game ended in favour of Yusuf *paşa*, as Britain, due to the high price of *paşa*, still had to pay excessive prices. Thus, they preferred to focus on strengthening their monopolies for future. However, in the period, Moroccan

with fake “piracy” cases to force him for compensation. B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/4.

293 Additionally, around 1812, Yusuf *paşa* frequently lodged complaints with the British Consul regarding encounters with several Genoese ships and their captains, who were in possession of British passports. Genoa sought to avoid paying tribute to Tripoli, thereby enjoying the protection afforded by British passports. Nevertheless, this was in violation of the treaty that Tripoli had with Britain, and the *paşa* demanded an investigation, while the British consul did not take Yusuf *paşa*'s accusations seriously until 1815. Indeed, he never conducted any investigation, stating in his reports that there was no reason to take any action regarding the accusations of “a barbarian” who claims “the civilized British diplomats are corrupt.” Additionally, the rationale behind this allegation was attributed to the consul's perception of the *paşa*'s “economic difficulties.” It was not until 1815 that the British Consul by chance became aware of the illicit sale of numerous British passports by a British diplomat in Genoa, a transaction that was undertaken for pecuniary gain. B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/7.

294 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/7.

295 Swedish Consul, for instance, criticized that some European consuls, such as British, tried to take advantage of the regulation of *appalto* instead of striving to abolish it for free trade that they claimed. See: Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia: Art II, Del Commercio Marittimo Di Tripolia:’, *Antologia* XXX (1828): 19.

merchants retained the most significant actors in the trade, largely due to their personal connections with the Moroccan sultan,²⁹⁶ which led Yusuf *paşa* to exempt them from his personal monopoly and grant them very cheap *appalto*.²⁹⁷ Around 1815-1817, Yusuf *paşa* enlarged the implementation of *appalto* even to Benghazi. Between 1815 and 1817, Yusuf *paşa* expanded the scope of *appalto* to include Benghazi. According to the account of the Italian doctor Viviani, the export of ostrich feathers and skins from Benghazi to Marseille and Livorno in 1817 was monopolized by a Jewish merchant who had secured *appalto* from the *paşa*.²⁹⁸

Around the year 1818, Yusuf *paşa* began to encounter the long-term consequences of employing the *ray* system in foreign trade. The implementation of *ray* is fundamentally predicated on the monopolization of the market, which creates an ambiguity between the tolerance of market prices during the procurement of goods—characteristic of *ray* under *tadbir*—and the practice of price-fixing at artificially low levels to enhance profit margins—indicative of *riasa*. Particularly in the prolonged application of *ray* Tripoli, there was a prevalent inclination towards *riasa*, considering the *paşa*, acting as an economic agent, sought to augment his profits. Following the introduction of *appalto* for various commodities, and maintaining direct monopolistic control over certain products²⁹⁹ for over a decade, Yusuf *paşa* gradually began to manipulate market prices during his purchases or permitted merchants with *appalto* to do so.³⁰⁰ Furthermore, the ongoing military operations between 1817 and 1820 compelled the *paşa* to seek additional revenue, thereby facilitating an increase in his monopolistic profits by shifting from *ray* to *riasa*.

2.2.2.3. Era of *Riasa*-Tendency

296 The rationale behind this contact was the lengthy historical tradition of pilgrimage. Tripoli served as a crucial intermediate stop for those undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca, with thousands of pilgrims from Morocco passing through the city on an annual basis. The economic impact of these visits on Tripoli was significant. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia', 94. To maintain this commercial relationship, Yusuf *paşa* fostered a positive rapport with the Sultan of Morocco. However, after 1820, pilgrims began utilizing maritime transportation to reach Alexandria directly. This shift also impacted the activities of Moroccan merchants in Tripoli. After 1820, their role in foreign trade underwent a significant transformation. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 95.

297 A.H.N, Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L . 6240.

298 Viviani, *Viaggio Da Tripoli Di Barberia: Alle Frontiere Occidentali Dell'Egitto*, 189.

299 For instance, the *paşa* had a direct monopoly in 1817 on the ox export from Benghazi to Malta. Viviani, 189. Likewise, the exportation of horses and calcium-carbonate remained under the monopoly of the *paşa* until 1835. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia: Art II, Del Commercio Marittimo Di Tripolia:', 13 and 15.

300 D.R., Tripolis: Almindelige korrespondancesager, 2901.

Following 1815, European merchants withdrew from the Tripolitan market in response to the rising *riasa*-tendency. In 1817, the Spanish Consul reported to Madrid that numerous European merchants were terminating their business engagements in Tripoli.³⁰¹ Similarly, a Danish Consul report from 1822 indicated a significant decline in foreign trade activities.³⁰² Furthermore, a Swedish consular official noted in an essay published in an Italian journal in 1827 that import-export transactions in Tripoli had reached their lowest point since the 1790s.³⁰³ The Tripolitan populace's reactions were markedly more destructive. However, these responses were a continuation of a pre-existing issue. Yusuf *paşa* ascended to power through a coup following 1795.³⁰⁴ This created a general distrust of his rule. Consequently, whenever local communities perceived any weakness or absence of the *paşa*'s forces, they felt justified in rejecting his authority or rebelling against him. This dissent was not directed against the Karamanlı dynasty or the Ottoman Empire as a whole, but rather against the individual authority of the *paşa*. Regular uprisings against Yusuf *paşa* thereupon became a normalized occurrence between 1800 and 1835. In 1803, the *paşa* had to suppress an uprising in Gharyan;³⁰⁵ in 1807 there was a rebellion by Awlad Sulaiman;³⁰⁶ in 1813 the communities in Gharyan again rejected to pay tribute to *paşa* and revolted;³⁰⁷ in 1818 there was an uprising in Nalut;³⁰⁸ in 1825 another rebellion in Gharyan;³⁰⁹ in 1827 the people in Jebel Garb revolted against *paşa*;³¹⁰ in 1830 there was almost no community that accepts the authority of Yusuf *paşa*.³¹¹ And around 1831, Awlad Sulaiman even captured Fezzan.³¹²

Until 1820, in instances of uprisings against the *paşa*, local scholars frequently endeavoured to mediate conflicts by invoking the authority of the *paşa*.³¹³ During his early years in power, Yusuf *Paşa* mostly respected their intermediary.³¹⁴ However, when the *paşa* tended to apply *tadbir* through

301 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L . 6242.

302 D.R., Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898.

303 Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia', 82.

304 Laurent-Charles Féraud, *Annales Tripolitaines* (Paris: Edition Bouchene, 2005), 287.

305 N.A.N., Ministerie von Buitenlandse Zaken (1796-1810), inv. nr. 356.

306 Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, 315.

307 Nehicüddin Efendi, *Tarih-i İbn-i Galbun Der-Beyânı Trablusgarp*, 69.

308 R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1818.

309 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/21.

310 Nehicüddin Efendi, *Tarih-i İbn-i Galbun Der-Beyânı Trablusgarp*, 89–90.

311 Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, 333.

312 Ali Said Masud, 'Al-Alaqat al-Siyasiyat Li-l-Ussrat al-Qaramanliyat Ma Fazan Wa Manatiq Ma Wara al-Sahra Fi Eahd Yusif Basha, 1795-1832', *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 20, no. 3 (2021): 98–100.

313 Folayan, *Tripoli During the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli*, 10–11.

314 For instance, the consul of Holland recounts how Yusuf *paşa* honoured the mediation of a scholar during negotiations with the people of Gharyan in 1803. See: N.A.N., Ministerie von Buitenlandse Zaken (1796-1810), inv. nr. 356.

ray and expand his power after the 1810s, he began to disregard such reconciliation efforts. For example, when a conflict broke between the Emir of Fezzan and Yusuf *paşa*, invoking *paşa* to sent al-Mukni for invasion, Ahmad Abdullah Shams al-Din (d. 1813), who was a prominent scholar in Fezzan, tried to avoid this invasion from Tripoli, and proposed reconciliation through his intermediary. However, his efforts proved fruitless, leading him to leave Fezzan in protest and migrate to Tunis.³¹⁵ By around 1820, as the *paşa's* economic policies began to shift towards *riasa*, this marked a significant development for Tripoli. The application of *riasa* was a red line for Maliki jurists, and they deemed it illegal; hence, Yusuf *paşa* could no longer legally justify his actions. This shift resulted in scholars distancing themselves from involvement in such matters, effectively closing off the last avenues for negotiation and decreasing the likelihood of conflict with minimal loss of life.³¹⁶ After 1820, the *paşa* lost the legal foundation for many of his actions, and communities found themselves not only entitled to revolt against the *paşa* in the absence of his forces but also legally justified in doing so at any moment. This legal opportunity further exacerbated the frequency of rebellions.

In addition to issues associated with the *riasa*-prone use of *ray* in the economy around 1818, there emerged another application of *ray* that the *paşa* began to explore around 1813. Yusuf *paşa* maintained his monopoly over various products through the regulation of *appalto* after 1806. He identified an alternative use of *ray* in 1813 to augment his personal profits: currency devaluation. According to the diary of al-Faqih, Yusuf *paşa* initially established a fixed exchange rate between the thaler and his own *dinar* by devaluing the local currency in 1813.³¹⁷ Another devaluation followed in 1814.³¹⁸ A significant devaluation occurred again in 1823³¹⁹ and 1832.³²⁰ The *paşa's* keen interest in currency devaluation post-1813 can be attributed to both technical and systematic factors. The technical rationale for the devaluation involved the issuance of new, less valuable coins by the *paşa*, a strategy that has historical precedent in Islamic history and the Ottoman Empire. For instance, when the Ottoman *padişah* devalued their currency in 1823, the Turkish chronicler Ahmed Cevdet noted that this action resulted in a substantial increase in the state treasury. However, the

315 Abdullah Ala Ibrahim, 'Al-Hayat al-Ilmiyat Wa-l-Thaqafiyat Fo Fazan Khilal al-Fatrat Ma Bayn al-Qarn al-Sabi Eash Wa-l-Qarn al-Tasi Eashr', in *Amal Al-Mutamar al-Awal Li-l-Wathayiq Wa-l-Makhtutat Fi Libiya Waqiyahu Wafaq al-Amal Hawlaha*, Zliten 1988, ed. Omar Jahidar, Vol.1, 493.

316 The rebellion of Abduljelil around 1823 is a good example of the lack of efficient mediation. See: A.E.F., Tuquie, *Tripoli de Barbarie*, 2.

317 Al-Faqih, *Al-Yavmiyat Al-Libiyya*, I:220.

318 Al-Faqih, I:231.

319 D.M.T.L, Qaramanli, dated as 1823.

320 D.M.T.L, Qaramanli, dated as 1832.

chronicler also emphasized that while such measures may appear beneficial at first glance, the resultant profits are derived from the financial detriment of the common populace; thus, he contended that "there is no goodness in this procedure for the state in reality."³²¹ In essence, Yusuf *paşa* facilitated the transfer of wealth from the common people to his personal treasury by merging the state and personal treasuries around the 1810s. He did so indirectly, avoiding direct taxation or coercion. In this respect, his devaluation system exhibited distinct dynamics compared to those of the Ottomans. The Ottomans employed this strategy to finance their *islah* application, that is to say state initiated reform programs, whereas Yusuf *paşa* utilized it for his *ray* application. i.e, for his personal wealth, which was no more separable from the state wealth.

The repercussions of currency devaluation in Tripoli during the years 1813 and 1814 were not immediately apparent to the local populace. However, following a subsequent devaluation in 1816, local shopkeepers began to express their discontent with this monetary policy.³²² In an effort to finance military operations from 1817 to 1820, including Bornu and Benghazi, Yusuf *paşa* exacerbated the devaluation process. By 1820, the instability of local currency had reached a point where French merchants began to refuse these coins in their transactions.³²³ The most significant phase of this devaluation strategy occurred in 1826, during which Italian sources estimated that the devaluation rate from 1820 to 1825 approached 500%, with an additional 500% devaluation occurring in 1826 alone.³²⁴ This year marked a critical juncture for the Tripolitan economy. Prior to 1826, the *paşa* had managed to balance expenditures through various means; however, post-1826, he began to lose control over the economic situation. The underlying cause was not merely the devaluation of the currency; the long-term impact of the use of *ray* in both administrative processes and economic activities also contributed to the situation. Between 1820 and 1825, tax revenues experienced a significant decline due to the corrupt practices of local administrators, who were predominantly family members of the *paşa*, without expertise. This decline was not solely a result of individual misconduct but was also indicative of systemic flaws within the *ray* system. Additionally, Tripoli faced an unprecedented agricultural crisis from 1818 to 1820, characterized by

321 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, [*Tarih-i Cevdet*] *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, ed. Mustafa Güçlükol and Bilge Bozkurt (İstanbul: İlki Kültü Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008), 373–74.

322 Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia: Art III, Dazii, Moneta, Pesì, Misure, Ec.', *Antologia XXXVII* (1828): 79.

323 P. Masson, *Histoire Des Établissements et Du Commerce Français Dans l'Afrique Barbaresque* (Paris: Hachette, 1903), 610.

324 G. Cimino, 'La Zecca Di Tripoli d'Occidente Sotto Il Dominio Degli Ottomani', in *Notiziario Archeologico Del Ministero Delle Colonie*, vol. III (Roma: Alfieri e Lacroix, 1923), 115.

poor harvests that led to rampant inflation in the prices of wheat, barley, and meat.³²⁵ This climatic crisis was further exacerbated by a growing reluctance among the populace to engage in agricultural activities by the end of the 1810s, since the monopolistic policies of the *paşa* consistently diminished producers' incomes, prompting them to explore alternative sectors beyond his control.³²⁶ For instance, around 1814, numerous merchants and former farmers began to invest their resources in a new trade route extending from Wadai to Benghazi via Ounianga and Kufra.³²⁷

The significance of this newly established trade route lies in its detachment from the control and monopolization exerted by Yusuf *paşa*, considering it culminated in Benghazi rather than Tripoli. Nevertheless, the *paşa*'s reaction to this trend was firmly unexpected. Rather than attempting to dominate this trade in 1815, he leveraged the burgeoning economic activities as a financial tool, which he referred to as *tezkere* (Ar. permission document). This is a bond document, which concerns the sale of future tax income from certain districts and harbours in exchange for an immediate cash payment. With the advent of this new trade route, Benghazi emerged as a vital economic hub. In 1815, Yusuf *paşa* sold a bond, termed as *tezkere*, to a French merchant, thereby pledging the future export revenues from certain goods associated with Saharan trade.³²⁸ By 1817, the *paşa* began issuing various *tezkere* bonds for the exportation of different commodities from Benghazi.³²⁹ This indicates that Yusuf *paşa* did not seek to monopolize the trade; instead, he transformed the customs duty revenues from this trade into a financial instrument for his personal enterprise by selling the rights to these revenues prior to their actual collection.³³⁰

In 1819, following the effectiveness of such instrumentalization, the *paşa*, first time issued a *tezkere* bond for the annual tribute by Sweden, which he utilized to settle the cost of several cannons purchased from a Swedish merchant.³³¹ This practice was similarly extended to merchants from Tunisia.³³² Between 1818 and 1820, the region experienced one of its most severe harvest failures, compounded by a significant decline in trade along the Katsina-Agadez-Ghat-Ghadames-Tripoli route in 1818, which was disrupted by the uprising in Nalut that severed the connection between

325 Al-Faqih, *Al-Yavmiyat Al-Libiyya*, I:263–80.

326 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L . 6242.

327 Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia', 94.

328 French Consular report this bond as "tèzchere", see: A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 35.

329 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L . 6242.

330 Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia', 84.

331 R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1819.

332 D.M.T.L, Qaramanli, dated as 1828.

Ghadames and Tripoli. This confluence of events precipitated the first economic crisis in 1821, characterized as a short-term shock in the Tripoli's markets.³³³ Nevertheless, the transient nature of this crisis did not incite widespread panic within the Tripolitan market, considering merchants and European consuls maintained an optimistic outlook. They believed that following the suppression of the Nalut rebellion and a more favourable harvest in 1822, conditions would likely improve. For this reason, a few European merchants, who were still in Tripoli, continued to accept Yusuf *paşa's* *tezkere* bonds, which promised future customs revenue from Benghazi derived from the new Saharan trade route, as well as anticipated annual tributes from several European nations, including Sweden, Denmark, and Holland.³³⁴ Nonetheless, the underlying issues were more systemic than merely the result of isolated incidents. Since 1818, the *paşa* had been manipulating the market by imposing fixed prices to enhance the profitability of his monopoly. Additionally, since 1815, he had been appropriating the wealth of the populace through currency devaluations, and from 1816 onward, tax revenues had been declining due to the long-term ramifications of the administrative use of *ray*.³³⁵ Most critically, Yusuf *paşa* was channelling the funds acquired from market exploitation and currency manipulation into his military campaigns and his personal treasury at reinforcing his control over the *ray*, which after 1820s initially resulted in financial losses in income, and ultimately began to reduce the personal wealth of the *paşa*.

In this regard, the anticipated economic recovery following 1821 did not materialize. However, due to the inability of consuls and European merchants to fully comprehend the intricacies of Yusuf *paşa's* governing strategy, there was no definitive expectation of a collapse until 1826. It was during this year that the Swedish consul first identified inconsistencies in the newly issued *tezkere* bonds. A Swedish merchant, upon travelling to Benghazi with his *tezkere* bond after successfully selling a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition to the *paşa*, discovered that the revenue from these exports had already been allocated to another party prior to his arrival.³³⁶ Additionally, in the same year, the Spanish consul reported to Madrid that Yusuf *paşa* had granted *tezkere* for the export revenues of the next four years from Benghazi. However, this steadily extending *tezkere* bonds led the consul to conclude that the entire financial system was at risk of imminent collapse.³³⁷

333 D.R., Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898.

334 D.M.T.L, Qaramanli, dated as 1822.

335 Cf. Ahmad bin Halim Khadija, 'Li-Qawafil al-Sahrawiat Bayn Tarabulus al-Gharb Wa Janub al-Sahra Fi al-Eahd al-Qaramanili' (B.A. Thesis, Al-Asmariya Islamic University, Zliten, 2002).

336 R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1826.

337 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L . 6241.

Furthermore, when Yusuf *paşa* executed one of the most drastic currency devaluations at the end of that year, a wave of panic spread among European consuls and merchants by 1827.

Although the French and British consuls expressed optimism regarding Tripoli's economic outlook, considering their merchant clients had acquired several *appaltos* with the expectation of soon monopolizing the market, the Danish, Swedish, and Spanish consuls reported that the *paşa's* financial policies had become increasingly unstable, and it is wise to be reluctant to accept any *tezkere* bond.³³⁸ After 1820, the *paşa* had difficulty balancing his expenditures, so he increasingly relied on currency devaluation and the issuance of *tezkere* bonds. However, by 1828, merchants ceased to accept *tezkere* bonds or utilize the local currency, effectively eliminating the *paşa's* options for further financial outlays. This situation precipitated a collapse of foreign trade in 1828.³³⁹ In the subsequent years, European merchants focused on converting their *tezkere* into cash. By 1830, the *paşa* had already sold the anticipated annual tributes from European states for the next five years, along with the entirety of Benghazi's export revenue.³⁴⁰ The supply system in Tripoli disintegrated in 1832,³⁴¹ prompting many residents to flee the city in search of survival.³⁴² In a desperate attempt to generate immediate cash, Yusuf *paşa* even considered unconventional measures, such as selling the central water reservoir of Ghadames, named Ain al-Faras.³⁴³ As a result, this economic crisis culminated in a significant uprising led by Muhammad (II) Bey³⁴⁴ in the same year, which garnered widespread support from various communities.³⁴⁵

Nevertheless, when the economic turmoil began to reverberate throughout Tripoli at the close of 1826, Yusuf *paşa* did not remain a passive observer of the state's decline. Following the failure of his last significant ambition to invade Bornu between 1820 and 1825, he lost faith in the efficacy of

338 D.R., Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898; R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1827; A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L . 6242.

339 Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia: Art II, Del Commercio Marittimo Di Tripolia:', 20–21.

340 D.R., Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898.

341 This was also because of the monopoly of Yusuf *paşa* on wheat and barley. As he sold them for his debts, there was a massive inflation in the price of bread. This soon caused a general problem of hunger in the city. Nora Lafi, 'Ville Arabe et Modernité Administrative Municipale: Tripoli (Libye Actuelle), 1795-1911', *Histoire Urbaine*, Société française d'histoire urbaine, 1, no. 3 (2001): 162.

342 R.S., Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1832.

343 In 1833, Yusuf *paşa* sent an officer named Ali Yusuf Al-Majrab to Ghadames to inform the people that he would sell the central water pool, *Ain al-Faras*, for 50,000 *mitqals* (approximately 21 kg of gold in total). The people of Ghadames protested, claiming that the pool belonged to the *umma* (Ar. public), not *paşa*. Although *paşa* was serious about his plan, he could not realize it due to the outbreak of a civil war. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1833.

344 He was the son of Muhammad (I) Bey, that is to say, grandson of Yusuf *paşa*.

345 In a circular letter (written in Arabic and Italian) he sent to the consuls in Tripoli on 13 December 1833, he declared his independence and sought cooperation with them. D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1833.

his *ray* system to yield the long-desired success. For this reason, in 1826, the *paşa* appointed Hassuna Dagayyis as the foreign minister and granted him the authority to implement essential actions aimed at preventing further deterioration. Hassuna Dagayyis was a prominent diplomat and merchant in Tripoli. His father was Muhammad (I) Dagayyis, the famous Tripolitan foreign minister who held the position for more than 20 years.³⁴⁶ In this respect, Hassuna Dagayyis was considered the future foreign minister both by his father and by Yusuf *paşa*. For this aim, he was sent in 1813 by his father to London and Paris to learn French and English language, economy, politics, and culture, thereafter making trade with them.³⁴⁷ Between 1820-21, he even regularly met with the British political theoretician Jeremy Bentham in London, and encouraged him to write an essay on the politics of Tripoli.³⁴⁸

Upon receiving authorization from Yusuf *paşa* to undertake necessary actions, Hassuna Dagayyis promptly initiated the implementation of his improvement plans while simultaneously adopting a novel diplomatic approach. In 1826, the British consul expressed considerable dissatisfaction, reporting that Dagayyis had successfully established a new and favourable relationship with al-Kanemi in Bornu, aimed at revitalizing Saharan trade. The consul's discontent stemmed not only from Dagayyis's efforts to invigorate trade in southern Central Sudan but also from his diplomatic manoeuvres, which sought to forge a coalition between Bornu and Tripoli to counteract European influence.³⁴⁹ Furthermore, Dagayyis's keen focus on economic stability to prevent collapse led him to establish a French-style chamber of commerce in Tripoli in 1826.³⁵⁰ This initiative marked a significant shift from the use of *ray* to *islah*.³⁵¹ Greatly inspired by the success of *islah* implementation in Tunisia, Hassuna Dagayyis tried to reduce the *paşa*'s monopolist effect on the

346 The French and British consuls always hated him, whereas the Swedish and Danish consuls reported positively on his abilities and policies. See: D.R., *Tripolis: Almindelige korrespondancesager*, 2901.

347 I. Coller, *Ottomans on the Move: Hassuna D'Ghies and the "New Ottomanism" of the 1830s*, in *Mediterranean Diasporas: Politics and Ideas in the Long 19th Century*, ed. M. Isabella and C. Zanou (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 98.

348 Bentham wrote thereafter an essay on this issue titled "Securities against Misrule and Other Constitutional Writings for Tripoli and Greece". For more details for this encounter, see: L.J. Hume, "Preparations for Civil War in Tripoli in the 1820s: Ali Karamanli," "Hassuna D'Ghies and Jeremy Bentham", *Bentham*, *The Journal of African History* 21, no. 3 (1980): 311–22.

349 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/22.

350 The Spanish consul, who has recently been representing France as well, has reported on the establishment of a new chamber of commerce, characterizing it with considerable disdain. He perceives this initiative as a poor imitation of the French system, asserting that "this barbarian has no real clue about its real function". See: A.H.N., *Sección Estado* (3), *Trípoli*, L . 6241. In truth, the Consul was unaware that Hassuna Dagayyis, who had lived in France for many years, created this chamber, not Yusuf Paşa as he had assumed.

351 D.M.T.L., Qaramanli, a letter dated as 1827.

market, fostering a return to collaborative economic activities by promising individuals enhanced rights through the newly established a chamber of commerce.³⁵²

Hassuna Dagayyis undertook a diplomatic initiative aimed at enhancing the economy by challenging Britain's dominant role in foreign trade. In 1826, he formally communicated to the British consul that all European nations were required to engage in negotiations with him directly through their respective consuls, thereby prohibiting any other state from acting as an intermediary or representative.³⁵³ This declaration constituted a direct challenge to Britain's bloc diplomacy, which had been established post-1812.³⁵⁴ The British consul was involved in the negotiation between Yusuf *paşa* and several European states, such as Holland, Portugal, Russia, Tuscany, Austria, and Hanover; thereby attempting to establish an indirect British dominance in the Mediterranean region. Furthermore, the unexpected nature of Dagayyis' declaration caught the British consul off guard, leaving him with no alternative but to acquiesce to this new diplomatic stance. In an effort to maintain the façade of British hegemony, the consul subsequently communicated to other European states that Britain had adopted a different diplomatic approach, choosing to focus solely on its own affairs, by deliberately distorting the fact that this was the result of Hassuna Dagayyis' declaration.³⁵⁵ Consequently, following 1826, the British consul referred to Dagayyis' activities using derogatory racial epithets, such as "dirty Arab."

Another significant *islah* strategy employed by Hassuna Dagayyis involved mobilizing ordinary citizens to engage as political actors. The British Consul, expressing considerable discontent, reported that Hassuna Dagayyis delivered multiple public addresses urging individuals to adopt a

352 The Swedish consul was surprised by the efficiency of this chamber. Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia', 86.

353 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/40.

354 It was the French Consul in Tunisia that first reported a possible plan concerning the bloc diplomacy of the British consuls in Tunisia and Tripoli in 1812. See: Eugène Plantet, *Correspondance Des Beys de Tunis et Des Consuls de France Avec La Cour, 1517-1830*, vol. Vol III (Paris: Alcan, 1893), 502, 512, and 520. With the occupation of Spain and Sicily by British forces in 1813, the British diplomats in Tunisia and Tripoli started to run this project. B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/4. Especially in Tripoli around 1816, the British consul was successful in applying bloc diplomacy by getting many European states under his protection or representation. A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 35. Yet, around 1820, the consuls of several European states – such as Denmark and Sicily – began to criticize the bloc diplomacy of Britain by accusing that it serves only to the interests of Britain. D.R., Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898; A.S.T., Corr. Ministero die guerre e marina, let. 2, 1825. Furthermore, around the same years, with the rise of the new power of France in the Mediterranean, the bloc diplomacy of Britain started to weaken. A.S.T., Corr. Ministero die guerre e marina, let. 27, 1823. In 1826, before the new declaration of Hassuna Dagayyis, the consuls of Sardinia and Tuscany had a very negative consideration for the bloc diplomacy of Britain, thereby they accused this as "project in the name of European states against European states". A.S.T., Corr. Ministero die guerre e marina, let. 9, 1826; A.S.L., Archivo Consular Toscana, Corr. M.G.M., let. 35, 1826. For this reason, they were pleased with the reforms of Hassuna Dagayyis.

355 A.H.N., Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L . 6241.

more responsible approach to political engagement. For example, he urged Tripolitan and Tunisian merchants and producers to curtail their economic interactions with British merchants, who were perceived as attempting to monopolize the market in Tripoli, framing it as a political obligation for every Muslim to resist such dominance.³⁵⁶ This approach alarmed the British consul to the extent that he frequently complained to Yusuf *paşa* pertaining to Dagayyis' policies, alleging that they undermined the authority of the *paşa*.³⁵⁷ Ironically, in reality, Hassuna Dagayyis was devising an unprecedented plan aimed at strengthening Yusuf *paşa*'s power in İstanbul. Following the Ottoman Empire's successful abolition of the *yeniçeri* corps in 1826, after years of insurrection and instability, Dagayyis promptly responded to this development, even prior to receiving directives from İstanbul. In the same year, he disbanded the *yeniçeri* forces in Tripoli and established a new *nizamı-cedid* (Tr. new order) army following the model of Ottomans' newly established *nizamı-cedid* divisions, which garnered significant attention and satisfaction from İstanbul. Furthermore, this Tripolitan *nizamı-cedid* had a unique character. The soldiers were enslaved people brought to Tripoli³⁵⁸ who signed a contract with Yusuf *paşa* that after 5 years of duty they would be free. Even their general was an enslaved person named Said Buhayba.³⁵⁹ In 1827, Yusuf *paşa* levied taxes on the Kuloğlu communities in Tripolitania, which had historically been exempt from taxation. This decision incited a rebellion, prompting him to deploy the newly formed *nizamı-cedid* army to suppress the dissent.³⁶⁰ Furthermore, Dagayyis persuaded Yusuf *paşa* to reappoint local administrators, considering the current officials were deeply implemented in corruption. In this instance, rather than selecting individuals from his own family, the *paşa* predominantly appointed enslaved individuals from his household.³⁶¹

All these *islah* reforms implemented by Hassuna Dagayyis were sustained until 1829; however, the economic impact on Tripoli remained ambiguous due to the limited timeframe of these reforms. In 1829, the British consul issued a threat of military action against Yusuf *paşa* unless he dismissed Hassuna Dagayyis and appointed a new foreign minister, claiming that Hassuna Dagayyis was a

356 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/20.

357 This is very interesting, because it was also the same consul who regularly insulted the *paşa* as being an absolute despot. B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 76/20.

358 It is important to note that not all enslaved people in Tripoli were from southern part of the Central Sudan. Also, several Europeans, who were once captured as captives, since their countries had no *aman* status, and never paid ransom to buy their freedom, entered into the contract with *paşa* to buy their freedom, joining his army. Interview No. 22: with Abubakr Harun in Tripoli, 2023.

359 Walid Shueayb Adem, *Tijarat Al-Raqiq Eabr Sahra' 'iyalat Tarablus al-Gharb* (Trablus: Dar Al-Walid, 2021), 148–49.

360 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 147.

361 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, 147.

criminal who made secret plans to kill British agents.³⁶² In response, to avoid further problems, the *paşa* appointed Muhammad II Dagayyis, Hassuna's brother, as the new foreign minister. He had a more moderate approach and eschewed rapid and radical reforms.³⁶³ Despite being exiled in Paris following the 1829, which stemmed from unfounded allegations by the British Consul, the *islah* reforms of Hassuna Dagayyis persisted. Particularly after the French invasion of Algiers in 1830, he maintained regular communication with Ottoman consuls in Paris to discuss the future of Tunisia and Tripoli. The Ottoman Consul in Paris was notably impressed by Hassuna Dagayyis's extensive knowledge of West Africa and, in 1834, requested that he should compose a report for the Ottoman *padişah* outlining his reform proposals to mitigate further European encroachments.³⁶⁴ This report represents one of the earliest intellectual endeavours from Tripoli aimed at countering European colonial invasions in West Africa. In this report from 1834, Hassuna Dagayyis proposes a federative structure in the whole Central Sudan that should run as a bloc with the functional collaboration of various actors in the case of war against European invasion. In this regard, with this project, he was also against any centralist policy of the Ottoman Empire, such as occupying Tripoli to exert stricter control. In this federative structure, every significant actor should fulfil some functions. For him, Kel Tamasheq, Teda, Hausa, Pullo, and Kanuri groups should recruit soldiers, since they are the best soldiers in West Africa. Tunisia should finance whole operation, considering it is the richest state in the region. The Ottoman Empire should support and protect the whole structure with its diplomacy against European aggression. Lastly, Tripoli should manage the entire military operation as the most experienced actor to operate big armies in the Central Sudan. For him, all these actors would willingly accept to fulfil these functions and collaborate within this federative structure, since they

362 This threat presents a compelling historical account centred around the British agent Laing. He was wed to the daughter of the British Consul, embarked on a "discovery mission" to Timbuktu in 1826. During his return, he was killed by unidentified people. In response, the British Consul promptly compelled Yusuf *paşa* to initiate an investigation to identify the perpetrators; however, the region was beyond the *paşa's* control. Throughout 1827 and 1828, the British Consul consistently attributed blame for Laing's death to various individuals and demanded punitive measures from Yusuf *paşa*. By 1829, the Consul posited that Hassuna Dagayyis had orchestrated Laing's death. While he communicated to London that he possessed numerous pieces of evidence to support his allegations against Dagayyis, he failed to submit any of this purported evidence. Simultaneously, he leveraged this accusation as a means to eliminate Dagayyis from his position. When the Consul presented his claims—devoid of substantiation—Yusuf *paşa* did not take them seriously. However, when the Consul issued an official threat of war, Yusuf *paşa* sought to avert further conflict, particularly as he was already grappling with an economic crisis. Consequently, he dismissed Hassuna Dagayyis from the foreign ministry but refrained from arresting him, allowing Dagayyis to travel to London to defend himself against the unfounded allegations. Nevertheless, the British authorities did not afford Dagayyis the opportunity for a formal judicial process. Taş, 'Osmanlı Garp Ocaklarından Trablusgarp Eyaleti: Karamanlılar Dönemi (1711-1835)', 2016, 398.

363 Muhammad II Dagayyis was more of a merchant than a diplomat. While his brother specialized in diplomacy, Muhammad focused on the family business. For instance, while he was in the foreign office in 1832, he was still further busy with his own trade business. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a register dated as 1832.

364 B.O.A., Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 46429-S, 1-2.

must be aware of the fact that if they would not do that, then there will be constant danger of invasion for them.³⁶⁵

Nevertheless, after a year, the Ottoman *padişah* opted to exert complete control over Tripoli in lieu of waiting for overarching reform initiatives from the region. In this vein, the reform plans proposed by Hassuna Dagayyis, aimed at preventing further invasions from Tunisia and Tripoli and mitigating centralist encroachments from İstanbul, ultimately remained an unfulfilled intellectual endeavour. Nonetheless, Dagayyis' vision of establishing a federative Central Sudanic bloc under the diplomatic aegis of the Ottoman Empire to counter potential European invasions was revived by various actors from the 1870s until 1911, albeit without a direct acknowledgment of Dagayyis' contributions.

In summary, under the revised governance approach of Yusuf *paşa*, Tripoli experienced significant transformations from the long *idara* system to the new *tadbir* system. However, the *paşa*'s pronounced preference for employing *ray* under *tadbir*—shaped by historical, geographical, and personal influences from the figures such as al-Mukni—diverged Tripoli's trajectory from that of Tunisia and Egypt during the same period, considering they implemented *islah* reforms under the same *tadbir* system.³⁶⁶ The immediate outcomes of utilizing *ray* in domestic policy yielded favourable results for the *paşa*, such as between 1811 and 1815, whereas the long-term repercussions led to a tendency of *riasa* with substantial decline, which Yusuf *paşa* had not anticipated. In spite of his firm belief in the efficacy of this governance strategy from the 1810s to 1826, by 1826, he was compelled to confront the harsh reality that his *ray* based *tadbir* system was no longer effective and successful, furthermore even creates an inclination to *riasa*. A brief period of *islah* era under the directive of Hassuna Dagayyis, from 1826 to 1830, failed to halt the persistent economic and political deterioration. Accordingly, from 1830 to 1835, the whole country was engulfed in a formidable civil war, prompting the intervention of the Ottoman Empire in 1835.

365 B.O.A., Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 37520-B.

366 Different from Tripoli, these both neighbouring states applied *tadbir* through *islah* in the first half of the 19th century. However, the results for both states were different. While the *islah* policy in Tunisia led to a more diplomatic and trade-oriented direction, in Egypt it led to an invasive policy toward the south, resulting in the invasion of Sudan in the 1820s. Yusuf *Paşa* had also made plans to expand southward, but he could not realize them. Consequently, Egypt and especially Muhammad Ali *Paşa* were remembered as colonizers by the Sahrawi communities. Abubakr Harun, *Al-Sahl Wa-l-Muysir Fi Taealum al-Lughat al-Amazighiya: Muhadatha Bi Lahjat Ghadamis* (Trablus: Al-Farjani, 2013), 70.

2.3. Involvement of the Ottoman Empire in Tripoli: Changing Regime, Remaining Governance

When the Ottoman Empire assumed control of Tripoli in 1835, the local actors and European consular officials were unaware of the historical and intellectual context surrounding this action. Consequently, influential community leaders such as Ghuma and Abduljelil anticipated the appointment of a new *paşa* by the Ottoman *padişah*. The British and USA consuls viewed this as a typical example of “invasion politic of despot Turks”. As a result, historians who rely on these local Arabic sources or consular rapports have been unable to provide any plausible explanation for the Ottoman Empire's actions. In reality, this significant shift in the Ottomans' approach to Tripoli was the outcome of a specific intellectual and historical process that began in the 18th century.

2.3.1. Historical Background of the Ottoman-Islamic Epistemology on *riasa*, *tadbir*, and *idara*

As previously mentioned, the Ottoman Empire essentially transformed its administrative structure into an *idara*-based system after the 1650s. This was a conjectural response to the conditions of the 17th century. In the following decades, the Ottoman Empire experienced crucial internal rebellions and lost territories. Especially between the 17th and 18th centuries, a number of officers and scholars began to think about the reasons for problems in the state affairs. This intellectual engagement resulted in the production of numerous texts that aimed to identify the root causes of these problems and suggest remedies, contributing to the Ottoman-Islamic epistemology.³⁶⁷ These texts deeply shaped the transformation of governance in the Ottoman Empire in the following decades. The 18th century was a particularly important period in Ottoman history, considering it witnessed the emergence of a rich literature on governance, known as *siyasetname*, which had a profound impact on the system of governance in the empire during the 19th century.

As Ahmed Uğur already noted, despite being written by different authors and containing different specific contents, these texts share certain common characteristics. One notable feature is the reliance on a shared historiography that portrays the era of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman (d. 1566) as the golden age of Ottoman history, suggesting that all issues within the state can be resolved by emulating Süleyman's actions.³⁶⁸ This era is referred to as the ancient order (Tr. *nizam-ı kadim*) or

367 For more details, see: Marinos Sariyannis and Ekin Tuşalp Atiyas, *A History of Ottoman Political Thought up to the Early Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2019).

368 For detailed analysis, see: Ahmet Uğur, *Osmanlı Siyaset Nameleri* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1987), conclusion chapter.

the ancient canon (Tr. *kanun-i kadim*), whilst the 18th century is depicted as a period of moral, religious, economic, and military decline. Furthermore, this decline was inevitable according to view of historian Mustafa Naima (d. 1716), who was the main reference for all others in the 18th century. Drawing upon the historiographies of Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) and Katip Çelebi (d. 1657), Naimi argues a state progresses through five phases: victory, independence, prosperity, contentment, and decline. According to this narrative, Süleyman was the last *padişah* to experience the phase of prosperity, and since 1683, following the failed capture of Vienna, the state has been in a period of decline. Along this line, the best course of action for subsequent rulers is to slow down this decline.³⁶⁹ At this juncture, although many Ottoman authors in the 18th century subscribed to this historical narrative, they developed two distinct intellectual movements to address the question of how to best emulate Süleyman or understand the governance system he employed.³⁷⁰

For instance, according to Şehid Ali paşa (d. 1716), the system of governance that Kanuni Sultan Süleyman applied was *idara*, utilizing the instrument of *dairat al-siyasa*. However, unlike the *idara* system in the 18th century, Süleyman was able to establish an effective balance mechanism to unite different power components. In this respect, for him, the problem in the 18th century was not the system of governance itself, but its ineffective application. He stresses that subsequent *padişahs* did not comprehend the dynamics of *dairat al-siyasa*, leading to a failure in maintaining a balance among different power components and resulting in rebellions.³⁷¹ Several other authors also support this opinion.³⁷²

Nevertheless, there was also a second view regarding the system of governance applied by Süleyman. According to Canikli Ali paşa (d. 1776), the ancient order employed the *riasa* system, in which Süleyman held absolute authority and did not share power with others. He personally commanded the army, managed the state treasury accounts, and oversaw religious affairs. In this narrative, Süleyman's "infallible moral superiority" and "genius" allowed him to succeed in all

369 For more details, see: Mustafa Naima, *Târîh-i Naîmâ* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1280 [1864]).

370 One intriguing example that challenges the notion of emulation of Süleyman was Katip Çelebi. For him, not every age, as Penah Efendi and Müteferrika assumed (see following pages), but every stage of state requires its own unique solution. In this respect, he argues that, since the Ottoman Empire is no longer in a prosperous stage, the solution must be tailored to the conditions of the new stage. Yet, this opinion still maintains an inward-looking approach (see following pages) in its historiography. See: Orhan Şaik Gökyay, 'Katip Çelebi: Hayatı, Şahsiyeti, Eserleri', in Katip Çelebi: Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında İnceleme (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), 150–60.

371 Şehid Ali paşa, 'Ta'lîmât-ı Hikmet-Âyât-ı', Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Ö.S.A.

372 See: Ali İbrahim Savaş, 'Lahiya Geleneği İçinde XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Islahat Projelerindeki Tespit ve Teklifler', *Billig* 9 (1999): 88–112.

matters.³⁷³ Hence, Canikli Ali *paşa* believes that the problem in the 18th century was the governance system aligned with the character of the *padişahs*, as it changed through the decline of the personal character of the *padişahs*. Subsequent *padişahs* lacked the courage to maintain the *riasa* system and instead opted for the *idara*, which he considers the main reason for territorial losses. The solution in this regard lies in *padişahs* possessing a strong moral character and receiving a genuine education to govern state affairs personally. To reach this stage, the short-term application of *tadbir* was necessary. Several other authors in the 18th century echoed this opinion.³⁷⁴

As can be noticed, the primary concern of the two perspectives also differed. The authors who regarded the frequent uprisings in the state as the most significant issue proposed reforming the *idara* system by effectively implementing *dairat al-siyasa*, considering this instrument ensures a proper balance between various power components, such as powerful local governors, central *yeniçeri* army, or scholars in the juristic sphere. On the other hand, the authors who identified territorial losses as the central problem in the state suggested a return to the *riasa* system, since this principle, heavily influenced by military order, defines the ruler as the leader and commander of the state, potentially offering better solutions for military defeats.

In spite of the fact that during the early and middle of the 18th century, Ottoman *padişahs* preferences vacillated between these two contrasting views, the core impetus of the late 18th and the whole 19th century reform movements in the Ottoman Empire greatly differed from these opinions. Instead, the intellectual origins of the reform movement in the 19th century can be traced back to two authors who were largely marginalized during their time: İbrahim Müteferrika (d. 1726)³⁷⁵ and Penah Efendi (d. 1780).³⁷⁶ These authors fundamentally differed in their opinions from the prevailing narratives and historiography, and their uniqueness lay in the establishment of a new historiography. For instance, in his text on governance, Penah Efendi firstly criticizes the traditional historiography represented by Mustafa Naimi, due to its universalist determinism. He does not view the era of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman as the golden age of the Ottoman Empire, but as an era in which the Ottoman *padişahs* were able to understand the dynamics of their age. Consequently, the solution

373 Canikli Ali *paşa*, 'Tedbîr-i Cedîd-i Nâdir', Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Ö.S.A., HO, 104b.

374 See: Savaş, 'Lahiya Geleneği İçinde XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Islahat Projelerindeki Tespit ve Teklifler'.

375 He was also the founder of the first official printing house in the Ottoman Empire in 1726 with the permission of the *padişah*. See: Osman Ersoy, *Türkiye'ye Matbaanın Girişi ve İlk Basılan Eserler* (Ankara: Güven Basımevi, 1959).

376 For instance, historian Mustafa Nuri Paşa (d. 1890) clearly uses the concepts and historiography of these two authors in his famous book *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, written between 1873 and 1881. See: Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, ed. Yılmaz Kurt (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları).

to the challenges faced by the empire could not be found by simply imitating what Sultan Süleyman had done, rather by understanding the new dynamics of the 18th century and adjusting state policy accordingly.³⁷⁷ İbrahim Müteferrika even goes further by proposing a new concept, arguing that the ancient order (Tr. *nizam-ı kadim*) came to an end, and that they are now in an era characterized by a new order (Tr. *nizam-ı cedit*).³⁷⁸ In this regard, both authors put forth a new historiography that rejected universalism in favour of a global perspective, and rejected determinism in favour of constructivism. Ali İbrahim Savaş describes this shift as a transition from an introverted perspective, which sought solutions within the state, based on a universalist depiction, to an extraverted perspective, which sought solutions outside the state by considering other actors on a global scale.³⁷⁹

In relation to the topic of governance, İbrahim Müteferrika and Penah Efendi argue from a global perspective that certain other states have already grasped the fundamental dynamics of the new order in the world, and therefore the Ottoman Empire should take them as a model of inspiration. Müteferrika specifically points out that France and Austria have achieved significant military successes in recent years (in the 18th century) due to the adaptation of their governance systems to the new dynamics. For him, the conditions of the new order require from states cruel indoctrination and discipline. He criticizes the *idara* system in the Ottoman Empire, since it grants excessive freedom and rights to the people. He recounts that in France and Austria (in the 18th century), the kings do not consider their subjects as human being but as slaves of the will of the kings. No one has any rights or freedoms that could go against the will of the king. Every individual was required to serve the king's plans, and thereupon people needed to be indoctrinated and subjected to discipline, if necessary through cruel despotism.³⁸⁰ Interestingly, İbrahim Müteferrika argues that the application of *riasa* too does not align with his perspective. He suggests that, in the *riasa* system, the ruler exercises authority without concern for the thoughts and actions of the people, as long as they obey his orders. In this new age, however, every individual should align their thoughts and actions with those of the ruler, even without explicit orders. In this regard, he argues that in France and Austria, kings discipline their people in a manner similar to that of an army. They apply strict instructions and order to every single affair in the social life. Therefore, for İbrahim Müteferrika, the Ottoman *padişahs* must apply *tadbir* through *islah* by making visionary reforms,

377 Penah Efendi, *Mora İhtilâli* (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2017), 88.

378 Adil Şen, *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usûlü'l- Hikem Fî Nizâmi'1-Ümem* (Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1995), 149.

379 Savaş, 'Lahiya Geleneği İçinde XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Islahat Projelerindeki Tespit ve Teklifler', 88.

380 Şen, *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usûlü'l- Hikem Fî Nizâmi'1-Ümem*, 150–55.

so that every single person should be an absolute servant of the *padişah* through indoctrination and discipline that are instructed by the state.³⁸¹ In this point, it is important to note that Müteferrika does not attribute these new dynamics solely to France or Austria, but rather sees them as part of a larger global context. He suggests that the Ottomans should learn from these examples and adapt their governance to the changing global dynamics, without necessarily imitating everything that France or Austria did. Furthermore, Müteferrika does not propose the creation of an entirely new system of governance; rather, he advocates for a shift from *idara* to *tadbir* through the implementation of *islah*. In other words, he believes that the Ottomans already possess the necessary tools to adjust their governance system, and they simply need to choose the appropriate ones.

Penah Efendi shares similar arguments, contending that the key characteristic of successful states such as the Mongol Empire, Spain, and Austria is their systematic despotic order. These states strip common people of their rights and freedoms, imposing regulations and order dictated by the ruler, thereby instilling even fear of divergent thinking. According to Penah Efendi, the main issue in the Ottoman Empire is that common people enjoy excessive freedom and possess numerous rights.³⁸² In this point, he provides more specific details than İbrahim Müteferrika. He asserts that the Ottomans displayed significant tolerance toward local communities and their cultures. For instance, notwithstanding numerous rebellions in the Albanian region, the Ottoman *padişahs* consistently forgave the people at the end of each rebellion and refrained from implementing further precautions. Instead, the Ottomans should have inspired what Spain made in America, where they compelled people to speak Spanish and forcibly took young individuals, as well as women, to Spain for indoctrination. Subsequently, these individuals were returned to their communities and tasked with indoctrinating the entire population. If any communities resisted this indoctrination, they were mercilessly massacred.³⁸³ In this context, the author argues that in order to maintain successful rule during their time, cruelty and indoctrination are unavoidable. To support this point, Penah Efendi provides specific examples of the implementation of reforms in the economy. He narrates how the French cultivated coffee in America for centuries, reaping significant profits without regard for the local crops, and simply forcing the inhabitants to comply with the ruler's plans. The Ottomans should adopt a similar approach by cultivating coffee in Yemen and Egypt, coercing the locals to abandon their own crops and adhere to the *padişah's* plan. Similarly, he suggests that China and

381 Şen, 140–42.

382 Penah Efendi, *Mora İhtilâli*, 123.

383 Penah Efendi, 109–13.

Austria invested substantial resources and expertise in ceramic production by banning imports and compelling traders to only export. The Ottomans should do the same by creating a ceramic production centre in Kütahya³⁸⁴ for the same purpose, by forcing traders only export it and not import. Penah Efendi also highlights how the Mongols in India forcefully settled nomadic groups and cultivated cotton for textile production in every available plot of land. He argues that the Ottomans should do the same with nomadic communities on the Anatolian plateau.³⁸⁵ In this regard, Penah Efendi advocates for comprehensive reforms, known as *ıslahatlar* in Turkish, prepared by the ruler to bring the entire state under strict order and discipline, in order to align the state's affairs with the new global dynamics. However, it is important to note that these opinions remained largely on the fringes and lacked support until the reign of Selim III (d. 1808) after 1789.³⁸⁶

Although the Ottomans were always in close contact with Austria, France, and Russia during the 17th and 18th centuries, their main interest was only technical issues. They regularly sought military specialists and engineers from these states to modernize their military infrastructure.³⁸⁷ Nonetheless, little attention was given to their administrative structure or system of governance. Until the rise of Selim III to power after the 1780s, traditional introvert perspective was maintained for the state affairs by debating between *idara* and *riasa*. Selim III, however, departed from these conventional views and embraced more radical solutions proposed by İbrahim Müteferrika and Penah Efendi. Even as crown prince, he was convinced of the importance of *tadbir* and sent a special agent to Paris to establish contact with French officers and gather information with regard to the French governance system. In of his letter to his special agent, he clearly states that “I sent you [to Paris] as an implementation of *ray* in the *tadbir*... it’s your duty to deliver me every usable information and make me strong there in the future.”³⁸⁸ It is noticeable that although Selim III was convinced for the application of *tadbir*, he faced with the fact that it was impossible to shift from *dairat al-siyasa* to *islah* immediately, since so many powerful groups would try to avoid such transformation to keep their privilege position. In this regard, during his period of being crown prince and earlier ruling, he

384 Today, Kütahya is a city in Turkey and one of the world's most famous ceramic producers.

385 Penah Efendi, *Mora İhtilâli*, 146–52.

386 In fact, Selim III's father, Abdülhamid I, also worked to stop the Empire's ongoing decline. Although he shortly strove to apply *tadbir* around the 1780s, he had to turn into the classical *riasa-idara* narrative to avoid the unrest of the *yeniçeri* army and scholars in the juristical sphere. See: Fikret Sarıcioğlu, *Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi: Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789)* (İstanbul: Tatav Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001), 147–50. However, even at an early age, he encouraged his son to seek further solutions. See: Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III'ün Hat-Tı Hümayunları: Nizam-ı Cedit (1789-1807)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988), 27.

387 For an example, see: Özbaran, ‘Osmanlılar ve Deniz: 16. Yüzyıl Hint Okyanusu Bağlamında Yeniden Bakış’.

388 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, ‘Selim III'ün Veliht İken Fransa Kralı Lüi Ile Muhabereleleri’, *Belleten* 2, no. 1 (1938): 216.

implemented the *ray* to discard all these anti-*islah* actors before beginning to actualize reforms (Tr. *islahatlar*). One of the most characteristic examples of this *ray* implementation was his official demand from all officers and foreign consular officials reformation proposals. Instead of demanding an official opinion of jurists or scholars, he asked the opinion of every single person regardless their origin.³⁸⁹ As part of this approach, Selim III sent special agents and consular officials to foreign countries to gather information and perspectives. In 1792, first time in Ottoman history, he established an official consulate in Vienna, appointing Ebubekir Ratip Efendi as consul.³⁹⁰ One year after, Selim III sent Yusuf Agah Efendi, who was actually the son of Penah Efendi, to London in order to establish the new consulate there.³⁹¹ Although due to the civil war after the French Revolution no consul could go to Paris, Selim III sent Abdurrahman Muhib Efendi as Ottoman consul to Paris in 1798.³⁹² All these consuls wrote several very detailed reports (Tr. *layihalar*). Interestingly, reports regarding Britain and France were more negative since the consuls considered parliamentary and republican systems to be ineffective and lacking in coherent policies. Reports from Vienna, on the other hand, were more favorable. Nevertheless, Ratip Efendi, who wrote favorable reports about Austria, clearly stated in a letter to Selim III that each state has its own historical, traditional, and cultural context. In this regard, it would be wrong to imitate what the Austrians did. Instead, the Ottomans should take them as an example and source of inspiration to develop their own *islah* implementations.³⁹³ Thus, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottomans were deeply inspired by the Austrian administrative structure and reforms, which they used as a model for their own reforms by applying *islah*.³⁹⁴ After 1800, Selim III prepared a reform program and began to actualize it accordingly. At its core, the program was related to applying *islah* in a most effective way, by giving new order and strict regulation for every sphere of social life as well as economic, military, and political institutions. The plan involved standardizing and restructuring the legal system and the army because scholars in the legal sphere and the central Yeniçeri army were core actors in past rebellions. These reforms should be followed by the

389 Yüksel Çelik, 'Nizâm-ı Cedîd'in Niteliği ve III. Selim ile I. I. Mahmud Devri Askerî Reformlarına Dair Tespitler (1789-1839)', in *Nizâm-ı Kadîm'den Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e: III. Selim ve Dönemi* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2010), 524.

390 See: Enver Ziya Karal, Ebubekir Ratip Efendi'nin Nizamı Cedid Islahatındaki Rolü, V. Türk Tarih Kongresi (Ankara, 1960).

391 Aladdin Yalçınkaya, 'Yusuf Agah Efendi', in *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 680.

392 S.K., Hacı Muhammed Efendi Koleksiyonu, Abdurrahman Muhib Efendi, 'Fransa Sefâretnâmesi'.

393 Aysel Yıldız, 'Şehzadeye Öğütler', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 42 (2013): 263.

394 Ali Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform (1836-1856)*, 294.

establishment of new political and administrative structures in the far future.³⁹⁵ In this regard, he established a new army even called “new order” (Tr. *nizam-ı cedit*), considering he was entirely convinced that with the “orderless, indiscipline *yeniçeri* army” he will never achieve victory.³⁹⁶ Similar to Penah Efendi's proposal, he banned imported products, such as Austrian ceramics and French coffee, to encourage local production.³⁹⁷

These attempts resulted with a rebellion, known as *Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanı*, by central *yeniçeri* army and *şeyhülislam* (Tr. chief Islamic judge) against Selim III.³⁹⁸ In 1807, he was forced to leave the throne by the very actors he had planned to reform. Although the new padişah, Mustafa IV (d. 1808), suspended the entire reform program for a short period of time and defined the old idara system as the only official strategy,³⁹⁹ an army commander from Rumeli who strongly supported reforms and Selim III came to Istanbul and oppressed the rebellious army with the aim of reinstating Selim III to the throne. However, before he reached the Ottoman palace, Selim III was assassinated. Therefore, he placed Mahmud II (d. 1839) on the throne in 1808 to maintain the new Islah reforms.⁴⁰⁰ Consequently, Mahmud II continued with the implementation of *islah* for the following decades. Unlike Selim III, he had the time and opportunity to transform the state structure entirely according to the new system of governance. He introduced a new education and training system for officers, who were expected to be the foundation of the planned reforms. As part of this initiative, officers were required to learn Arabic, Persian, and Islamic jurisprudence, regardless of their rank.⁴⁰¹ By doing so, he planned to break the power of scholars in the jurisprudence. In 1826, he even managed to abolish the central *yeniçeri* army, due to their resistance against *islah*.⁴⁰²

395 For more details, see: Ali Osman Çınar, ‘Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emîn Behîc’in Sevânihü’l-Levâiyh’i ve Değerlendirmesi.’ (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 1992).

396 Karal, *Selim III’ün Hat-Tı Hümayunları: Nizam-ı Cedit (1789-1807)*, 27.

397 Saadet Öner, ‘İsveç Devlet Arşivi’nde Mahfûz İ. M. D’Ohsson Evrakı Tasnîfi ve Tahlîli’ (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1999), 152.

398 The support of various jurists and the chief Islamic judge for the rebellion created long-term hostility between reformers and Islamic jurists (Ar. faqih) and judges (Ar. qadi) during the 19th century. For instance, in the 1880s, reformist Ottoman officers were helping Bulgarian prisoners in Murzuq against possible aggressive judgements by the local *qadi*. Pavel Shatev, one of these prisoners, recounts that while the local *qadi* pressured local officers to mistreat Bulgarian prisoners, these reformist officers openly accused the *qadi* of being stubborn and deliberately treated the prisoners well. Shatev, *Zatochenieto vu Sakhra-Fezanu*, 98.

399 See: Kemal Beydilli, ‘Kabakçı İsyanı Akabinde Hazırlanan Hüccet-i Şer’iyye’, *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 4 (2001): 33–48.

400 See: Feridun Emecen, ‘Osmanlı Hanedanına Alternatif Arayışlar Üzerine Bazı Örnekler ve Mülâhazalar’, *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6 (2001): 63–76.

401 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 23984.

402 See: Şamil Mutlu, *Yeniçeri Ocağının Kaldırılışı ve II. Mahmud’un Edirne Seyahati* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1995).

2.3.2. Ottoman Involvement in Tripoli and *tadbir* Policy

After these earlier transformations, one of the core shift was reforming the *idara* system in the whole administration in which due to this system some regions had their own autonomous governor, who only nominally linked to İstanbul, such as Bosnia, Trabzon, and Tripoli, and they were not eager to apply new reforms in their domains. It is important to note that the core aim of the Ottomans was not administrative centralization, as some historians wrongly assumed,⁴⁰³ or not copying the modernism discourse in Europe. The goal was to develop their own reform project according to Ottoman-Islamic epistemology. This project aimed to involve local actors in bureaucracy and political representation, as well as integrate new *islah* programs.⁴⁰⁴ For instance, the Ottoman Empire did not prepare a plan to take Tunisia and Egypt under direct control. As long as local dynastical governors were ready and able to implement *islah*, which Tunisia and Egypt began this implementation even before Ottomans, and they even gave inspiration to the Ottoman *padişahs*, there was no reason for the Ottoman governance to take these regions under direct authority.⁴⁰⁵ For the other regions, in the 1820s, Ottomans gradually began to decrease the autonomy of the governors with the aim that at the end they should either apply *islah* in their regions or these regions should be governed by administrators who are sent from İstanbul with clear instructions for *islah* application. However, the first attempt at achieving this goal quickly resulted in rebellions in Trabzon and Bosnia between 1820 and 1830.⁴⁰⁶

In this context, when a civil war emerged in Tripoli around 1832, the Ottomans were extremely preoccupied with the anti-*islah* rebellion in Bosnia and Trabzon as well as a war against the son of Mehmed Ali *paşa* in Egypt. For this reason, although it was in their agenda to take Tripoli under direct control for *tadbir* application in the future, considering they were entirely convinced that Yusuf *paşa* would not and cannot implement *islah* properly, they lacked necessary soldiers and

403 As an example see: Rodolfo Micacchi, *La Tripolitania Sotto Il Dominio Dei Caramanli* (A. Airoldi Editore: Intra, 1936); Ettore Rossi, *Storia Di Tripoli e Della Tripolitania: Dalla Qonquista Araba al 1911* (Roma: Istituto per L'Oriente, 1968); Kola Folayan, *Tripoli During the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli* (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1979).

404 Lafi, 'Mediterranean Connections: The Circulation of Municipal Knowledge and Practices at the Time of the Ottoman Reforms, c.1830-1910', 15; Nora Lafi, 'L'Empire Ottoman En Afrique : Perspectives d'histoire Critique', *Cahiers d'histoire. Revue d'histoire Critique* 128 (2015): 6.

405 The production of *chechia* (red caps that became symbolic of the Ottoman Empire) in Tunisia and their domination of the entire Ottoman market was always a factor in Istanbul considering Tunisia as advanced part of the *Islah* reform. Sadok Boubaker, 'Négoce et Enrichissement Individuel à Tunis Du XVIIe Siècle Au Début Du XIXe Siècle', *Revue d'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 50, no. 4 (2003): 29–62.

406 For Bosnia, see: Fatma Sel Turhan, 'Rebelling For The Old Order: Ottoman Bosnia, 1826-1836' (Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2009), 1826–36; for Trabzon, see: Mehmed Hacısalihoglu, *Trabzon'da Ayanlık Mücadelesi: Hacısalihzâde Hasan Ağa, Ömer Ağa ve Büyük Ali Ağa (1737-1844)* (Trabzon: Serander Yayınları, 2014).

finances to initiate a new military campaign. For this reason, as an initial response, the Ottoman government chose not to interfere in the war in Tripoli. Nevertheless, Yusuf *paşa* personally requested the involvement of the *padişah* in the civil war. In his letter to İstanbul in 1833, he states that “the aim of the rebellious groups is to avoid the reforms (*islah*) that I [Yusuf *paşa*] operate on behalf of Ottoman sultan...”, thereupon, he asks military aid from İstanbul to oppress the rebellion.⁴⁰⁷ It is noteworthy to underline that starting from the 1820s, the Ottoman *padişah* consistently instructed the *paşas* of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli to implement *islah* in their respective regions, following the example of the Ottoman practices in Rumeli and Anatolia.⁴⁰⁸ However, the *paşa* of Algeria never changed *idara* system until French invasion in 1830. On the other hand, the *paşa* of Tunis, even before being prompted by the Ottomans, implemented *islah*.⁴⁰⁹ In the case of Tripoli, as was seen in the previous chapter, Yusuf *paşa* shifted the system of governance from *idara* to *tadbir*, by implementing the *ray*, rather than *islah*. In this respect, the letter of Yusuf *paşa* demonstrates that he was aware of the new governance strategy of the Ottomans and its possible threat for him. For this reason, to ensure his authority and throne, he depicted himself as a reformer in accordance with what the Ottomans demanded. However, from the Ottoman perspective, Yusuf *paşa* was incapable of properly implementing reforms as the *paşas* of Tunisia and Egypt had done.⁴¹⁰ For this reason, in lieu of responding to the demand of Yusuf *paşa*, the Ottoman government send an envoy to Tunis in 1833, the only province in the *Garb Ocakları* (Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli) that Ottomans were satisfied with the system of governance.

The purpose of the envoy in question was to engage in negotiations with the *paşa* of Tunisia regarding the potential takeover of power in Tripoli, and further implement *islah* there as was the case in Tunisia. According to his rapport, he informed the Tunisian *paşa* that if he were to send an army to Tripoli to end the civil war, the Ottomans would recognize him as the new *paşa* of Tripoli. The only condition was that after assuming power, the Tunisian *paşa* should pay off the debt of Yusuf *paşa* to European states in order to prevent potential European involvement. Although the *paşa* of Tunisia considered this plan seriously, he ultimately declined involvement due to the

407 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 366/20242-D.

408 See: Taş, ‘Garp Ocaklarında Birliğin Bozulması: 18. Yüzyılda Cezayir-Tunus-Trablusgarp İlişkileri’.

409 Interestingly, the first impetus for the Tunisian *paşa* to shift from *idara* to *tadbir* was the occupation of Tripoli in 1795 by Ali Bulgurlu and Ottomans’ indifference to it. In this regard, the *paşa* began to consider *yeniçeri* army in Tunisia as a threat in case of any similar attempt against Tunis. Thus, he began to create a new army to break the power of *yeniçeri* army in Tunisia. Al-Imam, *Siyasat Hammuda Basha Fi Tunis*, 204–5. After the creation of a new army, he followed similar new formations for economy and administration. See: Ibn Abi’l Diyaf, *It’haf Ahl al-Zaman Bi-Akhbar Muluk Tunis Wa ’Ahd al-Aman*. It is, however, important to note that the *islah* implementation used by the Tunisian *paşa* had its own intellectual and historical origin.

410 B.O.A, Bâb-ı Âsafî Divan-ı Hümayun Name-i Hümayun Kalemi, 250/1412.

unpredictable costs associated with such action.⁴¹¹ In the meantime, the Ottomans received an official declaration from Yusuf *paşa* stating that he was abdicating the throne in favour of his son Ali Bey, and requested official recognition for him. The Ottomans still had no interest in intervening in the civil war at this point due to their own ongoing troubles in Bosnia and Greece. However, they were uncertain regarding which side would emerge victorious in the civil war. To resolve this dilemma, the Ottoman government decided to implement *ray*. For this purpose, they appointed an envoy, Şakir Efendi, with an instruction. They gave him two *fermans*, one is for Ali Bey and the other is for Muhammad (II) Bey. As planned, Şakir Efendi will visit Tripoli and the surrounding rural areas to determine which side is most likely to win. At the end, according to his own personal reasoning (*ray*), he should choose one of the candidates, and declare him as the new *paşa* of Tripoli. After Şakir Efendi completed his investigation in 1834, he declared Ali Bey as the new *paşa* of Tripoli.⁴¹² This was, in fact, a common implementation of *ray* for state affairs after 1820 in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, during the rebellion in Trabzon around 1819-1820 against the new *islah* system, the Ottomans sent an army but also an envoy. They gave the envoy two *fermans*. One was a declaration of forgiveness for the leaders of the rebellion. The second was a declaration of their death penalty. The envoy should have decided according to his personal reasoning (*ray*) by observing the results of military actions.⁴¹³ In the case of Tripoli, when Şakir Efendi chose Ali Bey as the new *paşa*, he personally negotiated with the Muhammad (II) Bey and his followers to end their rebellion against Ali Bey. However, the supporters of Muhammad (II) Bey informed Şakir Efendi that their rebellion is not against Ottoman authority but against Yusuf *paşa* and his “imitator” Ali, since they put their own policies (*ray*) over the *sharia*, which for them the only *sharia*-comfort system was *idara*. For the sake of Tripoli, in this regard, they demanded Şakir Efendi that İstanbul should declare Muhammad (II) Bey as the new *paşa*, considering he promised them to apply *idara* in accordance with *sharia*.⁴¹⁴ Thus, Şakir Efendi was not able to convince the supporters of Muhammad (II) Bey and returned to İstanbul. In his report, he asserts that, although he granted the *ferman* to Ali Bey, now known as Ali *Paşa*, he is sceptical about his ability to end the civil war successfully due to his failure to persuade the supporters of Muhammad (II) Bey. Notably, he also provides an explanation for not selecting Muhammad (II) Bey, highlighting that his supporters were

411 B.O.A, İrade Dosya Usulü, 139/42. In fact, the Tunisian pasha had already considered possible involvement in Tripoli before the Ottomans requested it. However, he did not expect the Ottomans to demand repayment of Yusuf Paşa's entire debt to the European consuls. See: Suad Muhammad Al-Cafal, *Al-Alakatu'l-Libiyye – al-Tunisiyye Hilala'l-Ahdi'l-Osmani al-Sani (1835-1911)* (Trablus, 2006), 24–25.

412 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 454/22449.

413 Hacısalihhoğlu, *Trabzon'da Ayanlık Mücadelesi: Hacısalihzâde Hasan Ağa, Ömer Ağa ve Büyük Ali Ağa (1737-1844)*, 103–4.

414 D.M.T.L, uncategorized, dates as 1834.

promised excessive privileges, resulting in a rebellious movement reminiscent of the French Revolution. To prevent a similar outcome to the post-revolutionary events in France, Şakir Efendi opted for Ali Bey as *paşa*.⁴¹⁵ Interestingly, in this point, the envoy considers the promise for an application of *idara* in Tripoli as a possibly chaotic regime, remembering the short-lived republic of France. This example demonstrates how new Ottoman officers viewed the ancient *idara* system and its reference to *sharia* as worst option for all due to the several traumatic rebellions with the support of juristic scholars under the *idara* system during the 18th century.

The USA consul in Tripoli shared a similar viewpoint to Şakir Efendi regarding the future of Ali *paşa* in Tripoli. In 1834, the consul reported that the *ferman* received by Ali *paşa* had not brought any changes in the ongoing civil war. According to the Consul, Ali *paşa* could only gain control through a substantial military intervention, which would require a significant number of Ottoman soldiers, estimated to be at least 10,000. Hence, he saw no viable solution for the future.⁴¹⁶ The possible economic and military costs of any operation in Tripoli were the main concern in İstanbul. Additionally, there was apprehension with regard to the reaction of European states, considering they had a significant influence in Tripoli due to the debts owed to them by Yusuf *paşa*. In 1835, the British representative led a group of European consuls who warned Yusuf *Paşa* that the ongoing civil war had severely impacted their merchants' businesses. They threatened to send an army to invade Tripolitania if the war was not resolved, in order to protect their merchants' interests.⁴¹⁷

Consequently, the Ottoman government formulated a specific plan for a swift resolution. The plan, which was presented to the *padişah* for approval, involved a military commander leading a small fleet of ships with a couple of thousand soldiers to Tripoli, under the pretence of providing military aid to Ali *paşa*. This approach aimed to prevent European states from perceiving the army as an occupying force, and the cost of maintaining such a small army would not burden the state treasury. Upon arrival in Tripoli, the commander would invite Ali *paşa* and his entire family onto the ship to celebrate the aid. Once on board, the commander would inform them that they were under arrest and would be transported to İstanbul, while asserting his authority as the new governor of Tripoli. By doing so, without encountering any opposition from the existing military presence in the city, the *vali* would assume control. Since the supporters of Muhammad (II) Bey are not against a direct Ottoman authority but against Ali and Yusuf *paşa*, they would cease their rebellion and accept the

415 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 961/41197-S.

416 I.S.N.A, Despatches From United States Consuls in Tripoli, 1796-1885, 6/21.

417 D.M.T.L, Consular, dates as 1835.

vali. If they refused to accept him, the *vali* would summon Muhammad (II) Bey to Tripoli under the pretence of appointing him as the new *paşa*, only to arrest him as well.⁴¹⁸ In 1835, the Ottoman *padişah* approved this plan and assigned Nedim Paşa to carry it out. Accordingly, Nedim Paşa arrived in Tripoli that same year and executed the instructions he had received. Ali *paşa* and his family were apprehended on the ship and transported to İstanbul. Nedim Paşa declared himself as the new *vali* and awaited the reaction of Muhammad (II) Bey's supporters. This action came as an unexpected shock to the British consul in Tripoli, who referred to it as a "colonial invasion". In his reports from 1835, he also expressed anticipation for a "heroic Arab resistance against the despotism of Turks".⁴¹⁹ However, contrary to his expectations, there was no widespread resistance. Even the supporters of Muhammad (II) Bey abandoned their rebellious movement and accepted the appointment of Nedim *paşa* as the new *vali*. In the same year, the Ottoman *padişah* personally sent letters to the various communal leaders in Tripolitania such as Ghuma from Jebel Garb and Abduljelil from Murzuq to explain the reason of why he appointed a new *vali*, such as ending "bad governance" of Karamanlı dynasty, and putting an end to the civil war. Therefore, he asked for submission to the new *vali*.⁴²⁰ Furthermore, the *vali* called people in the city of Tripoli for reconciliation by declaring that any illegal transactions, such as confiscation, made by Yusuf *paşa*, Ali *paşa*, and Muhammad (II) Bey are cancelled, and now people have the right to take their properties as well as goods back. To avoid any aggressive stance from European states, the Ottoman Empire overtook all debts of Yusuf *paşa*, and paid it to the European agents. Also, the *tadbir* application in the marine policy, which was a tribute system established by Yusuf *paşa*, was entirely cancelled since Tripolitania was no longer a *Garb Ocağı* but a direct province under the control of İstanbul.

Although the Ottoman authorities initially expressed satisfaction with the outcomes of the plan, they soon encountered the reality that the end of the civil war and the appointment of a new *vali* did not necessarily translate into a willingness among the people of Tripolitania to embrace any form of new governance, such as the proposed *islah* system. The newly appointed *vali*, Nedim Paşa, reported that in many parts of the country, communities had long been accustomed to living under the *idara* system and had evaded proper taxation by exploiting the corruption of Yusuf *paşa*'s administration. Accordingly, they now only symbolically acknowledged the authority of the Ottoman *vali*, showing no inclination to pay taxes or accept an Ottoman administrator for their

418 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 457/22538.

419 B.P.R.O, Foreign Office, 76/38.

420 B.O.A, İrade Mesail-i Mühimme, 73/2093.

region. Consequently, the new *vali* concluded that the state's authority was currently limited to the city of Tripoli, and military action would be necessary to extend it to the rest of the country.⁴²¹ Nevertheless, the Ottoman government once again faced a shortage of soldiers and financial resources to support further military endeavours. For this reason, the *vali* was advised to seek local support, such as the Kuloğlu communities. At this juncture, first the Ottomans had to understand who these people were. According to their own reports, these communities were composed of *yeniçeri* soldiers who were dispatched to Tripoli after the 16th century,⁴²² and after their military carrier married and settled in Tripoli instead of returning to central regions of the Ottoman Empire. During the Karamanlı era, they were utilized for military operations. The *paşas* of the Karamanlı dynasty granted them exemption from taxes in exchange for their military assistance in times of need.⁴²³ Based on this information, the *vali* sent official correspondence to the Kuloğlu communities, informing them of his intention to maintain the existing system by exempting them from taxes in recognition of their military support.⁴²⁴ Similarly, the *vali* promised official titles in Tripoli to those who had participated in the civil war, a promise that was eagerly embraced by many supporters of Muhammad (II) Bey.⁴²⁵ However, especially supporter of Yusuf and Ali *paşa* expressed dissatisfaction with the new *vali*. One of them, who was, in fact, a *qadi*, even acquired a British citizenship to protest the appointment of a new *vali*.⁴²⁶

In 1836, the Ottoman government dispatched a new governor to address the prevailing issues in Tripoli. The objective was to extend the authority of the state beyond the city limits and into the entire country. However, the newly appointed governor encountered significant challenges,

421 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 456/22505-E.

422 In fact, Kuloğlu communities were not a special phenomenon for Tripolitania but for all *Garp Ocakları*, i.e. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripolitania. Since Tripolitania was the only province taken under the direct control of Istanbul, only the Kuloğlu communities are mentioned in Ottoman sources. See: Muhammad Maqsudat, ‘‘awdae al-Karaghilat Fi al-Jazayir Wa-Tunis Wa-Libiyya Khilal al-Qarnayn al-Thaanmin Eashar Wa-l-Thaasie Easher al-Miladiyin’ (M.A. Thesis, Oran, Jamiat Oran, 2019). The term Kuloğlu barely used in Tunisia and Algeria. In these regions, the term *Makhzen* was in common use. However, there was a significant difference between Tunisia and Algeria. In the case of Tunisia, the *Makhzen* communities played the same historical role. They had Ottoman ancestry and were exempt from taxes for their military and administrative services. See, Ammar Jahidar’s remarks on the issue during a symposium in Awjila in 2000. Muhamad Bashir Suvaysin, ed., *Awjilat Bayn Am-Madi al-Hadr, 1550-1951m* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2007), 266. In the case of Algeria, the *Makhzen* communities played a similar military and administrative role. However, they did not have an ancestral connection to the Ottoman Empire. For instance, see: Muhammad Al-Said Akib and Omar Al-Muqadam, ‘Qabayil Al-Makhzan Wa Dawruha Fi Ealaqat al-Sultant al-Uthmaniyat Bi al-Sukan Iyalat al-Jazariyat’, *Majallat Al-Bahith Fi al-Ulum al-Insaniyat Wa-l-Ijtimaiyat* 9, no. 2 (2018): 105–18.

423 İ.Ü.N.K, ‘Trablusğarb ve Bingazi’de Erkan-ı Harb Miraleyn Zeki ve Fuat Beyler Tarafından Yapılan Erkan-ı Harbiye Seyahati Hakkında Rapor’, *Türkçe Yazmalar Katalogu*, nr. T8897.

424 D.M.T.L, Letters, dated 1835.

425 D.M.T.L, Letters, dated 1835.

426 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 456/22505-A.

primarily due to a severe shortage of financial resources and soldiers, rendering any meaningful action impossible. The situation in Tripoli worsened during the winter of 1836, with the governor unable to pay the soldiers' salaries or provide sufficient food for the local population, considering caravans ceased to visit the city. For this reason, the *vali* asked the *paşa* of Tunisia for help. Interestingly, without receiving any order from İstanbul for that, the *paşa* of Tunisia accepted the demand of Tripolitan *vali* for aid, and dispatched several ships carrying cereals, as well as a substantial amount of money in the form of a loan.⁴²⁷ Hence, the *vali* resorted to applying *idara*-tended *tadbir*, since he was unable to take any proactive measures, and tolerated the fact that the communities outside of Tripoli do not pay any tax.

In the summer of 1836, there was a significant change in the political landscape with the appointment of a new *vali*. This new *vali* brought with him financial and military provisions from İstanbul, and immediately sought to assert the authority of the state through *riasa*-tended *tadbir*. He sent letters to various cities and nomadic communities, warning them that if they did not come to Tripoli to pledge their allegiance and pay taxes, he would initiate military operations against them.⁴²⁸ Some cities close to Tripoli and some communities took this threat seriously and sent representatives to Tripoli to submit to the *vali*'s authority and fulfil their tax obligations. There were only minor military actions; still, these operations created a sense of unrest, as some communities openly refused to pay taxes. In response, in 1837, the Ottoman government sent another *vali* with the instruction that he should apply *idara*-tended *tadbir* by giving a message that the Ottomans are willing to accept the old *idara* system if some compromises are made. This regular change between *idara*- and *riasa*-tendency was, in fact, a special *ray* strategy utilized by the Ottomans. Initially, they sought to convince the population that they would respect the old system if taxes were paid, but then they would appoint a new *vali* to take military action against those who resisted. However, after the military operations and suppression of the communities, a new *vali* was sent to deliver a new message. This message acknowledged the excessive use of force and proposed a new, *idara*-tended system with a few new compromises. The Ottomans did this to avoid a general rebellion and

427 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 454/22443-A. Following years, in the similar manner, Tunisian *paşas* provide further aid to Tripoli in case of demand. The same happened in Benghazi after the 1840s. For instance, in 1847, the Khedive of Egypt informed the *kaymakam* of Benghazi that the community of Awlad Ali (who was left Bengazi in 1818, after the defeat of Muhammad (I) Bey, since they supported him) is preparing a revenge attack against Uqbiyat community in Benghazi. Hence, the *kaymakam* rapidly took preventive measures and also collected an additional local army with the support of Uqbiyat community. Accordingly, they easily defeated the forces of Awlad Ali when they entered Benghazi that same year. M.M.J.B, Manuscript Collection, 121/160, 104 and 40/80, 51.

428 B.O.A, Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 1336/52146-A.

to expand their authority so they could begin implementing the new reforms.⁴²⁹ This shifting strategy, indeed, caused general confusion not only for the communities but also for the chronicles. Since they were not aware of that this was a clear strategy of the Ottoman government, Turkish written chronicles registered the *valis* who applied *riasa*-tended *tadbir* as “brave and active”, the *valis* who applied *idara*-tended *tadbir* as “coward and lazy”.⁴³⁰ Arabic written chronicles, on the other hand, described *riasa*-tended *valis* as “despot and bloodthirsty” governors, and *idara*-tended *valis* were for them “peaceful and merciful”.⁴³¹ European consuls were also unaware of this strategy, as evidenced by a British consul report in 1838 expressing confusion over the frequent appointment of new *valis*.⁴³² This specific implementation of *ray* was also new to the Ottomans. Nevertheless, since they had already applied this strategy in Bosnia and Trabzon between 1820 and 1830 and achieved positive results, they relied on their experience.

In 1838, the new appointed *vali* maintained the *idara*-tended *tadbir*, due to the inability of İstanbul to send additional soldiers for military operations. The new *vali* even proposed a clear *idara* application for communities in Jebel Garb under the leadership of Ghuma, and communities in Fezzan under the leadership of Abduljelil.⁴³³ Under this proposal, if Ghuma and Abduljelil agreed to pay an annual tax to Tripoli, the *vali* would appoint them as Ottoman *müdür*, and refrain from interfering in their internal affairs in accordance with the ancient *idara* system.⁴³⁴ According to Umar Ali bin Ismail, this proposal aligned with the desires of Ghuma and Abduljelil, who sought autonomy under the *idara* system rather than engaging in a "heroic independence movement" as expected by the British consuls.⁴³⁵ As a result, they promptly accepted the proposal and positioned themselves as the Tripolitan *vali*'s representative in their region. Nevertheless, after one year, in 1839, the Ottomans were again able to send new financial and military provisions. In this regard, they sent a new *vali* with the instruction that he should apply *riasa*-tended *tadbir*.⁴³⁶ Consequently,

429 The Ottomans also used this strategy to experiment with tax policies. When they implemented a new tax that caused great unrest, they replaced the *vali* and cancelled the new tax policy, claiming it was the previous *vali*'s bad idea. However, the new *vali* arrested all those who opposed the previous policy. Once the *vali* gained control of the country, he tried to implement a similar policy again. See: Nesir bin Musi, *Al-Muhtama' al-'arabiya al-Libiyya Fi al-'ahd al-Othmani* (Trabulus: Al-Dar al-Arabiyyat al-Kitab, 1988), 211.

430 For instance, see: Mehmed Nehicüddin Efendi, *Târîh-i İbn Ğalbûn Der-Beyân-ı Trablusğarb* (İstanbul: Ceride-i Havadi Matbaası, 1284).

431 For example, see: Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*.

432 B.P.R.O, Foreign Office, 195/148.

433 Muhammad Shakir Meshal, *Sevratu Ğûma El-Mahmûdî Fi'l-Cebeli'l-Ġarbî Lîbyâ 1835-1838* (Cairo: Dâru'n-Nahdatu'l-Arabiyye, 1991), 5.

434 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 150.

435 Umar Ali Bin Ismail, 'Et-Tatavvuru's-Siyâsî ve'l-İctimâî Fî Lîbyâ Min 1835 İlâ 1882' (Ph.D. Thesis, Cairo, Jamiat Ain Shams, 1972), 163.

436 Muhammed Imhammed Tuwayr, *Mukâvemetu's-Şeyh Ğûma El-Mahmûdî Li'l-Hukmi'l-Osmânî Fî İyâleti Trabulusu'l-Ġarb 1835-1858* (Trabulus: Merkezu Dirâseti Cihâdu'l-Lîbiyyin Zıddu'l-Ġazvi'l-İtâlî, 1988), 97–100.

the Ottomans conducted extensive military operations between 1839 and 1842 to suppress all communities demanding the application of the *idara* system.⁴³⁷ The British consul was particularly perplexed by these military actions, considering there was no rebellion against Ottoman authority as he had anticipated. Instead, the people of Jebel Garb and Fezzan were willing to accept Ottoman rule as long as the *idara* system was reinstated. The consul's lack of awareness regarding the significant changes in Ottoman governance since the 1790s, including the implementation of the new *tadbir* system in all regions of the empire to replace the old *idara* system, led him to attribute these actions to the "moron and bloodthirsty character of Turks."⁴³⁸

The three-year war period also crystallized the differences between Ghuma and Abduljelil in terms of governance. While both leaders sought *idara* system from the Tripolitan *vali*, Ghuma applied *idara* in all aspects of governance in Jebel Garb. This is not surprising, since Ghuma was a scholar with a knowledge of Maliki jurisprudence and advocated for proper execution of *sharia*. Abduljelil, on the other hand, had no such scholar background, and strove to establish a dynastic state by applying *riasa*. After almost 10 years of Abduljelil's *riasa* regime, several cities and communities in Fezzan began seeking Ottoman authority in their region. For instance, a local chronicle from Sokna narrates that around 1841, the inhabitants of the city decided to request the Ottoman authority in their realm, after suffering destructive tax policies of Abduljelil since 1830.⁴³⁹ When Abduljelil learned of this demand, he surrounded the city and forced its inhabitants to pay a "punishment fee." The city inhabitants closed the doors of the city, and thanks to the city walls, rejected the order of Abduljelil. In response, Abduljelil enacted a revenge plan by killing relatives of the city inhabitants who were living in the villages close to the city as well as cutting their palm trees in the vicinity of Sokna.⁴⁴⁰ At this juncture, the Tripolitan *vali* informed the city inhabitants that he was preparing his army to rescue them.⁴⁴¹ This instance was the core argument for the Ottomans to explain their military operations in Fezzan to other communities. Furthermore, they were successful in their efforts, as the perception of *riasa* was highly negative in the region after the experiences from the period of Yusuf *paşa's* *riasa*-tended governance. Ghuma, for instance, refused any kind of connection with Abduljelil, even supporting the *vali* in ending his "despotism," as described by the

437 However, even in this offensive period, there were concerns with regard to the economic life of the region. For instance, in 1836, the Tripolitan *vali* sent orders to the communal leaders in western Tripolitania. He declared that whatever conflict they had with each other or with Tirpoli, no one should harm any merchant from Ghadames. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, an order dated as 1839.

438 B.P.R.O, Foreign Office, 101/4.

439 M.G, Chronicles of Muhammad Al-Bashir Al-Sukni, Text No. 7.

440 M.G, Chronicles of Muhammad Al-Bashir Al-Sukni, Text No. 8.

441 M.G, Official Letters, dated as 1842.

inhabitants of Sokna.⁴⁴² The Tripolitan *vali* also paid attention to the differences between Ghuma and Abduljelil and maintained a good relationship with Ghuma until he could overthrow Abduljelil's authority.

The British consul was particularly displeased with the military action against Abduljelil, considering he was attempting to negotiate an agreement with him to create a corridor from Murzuq to the Mediterranean. According to this plan, they could by-pass Ottomans in Tripoli and establish a new trade route from Murzuq to the coast, where Britannia could dominate the whole trade.⁴⁴³ However, this plan remained short-lived, since Abduljelil's forces entirely defeated in 1842, and Abduljelil lost his life on the battlefield. In fact, the Tripolitan *vali* was already aware of these illicit activities of British consul, and warned the Ottoman government to take an action against British Foreign Office, by further stating that this proves the inability of *idara* system in Tripoli, as this system grants a chance for a foreign intervention.⁴⁴⁴ Likewise, Nora Lafi notes that especially French and British consuls regularly attacked the *islah* reforms of the Ottomans to keep the possibility to involve the internal affairs of the state through their corrupted clientele system from the local people.⁴⁴⁵ When they realized that they could not stop the reforms, they began developing their own reform projects to create a new kind of clientele for their colonial invasion plans. If the Ottomans prevented their projects, they could accuse the Ottoman officers of being backward enemies of modernization.⁴⁴⁶

Following the Abduljelil's defeat, in 1842, Ottoman forces entered Murzuq, which was burned by the supporters of Abduljelil, before they retreated to Kanem region.⁴⁴⁷ In the same year, after being persuaded by the arguments presented by the Tripolitan *vali* regarding the importance of respecting the *idara* system in Jebel Garb, Ghuma agreed to come to Tripoli; yet, the *vali* put the condition that he would hold a title and remain in Tripoli.⁴⁴⁸ In the presence of a *qadi* and the city council, he

442 M.G, Official Letters, dated as 1842.

443 B.P.R.O, Foreign Office, 195/212.

444 D.M.T.L, uncategorized, dates as 1842.

445 Lafi, 'Mediterranean Connections: The Circulation of Municipal Knowledge and Practices at the Time of the Ottoman Reforms, c.1830-1910', 14.

446 Nora Lafi, 'Municipalités Méditerranéennes: Pratique Du Comparatisme, Lecture Des Change- Ments Institutionnels et Analyse Historique de l'évolution Des Pouvoirs Urbains Du XVIIIe Au XXe Siècle', in *Municipalités Méditerranéennes. Les Réformes Urbaines Ottomanes Au Miroir d'une Histoire Comparée (Moyen-Orient, Maghreb, Europe Méridionale)*, ed. Nora Lafi (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2015), 23; Nora Lafi, 'Tunis Als Laboratorium Osmanischer Modernität: Das Beispiel Der Vorstadtbahn (1863-1881)', *Die Osmanische Stadt, Moderne Stadtgeschichte*, 51, no. 1 (2018): 24-25.

447 M.G, Chronicles of Muhammad Al-Bashir Al-Sukni, Text No. 9.

448 B.O.A, *İrade Mesail-i Mühimme*, 72/2084.

signed a *şehadetname* (Tr. promise) for his submission to the *vali*.⁴⁴⁹ He also brought several letters from the communal leader in Jebel Garb. The letters explain that, since ancient times, they have used only the *idara* system of governance. Even in the era of Yusuf *paşa*, they had the privilege of maintaining this system. This new *tadbir* system through *ray* and *islah* is not compatible with their tradition and communities. In this respect, they demand respect and understanding from *vali*.⁴⁵⁰ In fact, Ghuma went on to write a lengthy personal letter to the *padişah* in the following years, in which he recounted that Yusuf *paşa* had also implemented the *idara* system, as his ancestors had done. Inasmuch as Ghuma was among the privileged groups who were exempted from *ray* implementation, he does not mention Yusuf *paşa*'s *tadbir* policy after 1811. According to him, *idara* is the best system for Tripoli. He criticizes the appointment of a *vali* from İstanbul, considering they lacked knowledge of the region's culture and society. He suggests that it would be more effective to appoint someone from the region as *paşa*, as was the case with the Karamanlı dynasty, since they know better the fact that *idara* has deep roots in the country. Interestingly, Ghuma accuses in this letter the *valis* with implementation of *ray*. He recounts that although the *padişah* sent them to apply *idara*, They destroyed the ancient *idara* system through *tadbir* and *ray*.⁴⁵¹ That was in reality the imagination of Ghuma, since he does not show any awareness pertaining to the new reform movement and *tadbir* application in the Ottoman Empire. In other words, Ghuma and his followers assumed that the Ottomans were still using the ancient *idara* system, and it was only the new coming *valis* who were applying *tadbir* according to their own interest.

When the Ottoman *vali* was able to re-organize the army following the defeat of Abduljelil, he arrested Ghuma in Tripoli and sent him to İstanbul, which immediately sparked a rebellion in Jebel Garb. Nevertheless, this time Ottoman forces were able to react, and they took control of the region by suppressing the rebellion in 1843. To justify these actions, the Tripolitan *vali* claimed that upon occupying the region, they observed that the majority of people "have no idea about religion and *madhab* (Ar. school of Islamic law)". Due to the governor's lack of knowledge of Ibadism, he regarded the majority of the İbadi community in the region as "unbelievers" and "ignorant". Consequently, he asserted that it was their duty to introduce "true Islam" to the region by dispatching several Hanafi *imams* and *muftis*, as if that was the sole purpose of the operation.⁴⁵²

449 For the original document, see: D.M.T.L, Sijiliyyat Al-shariat, dated as 1842.

450 D.M.T.L, Official Letters, dated as 1842.

451 D.M.T.L, Ghuma, dates as 1852.

452 B.O.A, İrade Mesail-i Mühimme, 72/2086.

However, unlike the successful arguments used against Abduljelil, this particular argument had the opposite effect. Since Ibadism had existed in the region even before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, and since the rest of the inhabitants adhered to Maliki jurisprudence, there was essentially no one to believe this narrative. Therefore, the *vali*'s narrative only served to highlight his ignorance concerning the local communities. Accordingly, the people of Jebel Garb regularly rebelled against Ottoman authority until 1858 and received indirect support from other communities.

In 1843, the Ottoman regime in Tripoli experienced a significant shift in its governance. After 8 years of alternating between *riasa*- and *idara*-oriented *tadbir* approaches, the regime achieved complete control over Tripolitania through a series of wars. With the appointment of a new *vali*, the Ottoman government left their special *ray* strategy and instructed the *vali* finally to initiate the implementations of *islah*. Also, first time in its history, the Ottoman Empire opened a consular in Malta to improve the communication between İstanbul and Tripoli.⁴⁵³ Prior to this, the administrative structure in Tripolitania was centred around the *vali*'s personal office and secretaries, as all governance based on his personal reasoning (*ray*).⁴⁵⁴ In 1844, the new *vali* began building the first administrative structure according to instructions from İstanbul. He appointed *müdürs*, or administrators, for the local communities, who were chosen from among the community members. The only exceptions were Jebel Garb and Ghadames, which had recently been captured and were therefore deemed untrustworthy by the Ottoman authorities.⁴⁵⁵ Additionally, a new juristic reconciliation process was initiated, allowing local communities to seek compensation for losses incurred during the wars between 1835 and 1843. That was also a message that, with the implementation of *islah*, the execution of *sharia* will not be abandoned. For instance, in Fezzan, inhabitants of Sokna demanded compensation for their loss caused by Abduljelil. Hence, an immense court process took place in Murzuq in 1843 with the involvement of several *qadis* from Sokna, Tripoli, and Murzuq, who were tasked with determining the extent of the losses and the potential costs for compensation.⁴⁵⁶ During this reconciliation process, forgiveness was extended to several family members and close supporters of Abduljelil who remained in Fezzan, and some of them even obtained positions in the administration in the subsequent decades.⁴⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the

453 Nora Lafi, 'Les Relations de Malte et de Tripoli de Barbarie Au XIXe Siècle', *Revue Du Monde Musulman et de La Méditerranée* 71 (1994): 129.

454 D.M.T.L, *Idara*, dated as 1842.

455 B.O.A, *İrade Mesail-i Mühimme*, 72/2092.

456 See the following for further details related to the process: D.M.T.L, *Sijiliyyat Al-Mahkamat*, dated as 1843.

457 Bashir Qasim Yusha, 'Taqsim Tarikh 'ahad Muatini Taf Amin Fi 'Awakhir', *Majallat Al-Buhuth al-Tarikhiyya* 6 (1984): 138.

residents of Jebel Garb were fundamentally exempted from the right of reconciliation and compensation as revenge for their ongoing unrest. Following this, several plunders in the region made by the Ottoman soldiers remained untouched.⁴⁵⁸ Also in that same year, the tax registration system was reformed. The first change was related to collecting taxes from nomadic communities. For instance, a document from 1844 shows that the *kaymakam* of Benghazi called all representative of nomadic communities in Berka to inform them that now they are obliged to pay an annual communal tax according to a jointly determined price, which was acknowledged by the representative without any opposition.⁴⁵⁹ Inasmuch as the trans-Saharan trade shifted to Tunisa and Egypt since the civil war in the 1830s, in 1844, the new *vali* created a new standardized custom system. To this end, products from southern Central Sudan were taxed at 9% for imports and 3% for exports.⁴⁶⁰ Prior to 1844, the custom system relied on the personal reasoning (*ray*) of *kaymakam*, since they had to define tax rates freely. Still, this does not imply that the *kaymakams* utilized unusual tax policies. For instance, the tax registration in Awjila and Jalo in 1842, which these cities were the centre of the trade with Wadai, shows a very distinct portrait. The revenue from the farm production was 112,442 *kuruş*, communal tax from nomadic communities was 12,000 *kuruş*, and tax on trade was only 5,000 *kuruş*.⁴⁶¹

During that same period, the entire agricultural tax collection process was also reformed according to the Ottoman government's instructions. One of the internal documents from Murzuq in 1848 clearly illustrates this new procedure, where the city council (Ar. *majlis al-bilad*) estimates the average harvest and registers it with the *kaymakam* of Murzuq. The *kaymakam* then calculated the estimated tax payment based on the proportion defined by the Ottoman government and sent it to his *müdürs*. The *müdürs* were chosen from among the local people in rural areas. These *müdürs* collect the calculated amount. However, the document also reveals that nearly 20% of the estimated collection was not paid by the farmers because of their absence in their property, and they registered as "fled". This unpaid amount is recorded as debt to be paid the following year.⁴⁶² In this regard, with the implementation of *islah*, a complex administrative structure was established between the Ottoman government in İstanbul, local members of city councils, and local *müdürs* in the rural area. Formal instructions were coming from İstanbul, whereas executions of these instructions were made according to local conditions by local actors. By doing so, Ottoman aimed to better regulate tax

458 D.M.T.L, Official Letters, dated as 1843.

459 M.M.J.B, Manuscript Collection, 1/40, 10.

460 D.M.T.L, Tax Registration, dated as 1844.

461 D.M.T.L, Tax Registration, F. 151-181, No. 174.

462 D.M.T.L, Internal Affairs, 134/1.

collection, and with the involvement of local actors tried to avoid any possible unrest. Nonetheless, they still had trouble collecting taxes properly in this earlier phase. This did not stop them from forcing all nomadic groups to pay the same amount of tax as farmers and merchants by cancelling their *idara* privileges. For nomadic groups, this meant paying twice as much tax in 1851.⁴⁶³

Although the Ottomans began to imply *islah* through several new structural reforms, exemption-situation in Ghadames and Jebel Garb persisted until 1851. It was only after this date that the Ottomans ceased the exemption and began implementing reforms throughout the entire country. The British and U.S. consuls also noticed this transformation. In 1851, the British Foreign Office decided to re-form the consulate in Tripoli by downgrading it to a normal consulate, arguing that Tripoli had become an ordinary province within the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁶⁴ In the same year, the USA consul similarly reported that although he initially doubted the Ottomans' ability to establish a "centralized state", that was the imagination of consul regarding the implementation *islah* in Tripoli, he was surprised by their success and even stated that the new system was functioning better than the old one.⁴⁶⁵ Despite these success stories, the Ottoman government remained concerned regarding ongoing unrest in Jebel Garb and widespread corruption among *valis*. Although after 1843, they discontinued their *ray* strategy for big parts of the country, the Ottoman government continued to replace *valis* almost every year due to regular reports of corrupt practices, which was one of the reason for Ottomans to implement *ray* only as a transformation period. Inasmuch as it relies on the governor's personal reasoning, it has a fundamental weakness for corruption. For example, in 1842, a special commission discovered significant money laundering by a recent *vali*, leading to his immediate recall.⁴⁶⁶ To prevent similar cases, till 1870s, the Ottoman government did not allow *valis* stay more than one year in Tripoli.

Following a 16-year period of *ray* implementation, utilizing the same instrument employed by Yusuf *paşa*, the Ottomans successfully gained complete control over Tripolitania, enabling them to begin implementing *islah* measures. Thus, after 1851, there were no more strategic changes to the governance system, and the implementation of *islah* remained the same until the beginning of the 20th century. In this respect, the issue after 1851 was how to efficiently implement *islah* and deal with its new consequences.

463 D.M.T.L, uncategorized, dated as 1851.

464 B.P.R.O, Foreign Office, 101/29.

465 U.S.N.A, Despatches From United States Consuls in Tripoli, 1796-1885, 7/12.

466 B.O.A, İrade Dahiliye, 56/2747.

Conclusion

The strategy of governance in Tripoli between 1790s-1851 was multilayered partly due to the historical and geographical complexities, such as its formation from *Garb Ocakları* to *paşalık* and finally to direct Ottoman authority, partly because of the global entanglements, from the decline of Spain and Venice to emerging new actors, such as the USA, Sweden, Britain, France etc., and partly due to new transformations in the Ottoman Empire as well as various local actors.

The result was, in this respect, an immense complexity, but also some clear patterns. For instance, whilst the application of *tadbir* in marine diplomacy was already an established practice in Tripoli, the domestic policy heavily relied on the application of *idara* between 1795-1811. Around 1811-1813, there was a new transformation in the sphere of governance, by switching the domestic policy from *idara* to *tadbir* with the implementation of *ray*. This new policy, which tended to *riasa* in its long-term use, resulted in detrimental economic and administrative collapse. Even the brief *islah* system of Hassuna Dagayyis did not bring any significant change. Therefore, the region descended into civil war between 1830 and 1835 until the direct involvement of Ottoman authorities.

Ironically, the new appointed *valis* also used the implementation of *ray*, causing unrest among local communities who had suffered under this new governance system. From the Ottoman perspective, the use of *ray* was a short-term measure to establish state authority before transitioning to *islah*, considering they were aware of the *riasa*-tendency of *ray* implementation through corruption. Along this line, although there was a regime change in 1835, the system of governance remained the same with new actors and new intentions until 1851 with the exemption that the application of *tadbir* in the marine diplomacy absolutely cancelled in 1835 under direct Ottoman authority. Overall, the period from 1811 to 1851 marked a transformative phase in the governance system of the region, characterized by political and military conflicts, since there were many local actors who supported different system governance than the state. After 40 years of effort through the implementation of *ray*, the system of governance turned from *idara* to *tadbir* with the implementation of *islah*, although the aim of Yusuf *paşa*'s *ray* application was not approaching *islah*, and instead tended towards *riasa*. In other words, despite the fact that Yusuf *paşa* and Ottoman *valis* implemented the same implementation of governance between 1811-1844, their aims and backgrounds were entirely different. In essence, it was a historical intersection of the new

developments in Ottoman-Islamic epistemology and the legacy of the Afro-Islamic epistemology. Indeed, the actors from both sides were talking with the same terms; yet, they had different historical backgrounds, assumptions, and goals. This *divergence in similarity* contributed to both the prolonged resistance against Ottoman authorities, since local communities compared them with Yusuf *paşa*'s fails for changing *idara* to *ray*, and the success of the new regime, as the clear instructions received by the new *valis* allowed them to channel the implementation of *ray* towards *islah* rather than *riasa*, which was epistemologically not foreign for the region. Consequently, Ottoman governance in Tripolitania relied on the implementation of *islah* for the remainder of the century. However, after the 1850s, a new governance strategy had to be developed for Ottoman expansion into the Sahara.

3. Islamic “Revivalism” (*riasa*) vs Vassalage System (*tadbir*): Separations and Convergences in the Governance of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, Bornu, and Wadai

„In their governance,... people of Darfur are like Turks, they are only interested in their own affairs and ignore the rest of the world;... people of Wadai are like French, they seek developments but are daydreamer;... people of Bornu are like Britain, they are proud of their own state, but they are not powerful as they assume;... people of Sokoto are like Russian and Spanian, they are invasive such as Spaniens...“

Muhammad ibn Umar al-Tunisi, Voyage au Waday, 1844

This intriguing comparison by al-Tunisi, a Tunisian merchant who resided in Darfur and Wadai from 1803 to 1815, offers valuable insights. It provides a first-hand account of a tumultuous period and attempts to elucidate the decline of Bornu and Darfur's power, while also criticizing the ascent of Sokoto and Wadai in the early 19th century. However, the significance of this statement lies in its global perspective. Al-Tunisi effectively situates these regional transformations within the broader context of governance during the early 19th century. This was a common feature among the rulers in the region, since they considered themselves as a part of a big global world. Nevertheless, the primary challenge lies in comprehending the intricate interconnections between these states in order to gain a deeper understanding of governance in the southern Central Sudan during this period.

The beginning of the 19th century came along with three major changes that were realized by prominent “reformers” in the region. In the eastern part, Muhammad Sabun's rise to power in Wadai in 1804 quickly resulted in a new rising power in the region, thanks to his distinctive governance strategy. Similarly, in the western region, the jihad movement initiated by Uthman dan Fodio in the same year paved the way for the establishment of a vast caliphal state governed by a complex system. Meanwhile, in the central region, the ascent of Muhammad al-Kanemi as a powerful religious and political figure in Bornu around 1808 played a significant role in determining the power balance in the region. These actors developed their own governance strategies based on their unique political circumstances and intellectual backgrounds. They were also compelled to revise their systems due to their interactions with one another. Consequently, the period spanning from the 1790s to the 1830s was characterized by significant reforms and transformations in the realm of governance within the region.

3.1. Uthmaniyya Caliphate and Experience of Governance from *riasa* to *idara*

Before the rise of the revivalist jihad movement of Uthman dan Fodio (d. 1817), Hausaland and its surrounding regions experienced the long-term application of *tadbir* in various ways. One result of this tendency was the flourishing of craft production through the support of local rulers in rivalry against other states. Even Muhammad Bello, son of Uthman dan Fodio, who authored several texts to justify their jihad by representing the states in the Hausaland in decadence, had to confirm that there was a vibrant craft production at the end of the 18th century around Hausaland and its environs.⁴⁶⁷ Another outcome of this application was a dense network of Islamic scholarship.⁴⁶⁸ Through the common implementation of *ray* by granting privileges to scholars, which was also a widespread practice in Bornu as will be seen in the ensuing pages, to gain their religious support,⁴⁶⁹ there were several powerful scholar communities.⁴⁷⁰ In this respect, when Uthman dan Fodio began to propagate a jihadist political movement in Gobir, local scholars did not view it as a major revivalist or reformist movement. Instead, they saw it as a minor experiment that would only attract the interest of young scholars seeking a brief adventure.⁴⁷¹ Even most of the Uthman's cohort rejected his ideas later.⁴⁷² Nonetheless, the base of the dan Fodio's movement extended beyond a local experiment. It encompassed two deeply different intellectual traditions in terms of governance. Since at the end of the 18th century, the power and authority of scholar communities in Hausaland relied on the *tadbir* application by the rulers, their intellectual inclination towards governance aligned with this principle. However, Uthman dan Fodio drew upon a different intellectual tradition, which had its roots in the long connection to Futa Toro and Futa Jolon in Senegambia region thanks to his nomadic Pullo ancestors, who emigrated from Futa Toro to Hausaland a century ago.⁴⁷³ A

467 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*, ed. Muhammad Taqrun (Tunis: Majmua Al-Atrash, 2020), chap. 8.

468 For more details, see: Hamza Muhammad Maishanu, *Five Centuries of Historical Writing in Hausaland and Bornu, 1500-2000* (Ibadan: Macmillan Nigeria, 2007).

469 Ibrahim D. Nababa et al., *Tarihin Ungunnin Brinin Katsina Da Kaweya* (Katsina, 2011), 8.

470 For instance, there were several scholars from Tuwat (today's southern Algier) in Katsina at the end of the 18th century. See: Nababa et al., 30.

471 Abbas Muhammad Fagachi, *Tarihin Sarautu Da Al'adu Na Masarautar Zazzau* (Zaria: Sankore Educational Publisher, 2014), 19.

472 Saidu Muhammad Gusau, *Fulanin Zamfara-Katsinar Laka Da Tasirinsu a Daular Sakkwato* (Kano: Research and Publishing Century, 2015), 98.

473 Abduh Badavi, *Harakat Al-Islam Fi Ifriqiya* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Sakafiya, 1991), 171. During their long migration eastward, some Pullo communities began settling in villages and cities. Through this sedentary lifestyle, they began to convert to Islam. In this way, some Fulbe became important Islamic scholars known as "Modibbo'en." Uthman dan Fodio was one such scholar because he came from a Modibbo'en lineage. T.A. Muhammad-Baba, 'Pastoral Ascendancy in the Savannah: A Sociological Assessment of the Impact of the 1804 Jihad on Pastoral Fulbe', in *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, ed. A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandi (Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990), 109. Also, several female scholars existed within these communities. For instance, the oldest daughter of Uthman, Khadija translated the *Mukhtasar* of Khalil to Fulfulde in the 1830s. Sadiya Omar, *Malamai Mata a Daular Usmaniyya: A Karni Na 19 Da 20* (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), 22. Or another daughter of Uthman, Maryan, wrote several poem regarding jihad. See: K.S.C.B., MS 223, *Arf al-Rihan fi al-Tabarruk bi Dhikr al-Shaykh 'Uthman b. Fudi*. Furthermore, besides this early immigration, in the 19th century,

prominent characteristic of the intellectual milieu associated with Futa Toro was the significant emphasis placed on the Al-Maghili's *riasa* system,⁴⁷⁴ which resulted in jihad movements and establishments of Imamete in Futa Toro and Fura Jalon between 1720s and 1790s.⁴⁷⁵ Consequently, when Uthman dan Fodio spearheaded his movement, albeit with an effort to claim that also scholarship in Hausaland has a legacy of *riasa*,⁴⁷⁶ he not only ignited a vigorous debate but also challenged the principle of *tadbir* and its application, advocating for a different form of governance for Hausaland.

The core characteristic of the *tadbir* application in the Hausaland, which was regularly mentioned by Uthman dan Fodio to show the "corrupted" side of *tadbir*, was the overarching enslavement practice among the Muslims. For instance, a Hausa man from Zamfara who was enslaved by the forces of the other Hausa states, and at the end sold to an Ottoman merchant called Abdurraġman Aġa in Tripoli around 1790s narrates that since economic and politic rivalry among the Hausa states is determining for whole governance, reciprocal plunder attacks as well as enslavement are almost a daily reality in the region.⁴⁷⁷ Local scholars justified this practice by using the argument of *maslaha* (Ar. common good, expediency),⁴⁷⁸ indicating that enslaving neighbouring Muslim states was permissible if it prevented more destructive political and economic conditions for their own people. Hence, with reference to legal principle "necessity permits the forbidden" (Ar. *al-dharura tubih al-mahzurat*), it is lawful to enslave their Muslim neighbours, although by sharia, it is forbidden, to avoid their own absolute destruction.⁴⁷⁹ Uthman dan Fodio specifically critiqued this argumentation to justify the *tadbir* system and advocated for an alternative governance model.⁴⁸⁰ He perceived the application of *tadbir* in relation to slavery as a definitive indication of practices that are inconsistent

there were still several Pullo communities that were newly immigrating to Hausaland. Gusau, *Fulanin Zamfara-Katsinar Laka Da Tasirinsu a Daular Sakkwato*, 85.

474 For Futa Jalon, see: Georger Bohas et al., eds., *Islam et Bonne Gouvernance Au XIXe Siècle Dans Les Sources Arabes Du Fouta-Djalou* (Paris: Geuthner, 2018); for Futa Toro, see: Mamadou Youry Sall and Ibrahima Silla, *Alluwal Ceerno Sileymani Baal: Pensée Politique d'un Tricentenaire Africain* (Dakar: Baajoorde Centre de Recherche, 2020).

475 Modi Sory Barry, *Hirdè Tarikha è Taali Fuuta Djaloo: La Création d'un État Théocratique* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2021); Oumar Kane, *La Première Hégémonie Peule: Le Fuuta Tooro de Koli Tenella à Almaami Abdul* (Paris: Karthala, 2004); Usman Muhammad Bugaje, 'A Tradition of Tajdeed in the Western Bilad Al-Sudan: A Study of Genesis, Development and Patterns of Islamic Revivalism in the REgion, 900-1900 AD' (Ph.D. Thesis, Khartoum, University of Khartoum, 1991).

476 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Tabšir al-'Ihwān aḥbārī al-ḥulafā fi al-Sūdān', L.U.I., 82/169.

477 Carsten Niebuhr, 'Noch Etwas Über Das Innere von Afrika', *Neues Deutsches Museum* 4 (1791): 421.

478 This term mostly used for specific cases that sharia does not provide with a clear rule. In this case, jurist take *maslaha* as principle for their decision.

479 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Waṭiqah Al-'Ihwān', C.A.D., 19.

480 In one of his texts, Uthman Dan Fodio provides a long list of the "corrupt" aspects of *tadbir* in Hausaland, apart from the debate on slavery. Although the text shows how governance in Hausaland was unjust, he clearly criticizes the application of *tadbir* in a broader context. See: Uthman dan Fodio, 'Kitāb Al-Farq', L.U.I., 82/397.

with Islamic principles, asserting that all Muslims are obligated to categorically reject such practices, without giving any chance for the legal principle “necessity permits the forbidden”.⁴⁸¹ In support of this position, dan Fodio referenced the *riasa* system articulated by Al-Maghili, which posits that the responsibility to denounce “un-Islamic” practices falls upon all Muslims, irrespective of the tolerance exhibited by their rulers.

This direct imitation of Al-Maghili’s *riasa* system marked a special period in the intellectual movement of Uthman dan Fodio between the 1790s and 1804. He openly criticized the application of *tadbir* on various issues and called upon Muslim communities to reject and prohibit such practices, including the distribution of the inheritance of a deceased person without heirs to the personal treasury of the ruler in lieu of the communal treasury.⁴⁸² However, he confined his criticisms to the social sphere and refrained from openly criticizing any ruler, which aligns with the characteristic approach of Maghili’s *riasa* system. In other words, prior to 1804, Uthman did not have the intention of establishing a new state, but rather aimed to bring a principal shift in the governance from *tadbir* to *riasa* in the existing Hausa states.⁴⁸³ For instance, in his chronicle, the brother of Uthman, Abdullahi dan Fodio recounts that when many people came to Uthman to complain regarding the “corrupted” *tadbir* applications of their ruler, Uthman declined to intervene in the cases by stating, “I would never be the cause of a conflict between a ruler and his subject”.⁴⁸⁴ Rather, as his son Muhammadu Bello narrates in his own chronicle, he wrote various letters of advice to the *sarkins* of Hausa states, proposing the application of *riasa* instead of *tadbir* without naming any specific case.⁴⁸⁵

However, in 1804, this intellectual and social pressure on the incumbent *sarkins* (especially on the *sarkin* of Gobir⁴⁸⁶ in the territory where Uthman delivers his preaches) confronted Uthman with a

481 Uthman dan Fodio, ‘Masā’il Muhimma Yahtāḡu Ilā Ma’rifatihā Ahl Al-Sūdān’, I.R.S.H., MARA, 280. The extent of this principle was a disputed topic pertaining to the jurists and scholars in West Africa. For an example from Souf and Ghadames, see: Kerem Duymus, “Politico-Theological Debates in Ghadames between the 1770s and the 1850s from a Global Perspective”, *Afriques : Débats, Méthodes Et Terrains D’histoire* 15 (2024): 1-17.

482 S.W. Junaidu, ‘The Concept of Leadership in Sakkwato Caliphate’, in *The Sokoto Caliphate: A Legacy of Good Governance and Scholarship*, ed. Abubaker Aliyu Gwandu, Aminu Mikailu, and S.W. Junaidu (Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 2005), 64–72.

483 Mustafa Tahir, *Salātīn Mayrunū Ḥulafā’ Al-Šayḥ ‘Uṯmān Bin Fūdī* (Mayrunu, 2023), 37.

484 Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Tazyīn Al-Waraqāt’, P.C. 3, 27112.

485 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*, chap. 26.

486 Gobir was one of the most powerful Hausa states in the Hausaland during the 18th century, directly competing with Katsina, and regularly attacking Kano. Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*, 2019, 9. This was thanks to their successful control of trade between Yorubaland and Air. See: Aminu Isyaku Yandaki, Sanusi Shehu Gusau, and Umar Aminu Yandaki, ‘Gobir External Relations in the 18th Century’ (1th International Conference on Gobir, Past and Present: Transformations and Change, Sokoto, 2018). Regarding the trade relations between Nupe and Gobir, see: N.N.A., SNP 17/25355

direct threat of war, which clearly was unexpected for him. Thus, Abdullahi tells that when their community faced the attacks of the Gobir forces, they quickly named Uthman as their communal leader, *amr al-muminin* (Ar. leader of the Muslims) to act properly.⁴⁸⁷ In the short term, that was also an intellectual crisis for Uthman, since in the *riasa* system of Al-Maghili a revolt against the ruler was categorically rejected. The issue was resolved quickly by adopting a more expansive interpretation of the system in question. Consequently, Uthman, followed by Abdullahi and Bello, commenced in approximately 1805 to assert that Al-Maghili would endorse a rebellion against a ruler who fails to implement *riasa* in alignment with Al-Maghili's framework. They contended that the practice of *tadbir* led to the emergence of "un-Islamic" practices and ultimately resulting in a departure from Islam, necessitating an overarching revival (Ar. *tajdid*), regardless the rulers' intentions.⁴⁸⁸

This new interpretation was, in fact, not a radical invention by Uthman. One of his most influential teacher and strong supporter, Malam Jibril in Agadez, during his pilgrimage in Mecca around 1780s deeply inspired by the Diriyah emirate (present day Saudi Arabia), considering he meet some Wahhabi/Salafi scholars,⁴⁸⁹ and their critical stance against Ottoman rule by emphasizing a *riasa* based model; yet, different from Al-Maghili's.⁴⁹⁰ Thereafter, he became one of the important figure who openly challenged with the wide-spreading *tadbir* applications in the southern part of the Central Sudan by calling people for revolt. However, this was initially seen as extreme by Uthman in his earlier years.⁴⁹¹ In fact, the core similarity between the Wahhabi/Salafi movement and the Diriyah emirate as well as Uthman's jihad and Uthmaniyya Caliphate was already noticeable for even the contemporary figures such as al-Tunisi or Moroccan sultan Mawlay Sulaiman.⁴⁹²

487 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Tazyin Al-Waraqāt'.

488 For instance, see: Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Ḍiyyā' Al-Sulṭān Wa-Ġayrihi Min al-'Iḥwān Fī Aḥam Mā Yuṭlabu 'Ilmuḥu Fī Umūr al-Zamān', N.H.R.S, P 1/2.

489 Kadir Özköse, *Sufi Davet'ten Devlete: Osman B. Fudi ve Sokoto Halifeliği* (İstanbul: Gelenek Yayıncılık, 2004), 56.

490 Djibo Hamani, *L'Adar Précolonial (Republic Du Niger) - Contribution à l'étude de l'histoire Des Etats Hausa* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006), 138. In fact, it was a very old tradition for West African scholars to be inspired by the new intellectual movement in Hijaz during their pilgrimage and to bring it back to their homeland. Muhammed Tandoğan, 'Osmanlı Devleti'nin Afrika'da Avrupa Sömürgeciliğine Karşı Siyaseti: XIX. Yüzyıl ve XX. Yüzyılın Başları' (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2011), 106.

491 Additionally, Malam Jibril's departure from the Qadiriyya *tariqa* and his subsequent joining of the Halwatiyya *tariqa* during his time in Cairo, after returning from a pilgrimage, created a rift between him and his students in Agadez, most of whom were part of the Qadiriyya *tariqa*. Özköse, *Sufi Davet'ten Devlete: Osman B. Fudi ve Sokoto Halifeliği*, 53.

492 Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi, *Voyage Au Ouaday*, trans. Perron (Paris, 1851), 295. Mawlay Sulaiman in Morocco, who ruled from 1792 to 1822, was deeply inspired by the Wahhabi/Salafi movement. In 1811, he even received personal letters from the Wahhabi leader Al-Saud. For more details, see: Marek M. Dziekan, 'Wahhabi Propaganda in Morocco during the Reign of Sultan Sulayman (1792-1822) as Reflected in the Sources of His Era' (Ph.D. Thesis, Krakow, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2018). In the 1810s, Mawlay Sulaiman also received some letters from Al-Bakri, the sultan of Agadez, informing him regarding the revivalist jihad of Uthman.

Nevertheless, in their revivalist jihad politic, both movements had the same stances and activities; yet, their intellectual and historical backgrounds were entirely different.⁴⁹³ In other words, the inspiration of the Diriyah emirate for Jibril and after 1804 for Uthman was primarily centred on the potential for insurrection against a Muslim sovereign, rather than an intellectual affiliation.⁴⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the newly developed interpretation of Al-Maghili's *riasa* system faced significant resistance and lack of acceptance among the communities in Gobir in 1804, despite being propagated by Malam Jibril for several years.⁴⁹⁵ Uthman had to construct two further narratives to consolidate his followers in a war against *Sarkin* Gobir.⁴⁹⁶ One narrative revolved around a direct reference to the Kunta family in Timbuktu and their Qadiriyyah *tariqa* (Ar. Islamic brotherhood). According to Abdullahi, in the 1790s, an envoy from the Kunta family approached Uthman to introduce him to the Qadiriyya *tariqa*, and shared with him the secret knowledge with regard to “invisible worlds”, thereby he could give secret order to “invisible creatures”.⁴⁹⁷ The narrative in question emerged post-1805, with Uthman further developing it by claiming that Al-Maghili was affiliated with this *tariqa*, thereby he inherited the esoteric knowledge once possessed by Al-Maghili.⁴⁹⁸ This assertion enabled Uthman to bolster the legitimacy of his novel interpretation of Al-Maghili's *riasa* system, claiming that he has secret knowledge from and on al-Maghili that goes beyond his texts. In subsequent years, particularly Abdullahi contributed additional texts regarding

Hence, Mawlay Sulaiman saw possible connections between the two movements. He wrote a personal letter to encourage Uthman in his jihad and wished him the same success as the Wahhabis. Adam Abdullah Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, ed. Abdalhafiz Dusu (Alexandria: Maktabat al-Iskandariyat, 2014), 166.

493 Although Dan Fodio or his successors never went to Mecca for pilgrimage, there were members from his ancestors who went to Mecca. Hasan Isa Abdulzahir, *Al-Dawat al-Islamiyya Fi Gharbi Ifrikiyya* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Iskandariyat, 1991), 202. However, a radical intellectual change occurred in the Hijaz region following the late 18th century with the rise of the Wahhabi/Salafi movement. Especially Mecca was under the influence of Hadith-based interpretation of Wahhabi/Salafi networks in the 19th century. For instance, a scholar from Futa Jalon, Salih Al-Fulani al-Umari (d. 1804) was settled in Mecca in the late 18th century and deeply inspired by the Hadith-based Wahabi/Salafi interpretation. His work subsequently sparked a similar movement in Pakistan and northern India during the 19th century. However, his influence was quite limited in West Africa. Scholars such as Uthman drew their interpretations from a long intellectual tradition instead of an anti-intellectual, Hadith-based interpretation. J. O. Hunwick, ‘Towards a History of Islamic Thought in West Africa down to the Nineteenth Century’, in *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l’ouest*, ed. Samba Dieng (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999), 150. Also see: Ahmad Dallal, ‘The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750–1850’, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 113, no. 3: 341–59.

494 Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, 2014, 140–45.

495 Usman Muhammad Bugaje and Ibrahim M. Jumare, ‘Shehu Usman Danfodio 1804-1817: Founder of the Sokoto Caliphate’, in *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, ed. Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), 2–15.

496 For more details, see: A.A. Iraqi, *Nizam Al-Hukum Fi al-Khilafa al-Sokotiyyah* (Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1963).

497 Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Tazyin Al-Waraqāt’.

498 Uthman dan Fodio, ‘Ta’līm Al-’Iḥwān’, N.H.R.S., K 4/11.

Al-Mukhtar Al-Kunti from Timbuktu, aiming to position his figure and *tariqa* within contemporary scholarly discourse in Hausaland.⁴⁹⁹ Notably, neither Uthman nor Abdullahi addressed any political views attributed to Al-Kunti, who was known to support *tadbir*;⁵⁰⁰ instead, they focused on his spiritual authority.⁵⁰¹ Instead, they emphasized his spiritual authority. However, around 1809, Uthman took his narrative a step further by asserting that he is the *mujaddid* (Ar. renewer), who according to Jalaladdin al-Suyuti will come at the end of each century, a prophesied figure associated with the complete revival of Islam in *umma* (Ar. Muslim community). In citing a text from Al-Suyuti, titled *Tuhfat al-Muhtadin bi Akhbar al-Mujaddidin*, Uthman posits that a *mujaddid* should emerge around the 1780s, which precisely coincided with the period when Uthman commenced his proselytizing endeavours. This led Uthman to conclude that he must be the *mujaddid*.⁵⁰² It is worth noting that in the 1790s, another individual in Adar claimed to be the *mujaddid*, but he was quickly assassinated, leaving Uthman as the sole possible candidate.⁵⁰³ As a result of this assertion, Uthman's adherents conferred upon him an unequivocal legal authority (Ar. *sulta*) to offer the most authoritative interpretation of Al-Maghili's *riasa* system, and rule whatever he wants regardless going beyond sharia law for cases, extending his claims from being a *mujaddid* to that of a Mahdi, who is prophesied to appear at the end of times to engage in a final confrontation against the "devil".⁵⁰⁴ Similarly, Bello notes that he frequently suggested to their now militarized followers that Uthman was the anticipated Mahdi and that the apocalypse was approaching, thereby preparing them for a collusive war under Uthman's *riasa* rule.⁵⁰⁵ Hence, Uthman gained absolute authority, termed as *sulta* in *riasa* system.⁵⁰⁶ It was not until the 1810s, when the jihadist forces had secured a substantial portion of Hausaland, albeit without completely eradicating the opposing anti-

499 This decision was indeed part of a scholar network and tradition. Timbuktu had a both historical and symbolic importance in the Hausaland. Abdullahi wrote an abridgement of the one of Mukhtar Al-Kunti's texts, named *Naṣīḥat al-munṣif*. Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Nayl al-marām min shiyam al-kirām', P.C. 1., uncategorized.

500 See Chapter 1.

501 In fact, in general, scholar communities in the western Sahel were very critical of the *riasa* system because they had experienced similar systems in Futa Jalon and Toro in the past. For example, a chronicle from Oualata/Walatan illustrates that the scholars in the city heard about the jihad of Uthman around 1817. However, they were quite suspicious with regard to the war of Uthman and his *riasa* opinion. Abu Bakr bin Ahmad al-Mustafa al-Mahjubi al-Walati and Mohamed Lemine Hamady, 'Minah Ar-Rab Al-Ghafur: Biographies Des Lettrés et Recueil Des Événements Du Takrur de La Fin Du XVIIIe Au Début XXe Siècle' (Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Université de Paris I, 2004), 45.

502 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Amr Al-Sā'a Wa-Aṣrāṭihā', N.N.A., P/AR 2, 11

503 "Letter", I.R.S.H., MARA, Order of Jilani, dated as 1797.

504 Abd al-Qadir ibn al-Muatafa, 'Aṣr Masā'il Fī-l-Ḥilāf', P.C. 1., uncategorized.

505 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*, chap. 45.

506 See Chapter 1.

jihad factions,⁵⁰⁷ that Uthman began to clarify that he “may be” a *mujaddid* but not a Mahdi and that the end of the world is not imminent, whereas his *riasa* rule is still intact.⁵⁰⁸

A significant factor that led Uthman to withdraw his even *mujaddid* claim was the overwhelming enthusiasm within the community for engaging in military conflict. Al-Hajj Said (d. 1856) posits that this intense millenarian narrative fostered a permissive atmosphere for the community's armed forces, resulting in a loss of control and the occurrence of indiscriminate looting. Consequently, these coordinated assaults engendered considerable hostility towards the movement from neighbouring states.⁵⁰⁹ during the early phases of the jihad, the *sarkin* of Zamfara initially supported the movement; however, since the jihadist forces began to kill members of his communities and engage in rampant plundering, he subsequently allied with other Hausa states in opposition to the jihad.⁵¹⁰ Therefore, in an attempt to curtail further uncontrolled assaults and their underlying motivations, Uthman retracted his assertion of being the *mujaddid*.

At this juncture, after rapidly occupying the big part of the Hausaland, Bello posits that Uthman endeavoured to contextualize a newly established jihadist rule in the region within a global framework. Having moved away from advocating a millennial narrative such as *mujaddid* and Mahdi, Uthman sought to clarify their position within the broader Islamic world. This was the moment that the recently established jihadist *riasa* rule had to be re-justified in order to establish peaceful diplomatic relations with the rest of the Islamic world. Inasmuch as the concepts of *mujaddid* and Mahdi represented a significant threat not only to the Muslim Hausa *Sarkins* in the Hausaland but also, theoretically, to all other Muslim states worldwide, it was imperative to find a new justification for their *riasa* rule that would not pose a threat to other Islamic states. To this end, they returned to the concept of *amr al-muminin*. The term *amr al-muminin* carries three historical significances in Islamic tradition: 1) it was originally conferred upon military commanders in the early Islamic period who conducted jihad on behalf of the caliph; 2) also some caliphs subsequently adopted this title as leaders of the Muslim community; 3) some local rulers, distanced from any

507 One reason for this quick success was the effectiveness of the *riasa* system propagated by Uthman. He gave people a revolutionary role. Thus, people could easily declare their ruler an unbeliever and dethrone him without Uthman's involvement. Muhammad Al-Hajj, 'The Meaning of the Sokoto Jihad', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 17. Taking advantage of already existing local conflicts further rendered jihad movement successful. Moumouni Yacouba, 'Contribution à l'étude Du Passé Songhai: L'Histoire Du Dendi Origines à La Fin Du XVI^e Siècle' (Ph.D. Thesis, Abidjan, Université de Abidjan, 1997), 20.

508 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Tanbih Al-Umma', C.A.D. 27.

509 Al-Hajj Said, 'Taḡyīd Mimmā Waṣala Ilaynā', B.N.F., Arabe 5422.

510 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*, chap. 34.

caliphal authority, began to claim this title in their realm.⁵¹¹ According to Bello, in the 1810s, Uthman requested him to compose a letter to the Ottoman caliph in İstanbul in order to inform him regarding their jihad and paying allegiance to him.⁵¹² Bello claims that in essence, Uthman aimed to position the new state as a component of the Ottoman Empire, while presenting himself as an *amr al-muminin* engaged in jihad on behalf of the Ottoman caliph, with aspirations of becoming an emir under the Ottoman *padişah*. Nevertheless, Bello expressed disagreement with his father; although he did send a letter to Tripoli to inform Yusuf *paşa* concerning their jihad, he refrained from sending a letter to İstanbul to pledge allegiance. This decision stemmed from Bello's interpretation of *amr al-muminin*, wherein he argued that Uthman should be recognized as an *amr al-muminin* not for initiating jihad on behalf of the Ottoman caliph, but rather because he governed a region that was remote from any caliphal authority.⁵¹³ In this context, he contended that Uthman possessed the right to claim the title of caliph in addition to *amr al-muminin*. Likewise, Abdullahi contributed to this discourse by asserting that their lineage traces back to an Arab ancestor, a companion of Muhammad who served as a commander and an *amr al-muminin*.⁵¹⁴ Therefore, Abdullahi stresses that Uthman should be regarded as a caliph, not in the sense of belonging to the Quraysh tribe to which Muhammad belonged, but as a caliph of an *amr al-muminin* from an earlier epoch.

The reason of these various opinions with regard to the role and position of the Uthman and his *riasa* rule in the global Islamic world is the fact that Uthman never wrote any text to clarify the issue. However, Abdullahi and Bello sought to construct a narrative that Uthman should retain the *amr al-muminin* title and even assert his right to be called caliph, a subtle way to keep *riasa* rule with a peaceful relation with other Islamic states. Following Uthman's transfer of leadership to his son and brother in 1812, Abdullahi and Bello emphasized their claims that their jihadist rule constituted a caliphate independent of any other caliphal authority in the world. In this respect, after 1812, the early jihadist rule reshaped into Uthmaniyya Caliphate, which still bears the *riasa* rule.

During Uthman's reign until the 1810s, the utilization of the millennial *mujaddid*/Mahdi narrative and the reinterpretation of Al-Maghili's *riasa* system proved unexpectedly effective in military operations. However, challenges emerged in the governance of the newly established jihadist regime, considering several newly appointed emirs and followers of Uthman began to articulate

511 TDV *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 11 (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995), 156–57.

512 Muhammadu Bello, 'Ġawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd', N.N.A., O/AR, 12.

513 Muhammadu Bello, 'Ġawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd', N.N.A., O/AR, 12.

514 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Kitāb Al-Nasab', N.U.A., Ghana/115/MSX.

practical concerns regarding effective administration.⁵¹⁵ Although they recognized the clear implementations of Al-Maghili's *riasa* system, they soon discovered that its application did not consistently produce the intended outcomes. Accordingly, they suggested the potential implementation of *tadbir* in specific instances, as it appeared to resonate more closely with the preferences of the general populace.⁵¹⁶ In spite of these recommendations, Uthman remained resolute in his commitment to the exclusive application of *riasa*, irrespective of the compliance and reactions of local communities.⁵¹⁷ Furthermore, Uthman contended that if local populations continued to disregard the application of *riasa* in favor of *tadbir*, they should be classified as "unbelievers," thereby rendering it permissible to kill them and seize their properties, regardless of their prior identification as Muslims.⁵¹⁸

Muhammadu Bello, likewise, advocated for the principle of *riasa* as a form of governance. Following the establishment of several jihadist commanders around Hausaland after 1808, their authority appeared sufficiently robust to withstand potential challenges. In this context, Bello asserted that the creation of an "Islamic state" rendered any form of an insurrection against this newly established authority unequivocally illegal. To substantiate this claim, Bello composed various texts that elaborated on Al-Maghili's *riasa* system and incorporated classical arguments from earlier scholars. In one of these texts, Bello enumerates the reasons why *riasa* is the only justifiable principle of governance, citing ancient arguments: "one who obey Allah, also [must] obey to Muhammad and the ruler among them... obey your ruler even if he is an enslaved person from Ethiopia... regardless how "sinful" and despot a ruler is, one never cease to obey... rebellion is categorically forbidden... sultan is the shadow of God in the world."⁵¹⁹

Bello's unwavering support of *riasa* from 1808 onwards, which he maintained until the 1820s,⁵²⁰ led to a growing divergence from Uthman's teachings. Starting in the 1810s, Uthman gradually moved away from his longstanding emphasis on Al-Maghili's *riasa* system, subsequently affirming his

515 In one such case, Bello wrote a letter to the Emir of Bauchi after hearing that he had ceased expanding jihad in order to focus on the land he had obtained. In the letter, Bello stated that nothing was more important than jihad, and the Emir should not fear leaving his wealth and land behind to wage jihad. As Allah is with him in his jihad, He would also protect his wealth behind. K.S.C.B., uncategorized letter from Muhammad Bello.

516 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Ağwiba Muḥarrara', N.N.A., P/AR 2, 20.

517 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Bida' Al-Shayṭāniyah', N.H.R.S., P 7/10.

518 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Naṣā'ih al-Umma al-Muḥamadiyya Li-Bayān al-Firāq al-Ṣayṭāniyya Allatī Ḍaharat Fī Bilādīnā al-Sūdāniyya', I.R.S.H., R 4/17.

519 Muhammadu Bello, 'Ṭā'ah al-Sultān', P.C. 1, uncategorized.

520 After Uthman dan Fodio's death in 1817, Bello began claiming that he had received secret knowledge from Uthman. This allowed him to make extraordinary interpretations without accepting further debate. See: Muhammadu Bello, 'Wathīqa Ilā Ġamā'at al-Muslimīn', I.R.S.H., MARA, Order of Bello.

non-*mujaddid* status. It is noteworthy that, notwithstanding his initial unwavering commitment to *riasa*, towards the latter part of his life in the 1810s, Uthman progressively tended to the principles of *tadbir*, deeming the application of *riasa* to be impractical. He even rejected his earlier claims, such as declaring some Muslim communities as “unbelievers”, just because of some practices that they accustomed to do. Later, he argued that as long as people follow the core tenets of Islam and consider themselves Muslim, nothing can render them “unbelievers”.⁵²¹ To justify this fundamental shift, he posited that “every scholar decides according to his knowledge and needs of his age,” suggesting that “scholarly decisions may vary across different historical contexts and phases of governance”.⁵²² By approximately 1815, he candidly acknowledged that his rule was not as effective as he had intended, attributing this not to personal shortcomings but to the “fact” that the contemporary context was no longer reflective of the time of Muhammad, which he believed had led to a deterioration of conditions compared to earlier eras. Consequently, he argued that it is permissible to disregard certain aspects of Islamic principle in favour of more pragmatic solutions that align with the realities of their time, being a typical characteristic of *tadbir*.⁵²³

This notable transformation in Uthman's preaching was regarded as a critical error by his brother Abdullahi. Unlike Bello and Uthman, Abdullahi had become thoroughly disenchanted with the jihad movement and the nascent jihadist rule by 1805. He began to openly criticizing the Al-Maghili's *riasa* system, shifting his opinion towards *idara*. In one of his earlier texts from 1806, he asserts that the responsibilities of the *amir al-muminin*/caliph and appointed jihadist commanders are exclusively to implement Islamic law; they do not possess ownership of the land nor authority over the populace.⁵²⁴ In another text, he even goes further by arguing that the obligation of people is not to the ruler but to Islamic law; the ruler should be obeyed as long as he executes the Islamic Law.⁵²⁵ Ultimately, Abdullahi arrives at a conclusion that stands in stark contrast to the teachings of Bello and Uthman. He asserts that if a ruler fails to implement Islamic Law, it is legitimate to rebel against him, regardless if he is a jihadist commander or a *mujaddid*.⁵²⁶ All these considerations are exactly the arguments of the principle of *idara*, more specifically its *hisba* implementation.⁵²⁷ In this context, both Bello and Uthman continued to advocate for the principle of *riasa* as a basis for governance until the 1810s. However, Abdullahi adopted a fundamentally different approach by

521 Uthman dan Fodio, ‘Ihyā al-Sunna’. C.A.D., 10.

522 Uthman dan Fodio, ‘Ta’līm Al-’Iḥwān’.

523 Uthman dan Fodio, ‘Naḡm Al-’Iḥwān’, L.U.I., 82/57.

524 Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Ḍiyā’ Al-Hukkām Fī-Mā La-Hum Wa ‘alayhim Min al-Aḥkām’, P.C. 2, 4403.

525 Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Ḍiyā’ Al-Muqtadin Li-’l-Ḥulafā’ al-Rāšidīn’, N.A.U.I., 82/397.

526 Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Ḍiyā’ Al-Imām Fī Ṣalāḥ al-Anām’, B.M.D., 9/159.

527 See Chapter 1.

endorsing *idara* and frequently referencing Ahmad Baba in his later texts. At one point, he even openly criticized the arguments of Al-Maghili, claiming that many of his ideas contradicted the juridical texts of the Maliki school of law.⁵²⁸

That is not an unexpected outcome considering the distinct scholarly backgrounds. As Uthman described, he possessed a specialization in theology, Bello in history, and Abdullahi in jurisprudence.⁵²⁹ In this respect, Uthman was able to readily locate sufficient theological arguments, rather than legal considerations, to support the concepts of *riasa* and *tadbir*, considering theological texts provided ample material for such purposes. Similarly, Bello had access to a diverse array of historical sources that allowed him to justify *riasa* and *tadbir* in alignment with his own perspectives, since there were several historical accounts regarding the applications of these systems. In contrast, Abdullahi's reliance on juristic sources constrained his capacity to advocate for anything beyond *idara*, with *tadbir* applicable only in very specific instances. This divergence in their scholarly foundations became evident around 1812, when Abdullahi and Uthman started publicly criticizing each other. Their discussions were shaped by their different backgrounds and perspectives. Although Uthman had already abandoned his stance on *riasa* and embraced *tadbir* following the 1810s, Abdullahi found this shift not enough, expecting from him a clear *idara* stance. Therefore, their discussion centred around the application of *tadbir* and *idara*, not *riasa*. Despite Bello's ongoing advocacy for *riasa* at this time, his arguments were not sufficiently compelling to pose a significant challenge, likely due to his relative youth in comparison to Uthman and Abdullahi.

In his text around 1812, Abdullahi openly criticizes Uthman's support for the system of *tadbir*. He states that, "I look at all books of Maliki jurists as well as al-Wansharisi's book *Al-miyaar Al-Murib*. None of them say such things that you claim."⁵³⁰ To challenge with Abdullahi's critique, Uthman mentions some prominent scholars such as Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240), Šihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 1285), Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūfī (d. 1505), and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Al-Šaʿrānī (d. 1565), arguing that since these scholars confirmed, there are several dissimilarities between different schools of law in Sunni Islam, in this regard, it is not an obligation to follow one for any cases, since at the end all of these schools are enough lawful.⁵³¹ Uthman narrates that originally there were 313 schools of law, but

528 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Ḍiyā' al-tā'wil', P.C. 1., uncategorized.

529 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Nağm Al-'Iḥwān'.

530 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Ḍiyā' Al-Sulṭān Wa-Ġayrihi Min al-'Iḥwān Fī Aham Mā Yuṭlabu 'Ilmuhu Fī Umūr al-Zamān'.

531 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Nağm Al-'Iḥwān'.

only 4 of them, Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi, and Hanbali, survived. In essence, all of them are right. One can choose one of them according to the best interest.⁵³² In other words, for Uthman, it is possible to utilize a legal principle from a law school in a specific country, regardless of its actual adherence, to reach a conclusion that is consistent with the ruler's decision.⁵³³ However, Abdullahi rejects these arguments, characterizing it as a conventional manifestation of "corrupted" way of *tadbir*. In another text, he further critiques the concept of *malik* (Ar. owner, ruler) and its association with *tadbir*. He argues that since the Caliph and Emir do not qualify as a *malik*—meaning they do not possess ownership of land or authority over people—their primary obligation should be the implementation of Islamic law, rather than involvement in economic pursuits or the accumulation of wealth.⁵³⁴ In response, Uthman emphasizes that many scholars have recognized the historical precedent of certain Caliphs adopting the title of *malik* and engaging in economic activities to generate wealth. Thus, Uthman asserts that there is no intrinsic moral failing in the pursuit of wealth for rulers.⁵³⁵ However, for Abdullahi, the core promise of *tadbir*, providing wealth and economic growth, was against the core principle of Islam. He argued that people have the right to earn their food, not to become rich, but sustain their existence. Their ultimate goal is religious practices not wealth.⁵³⁶ Ultimately, both parties maintained their respective positions until their deaths. Nevertheless, after 1812, Uthman delegated active governance to his son, Bello, in the western part of the caliphate. Abdullahi, Uthman's brother, applied his own *idara* in his domain, which was different from Uthman's.

In the case of Bello, a gradual transformation occurred between 1815 and 1820. In 1815, when Uthman chose to establish his residence in Sokoto, a city founded by Bello, Uthman's inclination towards *tadbir* significantly influenced Bello's perspective on *riasa*. One of Bello's notable works from this period, titled *Usul al-Siyasa*, composed around 1816, delineates his actual view. In this text, Bello asserts that the practice of *siyasa* is intrinsically linked to the establishment of *riasa*,

532 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Hidāyat al-Tullāb'. L.U.I., 82/128.

533 This difference in opinion was also partly the result of the methodological differences between Uthman and Abdullahi. Uthman focused more on various interpretations of the *hadith* and was less concerned with the differences between the various schools of law. He could also use some Hanbali interpretations of Hadith, such as those of Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Jawziyya. Interestingly, Abdullahi also read these two Hanbali scholars; yet, not their *hadith* interpretations but "*siyasa al-shariya*" works. In this regard, while Uthman was drawing a selective *tadbir* interpretation from *hadith*, partly referring to these Hanbali scholars, Abdullahi was drawing an *idara* interpretation from their jurisprudence texts. In other words, although they were reading the same sources, they were only using a selective part of them according to their own methodological stance. Sidi Mohammed Mahibou, 'L'oeuvre de Abdullahi Dan Fodio et Son Impact Sur La Vie Sociale et Culturelle de Sa Région', in *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest*, ed. Samba Dieng (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999), 371.

534 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Diyā' Ūlī-l-Amr', B.N.F., Arabe 5697.

535 Uthman dan Fodio, 'Nağm Al-'Iḥwān'.

536 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Kitāb al-Adāt', P.C. 14., uncategorized.

outlining seven ways for its effective implementation. Six of these methodologies reiterate his previous arguments regarding *riasa*; yet, he explicitly posits that, in certain circumstances, the application of *tadbir* may be more advantageous for achieving effective *riasa*.⁵³⁷ the long-term transition from *riasa* to *tadbir* reflects the inherent characteristics of revivalist movements that seek to realize their objectives through the application of *riasa*. He argues that “the intimate relationship between *islah* and *tajdid* (revivalism) is underscored by the analysis that *tajdid* for its own sake would mean little unless it is aimed ultimately at *islah*.” In this regard, for him, as the *riasa* system of Uthman and Bello was aimed the revivalism, their intellectual development was already predetermined toward *islah*, a specific implementation of *tadbir*.⁵³⁸

In the later period, one of the core motivations for Bello’s insistence on *riasa* was the ongoing rebellions around northern Sokoto, Kano, and Katsina against new Emirs around the 1815s. He sought to consolidate the new established emirates with his intellectual preaching. He was also now open to some applications of *tadbir*. However, even after Uthman's death, Bello remained steadfast in his commitment to *riasa*. Following the demise of Uthman, not only were his emirates confronted with a series of rebellions, but Bello himself was also subjected to a multitude of challenges.⁵³⁹ In Kano, powerful local families rejected the appointments of a new emir by Bello around 1820.⁵⁴⁰ Around 1819, even one of the earlier commander of the jihad movement, Abdulsalam from Adar, openly rebelled against Bello.⁵⁴¹ As noted by Abdulsalam, the principal catalyst for the revolt was Abdullahi's opposition to Bello's ineffective application of *riasa*, which resulted in injustices. Additionally, following Uthman's death, Bello was proclaimed the new caliph without a formal summons, notwithstanding Abdullahi being a more suitable candidate due to his age and scholarly reputation. Consequently, Abdullahi, and referring to him Abdulsalam, did not acknowledge this decision until the 1820s, and even thereafter, he refrained from mentioning Bello's name during Friday prayers.⁵⁴²

A notable factor contributing to the widespread unrest was Bello's indecision regarding his governance strategy. Between 1815 and 1825, Bello exhibited a tendency to oscillate between the concepts of *riasa* and *tadbir*, which led to erratic political decisions. For example, in 1819, when Bello appointed a new emir in Kano, his choice faced criticism from the populace, who contended

537 Muhammadu Bello, ‘‘Uṣūl Al-Siyāsah’’, A.H.A., 5/30.

538 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Tajdid, Islah and Civilisational Renewal in Islam* (Washington: IIIT, 2018), 13.

539 Abdulkadir Mustafa al-Turudi (dan Tafa), ‘Rawḍāt Al-Āfkār’, N.N.A., O/AR 1, 1.

540 M.J. Abda, *Tsarin Musulunika Kano* (Kano: Triumph Publishing Company, 2007), 25.

541 Muhammadu Bello, ‘Sard Al-Kalām’, N.N.A., O/AR 1, 8.

542 Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Ḥuṭbah Al-Ġum‘ah Wa Kayfiyyat Ziyārat al-Amwāt’, J.M., AMC, 885.

that the newly appointed emir was not involved in the jihad movement. They argued that while many commanders from the jihad were actively engaged in warfare, this individual had been studying in Nupe. In that regard, they called for the appointment of one of the veteran jihad commanders as the new emir. Bello responded by asserting, “jihad is over [in Kano], so there is nothing wrong with having an emir who has no military skill”.⁵⁴³ This statement represented an unexpected application of *tadbir*, which ultimately incited a rebellion,⁵⁴⁴ considering the populace continued to adhere to Uthman's exhortations regarding the obligation of Muslims to conduct annual jihad campaigns, even after the establishment of an “Islamic state.”⁵⁴⁵ Following this insurrection, according to some anonym oral accounts, Bello revised his policy and personally initiated annual jihad campaigns against Kebbi.⁵⁴⁶ In another instance, when al-Jaylani⁵⁴⁷ launched new jihadist attacks on several Kel Tamasheq caravans engaged in trade with Sokoto after 1813, Bello vehemently condemned these actions and insisted that they cease. Nevertheless, al-Jaylani openly contested Bello's position, arguing that it was inconsistent with the principles espoused by both Uthman and Bello himself.⁵⁴⁸ The inspiration for the revivalist jihadist movement under a *riasa* rule extended far beyond the Uthmaniyya caliphate. Ahmad Lobbo carried this movement to Hamdullahi (presen-day Mali) in the 1810s.⁵⁴⁹ Many enslaved Muslims from the jihadist movement in the Hausland during their war with the southern non-Muslim states in the 1800s were sold and transported to Brazil. Especially in the Bahia region in Brazil, they even created their own jihadist movement to establish a new *riasa* rule in Brazil around the 1830s.⁵⁵⁰

In this respect, Bello faced criticism from various factions regarding his application of *riasa* and *tadbir*. In contrast with his previously consistent intellectual position, Bello's approach became

543 Adnan Bawa Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa* (Kano: Bayero University Press, 2019), 62.

544 That was also a contradiction of the earlier *riasa* arguments of Bello. In his earlier texts, he clearly states that the primary duty of a Muslim is waging jihad, not conducting business or building wealth. Muhammadu Bello, ‘Tanbīh al-Şāhib ‘alā Aḥkam al-Makāsib’, A.H.A., 1/5/34. If necessary, the individual should even sacrifice his wealth for the sake of jihad. Muhammadu Bello, ‘Şamş al-zāhira’, uncategorized, P.C. 14.

545 Uthman dan Fodio, ‘Masā’il Muhimma Yaḥtāgu Ilā Ma’rifatihā Ahl Al-Sūdān’.

546 “Hausa Account”, S.B., Krause Collection, MS 844.

547 He initiated a revivalist jihad movement among the Kel Tamasheq communities in the Adar and Air regions, inspired and supported by Uthman and Bello. For example, the Sokoto vizier wrote a poem to honor al-Jaylani's victories around Adar in the 1810s. See: “Poem”, I.R.S.H., MARA, Order of Jilani. Yet, ultimately he failed to create a jihadist rule in the region. Djibo Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l’Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie* (Paris: L’Harmattan), 364–69.

548 “Letter”, I.R.S.H., MARA, Order of Jilani, dates as 1819.

549 For more details, see: Bintou Sanankoua, *Un Empire Peul Au XIXe Siècle : La Diina Du Maasina* (Paris: Karthala, 1990).

550 For more details, see: Muhammad Shareef, *The Islamic Slave Revolts of Bahia, Brazil: A Continuity of the 19th Century Jihaad Movements of Western Sudan* (Sankore Educational Publisher, 1998); João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

more unpredictable after 1815, since he sought pragmatic solutions to the challenges he faced. This is particularly evident in his correspondence with Ahmad Lobbo in Hamdullahi. Following Uthman's death, Bello sent letters to Lobbo proclaiming himself as the new caliph. However, Lobbo dismissed his claim upon receiving a letter from Abdullahi, who declared himself also the caliph.⁵⁵¹ It was not until Abdullahi renounced his claim to the caliphate in 1825 that Lobbo began to consider Bello's assertion seriously; yet, he ultimately declined to participate in Bello's caliphate, despite prior association. He asserted that "[Ahmad bin Gunayim] Al-Nafrawi (d. 1713) and Abdullahi clearly stated the fact that if the order of the caliph cannot reach to a region due to the huge distance, the emir in the region has the right to be caliph for the community... Since we did not hear anything from you since the death of Uthman,⁵⁵² I have a right to be caliph here."⁵⁵³

Lobbo openly supported the *tadbir* principle, as also evidenced by his endorsement of the existence of two caliphs.⁵⁵⁴ This support can be attributed to his complex relationship with Mukhtar al-Kunti in Timbuktu and his alignment with *tadbir*. At this point, although Bello firstly attempted to force *riasa* by arguing that there can be only one caliph, once Lobbo mentioned the caliphs in Morocco and İstanbul, he had to concede to the argument of *tadbir* in order to justify his own caliphate. Nevertheless, Bello continued to challenge Lobbo, interpreting the *tadbir* principle differently. In one of his responds, he recounts that once he discussed with Uthman pertaining to the caliphs in the world. When Uthman referred to both the Ottoman and Moroccan caliphs as legitimate, Bello questioned whether the legitimate caliph should not be the sultan of Morocco, since he is from *Qurayshi*, whereas he who sits in İstanbul is just a "Turk". Then, Uthman explained to him that when Sultan Sulaiman (d. 1566) conquered a big part of the Islamic world, he became the protector of the Muslims, and people recognized him as caliph, thereby he was also the legitimate caliph.⁵⁵⁵ This narrative demonstrates, on the one side, the typical *tadbir* argument by Uthman by confirming more caliphs than one with some conditions. However, his condition is not directly distance; rather, whether people are on the side of an incumbent caliph. In this respect, in his response, first, Bello claims that the distance between Sokoto and Hamdallahi is not huge as Lobbo assured, since they are in the same country called Taqrur[/Sudan];⁵⁵⁶ second, he assumes that regardless from distance,

551 Muhammadu Bello, 'Ġawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd'.

552 That was because of the rebellion of Abdulsalam between 1819 and 1823, who blocked the western connection of the caliphate to Timbuktu and Hamdallahi.

553 'Compilation of Atiqu', P.C. 3, 34023.

554 See Chapter 1.

555 Muhammadu Bello, 'Ġawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd'.

556 'Compilation of Atiqu'.

the people of Hamdallahi are on the side of Uthman's successors, that is to say, him.⁵⁵⁷ Therefore, Lobbo should still obey Bello. This argumentation later greatly shaped the diplomatic affairs of Sokoto, especially with the Ottoman Empire. In order to maintain their claim to the caliphate, subsequent caliphs deliberately chose to eschew direct diplomatic relations with İstanbul.⁵⁵⁸

After engaging in a series of correspondences between 1820 and 1825, Bello completely abandoned his previous stance on the *riasa* and instead began advocating for the application of *tadbir* in all cases. That was also an intellectual reaction to finding a compromise with Abdullahi. In one of his text around 1825, he openly defends his position as caliph by invoking the argument of *tadbir* principle. He states that "Abdullahi may be a more justifiable caliph than me, but there is also a third way for justifiable rulership⁵⁵⁹ that is *shawka*"⁵⁶⁰; therefore, coming into power by force and having enough strength to maintain it provides enough justification.⁵⁶¹ In this case, any kind of rebellion would cause more damage than accepting this ruler. Along these lines, he defines himself as a ruler whose rule must be accepted to avoid *fitna* (Ar. civil strife).⁵⁶² This is a noticeable turn from *riasa* argument concerning absolute obedience to *tadbir* argument regarding conditional obedience.

This clear support for the *tadbir* argument was on the one side a more formative justification for his rule, but on the other hand also a rejection of applying *idara* as Abdullahi's insistence on. For example, in one of his later texts, Bello states that he "would prefer to judge according to *qawaid al-fiqh* (Ar. juristic maxims) rather than *zahir al-fiqh* (Ar. clear regulation in sharia)".⁵⁶³ In other words, for him it is legitimate to rule according to personal interpretation of sharia in lieu of direct execution of sharia. By doing so, he grants himself a huge room of manoeuvre through *ijtihad* (Ar. interpretation of sharia) instead of *taqlid* (Ar. direct execution of sharia without interpretation). Likewise, this approach allows Bello to bypass established *Maliki* texts and jurists, aligning with the *tadbir* argument defended by Uthman against Abdullahi once. This argument further demonstrates the critical perception of Bello regarding *idara*. For him, the application of *idara* with

557 Muhammadu Bello, 'Ġawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd'.

558 M.T.M. Minna, "Non Alignment": Sokoto's Foreign Policy under Sultan Muhammad Bello', in *Life and Ideas of Sultan Muhammad Bello*, ed. Centre of Islamic Studies Sokoto (Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 2013), 223–24.

559 As the prominent scholar Al-Mawardi explained, these two methods are a testament to the previous ruler and the election. See Chapter 1.

560 This is a specific implementation of *riasa*, see Chapter 1.

561 Muhammadu Bello, 'Al-Inšāf Fī Dīkr Mā-Fī Masā'il al-Ḥilāfa Min Wifāq Wa-Ḥilāf', A.I.F., 206

562 Muhammadu Bello, 'Šifā' Al-Asqām', B.N.F., Arabe 5669.

563 Muhammadu Bello, 'Al-Taḥrīr Fī Qawā'id al-Tabṣīr', P.C. 1, uncategorized.

a focus on *hisba* implementation, that is to say reducing the whole governmental sphere into the direct execution of sharia, means using blind repetition of juristic texts, which would lead to several conflicts. Nevertheless, Abdullahi challenges this assumption by asserting that executing sharia involves more than blind copying, considering the juridical texts also provide the concept of *maslaha* as a legal instrument to adapt rulings to local conditions. Nonetheless, this adjustment can be applied only if there is no clear regulation (Ar. *zahir al-fiqh*) in sharia. In the case of there are already clear regulations, it is not permitted to make any interpretation of law, as desired by Bello.⁵⁶⁴ In this respect, Abdullahi considers ruling through juristic maxims and personal interpretations as a typical way of falling into corruption. This discussion also encompassed their conceptualization of time. Abdullahi posited that there exists no fundamental distinction between the temporal context of early Islam and the contemporary period in Hausaland. Therefore, he advocated for the implementation of *hisba* within the framework of *idara*, since it was historically implemented in the very early phase of Islam. Conversely, Bello contended that the current era is markedly more detrimental than that of early Islam, a sentiment previously expressed by Uthman as well. In this respect, he asserts that the application of *idara* through *hisba* is feasible only within a nearly ideal community devoid of any "sins," a condition he believes is no longer attainable. In one of his letters to al-Jaylani, Bello claims that one should apply *tadbir* until the day that the Muslim community was properly formed to apply *idara*. But until that day arrives, the application of *idara* remains insignificant.⁵⁶⁵

Following the 1820s, Bello completely altered his governance approach in the eastern region of the caliphate from *riasa* to *tadbir*, whilst Abdullah in the western region continued to employ *idara* since 1805. A notable consequence of this transition was the increased emphasis on settlement policies in the eastern Caliphate, which included the introduction of new agricultural crops.⁵⁶⁶ Bello expresses his belief in one of his later texts that "living in town is better than village, which better than desert", thereupon, the ruler can initiate several development policies, that is to say, implementation of *islah* in *tadbir*, properly.⁵⁶⁷ In a letter of advice to al-Jaylani, Bello advocates for the encouragement of a settled lifestyle over a nomadic existence, positing that it is the inherent nature of the *salih insan* (Ar. supreme human) to reside in urban areas in accordance with Islamic law. Then, Bello directly quotes Al-Maghili: "It is the Imam's duty to transform his settled village

564 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Ḍiyā' Al-Siyāsāt', P.C. 3, 32385.

565 Muhammadu Bello, 'Risāla Ilā Muḥammad Al-Jaylānī', I.R.S.H., MARA, 1744.

566 P.C. 5., Habib al-Hassan, 'Tsaure Daga Cikin Tarihin Sarkin Musulmi Muhammadu Bello'.

567 Muhammadu Bello, 'Taḥdīb Al-'Insān Min Ḥiṣāl al-Ṣayṭān', P.C. 1, uncategorized.

into a *ribat* (Ar. walled town) and prepare for a long siege, as well as for a large influx of refugees.” Consequently, Bello concludes that the imam should encourage nomads to settle in a village by applying *tadbir*, and transform the village into a *ribat*, so that he can begin to implement *islah* of *tadbir*.⁵⁶⁸ In his later years, however, Bello favoured bestowing authority in a *ribat* upon a youthful prince in lieu of an imam, thereby affording him the opportunity to hone his governance skills. In this regard, for Bello, *ribat* played a dual role, developing the economic life and disseminating the urban-based Islamic lifestyle.⁵⁶⁹

The city of Sokoto serves as a notable illustration of the aforementioned politics. The settlement was established by Bello, who actively promoted the resettlement of immigrant and nomadic groups, including several blacksmiths from Air and Nupe,⁵⁷⁰ leading to substantial growth between 1815 and 1830.⁵⁷¹ However, this strong focus on *tadbir* through settlement policies resulted in the long-term marginalization of nomadic groups, particularly the Kel Tamashek and Pullo cattle herders. Bello believed that the practice of nomadic cattle herding was incompatible with the Islamic obligations, such as participating in jihad.⁵⁷² Furthermore, the Kel Tamashek were regarded as unreliable individuals, deemed unsuitable for adherence to Islamic law and governance due to their nomadic lifestyle.⁵⁷³ Bello interpreted the unsuccessful jihad led by al-Jaylani against various Kel Tamashek societies as a clear reflection of this belief. From the perspective of the Kel Tamashek communities, the *riasa* system implemented by al-Jaylani was perceived as excessively despotic, rendering it intolerable for them.⁵⁷⁴ Bello's overt hostility towards Kel Tamashek societies was a notable aspect of the dan Fodiyo dynasty, in contrast to Uthman, who did not exhibit discriminatory attitudes towards any nomadic community or Kel Tamashek societies. On the contrary, Uthman actively sought to promote the dissemination of Islam among the Kel Tamashek.⁵⁷⁵

568 Muhammadu Bello, ‘Risāla Ilā Muḥammad Al-Jaylānī’.

569 Muhammadu Bello, ‘Ribāta wa-l-ḥirāsa’. N.H.R.S., P 12/2.

570 I.U. Isa, *Metropolitan Sokoto: Issues in History and Urban Development since 1960* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 2013), 30–31.

571 Mukhtari Shehu Maniya, *Tarihin Ungawannin Sakkwato Dangane Da Sana’o’i* (Sokoto, 2013), 14-15.

572 Muhammadu Bello, ‘Risāla Ilā Muḥammad Al-Jaylānī’.

573 Muhammadu Bello, ‘Al-Nuqūl al-Nawāṭiq Fī Ṣā’n al-Barbar Wa-l-Tawāriq’, I.R.S.H., MARA, 273.

574 Djibo Hamani, ‘Adar, the Touareg & Sokoto: Relations of Sokoto with the Hausa and Touareg during the 19th Century’, in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 402.

575 Fadīl Ali Bari and Said Ibrahim Kiraydiye, *Al-Muslimin Fi Gharbi Ifriqiyya* (Lubnan: Dar Al-Kitab al-Ilmiyye, 2007), 198.

Bello's prolonged indecision between *riasa* and *tadbir* until the 1820s was also mirrored by the transformation from the old jihadist generation, that was acquainted with the system of *riasa*, to the new administrative generation, which was inclined toward *tadbir*. By around 1825, the *tadbir* application in the eastern part of the caliphate was commonly accepted.⁵⁷⁶ From a long-term perspective, the situation represented a reversion to the pre-jihad *tadbir* governance for local communities. In this regard, there was a swift reinstatement of traditional administrative titles, such as *sarkin*, within daily life, while the overarching concepts of the caliphate, including the title of Emir, remained unchanged in relation with Sokoto. Hence, the tensions surrounding governance strategies that had emerged since the onset of jihad were alleviated in the eastern local emirates of the caliphate following 1825. Two additional factors can be identified as contributing to the reimplementation of pre-jihad *tadbir*, different from the Bello's intellectual justifications. First, the older generation of jihadists, who had been fervent advocates of *riasa*, had largely passed away. Second, the application of *tadbir* represented a more familiar system for the general populace, who were struggling with the complexities of *riasa*.

Nonetheless, at the caliphal level, the implementation of *tadbir* continued to present significant differences from pre-jihad *tadbir* applications. The lack of political engagement with the caliphal title and the comprehensive caliphal framework in Hausaland prior to the jihad significantly influenced the administrative dynamics of the region. Local emirs promptly adopted the administrative systems of the former Hausa states, whereas Bello was compelled to devise new mechanisms of power through the strategic application of *tadbir* in his interactions with these local leaders. As a result, from 1825 until his death in 1837, the practice of *tadbir* became prevalent not only at the emirate level but also within the caliphate, considering Bello frequently intervened in local matters and personally led military campaigns in northern Sokoto against Hausa communities that had been displaced from the former Hausa states.⁵⁷⁷ Nonetheless, upon Bello's demise, the new caliph, Atiku, abandoned his *tadbir* policy at the caliphal level by granting significant autonomy to the local emirs.⁵⁷⁸ This partial shift in Atiku's approach can be attributed not to his intellectual

576 Around the 1830s, the Emir of Kano asked Bello if he could initiate some old Hausa administrative titles and institutions that were not mentioned in Sharia, but were useful and effective. Bello gave permission. Thereafter, this became the general norm throughout the caliphate. Mahamane Addo, 'Institutions et Imaginaire Politiques Haussa: Le Cas Du Katsina Sous La Dynastie de Korau (XVe-XIXe Siècle)' (Ph.D. Thesis, Marseille, Université de Provence-Aix-Marseille, 1998), 497.

577 As a result of this, Bello not only intellectually but also administratively left a *tadbir* legacy for Emirs. I. Sulaiman, 'Towards a Vision of the Future: A Letter from Sultan Muhammad Bello to the Muslim Ummah in Nigeria', in *The Sokoto Caliphate: History and Legacies, 1804-2004*, ed. Hamidu Bobboyi and Mahmood Yakubu (Kaduna: Arewa House, 2006), 403.

578 M. U. Adamu, *Kano Da Makwabtanta* (Kano: Government Printing Press, 2014), 127.

stance, since he did not author any text pertaining to governance, but rather to his concerns regarding potential rebellion, as Bello had previously experienced. Therefore, Atiku adopted a more conciliatory approach to secure the support of local emirs by affirming their autonomy through the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa* of *idara*. This notable distinction, specifically the application of *hisba* in the western caliphate versus *dairat al-siyasa*, at least at the caliphal level, engendered further intellectual discord between Sokoto and Gwandu, notwithstanding their adherence to the same foundational principles, that is *idara*, at the caliphal level.

One consequence of this instrumental disparity was the evident implementation of unlawful policies by local emirs within the eastern caliphate, since the *dairat al-siyasa* does not delineate any specific juristic framework for governance, but an abstract concept of justice. During the 1840s, emirs in this region were afforded significant latitude to exercise *tadbir* to an excessive degree, exemplified by the imposition of numerous new taxes that lacked legitimacy under Islamic law.⁵⁷⁹ This situation culminated in the notable Ningi rebellion, instigated by certain local scholars from Kano, which continued until the caliphate's dissolution.⁵⁸⁰ At the caliphal level, particularly under and following Atiku's leadership, the application of *idara*, with a specific emphasis on the *dairat al-siyasa* instrument, became increasingly prevalent. A salient illustration of this shift was the Caliph's intervention in the internal matters of the Agadez Sultanate. Prior to 1840, it was customary for Bello, and in his initial years, Atiku, to maintain regular correspondence with various actors in Adar and Agadez to manage the region in alignment with the political and economic interests of the caliphate. However, post-1840, this level of involvement significantly diminished.⁵⁸¹

In the eastern region of the caliphate, significant transformations in governance occurred prior to the 1840s, whereas the western region exhibited a relative stability. This stability can be largely attributed to Abdullahi's steadfast support, initiation, and execution of *idara* through *hisba* from 1805 until his demise in 1828. In other words, the application of *tadbir* was actualized not only at the caliphal level but also at the emirate level.⁵⁸² Notably, the governance strategies of Gwandu and Sokoto diverged markedly around the 1840s, as both regions concluded their era of reform and

579 For an example from Kano, see: Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*, 35.

580 "Hausa Accounts", S.B., Krause Collection, MS 844.

581 Djibo Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989.), 400.

582 A notable contrast can be observed between the taxation policies of Sokoto and those of Gwandu. In Gwandu, the imposition of taxes was strictly regulated, with a relatively simple tax system that was aligned with Islamic law. See: Ibrahim M. Jumare, 'Land Tenure in the Sokoto Sultanate of Nigeria' (Ph.D. Thesis, York University, 1995).

concentrated solely on the implementation of their respective governance system.⁵⁸³ Sokoto also adopted *idara* at the caliphal level through the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa*, which conferred considerable autonomy to local emirs. Gwandu, on the other hand, maintained a strict adherence to the principles of *hisba* and openly criticized the adoption of *dairat al-siyasa*. Accordingly, local emirs in Gwandu remained under the rigorous juristic guidance of the Gwandu leadership.⁵⁸⁴ This dynamic is particularly evident in the correspondence between Gwandu's Great Emir⁵⁸⁵ and his subordinate Emirs, who frequently sought consultation regarding the detailed implementation of *hisba*. In numerous instances, emirs inquired with regard to the permissibility of employing *dairat al-siyasa* or *tadbir*, considering these alternatives were often raised by local constituents. However, the Great Emir consistently rejected these proposals, advocating instead for the application of *maslaha* in exceptional circumstances.⁵⁸⁶ In this context, the Emirs in the eastern region had a significant degree of flexibility in their implementation of *tadbir*, allowing them to become key economic actors in their domain, since they personally involved trade, agriculture, and manufacture. On the other hand, the emirs in the western region primarily served as administrative agents and only intervened in cases of conflict. They did not play a substantial role as economic agents, but rather provided regulatory assurance to other economic actors.

Nevertheless, the conclusion of the era of reform was not rigid. In the Gwandu part of the caliphate, although the application of *idara* through *hisba* was consistently implemented from the beginning, it took a considerable amount of time for Abdullahi to address the most crucial governance issues, as this governing strategy was firmly new to the region. In this respect, the years between 1825 and 1827 marked a main turning point in the intellectual discussion pertaining to governance in the

583 Some historians have misinterpreted Abdullahi's Maliki jurisprudence-based *idara* system, viewing it as an uncompromisingly legalistic and narrow-minded approach that is inherently opposed to any form of development and problem-solving. See: S.A. Balogun, 'The Position of Gwandu in the Sokoto Caliphate', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 283; Paul Naylor, *From Rebels to Rulers: Writing Legitimacy in the Early Sokoto State* (Boydel & Brewer, 2021), 88. In reality, his *idara* system was far more intricate than a mere legalistic or visionless construct. To illustrate, Abdullahi sought to establish a uniform price for essential commodities and standardized market measures throughout the caliphate, with the aim of enhancing governance. This plan was thwarted by Uthman, who deemed it excessively ambitious. See: Sule Ahmed Gusau, 'Economic Ideas of Shehu Usman Dan Fodiyo', *Journal of Muslim Minorities* 10, no. 1 (1989): 139–51. In some instances, he even criticized the prominent scholar Al-Ghazali for being too legalistic on the topic of the *muhtasib's* duties. Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Diyā' Ahl al-Iḥtisāb 'alā Ṭarīq al-Sunnah wa-'l-Ṣawāb', P.C. 1., uncategorized.

584 Mukhtar Umar Bunza, *Gwandu emirate: The Domain of Abdullahi Fodiyo, since 1805* (Kaduna: GEDA, 2016), 189–90.

585 Following the recognition of Bello as caliph by Abdullahi, Gwandu received special status between Caliph and Emir, being a Great Emir.

586 Abdullahi Smith, *A Little New Light: Selected Historical Writings of Professor Abdullahi Smith* (Zaria: Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research, 1987), 179.

whole caliphate. During this brief period, Abdullahi passed away, leaving behind a vast collection of textual sources for future generations. In the meantime, Bello abandoned *riasa* and solely supported *tadbir*. Once Bello overcame his hesitations regarding governance, he continued to write on *siyāsa*, but from 1825 to 1837, his arguments remained unchanged. Consequently, intellectual discussions and the production of textual sources on governance came to a halt after 1827. Subsequent Caliphs and Emirs relied heavily on the existing governance strategies without engaging in any new discussions or proposals.

These radical transformations in the sphere of governance throughout Hausaland and beyond created further consequences for the states in the periphery as well as reshaped the intellectual pursuits of Uthman, Abdullahi, and Bello. One notable example of this in the western part of the Caliphate was the *Sarkins* Kebbi. Despite changing their allegiances multiple times during the jihad, managed to maintain their autonomy against the caliphate. However, due to its proximity to Gwandu, the *Sarkins* Kebbi frequently found themselves in a state of war with Abdullahi's forces. Upon Abdullahi's death, the new Great Emir attempted to resolve the conflict by implementing *hisba* even more strictly. This political move resulted in a legal reform in Kebbi around 1840. Through the diplomatic imposition of Gwandu, *sarkin* Kebbi granted Muslims in Kebbi the right to be judged according to Islamic law, even though this law did not serve as the legal foundation of the state. Thereafter, the conflicts between the two states significantly diminished, and eventually led to a peace agreement around the 1860s.⁵⁸⁷ Similarly, Abdullahi was eager to establish peace treaties with neighboring states as long as they do not pose a direct threat, by demanding free space for Muslims in their land, and the use of Islamic law for them. Thus, for instance, the Borgu states remained greatly autonomous without involving any big war with Gwandu.⁵⁸⁸ In another case, there was a Sub-emirate of Bitimkogi in Tako, which was just a small Muslim community in the far west part of the caliphate without interesting in any administrative state building but just following the Islamic law under the implementation of *hisba*.⁵⁸⁹ Malam Sori from Bitimkogi had received a flag from Uthman during his education in Sokoto, but in lieu of waging jihad in Bitimkogi, he declared their local Pullo chef Hussaini Muhammadu in Tako as the emir of Bitimkogi in a very symbolic

587 Bunza, Gwandu emirate: The Domain of Abdullahi Fodiyo, since 1805, 171–72.

588 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*, chap. 57.

589 Tahir, *Salātīn Mayrunū Ḥulafā' Al-Šayḥ 'Uṯmān Bin Fūdī*, 55.

manner.⁵⁹⁰ The only exception in this *hisba* policy was the Ilorin emirate. Endless wars with Yoruba states greatly shaped the system of governance in this emirate.⁵⁹¹

In the Sokoto region of the Caliphate, the implementation of *riasa* and *tadbir* policies prior to the 1840s had a significant detrimental effect on interstate relations. For example, in spite of Uthman's forces capturing the capital of Gobir during the earlier phase of the Jihad, the war against the remaining *Sarkins* Gobir and their Kel Tamasheq allies continued until 1836.⁵⁹² Different from Abdullahi, Bello regularly initiated plunder attacks to eastern Adar and northern Gobir against the exiled Hausas as well as Maguzawa Hausas in Zamfara who were not Muslim. The decisive battle only took place in 1836, when the caliphate forces put an end to the dynastic power in Gobir. Consequently, many Hausa people migrated westward. First, they settled in Maradi state, and then they moved on to Zinder, where they continued their rivalry with the caliphate in a more indirect way, such as through economic competition. In the far east, the results of the *riasa* and *tadbir* applications were not as successful as in Gobir. Although Uthman granted flags to some jihadist communities⁵⁹³ to expand the state toward Bornu and Baghirmi⁵⁹⁴ around 1807, these forces greatly failed under the strong military reactions from Bornu and Baghirmi. These endless wars in the eastern part of the Caliphate caused new political-economic dynamics in the rest of the century. Furthermore, after a number of transformations, focusing on the application of *tadbir* in the eastern

590 Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 86.

591 Several accounts of enslaved people explain this development, see: S. W. Koelle, *Polyglotta Africana* (London, 1854).

592 Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie*, 357. During this lengthy and contentious period, both parties were compelled to identify alternative, less violent means of coexistence. In the 1820s, regular correspondence was established between the Fodiwa and Gobirawa dynasties with the objective of preventing further military confrontations. Additionally, intermarriage arrangements were negotiated between the two dynasties. Murtala Mara and Attahiru Ahmad Sifawa, 'Inter-State Royal Marriages Between Gobir and Sokoto Sultanate: A Study in Social Diplomacy' (1th International Conference on Gobir, Past and Present: Transformations and Change, Sokoto, 2018). While this resulted in a brief cessation of hostilities, the underlying conflict remained unresolved. Historical Committee of Tiber, *Gubbaru: Kammalallen Tarhin Gobirawa* (Tiber, 1975), 29.

593 While the majority of the flags were distributed to military commanders and scholars, with the objective of encouraging the formation of independent emirates, additional flags were also provided to smaller communities that were willing to engage in jihad. In this instance, the communities in question were not establishing an emirate of their own, but rather aligning themselves with an existing emirate. Gusau, *Fulanin Zamfara-Katsinar Laka Da Tasirinsu a Daular Sakkwato*, 108.

594 The rationale behind the expansion towards Baghirmi was the presence of Pullo communities in that region. Some members of these communities proceeded to Sokoto to pursue studies. Consequently, Uthman was cognizant of their presence and exhorted them to engage in jihad in their region. Mohammadou Idrissou, "Kalfu", or the Fulbe Emirate of Baghirmi and the Toorobbe or Sokoto', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 338–44. This dynamic was largely consistent throughout the remainder of the eastern region of the caliphate. Yakubu, who originated from the Bauchi region, was dispatched by his family in the late 1780s to dan Fodiyo for educational purposes. Additionally, he participated in the jihad led by dan Fodiyo. In 1792, he was bestowed with a flag and returned to Bauchi to spearhead the jihad. By 1809, he had successfully established his emirate. N.N.A., SNP 7/1778/1909/Account on Yakubu and Gombe.

part of the Caliphate contributed to the trans-regional tendency of applying *tadbir* from Tripoli to Bornu, thereupon being part of a huge governmental bloc.

3.2. From *idara* to *tadbir*: Rise of Al-Kanemi in Bornu

Prior to the jihad movement that significantly transformed Hausaland in 1804, the state of Bornu occupied a crucial position in the southern region of Central Sudan, primarily through its vassalage system. By the late 18th century, several Hausa states, along with Baghirmi, were regularly paying tribute to the *mais* of Bornu from Sayfawa dynasty.⁵⁹⁵ The influence of Bornu extended as far as the Bussa kingdom in Borgu.⁵⁹⁶ However, during this period, the governance strategy that had been in place for an extended duration was entering a phase of decline.⁵⁹⁷ This decline was particularly pronounced following a significant defeat at the hands of the sultanate of Mandara in the 1780s, which resulted in many tributaries, including Wadai, Baghirmi, and various Hausa states, ceasing their tribute payments.⁵⁹⁸ Yusuf Usman further emphasizes that a long-term shift in the salt trade routes towards Hausaland also adversely affected Bornu. Ngourbaye, which was under Bornu's control, had been the primary source of salt for Hausaland. However, in the 18th century, the sultanate of Air initiated a change, leading Kavar to become the new source of salt for Hausaland.⁵⁹⁹

In the early 19th century, the Fodiwa dynasty was compelled to pursue a circuitous route in order to establish their own caliphal claims, whereas the use of the caliphal title by the *mai* of Bornu can be traced back to the 16th century. Early on, Bornu established scholarly communities that facilitated consistent interactions with Tripoli, Cairo, and Morocco following the 15th century.⁶⁰⁰ This was

595 See: Ibrahim Ali Tarkhan, *Imbraturiyatu l'Borno al-Islamiyyah* (Cairo: Al-Maktabah Al-Arabiyyah, 1975), 10-25.

596 N.N.A., SNP/7/8/1858/1907.

597 Hasan Ibrahim Hasan, *Intishar Al-Islam Fi al-Qarat al-Ifriqiyat*, vol. Vol 4 (Cairo: Maktabat Al-Nahdat Al-Misriyat, 2000), 128-29.

598 Shettima Bukar Kullima, Abdullahi Garba, and Ibrahim Alhaji Modu, "'Soldier of Fortune': From Intellectualist to Strategist in the Establishment and Consolidation of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty in Borno in the 19th Century', *Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science* 9, no. 5 (2021): 30.

599 Yusufu Bala Usman, 'A Reconsideration of the History of Relations Between Bornu and Hausaland Before 1804', in *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, ed. Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), 192.

600 See: Abubakar Mustapha, 'The Contribution of Sayfawa Ulama to the Study of Islam: C.1086-1846' (Ph.D. Thesis, Kano, Bayero University, 1984). The *mais* of Kanem/Bornu had built several schools for the Malikis in Fustat, an old city district in Cairo. One of the *mais* who became even famous in Egypt was Sultan Dunama Ibn Dabalami (d. 1259). He built the Ibn Rashi School in Cairo, and the *mais* after him used to send money to it most of the years. He also built a dormitory in Cairo for the benefit of his countrymen. Students, workers, and pilgrims stay there throughout their stay in Cairo. Ahmad bin Ali Al-Qalqashandi, *Subh Al-Asha Fi Sana'yi al-Insha'a*, vol. Volume 5 (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-'ilmiya, 1987), 218. In the case of Tripoli, the connections were denser. For example, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Sudani (d. 17??), a prominent mufti in Tripoli during the 18th century, had a wife from

accompanied by regular diplomatic⁶⁰¹ and economic⁶⁰² relations. Hence, the implementations of Islamic concepts for governance and politics were not only well established but also thoroughly documented by scholars in the 16th century.⁶⁰³ The assertion of the caliphal title was a critical aspect of the earlier *riasa* governance model in Bornu. However, by the time Uthman's jihad forces launched an attack on Bornu in 1806, the caliphal title held by the *mai* of Bornu had no more echo among the local populace.⁶⁰⁴ He was even unable to muster sufficient military support from the capital city, Ngazargamu, to counter the assaults.⁶⁰⁵ This decline in the title's relevance is related to the prolonged transformation of governance strategies in Bornu, evolving from *riasa* to *tadbir*, and ultimately to *idara*.

During the early 18th century, the *mais* of Bornu encountered significant challenges in the Hausaland, considering numerous Hausa states frequently and successfully rebelled against Bornu's regional dominance. *Mais* of Bornu could prevent the rapid decline only with an efficient implementation of *tadbir*. Still, in the late 18th century, successful implementation of *tadbir* by Hausa states posit another challenge for *mais*. As a response, local scholars became increasingly involved in the decision-making process, offering proposals for more effective governance principles as well as intellectual support for *mai* to consolidate his power against local unrest.⁶⁰⁶ One outcome of this involvement was the establishment of *shettima* (Kn. A scholar appointed as administrator) title and institution. Initially, this was a *tadbir* strategy to integrate the scholars into the policy-making system to exploit their reform proposals as well as intellectual power for the state's interest since the 17th century with the beginning of *tadbir* application.⁶⁰⁷ Nevertheless, by the end of the 18th century, the scholars appointed by the administration had amassed considerable

Bornu named Rajah, who was the daughter of Sheikh Khalid Al-Barnawi al-Sharif (d. 17??) in Bornu. He met her while studying in Bornu, following his initial studies in Tripoli. Sheikh Khalid al-Barnawi al-Sharif was Al-Sudani's teacher. Thereafter, he went to Morocco and Al-Azhar for further study. Al-Hadi bin Yunis, 'Al-Hayat al-Ilmiyat Fir Tarabulus Fi al-Qarn 12hu/18m, Al-Sheikh Omar Al-Sudani Nashatah Fo al-Fiqh Wa-l-Qada', in Amal Al-Mutamar al-Awal Li-l-Wathaiq Wa-l-Makhtutat Fi Libiya Waqiyahu Wafaq al-Amal Hawlaha, Zliten 1988, ed. Omar Jahidar, Vol.1, 209–10.

601 Adam Abdullah Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijirya* (Cairo: Dar Al-Kitab al-Misri, 2014), 30.

602 Kanuri merchants had their own market in Mecca, called Suq al-Burnu. Abdulbaqi Muhammad Ahmad Kabir, 'Muajiz Tarikh Qabilat Al-Barnu', vol. 3 (Amarat 'Umm Kabilat al-Barnu, Al-Fashir, 2016). Some of these merchants were even travelling to the East African coast for trade. Hasan Ahmad Mahmoud, *Al-Islam Wa-l-Thaqafa al-'arabiyat Fi Afriqiyya* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriat al-Qahirat, 1958), 236.

603 Hamidu Bobboyi, 'The 'Ulama of Bornu: A Study of Relations Between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808' (Ph.D. Thesis, Evanston, Northwestern University, 1992), 66.

604 'Madh Sultān 'Ali', N.U.A., Paden Collection, MS 399.

605 Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale, *Maroua et Pette* (Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1970), 305–7.

606 P.C. 4., Registration of Malam Ibrahim.

607 Bobboyi, 'The 'Ulama of Bornu: A Study of Relations Between Scholars and State under the SAYfawa, 1470-1808', 93–94.

power that they were leading a *majlis* (Ar. council) which could conclude war declarations or new tax policy in the absence of *mai*, prompting a shift from *tadbir* to *idara*.⁶⁰⁸

Although these scholars, who were appointed as *shettima*, publicly advocated for the effective implementation of *hisba* in accordance with Sharia, their perspectives were also influenced by their roles within the administrative offices. Inasmuch as the *mais* could no longer assert their authority through coercive means (*riasa*) or even with indirect interventions (*tadbir*), they were compelled to establish a mechanism for power balance to sustain their dominance, which granted a room of manoeuvre for *shettima* in the state affairs, resulting with the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa* in the early 19th century.⁶⁰⁹ Nur Alkali characterizes this approach as aiming at maintaining the status quo towards the 1800s.⁶¹⁰

The transition from *tadbir* to *idara* was not uniform in nature. Various authentic applications of *tadbir* persisted. Considering the *mais* were consolidating their dominance in southern Central Sudan through the *dairat al-siyasa* at the close of the 18th century, they simultaneously intensified the authentic use of *ray*, particularly in the form of *mahram* (Kn. officially granted privilege). Although issuing *mahram* was also a common practice in Darfur after the 17th century,⁶¹¹ in Bornu, it gained a special meaning and role during the end of the 18th century. A typical *mahram* contains privileges such as tax exemption or exemption from military duties, officially granted by *mai*.⁶¹² Despite the fact that some *mahrams* were issued for Arab merchants from Murzuq and Teda caravan owners from Kawar to encourage them to visit Bornu regularly, most of the *mahrams* were granted to scholars.⁶¹³ The main objective was to encourage the scholars to establish villages in the unsettled regions or frontiers and turn them into fief holders, who had mostly their own slave plantations to increase agricultural income.⁶¹⁴ With these privileges, scholars had the freedom to engage in economic activities without being subjected to taxes imposed by Bornu. They were even allowed to

608 Nur Alkali, 'The Political System and Administrative Structure of Bornu under Seifuwa Mais', in *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno*, ed. Usman Bala (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), 112.

609 Hasan, *Intishar Al-Islam Fi al-Qarat al-Ifriqiyat*, Vol 4:129.

610 Nur Alkali, 'The Political System and Administrative Structure of Bornu under the Seifuwa Mais', in *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno*, ed. Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), 103.

611 For one of the *mahrams* issued in Darfur, see: C.M.E.I.S., Photographic Collection, DF 305.44/5.

612 Muhammad Salih Ayub, 'Al-Talim al-Islamiyu Fir Kanam Birnu Min Khilal al-Maharim al-Sultaniya (1086-1806m)', in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 354.

613 The Jos Museum in Nigeria has an immense collection of *mahrams*. See: J.M., Army book.

614 Nur Alkali, 'Economic Factors in the History of Bornu Under the Seifuwa', in *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno*, ed. Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), 71.

provide their own legal judgments in case of conflicts in their territories.⁶¹⁵ Nevertheless, despite this great autonomy, there was an important aspect to this policy. Since in the *Maliki* Islamic Law there is no definition of *mahram*, it was purely a political invention. In this regard, these granted privileges were absolutely bound to the will of *mai*, who could easily revoke them if he dissatisfies.⁶¹⁶ Similarly, when a new *mai* assumed the throne, all *mahrams* had to be confirmed by him.⁶¹⁷ Therefore, the use of *mahram* was a very authentic implementation of *ray*, considering people were granted a great autonomy and privilege to use their own reasoning, by-passing state administration or Islamic law, while still being ultimately bound to the authority of *mai*. As mentioned earlier, the core aim of a *mahram* was creating new loyal fief holders for the state. The initial expectation was that they would establish dense agricultural activities. In the long term, they were expected to provide an armed division for Ngazargamu.⁶¹⁸ In the long term, most of the *mahram*-receivers, who hold now also a *shettima* office, preferred to live in Ngazargamu, appointing a bailiff for the land that they received, which led to widespread corruption.⁶¹⁹

However, implementation of *ray* through use of *mahram* yielded different outcomes for Bornu than Tripoli. In Tripoli, the implementation of *ray* resulted in a long-term a tendency toward *riasa*, in the case of Bornu, it strengthened the tendency of *dairat al-siyasa*, that is to say, *idara*. This can be attributed to the political challenges that Bornu underwent around the beginning of the 19th century. Especially against the rising power of Wadai and Sokoto, *mais* of Bornu had to find more alliances to solidify their power, granting an immense amount of *mahrams*. At the end, this created substantial numbers of powerful actors whose support for the *mai* was ensured through the implementation of *ray* to achieve a good working *dairat al-siyasa*.

One of the most significant outcomes of this policy at the outset of the nineteenth century was the ascendancy of al-Amin Muhammad al-Kanemi within the political domain.⁶²⁰ Born in Murzuq in 1776, his father was from Bornu and his mother was from Fezzan. Most importantly, her mother

615 For instance, see: N.H.R.S., Borsari Distric Report.

616 Bobboyi, 'The 'Ulama of Bornu: A Study of Relations Between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808', 130.

617 Hamidu Bobboyi, 'Relations of the Bornu Ulama With the Sayfawa Rulers: The Role of the Mahrams', *Sudanic Africa: A Journal of Historical Sources* IV (1993): 203–4.

618 Alkali, 'The Political System and Administrative Structure of Bornu under the Seifuwa Mais', 117.

619 Abdulkadir Benasheikh, 'The Revenue System of the Government of Bornu in the Nineteenth Century', in *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, ed. Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), 79.

620 Fatima al-Zahra Al-Qurashi, 'Al-Tawasul al-Thaqafi Wa-l-Iqtisadi Bayn Mamlakat Kanim Birnu Wa Misr Khilal al-Fatrat Ma Bayn al-Qarnayn al-Saadis Eashr Wa-l-Thaasie Eashr al-Miladin' (M.A. Thesis, N'djamena, Jamiat al-Malik Faysal, 2019), 197.

was from the renowned Awlad Sulaiman family, which played a central role in Tripolitania. This fact highly affected the future relations between Awlad Sulaiman and Bornu in the rest of the 19th century.⁶²¹ Al-Kanemi received his first education in Tripoli.⁶²² Thereafter, he embarked on a pilgrimage to Mecca and spent nearly a decade in the Hijaz region as well as Cairo, where he pursued scholarly activities. Before he returned to Central Sudan, and settled in Ngurnu around the Kanem region in the eastern Bornu, he lived for 5 years in Cairo, during the Napoleon invasion.⁶²³ In his settlement in the eastern Bornu, he attracted a diverse following consisting of Arab scholars, Teda caravan owners, Kanembu farmers, and herders from Shuwa Arabs.⁶²⁴ Especially Shuwa Arabs were playing a crucial role for the community, since they were responsible to import horses from the north.⁶²⁵ When Uthman's jihad movement reached Bornu around 1807, *mai* of Bornu, Ahmad bin Ali, sought to dispatch enough political, intellectual, and military actors to the west in order to counter the attacks of jihad forces.⁶²⁶ Following the capture of Ngazargamo by jihadist forces in 1808, the *mai* sought refuge in Ngala, where al-Kanemi resided, leaving the throne to his successor, Dunama ibn Ali.⁶²⁷ In Ngala, Ahmad bin Ali was surprised with overarching followers of al-Kanemi from various societies, and his scholarly background. This prompted him to encourage al-Kanemi to assume a leadership role in the west opposing the jihadist movement.⁶²⁸ Although al-Kanemi initially exercised his scholarly influence, he did not take military action until 1811. This was changed when *mai* Dunama ibn Ali was also compelled to flee to Ngala following further attacks by

621 Mustafa Ali, *Bornu Fi Eahd Al-Usrat al-Kawmiyyati* (Cairo: Dar al-Ulum li-l-Tibaeat wa-l-Nashr, 1984), 30.

622 Al-Naib al-Ansari, *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, 319.

623 Ali, *Bornu Fi Eahd Al-Usrat al-Kawmiyyati*, 195.

624 For more details, see: Abdulfettah Hasama Miqalad, 'Saltanat Barnu Sanat 1808m' (M.A. Thesis, Cairo, Jamiat al-Azhar, 1978).

625 Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Ibn Yunus, 'Ta'rīkh al-Islām Wa-Hayāt al-'Arab Fi Imbaratūriyyat Kānim Barnū'. P.C. 10, uncategorized.

626 This period also witnessed a state of economic stagnation in Bornu. Despite the existence of a robust commercial corridor between Tripoli and Ngazargamu, comprising a network of merchants and their own ward, called *Wasiliram* in Ngazargamu, the Emir of Fezzan assumed a prominent intermediary role. This led to the imposition of additional tribute, which constrained the growth of trade. See: Nur Alkali, 'Kanem-Bornu Under Sayfawa' (Ph.D. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1978), 124. As already discussed in Chapter 2, in 1807, Yusuf *paşa* of Tripoli sought to establish a direct corridor between Bornu and Tripoli. However, the Emir of Fezzan circumvented these plans through his lobbying of merchants in Ngazargamu. The substantial growth in this trade commenced following the fall of Fezzan to Tripolitan forces in 1811. Nevertheless, during this period, the *mai* of Bornu was no longer a dominant figure, and al-Kanemi capitalized on this shifting dynamic. Hasan Al-Madani Ali Karim, *Al-Aqat Libya Bi Buldan Wa Wara al-Sahra Fi Eahd Yusuf Basha al-Qaramanli, 1759-1832* (Trabulus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2009), 67–70.

627 Kullima, Garba, and Modu, "'Soldier of Fortune": From Intellectualist to Strategist in the Establishment and Consolidation of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty in Bornu in the 19th Century', 30.

628 In fact, *mai* of Bornu first tried to solve the problem using his own military and intellectual power. When some Pullo communities in Bornu decided to migrate to the Sokoto domain, *mai* of Bornu wrote to Uthman that he should convince them not to do that. He claimed that Bornu is *dar al-Islam*, not *dar al-harb*, so there is no reason for Fulbe to leave the country. Uthman first tried to find a compromise between them, but the tension soon escalated into a military conflict. Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, 2014, 171.

jihadist forces. Al-Kanemi proposed to the Dunama ibn Ali that if he were granted a *mahram* in exchange for a substantial tract of land, he would initiate a military campaign, a proposal that the *mai* quickly accepted.⁶²⁹

Sheikh Ibrahim Salih bin Yunus ascribes the ascendancy of al-Kanemi to authority to two pivotal connections: his expansive interregional network facilitated the acquisition of support from diverse areas and enabled consistent communication with prominent individuals and leaders in Tripoli and Cairo. Second, he was integrated into the scholarly tradition of Bornu, drawing upon a longstanding academic community.⁶³⁰ These both characteristics made him one of the most formidable rivals against Uthman's jihad. In this regard, his counter-offensive against jihad forces was initially characterized by an intellectual and diplomatic approach. As early as 1808, he dispatched agents to the west with the objective of discerning the true objective of Uthman. Additionally, he initiated a correspondence with the military commanders and scholars of Uthman's jihad who were engaged in combat operations in the territory of Bornu.

In one of his letters, al-Kanemi explicitly contests the prevailing narrative surrounding jihad, and the associated *mujaddid*/mahdi discourse. Inasmuch as jihadist commanders in the frontiers of Bornu were profoundly influenced by the Mahdist discourses from the *riasa* rule of Uthman, they disseminated arguments claiming that the reason for their rapid success was the will of God, considering Uthman's spiritual power was a crystallization of God's will. Al-Kanemi critiqued these narratives, referencing his own scholarly tradition in Bornu. He argues that the military successes achieved in the jihad against the Hausa state do not necessarily validate the legitimacy of Uthman's jihad as divinely sanctioned.⁶³¹ Although al-Kanemi does not overtly specify the assertions made by the recipient of the letter, he insinuates that the jihadist forces employ an *Ashari* theological framework to substantiate their movement. This framework is rooted in Al-Ghazali's interpretation of the theological principles established by al-Hasan al-Ashari (d. 936), which were predominantly adhered to by the *Maliki* and *Shafi* schools of Islamic jurisprudence, particularly in West and East Africa. According to this interpretation, significant historical occurrences are believed to transpire solely in accordance with divine will; thus, a military campaign that swiftly achieves multiple victories is perceived as a manifestation of God's will.⁶³²

629 Kullima, Garba, and Modu, "Soldier of Fortune": From Intellectualist to Strategist in the Establishment and Consolidation of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty in Borno in the 19th Century', 30.

630 P.C. 10., Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Ibn Yunus, 'Al-Islām Fī Kānim-Bornū Wa-Dawr al "Ulamā"'.

631 N.A.U.I., 82/237.

632 Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm Al-Dīn*, vol. 1 (Cairo: Uthmaniyya, 1933), 116.

Conversely, within the intellectual milieu of Bornu, several prominent texts authored by local scholars directly challenge the theological tenets of Al-Ḥasan Al-Ash‘arī by juxtaposing them with the doctrines of Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 944). One of the most influential of these texts was *Manzumah al-Kubra* written by Bornuan scholar Tahir bin Ibrahim around the 1770s. Although Mansur al-Maturidi’s theological doctrine was mainly followed by *Hanafi* school of Islamic law, that is to say in the domain of Ottoman Empire, in this text, Tahir critiques specific arguments posited by Al-Hasan al-Ashari and advocates for the perspectives of Mansur al-Maturidi, ultimately asserting that both doctrines share a common and rational foundation. However, Tahir's main argument is about how to interpret divine will. He posits, referencing Mansur al-Maturidi, that no historical action is independent of human agency. The will of God can only be discerned retrospectively over the long term, rather than in the immediacy of events, considering God ultimately safeguards virtuous actions and punishes transgressions, albeit in a complex manner rather than through direct and immediate intervention.⁶³³ Indeed, Tahir’s text from the late 18th century had its own historical content. Inasmuch as Bornu was experiencing a significant hegemonic decline, marked by the loss of numerous conflicts by the late 18th century, scholars like Tahir sought to illustrate that these military defeats should not be interpreted as manifestations of divine punishment. In this regard, it is not surprising that al-Kanemi articulates arguments akin to those of Tahir in his critique of the successes attributed to Uthman's jihad, albeit without direct attribution to Tahir.

In another letter dated 1810, al-Kanemi articulates a perspective that reflects a prevalent discourse throughout the eastern region of southern Central Sudan, which is significantly shaped by the scholarly circles of Cairo. In this correspondence, he poses a critical question: “How can you, as a Muslim, justify your aggression towards a Muslim society? Have you been led to believe that we are 'infidels,' thereby obligating you to wage war against us?”⁶³⁴ Notably, when the Khedive of Egypt dispatched an army to invade Darfur in the 1820s, a similar line of reasoning, characterized by identical rhetorical inquiries, was employed by the chief scholar of Darfur, who, like al-Kanemi, had received his education in Cairo.⁶³⁵ This indicates that al-Kanemi was contributing to a sophisticated scholarly discourse that encompassed both the intellectual traditions of Cairo and the scholarly communities of Bornu.

633 Tahir bin Ibrahim, ‘Manzūmah Al-Kubrā’. N.N.A., C/AR1/6.

634 N.H.R.S., Bornu 29.

635 Naim Şükrü Bey, *Tarih Al-Sūdān* (Cairo, 1903), 131.

The intellectual endeavours of al-Kanemi reached their peak when he commenced a direct correspondence with Bello and Uthman after the year 1809. These exchanges are meticulously preserved in Bello's chronicle. Interestingly enough, Bello's confidence in the validity of his own arguments led him to document al-Kanemi's letters verbatim, that is to say, citing them as they are.⁶³⁶ He presumed that readers of his chronicle would readily discern the "paradoxes" inherent in al-Kanemi's arguments. Nevertheless, these letters provide significant insights into the scholarly and political divergences between Sokoto and Bornu, rather than seeking to determine the correctness of either party's position.

The central debate in these correspondences is whether the jihad of Uthman in Bornu is legitimate. In his first letter, al-Kanemi directly challenges the narrative presented by Uthman and Bello, arguing that their claim of labelling certain Muslim groups in Bornu as "unbelievers" based on their practices is unsubstantiated. To illustrate his point, with his personal inclination to the principle of *tadbir*, al-Kanemi argues that "slaughtering animals to some trees does not make people "unbeliever", since they do it for the welfare of community [*maslaha*], not reject the God, and they follow all main principles of Islam as Muslim. Know that in Dimyat [a city in Egypt], there is also a famous three that people slaughter animals. So far, no scholar in the East [/Ottoman Empire] called them "unbelievers". This issue is about *haram* (Ar. sinful, forbidden), not *kufr* (Ar. rejection of God)."⁶³⁷ In his response, with his stance for the principles of *riasa*, Bello narrates another story: "Once, there was a tree in Sijilmasa [a city in Morocco] that people granted gifts to it. When a scholar saw this practice, he cut the tree and informed people that by doing so he saved them from *kufr*."⁶³⁸ It is noticeable that whilst al-Kanemi is referring to the Ottoman domain for his narrative, Bello refers to the domain of Morocco. This intellectual attribution of the different parts of the Islamic world also plays a significant role in the further discussion. This difference also illuminates the deep traditional differences between Hausaland and Kanem/Bornu. As Ahmad Kani emphasized, Islam entered Kanem/Bornu via Tripoli and Egypt/Sudan, in the case of Hausaland, the expansion of Islam began in the Futa regions and Timbuktu, and then spread westward.⁶³⁹ Hence, most of the historical and intellectual references in the Hausaland were connected to Morocco, whereas the main reference points in Bornu were from the Ottoman domain. Although these two

636 Some existing copies of real letters in the National Archive of Nigeria prove that Bello cites these letters without argumentative change.

637 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*, chap. 60.

638 Muhammadu Bello, chap. 62.

639 Ahmad Muhammad Kani, 'Introduction and Consolidation of Islam in the Central Sudan; with Special Reference to Kanem Borno and Hausaland, up to the Seventeenth Century', in *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest*, ed. Samba Dieng (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999), 10.

scholarly traditions were shaped by the same school of law, Maliki, these traditional scholarly networks also had their own impact. For instance, scholar families in Kel Essouq were among the most prominent scholar networks between Hausaland and Senegambia with the Kunta and al-Ansar families during the 19th century.⁶⁴⁰ Even celebrated scholar Mukhar Al-Kunti, who was very popular in the Hausaland thanks to Abdullahi and Bello,⁶⁴¹ had lessons from Essouq teachers.⁶⁴² However, historically and traditionally, the scholar families of Essouq were connected with Tripoli through Ghadames, as was the case for Bornu, not with Morocco. As a result, in spite of their social prestige, they barely played any crucial role among the political life of Iwilimmeden of Kel Tamasheq in the western part of the southern Central Sudan,⁶⁴³ whereas scholars in Ghadames were asking *fatwas* (Ar. legal advise to *qadi*, issued by a jurist) from the jurists in Essouq.⁶⁴⁴ Even more interestingly, in the 1830s, an Essouq scholar, Harun Mohammad Al-Asuki (d. 18??), wrote a similar kind of correspondences to Bello, as al-Kanemi did, after hearing attacks on some Iwilimmeden communities by caliphal forces. In one of his missives to Bello, Harun Mohammad Al-Asuki states that they have received favourable accounts of him, Bello, and his father. Nevertheless, it is imperative to ensure that justice is administered impartially across all segments of society, including Kel Tamasheq communities, without resorting to the unjustified characterization of these communities as "unbelievers."⁶⁴⁵ The networks of scholars were indeed not entirely static; they also underwent transformations, especially with the establishment of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. For example, prior to the 19th century, there is no documented evidence indicating that any scholar from Tripoli travelled to Hausaland for educational purposes. However, following the 1830s, the prominence of the Fodiwa family became known in Tripoli, prompting some scholars to journey to Sokoto for their education. One of them was Sheihk Abu Bakr bin Al-Qadi Hassan Al-Sanari (d. 18??). He was the imam and teacher in the Ahmad Pasha Al-Qaramanli Mosque in Tripoli around the 1850s. In one of his *ijazat* documents (Ar. confirmation of educative lineage), Sheihk Abu Bakr lists the places where he received an education and the teachers who

640 Humam Hashim Al-Alusi, *Al-Tawariq al-Shaib Wa-l-Qadhiyah Tarikhana Mansiyana, Wa Hadhiran Maqhuran, Wa Mustaqbalan Majhulan* (Rabat: Dar Abi Riqraq li-l-Ribayat wa-l-Nashr, 2010), 175.

641 This further increased his popularity and created a friendly relationship for future generations. Mukhtar Al-Kunti's successor, Ahmad Al-Bakkay Al-Kunti, wrote several poems about Bello to highlight his good religious character. P.C. 3., 18863.

642 Yahya Said Ahmadu, *Kitab Diwan Al-Sahra al-Kubra: Al-Madrasat al-Kuntiyat Wa-l-Qasayid al-Niyrat* (Al-Jazayir: Wizarat Al-Thaqafat al-Jazayir, 2009), 35.

643 See: Ahmad Al-Ansari and Sadayiq Al-Ansari, *Al-Shier al-Ansari Wa Tarikha Fi Marahilih al-Thalat* (Riyad, 2008), 412.

644 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, an undated fatwa in the 19th century.

645 Muhammad, *Al-Shier al-Arabiyyu Ind al-Tawariq: Kal Al-Suq*, 316.

taught him. He mentions his stay in Sokoto and his teacher Sheihk Adem bin Bello al-Fulani, who was the son of Muhammad Bello.⁶⁴⁶

In addition to the regional and traditional disparities, there existed notable differences in opinion among Bello-Uthman, who supported *riasa* during this period, al-Kanemi, who favoured a *tadbir* approach, and Abdullahi, who advocated for *idara*.⁶⁴⁷ In his writings from around the 1810s, Abdullahi recounts a narrative concerning the practice of offering gifts to trees. He observes that "many nomadic Pullo Muslims engage in local ceremonies that are not sanctioned by any Islamic doctrine, such as presenting gifts to trees. To interpret such ceremonies as a repudiation of God, or *kufur*, would overlook the fact that these individuals believe in God and adhere to sharia, similar to other Muslims."⁶⁴⁸ At this juncture, the fundamental distinctions among the three governing strategies and their perspectives on analogous practices hinge upon their interpretations. For Bello and Uthman, prior to 1815, within their *riasa* discourse, unorthodox practices are deemed sufficient grounds to question the Islamic faith of a community, irrespective of their adherence to the Islamic law, thereby rendering the declaration of jihad against them permissible. For al-Kanemi, and his *tadbir* policy, such practices may be conducted for the sake of social welfare, suggesting that there is no inherent issue with them. In essence, as long as these practices yield positive outcomes for society, their alignment with main Islamic principles is of secondary importance. In other words, as long as there are good results for the society, it does not matter if such practices are defined by the main Islamic tenets. Abdullahi, however, contends that unorthodox practices cannot contribute positively to social welfare, contrary to al-Kanemi's assertion, considering he believes that only the implementation of Islamic law can achieve such ends. Nonetheless, he emphasizes the importance of tolerating these practices to foster a peaceful social environment, provided that the communities in question are already adhering to the Islamic law. In short, a clear distinction centered around the system of governance in the western and eastern parts of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate and Bornu was also evident in other topics of debate.

After these critical debates, the correspondence between Bello and al-Kanemi intensified in its confrontational tone. In his responds, Bello explicitly invokes Al-Maghili to bolster his position. Conversely, al-Kanemi consistently asserts that "such opinions do not rely on the Islamic

646 D.M.T.L., Waqf Collection of Ahmad Pasha Qaramanli Mosque, ijazat, dated as 1866.

647 Mukhtar Umar Bunza, 'The Significance of the Doctrinal Disputations between Muhammad Al-Amin al-Kanemi and the Leadership of the Sokoto Caliphate, 1804-1817', in *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, ed. T. El-Miskin et al., vol. Vol 1 (Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013), 358.

648 Abdullahi dan Fodio, 'Diyā' Al-Sulṭān Wa-Ġayrihi Min al-'Iḥwān Fī Aḥam Mā Yuṭlabu 'Ilmuhu Fī Umūr al-Zamān'.

intellectual tradition that we had from East [/Ottoman Empire]" thereby arguing for the intellectual preeminence of the Ottoman realm over that of Morocco.⁶⁴⁹ By aligning himself with the Ottoman domain, al-Kanemi seeks to assert his political superiority over Bello. As another argument for their jihad, Bello posits that corruption and "sinful" practices pervade Bornu, rendering it impossible for the populace to adhere to Islam appropriately. Consequently, he argues that it is permissible to declare jihad in order to restore Islam in Bornu. However, al-Kanemi counters this by emphasizing his intellectual heritage from the "East" and introducing a *tadbir* perspective. Al-Kanemi claims that "from the times of first Caliphs to the Ottoman Empire, every generation had problems by tending toward "sins" and corruption. There was no single period in which the whole society was pure. However, our whole jurisdiction [*Maliki*] relies on scholars from these periods. If having "sinful" society would make all these people unbeliever than we should reject the whole Islamic law."⁶⁵⁰ In essence, al-Kanemi critiques the viability of Al-Maghili's *riasa* system.

At this juncture, Bello swifts the direction of debate and starts to argue that their jihad is legitimate in Bornu, "because *mai* of Bornu supported Hausa states against jihad movement, and as Al-Maghili said, supporting "unbeliever" against Muslims is *kufr*". In response to Bello's insistence of the *riasa* arguments, al-Kanemi consistently employs *tadbir* arguments to refute them, contending that "the jihad led by Uthman has resulted in the deaths of countless innocent individuals and has caused widespread plunder and suffering... This jihad is no more about *din* (Ar. religion) but very clearly about *siyasa*... Your quest for power yields no benefit for the populace, only further suffering." In this point, Bello expresses a desire to sever ties with al-Kanemi, dismissing his arguments as "nonsense" and even labelling al-Kanemi himself an "unbeliever." However, Uthman subsequently enters the debate, addressing al-Kanemi in a letter where he acknowledges al-Kanemi's scholarly reputation and commendable actions. In his letter to al-Kanemi, he states, "It is known to me your scholarly prestige as well as your good deeds. But you should know that *mai* of Bornu oppresses several Muslim communities just because they demand stricter execution of Islamic law and governance. Your side is our side, not Bornu."⁶⁵¹

It is important to highlight that while Bello steadfastly adhered to his narrative of *riasa* without any concessions, Uthman, indicative of his future inclination towards *tadbir*, sought to mitigate the

649 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*.

650 Muhammadu Bello. *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*.

651 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*.

conflict with al-Kanemi and aimed to establish some form of compromise.⁶⁵² For instance, in one of his letters, Uthman refrained from outright rejecting al-Kanemi's arguments, referring to him as *muta'awwil*,⁶⁵³ and acknowledging his community as good Muslims.⁶⁵⁴ This distinction between Bello's rigid stance on *riasa* and Uthman's more conciliatory approach through *tadbir* becomes particularly pronounced at this juncture. Bello labels al-Kanemi as an "unbeliever;" yet, Uthman explicitly recognizes him as a good Muslim and a scholar, having some wrong interpretations.

It is noteworthy that al-Kanemi does not reference *mai* of Bornu in his correspondences, opting instead to represent his own identity and community. Despite the fervent discussions, the exchanges between al-Kanemi and Uthman-Bello ceased around 1812 without yielding a definitive resolution. During this timeframe, the jihad forces experienced several defeats in Bornu at the hands of al-Kanemi's troops. This profound intellectual and military contention, however, paved the way for the emergence of new intellectual and subsequently military movements. Umar ibn Said Futi (aka. Hajj Umar Tall), (d. 1864),⁶⁵⁵ who was in Bornu around the 1830s after receiving a Tijjani brotherhood doctrine in Mecca, wrote a text calling for a reconciliation between Bornu and Sokoto. He argued that it is the responsibility of Muslim rulers to solve their problems without clashing, since shedding the blood of Muslims is forbidden. Along these lines, he introduced his Tijjani doctrine as an alternative to these two scholarly tradition.⁶⁵⁶ However, this also caused his unplanned early leave from Kuka, since al-Kanemi did not allow him to preach for a rival religious brotherhood.⁶⁵⁷

In this respect, although al-Kanemi came to power thanks to the general implementation of *dairat al-siyasa*, and in conjunction with this, through the specific implementation of *ray*. He favoured a broader application of *tadbir*, which was not a novel concept but rather a revival of traditional

652 According to Kyar Tijjani, this divergence can also be attributed to the differing political circumstances of Bello and al-Kanemi. Unlike Bello, who held the ruler position and thereupon faced significant political stakes, al-Kanemi had the flexibility to leave the country if his endeavours were unsuccessful. This disparity contributed to Bello's more aggressive rhetoric, as his entire political position was at risk, a situation that did not apply to al-Kanemi. For further details: Kyar Tijjani, 'Issues in the Shariah Debate - Learning from Al-Kanemi: A Political Economy Perspective', *Bornu Museum Socieity Newsletter* 52–53 (2001): 21–28.

653 An Arabic term denoting one who interprets Islamic law, which may be subject to error but cannot be dismissed as an unbeliever.

654 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*.

655 Born in Futa Tooro, present-day Senegal, he was a prominent Islamic scholar and military commander in the 19th century. Following his return from pilgrimage, he resided in Bornu in 1830. He subsequently lived in Sokoto for seven years, marrying one of the daughters of Bello. In the 1840s, he returned to the Futa region, establishing his own jihadist movement and Islamic state. For more details, see: Hadja Tall, 'Al Hajj Umar Tall: The Biography of a Controversial Leader', *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 32, no. 1 (2006): 73–90.

656 P.C. 3., 34121.

657 Omar Jah, 'Sufism and Nineteenth Century Jihad Movements in the West Africa' (Ph.D. Thesis, Quebec, McGill University, 1973), 136.

governance strategies in Bornu, as well as in Hausaland. Hence, al-Kanemi adeptly capitalized on various political, intellectual, and economic opportunities to establish optimal conditions for his authority. Although he was neither the sultan in his realm nor the *mai* of Bornu, from 1808 to 1814, he wielded power comparable to that of the *mai*. He undertook several strategic manoeuvres, including compelling Mai Muhammad—who had ascended to the throne by deposing Dunama Lefiami in 1810—to relinquish his position in favour of Dunama Lefiami in 1814, who had previously granted al-Kanemi *mahram*.⁶⁵⁸ This event epitomized al-Kanemi's application of *tadbir*, as he did not seek to become the *mai*; rather, he aimed to exert influence as a kingmaker, governing through indirect involvement. By doing so, *mais* of Bornu became useful instruments for his own *tadbir* policies before overtaking a whole administrative and political system that is deeply shaped by *idara* through *dairat al-siyasa*.⁶⁵⁹ In this regard, al-Kanemi allowed the *mais* of Bornu to retain their positions, thereby creating a distinct political space for himself. Unlike other actors who had likewise *mahram*, who could enjoy implementation of *ray*, al-Kanemi was the only one who could implement also *islah* by allocating the whole state administrations and military structures for his military plans. In that regard, he could apply *tadbir* in a general sense, as was the case in the previous century in Bornu.

In contrast with the *tadbir* implementation by the *mais* of Bornu in the preceding century, al-Kanemi's application of *tadbir* yielded successful outcomes well into the 1810s. During this period, whilst engaged with jihad forces in the western regions, he forged an alliance with Wadai, encouraging its *kolak* to conduct raids on Baghirmi in order to mitigate the escalating threat of a potential invasion from the south, which was exacerbated by the internal conflicts Bornu faced with Sokoto.⁶⁶⁰ The only precarious situation arose in 1817 when a new Wadai-supported ruler of Baghirmi allied with the *mai* of Bornu to challenge al-Kanemi's authority. He was able to thwart this coalition only through the military assistance of Yusuf *paşa*, whose forces defeated the Baghirmi troops while al-Kanemi remained preoccupied in the west.⁶⁶¹ Following his victories against Sokoto and Baghirmi, facilitated by support from Tripoli, al-Kanemi shifted his focus towards the southern territories.

658 Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Ibn Yunus, 'Mūjaz Ta'rīkh Bilād Borno'. P.C. 10., uncategorized.

659 Amma Khurso, 'Imbiraturiat Kanam Bornu Wa Salatuha Bi Al-Alam al-Islami Fi Eahd al-Usrat al-Kanimiya (1900-1846)', in *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, ed. T. El-Miskin et al., vol. Vol 1 (Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013), 96.

660 Ali, *Bornu Fi Eahd Al-Usrat al-Kawmiyyati*, 186–87.

661 Ibrahim Ali Tarkhan, *Imbraturiyatu l'Borno al-Islamiyyah* (Cairo: Al-Maktabah Al-Arabiyyah, 1975), 137.

In 1821, al-Kanemi once again sought military collaboration with Yusuf *paşa* to launch a joint offensive against the weakened Baghirmi, thereby compelling them into a vassalage position with tribute payment.⁶⁶² Benefiting from a steady supply of firearms and horses sourced from Murzuq and Tripoli, al-Kanemi effectively leveraged his extensive networks. One of the indirect outcomes of these robust connections was a significant increase in trade activities between Tripoli and Kuka, which in turn bolstered al-Kanemi's economic influence. Furthermore, around 1826, by redirecting Sokoto forces from Katagum to the increasingly aggressive Tripolitan forces—who posed a threat to Bornu—he successfully averted a potential Tripolitan invasion of Bornu without engaging in direct conflict with Tripoli.⁶⁶³ However, despite this strategic manoeuvre, which he planned to capture Kano after weakening the Sokoto forces with Tripolitan divisions, his forces ultimately could not dismantle the power of Sokoto or capture Kano, as the forces from Bauchi unexpectedly joined the conflict.⁶⁶⁴ In the 1830s, in response to the threat posed by Sokoto, al-Kanemi established walled towns along the Sokoto frontier, employing tactics similar to those of Bello and his application of *tadbir*.⁶⁶⁵ In addition to this, similar to Bello, also al-Kanemi created his own city, Kuka, around 1815s, which subsequently emerged as the most significant city in the entirety of Bornu.⁶⁶⁶ Through his dynamic application of *tadbir*, utilizing *ray* and *islah* interchangeably as circumstances dictated, al-Kanemi positioned Bornu as a prominent political actor in southern Central Sudan following the 1810s. Some historians even compared his successful *tadbir* system with the foreign policy of the U.S.A: “no permanent friend no permanent enemy but permanent interest.”⁶⁶⁷

The success attributed to al-Kanemi's strategic management via *tadbir*, necessitated considerable effort on his part to cultivate favourable conditions amidst various internal factions, such as the *mais* and *shettimas*, as well as external powers surrounding Bornu, including Sokoto, Baghirmi, Wadai, and Tripoli. Al-Kanemi recognized the formidable influence of *galadima* (Kn. a title for fief holders in the west of Bornu), the most powerful fief holder on Bornu's western front, and took

662 B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/13

663 Muhammad al-Hadi Abu Ajilat, *Al-Nashar al-Libiyu Fi al-Bahr al-Mutawasit* (Benghazi: Manshurat Jamiat al-Qaryuns, 1997), 129.

664 K.S.C.B., SNP 17/97/5.

665 N.H.R.S., Geidam Distric Report.

666 Mustafa Basyuni, *Bornu Fi Eahd Al-Usrat al-Kanemiyat, 1814-1969* (Riyad: Dar Al-Ulum li-l-Tibiyat wa-l-Nashri, 1984), 186.

667 Kullima, Garba, and Modu, ““Soldier of Fortune”: From Intellectualist to Strategist in the Establishment and Consolidation of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty in Borno in the 19th Century’, 32.

deliberate measures to diminish his authority.⁶⁶⁸ Although in 1829, the incumbent *galadima* noticed this strategy and openly rebelled against al-Kanemi by taking the *lawan* (Kn. local administrative) of Gummel and Munoyi in his side,⁶⁶⁹ he lost the war and had to escape to Hadeja Emirate, hoping the involvement of the caliph in Sokoto. This involvement, however, never happened.⁶⁷⁰

In relation to Tripoli, al-Kanemi was tasked with the intricate challenge of preventing a potential northern invasion, whilst simultaneously fostering a relationship that would not jeopardize the vital trans-Saharan trade between Kuka and Tripoli, a crucial economic lifeline for Bornu. In particular, following the outbreak of civil war in Tripoli in 1830, al-Kanemi devised a strategy to establish a new trade route under the authority of Bornu. In approximately 1833, he wrote to the Khedive of Egypt, proposing the establishment of a new trade route between Cairo and Kuka.⁶⁷¹ However, the distinctive aspect of al-Kanemi's plan was the introduction of a unique coinage for this trade. After attempting to identify an optimal method for printing a substantial quantity of coins, in 1835 he opted to request a printing machine from the British Consul in Cairo.⁶⁷² In 1836, he even dispatched an envoy to Cairo to obtain technical information regarding coin printing, and once again demand the printing machine from the British consul.⁶⁷³ Nevertheless, Britain never took his demands seriously. Following al-Kanemi's death in 1837, the plan to create a new route between Cairo and Kuka using Bornawi coins was effectively abandoned.

In response to Wadai's aggressive policies towards Kanem in 1830, al-Kanemi established connections with his relatives from the Awlad Sulaiman community in Fezzan, who were already controlling the big part of Fezzan in their rebellion against Yusuf *paşa*, offering them land in Kanem to counter Wadai's influence, which effectively curtailed Wadai's expansion.⁶⁷⁴ around the same

668 Bornu was separated under four big fiefholders with different names. *Kaigama* was the fiefholder of the south, *Yerima* was the fiefholder of the north, *Galadima* was the fiefholder of the west, and *Mustarma* was the fiefholder of the east. Afif Muhammad Awuda, 'Athat Al-Lughat al-Arabiyat Eala al-Mamalik Wa-l-Saltanat Fi Wasat Afrikiya', in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 29.

669 Maïkoréma Zakari, 'Contribution a l'histoire Des Population Du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas Du Mangari (XVIe - XIXe Siècle)' (Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris VII, 1983), 269.

670 Abdulkadir Benasheikh, 'The 19th Century Galadimas of Bornu', in *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, ed. Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), 142–48.

671 Al-Qurashi, 'Al-Tawasul al-Thaqafi Wa-l-Iqtisadi Bayn Mamlakat Kanim Birnu Wa Misr Khilal al-Fatrat Ma Bayn al-Qarnayn al-Saadis Eashr Wa-l-Thaasie Eashr al-Miladin', 187.

672 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 78/284.

673 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 78/285.

674 Kullima, Garba, and Modu, "'Soldier of Fortune": From Intellectualist to Strategist in the Establishment and Consolidation of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty in Borno in the 19th Century', 33.

years, he also wrote letters to Kanembu communities in Kanem to advise them to have peaceful relation with Awlad Sulaiman and not following any rule from Wadai.⁶⁷⁵

In spite of these numerous achievements, with some uncompleted projects, al-Kanemi experienced a degree of exhaustion due to the complexities inherent in *tadbir* and began to perceive contradictions between his religious scholarship and the pragmatic demands of governance. In a letter written in the 1820s to his sister in Murzuq, he articulated a sense of spiritual dislocation, stating, "although I wield significant political and military power, I feel that I have lost my religious path. I would be content to abandon everything and escape like a man enslaved who seeks freedom."⁶⁷⁶ Still, al-Kanemi's successes against Sokoto, both militarily and intellectually, established Kuka as a new centre of scholarship, attracting numerous scholars from Hausaland who were discontented with the ideologies and rule of the dan Fodiyo dynasty after the 1820s.⁶⁷⁷ In his late period, al-Kanemi wrote his only text concerning governance,⁶⁷⁸ *Nasihāt li-l-Hakim*. In this text, he posits that they are experiencing a period of significant hardship. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the rulers to assume responsibility for *implementing the requisite measures (tadbir)*, because "... *cavhar al-hukkam huva al-tadbir* (the essence of ruling is *tadbir*)".⁶⁷⁹

Prior to his demise in 1837, al-Kanemi bestowed upon his son Umar al-Kanemi the *mahram* privileges, which granted him the authority to oversee a significant portion of Bornu. In this respect, his son subsequently continued to implement *tadbir*, which ultimately resulted in the end of the Sayfawa dynasty in Bornu around 1846, and al-Kanemi dynasty took the whole control in Bornu.

3.3. From *idara* to ray-based *tadbir* in Wadai

In the late 18th century, Wadai functioned as a relatively weak political entity situated between two dominant states, Bornu and Darfur, obeying their vassalage system. This arrangement was the outcome of a lengthy historical process, as Bornu, through its connection with Tripoli, and Darfur, through its association with Cairo, had established themselves as key centres for trans-Saharan trade. Wadai, on the other hand, had no direct access to the Mediterranean coast, and must have dealt with

675 M.B.D.A., uncategorized, a letter from the 1830s.

676 N.H.R.S., Bornu 46.

677 Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Ibn Yunus, 'Masādir Ta'rīkh Borno Wa Kanem'. P.C. 10., uncategorized.

678 He mostly shared his ideas through letters rather than scholarly texts. Muslihuddin Yahya, 'Historiography of Kanem-Borno "Ulama" and Their Contributions to Learning', in *Impact of the Ulama in Central Sudan*, ed. Abubakar Mustapha and Abubakar Garba, Trans-Saharan Studies (University of Maiduguri, 1991), 38.

679 Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi, 'Naṣīḥat li-l-ḥākīm'. P.C. 10., uncategorized.

Bornuan and Darfurian merchants and middle-men who were controlling the trade. Furthermore, Bornu and Darfur were in regular contact with Istanbul, which in return they gained political and military support.⁶⁸⁰ For instance, the sultan of Darfur, Abdullrahman Al-Rasheed, who reigned between 1787 and 1801, was sent to İstanbul by his father for training in governance and religious education.⁶⁸¹ In another example, during a dynastic conflict in Darfur in 1861, one faction sought the intervention of the Ottoman *padişah* by writing to İstanbul.⁶⁸²

At the beginning of the 19th century, the real rival of Wadai in this respect was Baghirmi. Like Wadai, Baghirmi had no direct access to the Mediterranean coast and depended on Bornu and Darfur merchants.⁶⁸³ Thus, Baghirmi and Wadai had to implement *dairat al-siyasa* to protect their autonomy against Bornu and Darfur without clashing with them in the 18th century, as both were vassals of Bornu.⁶⁸⁴ However, this system underwent a significant transformation in Wadai with the ascension of Abdulkarim Sabun to the throne around 1804, when he dethroned his father with a military coup.⁶⁸⁵ According to al-Tunisi's personal observations from 1803 to 1815, Sabun recognized the importance of accessing the Mediterranean coast markets at a very early age. Prior to his reign, he displayed a keen interest in acquiring goods from the northern regions, particularly firearms from Bornu and Darfur. To avoid arousing suspicion, he would send his clients, who were mostly enslaved individuals, to these markets dressed in Maghrebian attire to create the impression that they were from Morocco.⁶⁸⁶

In 1804, when he was on the throne, he attempted to send his clients even further, to Murzuq. However, the journey proved to be arduous as there was no established route for merchants travelling from Wara, the capital city of Wadai, to Murzuq. Nonetheless, al-Tunisi recounts that an unexpected arrival of an Arab merchant from Murzuq in 1805 provided to Sabun exactly what he

680 While Tripoli and Cairo served as significant hubs for Bornu and Darfur in terms of trans-Saharan trade and military supplies, İstanbul emerged as the principal political centre from which they frequently solicited assistance. An illustrative instance of this is a letter from the Sultan of Darfur to the Ottoman *padişah*, in which he expressed grievances regarding the oppressive policies of the Egyptian Khedive towards Darfurian merchants, ultimately requesting intervention from İstanbul. This correspondence resulted in the Ottoman *padişah* compelling the Egyptian Khedive to improve his treatment of the merchants. B.O.A., Sadaret Âmedî Kalemi Defterleri, 56/30.

681 Naim Şükrü Bey, *Tarih Al-Sūdān*, 121.

682 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezâreti Siyasî Kısım Evrakı, 1947/53.

683 Mahamat Kodi, 'Islam, Societes et Pouvoir Politique Au Baghirmi (Tchad), Des Origines Au Milieu Du XIX^{ème} Siecle' (Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Université de Paris I, 1993), 353.

684 Muhammd al-Amin Al-Abqari, 'Al-Islamiyat Fi Mamlakat Wa Baqarami' (Ph.D. Thesis, Khartoum, Africa International Univerisity, 2003), 68.

685 Uthman Ahmad Uthman, 'Athar Al-Istimar al-Thaqafiyat Wa-l-Iqtisadiyat Eala al-Muslimin Fir Wasat Afrikiya - Tshad Mamudhajan', in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 154.

686 Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi, *Voyage Au Ouaday*, 94.

sought. According to his account, this Arab merchant lost his way in the Sahara with his caravan while he was on the way to Murzuq from Awjila, in southern Benghazi. All his clients died, but he was found around northern Wadai. He was brought to tell his story before the *kolak*. The merchant claimed to have discovered an unknown route that would connect Benghazi to Wara.⁶⁸⁷ If sultan would give him enough camel and enslaved people, he could return to coast through this so far unknown route, and establish a direct trade between Wadai and Mediterranean coast. The high motivation of this Arab merchant from Awjila was not a mere coincidence; the city was a prominent trade hub for gold between Timbuktu and Cairo at the beginning of the 18th century. Nevertheless, tax registrations of Ottoman Egypt in Cairo demonstrate that this trade underwent a significant decline throughout the century. For instance, the total value of gold exported from Awjila to Cairo in 1710 was 20 times greater than the total value gold in 1790. By the 1800s, the trade had essentially collapsed.⁶⁸⁸ Therefore, the merchants were in need of a new trade flow for their survival. In 1810, the historical and economic intersection of the interests of Awjila merchants and the Sultan of Wadai was the key to solving their deep problem. In that regard, the sultan accepted the merchants' plan and provided them with what they needed for the journey. The Arab merchant arrived in Awjila without incident and duly informed the *kolak* of his success. In response, the *kolak* arranged for the dispatch of numerous additional caravans to Derna and Benghazi via this newly established route, a process that commenced around 1806. Consequently, by 1810, Wadai had secured access to the Mediterranean coastline at Bengazi through Awjila.⁶⁸⁹

During this period, the region of Bornu was grappling with tensions involving Sokoto. Darfur was contending with issues related to Senna. In this regard, the importation of firearms from Benghazi to Wadai was the primary concern for these states. At this point, Sabun encountered a significant obstacle. Since Wadai was a long-time small state under the control of Bornu and Darfur, without having access to the north, there were no merchant communities, nor enough manufacture production that could meet the burgeoning demand for trans-Sahara trade. Hence, Sabun was compelled to manage the entirety of trade operations in Wadai independently, conducting business on his own behalf and with his own capital. Although acting as an economic agent is part of the *ray* system for rulers, being the only economic agent is the character of *riasa*. In this regard, this

687 This route commenced in Wara and concluded in Kufra, traversing the Ouanianga Lakes. The distinctive feature of these lakes is the contrast in their water chemistry. One lake is saline, providing salt for camels during their journey, while the other is freshwater, teeming with fish, and offering sustenance and water to merchants. S.A.D.U., 258/1/907a, (Salama Ghigidan interviewed by Reginald Wingate in 1895 in Cairo).

688 D.K.W.K., Tax Registration, Daftar 4170/31, 4283/145, 4284/146.

689 Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi, *Voyage Au Ouaday*, 212–14.

unconventional *riasa* application (which, from a typical euro-centric perspective of a French consul in Jidde, this was a “*usual african feudal despotic rule*”⁶⁹⁰) was also noticed by the Arab merchants in Benghazi and Awjila. However, the reality was different. In one of the letters from Awjila, a merchant narrates his observations in Wara, when he travelled with the caravan of Sabun that was returning from Derne. Upon their arrival in Wara, he was introduced to the *kolak*. Sabun wanted to see what kinds of products he had. Thereafter, he bought all of them from him. As the merchant had no chance to negotiate with the *kolak* for price, he had to accept whatever Sabun proposed. According to his account, he was deeply saddened by this attempt, and then desired to visit the market of Wara to see the real prices for his products. However, he was quickly surprised by the fact that there was no real market where he could sell his products nor any long-trade merchant. He concludes, “if you come here, do not hesitate to sell your products to the *kolak*, because if he does not buy them, there is no one to buy, and he thinks like a merchant not like a sultan [that is to say, pay considerable price].”⁶⁹¹ In other words, Sabun was implementing *ray* only under some extreme conditions without having interest to apply *riasa*.

This shift from *idara* to *tadbir* was also supported by the claim of being caliph, to create a legal counterpart against Bornu and Darfur. Ahmad bin Abdullah, a scholar residing in the palace of Sabun in Wara, initiated the authorization of historical texts to substantiate the caliphal claim for Sabun, given the absence of a scholarly community in the city.⁶⁹² His objective was to soften the *ray* implementation of Sabun, which leaves an impression of *riasa*, since the Maliki jurisprudence categorically rejected the ruler's absolute presence in the marketplace. To show that Sabun does not act against sharia, he strives to build a caliphal narrative for him. In one of these texts, Ahmad tells the history of the Abbasid family as the successor of Muhammad: “From the time of Muhammad to 12th century, the Abbasid family ruled as caliphs over the Islamic world without any problems. When the Tatars [*sic!*] captured Baghdad, Caliph moved to Cairo. They continued to live there. But then the Turks and Mamluks also came. After a while, they took the power from the Abbasid family. Thus, the family’s sons went into exile in different regions. One of these sons was Salih. First, he

690 M. Fresnel, *Mémoire de M. Fresnel, Consul de France à Djeddah, Sur Le Waday (1848-1850)*, ed. Fresnel (Paris, 1850), 33.

691 P.A. 25, Letter dated as 1814.

692 It was, in fact, even a tradition if Wadai till the middle of the 19th century to travel to Baghirmi for Islamic education. Al-Abqari, ‘Al-Islamiyat Fi Mamlakat Wa Baqarami’, 128–29. In Baghirmi three scholar hubs emerged in the 16th century. These were centred around Muhammad al-Wali bin Sulaiman Mosque in Abqar, Omar al-Wadidah Mosque in Badri, and Muhammad Qaiqala Mosuq in Blou. Abdulkadi Abukar Adam, ‘Athat Al-Ulama Fi Nashr al-Islam Wa-l-Lughat al-Arabiyyat Fi Mamlakar Baqarmi al-Sheikh al-Wali Muhammad Bin Sulaiman Namudajan’, in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 62.

lived in Hijaz, then moved to Senna. At the end, he came to Wadai. He converted people to Islam and became the first sultan\caliph in Wadai around the 16th century, who was the ancestor of Sabun.”⁶⁹³

Although this narrative accurately reflects several real historical events, such as the fall of Baghdad, the capture of Cairo by the Ottomans, and the end of the caliphal title of the Abbasid family, there is no other record besides this text that recounts the caliphal claims of the Wadai sultans. Furthermore, al-Tunisi also mentions the fact that this scholar was a close adviser of Sabun.⁶⁹⁴ In this regard, it is challenging to ascertain whether the preceding *kolaks* also utilized the title of caliph, or if it was a construct that emerged during the era of Sabun, given the absence of documented evidence from the 18th century. Nevertheless, the historical accuracy of the text is remarkable. For instance, although Arabic sources do not prove any awareness of such caliphal claims by the *kolaks* of Wadai, the sources confirm that the *kolaks* of Wadai originated from an Arab family emigrated from Sudan to Wadai. It is, for them, just not clear if this Arab family was really related to the Abbasid family, which was also immigrated to Sudan.⁶⁹⁵ Furthermore, previous *kolaks* had close relations with the rest of the Islamic world, regardless their disinterest for caliphal claims. For instance, Kolak Jawda,⁶⁹⁶ ruled from 1747 to 1795 in Wadai, had initiated many endowment projects in Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, and Cairo. One of such endowments was the Salih Corridor⁶⁹⁷ in Al-Azhar University in Cairo.⁶⁹⁸ Thanks to such projects, the *kolaks* of Wadai were known in the Islamic world during the 19th century.⁶⁹⁹ In other words, whatever the fact is, Ahmad had already a

693 Ahmad bin Abdullah, unnamed manuscript from 1815. P.C. 6., uncategorized.

694 Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi, *Voyage Au Ouaday*, 70.

695 Abdulhaq Adam Muhammad, *Al-Aslam Fi Tshad Nadwat al-Islam Wa-l-Muslimun al-Atahum* (Trablus: Jamiat Al-Dawat Al-Islamiya, 1998), 298.

696 According to the chronicle of Wadai, he is the son of Kolak Harut al-Saghir, ruled from 1707 to 1747. He was called several names, including Kolak Khareef Timan and Sultan Muhammad Salih as well as al-Sharif. These appellations are attributed to his “eminence, virtue, and piety”. P.C. 6., uncategorized, ‘Chronicle of Wadai’.

697 The name of this corridor comes from the founder of the Wadai Sultanate, Abdulkadir Jami, who was nicknamed Salih. It is believed that he brought an end to the Tunjur dynasty in the region between 1615 and 1635 and established the Wadai Sultanate. Abukar Walar Mudaw, ‘Ishamat Dawr Al-Thaqafat al-Islamiyat Fi Nashr al-Lughat al-Arabiyat Bi Shad’, in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 73. The first capital was Kadma; thereafter, they established Wara. The last capital, Abeche, was built only in the 1850s. Al-Sadik Ahmad Adam, ‘Al-Mamalik Wa Duwaylat al-Islamiyat Fi Afrikiya Mamlakat Waday Namudhajan 1615-1909m’ (Al-mutamar al-duwali al-islam fi afrikiya, Khartoum, 2006), 313–43.

698 Makki Abdullah Al-Tijani, *Tarikh Uduhuli Al-Islam Wa-l-Tariqa al-Tijaniyya Fi Tshad* (Khartoum: Matba’ Al-Tamdun, 1999), 97.

699 However, rise of the scholar communities in Wadai only took place after the reign of Sabun in the 1800s. Al-Tayyib Ali Awam, ‘Al-’alaqa Bin al-’ulama Wa-l-Sultan Fi Mamlaka Waday’ (Ph.D. Thesis, N’djamena, Jamiat al-Malik Faysal, 2001), 38.

historical possibility to connect the *kolaks* of Wadai through Salih to the Abbasid family, and he used this chance.

The initial sphere in which Sabun applied his newly acquired economic and military advantages, facilitated by trade with Benghazi, was the campaign against Baghirmi around 1808. With a well-equipped army and ample supplies of firearms and horses, Sabun was also encouraged by al-Kanemi to launch an attack on Baghirmi. To rationalize this unexpected invasion, Sabun propagated a narrative, which even reached Muhammad Bello in Sokoto, alleging that the sultan of Baghirmi intended to marry his own daughter—a notion considered a profound taboo within Islamic discourse.⁷⁰⁰ According to this account, and in light of his caliphal claims, Sabun purportedly sought to prevent such a significant "scandal" within a Muslim society by launching an attack on Baghirmi. However, as Al-Tunisi observed first hand, the conflict was fundamentally political; Baghirmi was attempting to gain an advantage to assault Bornu and posed an unpredictable threat to Wadai, while simultaneously being sufficiently weakened to test Sabun's newly established forces.⁷⁰¹ After a swift victory, Baghirmi became the first vassal of Wadai. Notably, at this juncture, Sabun instituted a deliberate division of Wadai and Baghirmi. Rather than fully annexing Baghirmi and integrating it into Wadai under his rule, he permitted another sultan to retain the throne, imposing an annual tribute. That was, in fact, the same *tadbir* principle that Wadai was exposed by Bornu and Darfur in the earlier centuries under the vassalage system. In this regard, Sabun clearly tended toward establishing the old governance system with his advantageous position. To expand his indirect power towards north-east, he proposed military security for the nomadic groups on the northern Wara, and imposed them only *zakah* (Ar. religious donation) in lieu of taxation. This resulted in a rapid increase in his indirect power in the southern Central Sahara.⁷⁰²

Following the establishment of a connection to Benghazi around 1810, Sabun embarked on more ambitious commercial endeavours. A correspondence from an Arab merchant named Abubakr Sarahna, in Benghazi, dated approximately 1811, addressed to his business associate in Derne, indicates that the *kolak* of Wadai dispatched caravans not only to Benghazi but also to Murzuq and Cairo. The merchant requested an investigation from his business partner into whether the *kolak* offered the same goods in these markets as he did in Benghazi.⁷⁰³ However, as noted by al-Tunisi, these initiatives largely failed. In the case of Murzuq, al-Tunisi recounts that the Emir of Fezzan

700 Muhammadu Bello, *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*, chap. 2.

701 Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi, *Voyage Au Ouaday*, 132.

702 Naim Şükrü Bey, *Tarih Al-Sūdān*, 139.

703 P.A. 13, Letter dated as 1811.

observed that Sabun's caravans were disinterested in selling their wares in the city, opting instead to proceed to Tripoli. Given the Emir's ongoing conflict with Tripoli—culminating in the capture of Murzuq by al-Mukni later that year—he compelled the caravans to sell their goods locally. This aggressive intervention curtailed Sabun's aspirations to expand his trade to Tripoli. In the instance of Cairo, some nomadic groups from northern Darfur ambushed Sabun's initial caravan, severely hindering its arrival in the city. Despite Sabun's subsequent attempts to send additional caravans to Cairo in search of safer routes, all were similarly subjected to attacks by these Darfurian nomadic factions. Sabun had to limit his trade activities with Benghazi.⁷⁰⁴ Nevertheless, in 1814, a significant shift occurred when several businessmen from Tripoli began relocating their operations to Benghazi to evade the monopolistic practices of Yusuf *paşa*, thereby providing a substantial boost to trade between Benghazi and Wadai.⁷⁰⁵

The rapid military successes achieved in the early 1810s, coupled with a significant increase in trade with Benghazi due to the evolving dynamics in Tripoli, conferred upon Sabun considerable economic and military influence in the region. By 1813, he was poised to launch an offensive against Darfur in response to conflicts involving a local sultanate, Dar Tama, situated between the two states. However, the outcome of the war proved to be disastrous. Both Sabun and the Sultan of Darfur perished, and the Wadai army was largely disbanded.⁷⁰⁶ This event marked the beginning of a 16-year of *idara* system in Wadai, and the six-year civil war between 1829 and 1835.⁷⁰⁷ During this period, Baghirmi gained its autonomy, and as the whole trans-Sahara trade with Awjila and Benghazi was relied on the personal account of Wadai's *kolak*, the whole trade is collapsed.

Nevertheless, in the early 1820s, a significant figure emerged in Wadai. One of the brothers of Sabun, Muhammad Sharif, was in Mecca for his pilgrimage. Upon his return to Wadai, he was informed by Sultan Muhammad Fadl of Darfur with regard to the ongoing civil conflict in Wara. Consequently, they reached an agreement to deploy a Darfurian army under Muhammad Sharif's command to assist him in ascending to the throne and thereby resolve the civil war.⁷⁰⁸ Around 1825,

704 Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi, *Voyage Au Ouaday*, 217–19.

705 Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö, 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia', 94.

706 Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi, *Voyage Au Ouaday*, 82.

707 Following Sabun's unexpected death, his son, Yusuf Kharifin, ascended to the throne. However, since he was very young, various members of the dynasty shared administrative duties. They focused on maintaining the status quo in the region through *dairat al-siyasa*. When Yusuf Kharifin was old enough to take on all the responsibilities himself, different members of the dynasty pushed their own candidates for the throne. Following the *Idara* rule from 1813 to 1829, several *Kolaks* came to the throne by waging war against each other until 1835. See: 'Chronicle of Wadai'.

708 Naim Şükrü Bey, *Tarih Al-Sūdān*, 129.

with the assistance of the Darfurian army, Muhammad Sharif took control of the eastern part of Wadai. Instead of beginning a war against his own dynasty, he focused on the southern Wadai. In 1830, he managed to force Baghirmi again into its vassalage system.⁷⁰⁹ Around the same years, he achieved to gain control over the region of Runga. In these campaigns, Muhammad Sharif carefully followed the *tadbir* strategy of his brother by leaving a sultan of Baghirmi on his throne and installing a local commander as the new sultan of Runga. Afterwards, he established a sub-sultanate in Kutu, becoming a vassal of Runga, who was ultimately a vassal of Wadai.⁷¹⁰ This rapid military success came to a halt when the Egyptian Khedive's army began invading Darfur in 1830. For his own safety, the Sultan of Darfur took whole armed forces back in the same year.⁷¹¹ After this year, Muhammad Sharif concentrated on building a stable economic system for his own army. In the same year, he shifted his ambition to trans-Saharan trade. Private letters in Benghazi mention that around the end of the year 1830, a huge caravan from Wadai appeared in the markets of Benghazi. Due to the civil war in Tripoli, re-activation of this route in Benghazi was a big impetus for the Arab merchants in north.⁷¹² A letter in the archives of the University of King Faysal in Ndjamenā exhibits that this caravan was sent by Muhammad Sharif. In 1830, he even established a personal partnership with a merchant from Jalo, named Yunus Adam, informing him that a big caravan from Wadai is on the way to the north.⁷¹³ Interestingly, during the civil war in Wara between 1829 and 1835, Muhammad Sharif preferred not to intervene, de facto holding the main control of the state. Only in 1835, he finally took the power, thereupon applying his *tadbir* system as a primary policy of Wadai.

Conclusion

The late 18th century was a period of gradual transformation in terms of governance throughout the southern part of the Central Sudan. In the west, the Hausa states were enjoying more autonomy due to the decline of Bornu's hegemony. Along this line, applying their *tadbir* application so freely that rivalry among the Hausa states was causing collusive wars and plunders against each other. In the east, Bornu was struggling to consolidate its autonomy by implementing *dairat al-siyasa*, and Wadai was stuck between the power of Bornu and Darfur; yet, thanks to their slow decline, it had

709 Kodi, 'Islam, Societes et Pouvoir Politique Au Baghirmi (Tchad), Des Origines Au Milieu Du XIX^{ème} Siecle', 373.

710 Gayo Kogongar, 'Introduction a La Vie et L'Histoire Precoloniales Des Populations Sara Du Tchad' (Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Universite de Paris I, 1971), 210.

711 Naim Şükrü Bey, *Tarih Al-Sūdān*, 131.

712 See the uncategorized letters of the family Ahwal in Benghazi: P.A. 7.

713 M.B.D.A., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1830.

new possibilities to get power. In this regard, new formative forces and actors in the region arose in the first place as a reaction to their conditions. Jihad of Uthman was challenging to the internal conflicts between Hausa states that were causing immense enslavement in the region; al-Kanemi's rise to power was a response to the treat of Uthman's jihad in Bornu; Sabun's new unique policy was an effort to unleash the power of Wadai by finding a way to the north in order to create essential trans-Sahara trade to break the hegemony of Bornu and Darfur. Nevertheless, all these actors had different kinds of backgrounds, ideals, networks, and motivations. Fodiwa elites were relying on an intellectual tradition that combines devoted support for Al-Maghili's *riasa* system from the scholarly circles in Futa Toro and Futa Jalon with the local scholar circles in Gobir and Agadez. Al-Kanemi was combining the local Bornuan scholar tradition and scholarly circles from Cairo. Sabun, on the other hand, had no scholarly background, but clear ambitions to create a powerful Wadai by applying whatever most effective principle of governance is.

In this context, the radical re-formations occurring in the region were not driven by a single cause or a unified objective. Through diverse backgrounds, networks, and motivations of various actors, three new powers, the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, al-Kanemi's Bornu, and Wadai were rising from different local and historical contexts, and aiming for different objectives around the 1810s. In the west, the direct implementation of Al-Maghili's *riasa* system until 1804, and thereafter a new interpretation of his doctrine, was providing core impetus for the Uthman's jihad movement. In the east, Sabun was striving to establish a *ray* system; and al-Kanemi was aiming to reactivate the ancient *tadbir* system in a more effective way. Hence, this early period was marked by separations in the governance strategies of these three powers. Between 1810-1820s, there were also some crucial changes. In the western part of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, Abdullahi entirely left the *riasa* system, and built a *hisba*-based *idara* politics. In the eastern part of the Caliphate, Bello applied an ambivalent system that hesitated between *riasa* and *tadbir*. In the east, Sabun created a *tadbir*-based vassalage system in the periphery and a specific *ray* system in his trade. In this regard, around 1825, there was an immense convergence in terms of governance in the region. Around this time, Bello had entirely left the *riasa* system and was applying *tadbir* such as al-Kanemi in Bornu. In Wadai, after a civil war, a new sultan was able to re-establish Sabun's *tadbir* system. Thus, aside from the Gwandu region of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, which follows the *idara* system with strict *hisba* implementation, most of the region was under *tadbir* rule.

Around the 1830s, a widespread conformity with the new-established system dominated the sphere of governance. Neither the old nor the new actors desired radical changes. Instead, they competed with each other to apply their new systems in the most effective way. One of the most critical results of these transformations that created an immense *tadbir* bloc from Sokoto to Wara was the radical change in the area of Baghirmi, Runga, and Fombina (Adamawa). Since the Baghirmi sultans had no military chance against Bornu and Wadai, as they were vassals of both, they turned their economic and political interests southward, toward the Sara communities' land. Similarly, the newly established Fombina (Adamawa) emirate, as part of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, and the Runga sultanate, as a vassal of Wadai, could only expand their power in the south.⁷¹⁴ As a result, after 1830, Baghirmi, Fombina (Adamawa), and Runga/Kuti played a fundamental role in the expansion to the south till Congo river to provide enough ivory, ostrich feather, and enslaved people to the merchants of Bornu and Uthmaniyya Caliphate as well as to the *kolaks* of Wadai, being the most significant suppliers of whole trans-Sahara trade in the Central Sudan. Only the Gwandu part of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate did not take place in these changes due to its *hisba* implementation that prefers a peaceful relation with neighbours under some juristic conditions. Only in case of Ilorin, endless war with Yoruba created a long enslavement tradition, making Ilorin and Bida regularly visited places for the merchants from Kano and Zaria, who were seeking enslaved people to supply massively growing manufactures and farms in the central part of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. In this respect, the era of reform was completed in the southern part of Central Sudan between the 1830s and 1850s. The main actors were now interested in political and economic expansion rather than transforming their system of governance.

714 Kodi, 'Islam, Societes et Pouvoir Politique Au Baghirmi (Tchad), Des Origines Au Milieu Du XIXème Siecle', 386.

4. Sahrawi Side of Governance: Patterns and Changes in the Trans-Sahara Dynamics

"It is almost impossible to understand how these shrewd merchants can offer their goods at such low prices, since they have to pay dues in the form of gifts to the rulers of the countries, and many of their pack animals die during the long journey through the desert, or in the unaccustomed damp climate. True, they earn most money on the slaves, but the other items must also bring them a profit, or they would not trade in them."
P. Staudinger, in 1891

Despite its centuries-long existence, the patterns and dynamics of the trans-Saharan trade remained a mystery to non-Afro-Islamic agents and consuls throughout the 19th century. Furthermore, the explanations provided by these agents, such as P. Staudinger, only served to further misunderstand and misrepresent the trade. Under such conditions, the question of governance in the central Sahara was largely overlooked, since the entire trade dynamic has been reduced to profit from slavery. However, a closer examination of local sources such as court registrations and private letters, reveals a complex picture that not only explains how the trans-Saharan trade persisted notwithstanding numerous challenges, but also uncovers the various sustainable governmental dynamics and practices that existed in the central Sahara. In other words, there was no single factor that was solely responsible for driving the trade in the central Sahara, nor were the conditions characterized by absolute chaos. Instead, there were different political and economic patterns accompanied by various strategies of governance. Furthermore, the dynamics in the region were not static structures that were unaffected by political changes in the surrounding areas of the region. All key actors quickly adapted to the transformations occurring in the northern and southern parts of the Central Sudan, particularly between the 1840s and the 1850s in accordance with their own dynamics. Therefore, the period from the 1790s to the 1850s represents a combination of continuities and disruptions in terms of governance in the region.

4.1. Applying *idara* with *hisba*: The Unique Way of Ghadames

The city of Ghadames served as a primary hub for merchants travelling from Tripoli into the Sahara, embarking on a lengthy desert journey. Despite its proximity to Tripoli, Ghadames was never under Ottoman rule until the 19th century, although it was required, and in some cases forced,

to pay tribute between the 17th and 19th centuries.⁷¹⁵ Additionally, Ghadames had a rich tradition of scholarship, and one famous library, called Tasku Matidha,⁷¹⁶ making it an important centre for juristic circles.⁷¹⁷ The city was also a popular visiting and education place for Essouq scholars from the southern Kel Tamasheq world, as they also enjoyed recognition and prestiges.⁷¹⁸ Different from the other important cities around central Sahara, the only *hakim* in Ghadames was the *qadi* (Ar. judge) between the 16th and 19th centuries.⁷¹⁹ This also greatly shaped the demography of the city. In the 16th century, there were several Jewish and Ibadi communities in Ghadames.⁷²⁰ In the 17th century, whilst either some Jewish communities were converted to Islam or some Ibadi communities began to follow Sunni Islam, the rest began to immigrate north. Accordingly, several Ibadi communities went to Jebel Nafusa, and some Jewish communities arrived to Tripoli,⁷²¹ while in the city there were already many Jewish communities since centuries.⁷²² The role of Ibadi communities in the trans-Saharan trade greatly disappeared following the 17th century. Jewish communities continued to be a modest part of this trade.⁷²³ Nonetheless, different from the 16th century, not as merchant, but as creditor and broker.⁷²⁴ As a result of the dominance of Maliki school of law, albeit there were some merchants families adhered to the Hanafi and Shafi school of law in

715 Bashir Qasim Yusha, *Madinahu Ghadames Eabr Al-Asur* (Trablus: Al-Markaz al-wataniya li-lmahfuzat wa-l-dirasat, 2011), 20. Since Ghadames was not official part of Ottoman Empire, they were paying their tribute according to recent conjecture. For instance, from 1806 to 1816, the city paid tribute to the *paşalık* of Tunis rather than the *paşalık* of Tripoli.

716 'Interview No. 23: With Hajj Al-Hadi Al-Tawhami in Ghadames, 2023'.

717 Musa ibn Muhalhil Al-Ghadamisi, *Taḍkīr al-nāsī wa-talyīn al-qalb al-qāsī*, ed. Abdaljabbar Assaghir (Ghadames, 2004), 28. Scholars of Ghadames were receiving earlier education in Tunis and Agadez, after that, they were travelling to Timbuktu, Fez, and Cairo to be master in jurisprudence. Furthermore, it was very common for the judge of Ghadames to correspondent with the jurists in Al-Zaytuna University in Tunisia, see: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1890. The intellectual importance of Ghadames did not disappear even after the colonial invasion of Italy in 1911. See: Bashir Qasim Yusha, 'Ghadamis Min Al-Ilmiyat al-Thaqafiyat Fi Libiya', in Amal Al-Mutamar al-Awal Li-l-Wathayiq Wa-l-Makhtutat Fi Libiya Waqiyahu Wafaq al-Amal Hawlaha, Zliten 1988, ed. Omar Jahidar, Vol.1.

718 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 234.

719 For example, the oldest known court register from Ghadames dates back to 1522. See: P.A. 24., uncategorized, court register dated as 1522.

720 The last document mentions these Ibadi and Jewish communities is from 1602. P.A. 23., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1602.

721 'Interview No. 23: With Hajj Al-Hadi Al-Tawhami in Ghadames, 2023'.

722 Hagid Mardechi, 'Toldot Yahodi Tripuli', unedited manuscripts from the 1890s.

723 Shaban Muhammad Gheriyani, 'Dawr Al-Yahud Fi al-Tijarat Eabr al-Sahra Khilal al-Easr al-Islami Bayn al-Iddiea Wa-l-Haqiqat al-Tarkhiya', *Majallat Al-Dirasat al-Insaniyat Wa-l-Adabiyat* 28, no. 3 (2023): 647–48.

724 Not surprisingly, most of the documents related to trans-Saharan trade and Jewish communities concern credit contracts. One of them, see: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a register dated as 1855. There were two kinds of credit: one was cash money with an interest rate, and the other was goods with no interest rate. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a register dated as 1792. Jewish communities were not the only creditors in Tripoli, also the Ghadamesian merchants gave each other credit. However, unlike the interest-bearing loans they received from European or Jewish creditors, they lent to each other interest-free, calling this kind of credit as *salaf al-ihsan* (Ar. follower of charity). J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1815.

the city,⁷²⁵ the governance relied on *Maliki* jurisprudence, and this reliance distinguished Ghadames from neighbouring cities such as Ghat and Murzuq, aligning it more closely with Shinqiti (in present-day Mauritania) and Tuwat (in present-day Algeria) in terms of governance.⁷²⁶ Given that the entire political landscape was shaped by *Maliki* jurisprudence through the judge of Ghadames, these scholars played a significant role in political and diplomatic matters. For instance, one of these judges was Abdallah bin Abi Bakr Al-Ghadamisi (d. 1719) who through his son left a chronicle that explains through juristic arguments why Ghadames notwithstanding its proximity to the Ottoman rule in Tripoli was autonomous.⁷²⁷

The chronicle clearly illustrates that in Ghadames, political matters were resolved through the juridical sphere, as the only *hakim* of the city was a judge. This characteristic had a significant impact on the governance strategy, because when jurisprudence has such a central role in the political realm, it is not surprising that the city tends to adhere to a governance principle that aligns with jurisprudence, that is to say, *idara*. Under this principle, the ruler's role is limited to enforcing the law and maintaining power balances, so having the judge as the sole governing authority does not hinder the city's ability to govern. The absence of a *hakim* other than the judge in Ghadames does not indicate a lack of knowledge or experience; rather, it signifies the specific implementation of the *idara* principle, particularly through the use of *hisba*. The instrument of *hisba* in the application of *idara* was, in fact, so central and self-evident for the city inhabitants that they even used this notion in their economic affairs.⁷²⁸

Furthermore, the application of *idara* through the *hisba* had specific consequences for Ghadames, given that its primary economic activities revolved around trade. In fact, the significance of artisanal and agricultural production was so negligible that being a merchant in the city was considered a self-evident fact, as one Ghadamesian individual expressed in a letter dating back to the 1850s: “In Ghadames there is nothing to produce, only to spend; there is nothing to harvest, only to consume,”⁷²⁹ hence, “anyone who wants to make a fortune must go to southern Sudan...”⁷³⁰ In this context, the application of *idara* through the *hisba* offered certain advantages to the city's

725 Piyade Binbaşısı Ali Rıza Muayni, *Trablusgarb Tarik Muvaslatı*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Hariciye Nezareti: Şark İdaresi, 1334 [1918]), 113.

726 Al-Ghadamisi, *Taḍkīr al-nāṣi wa-talyīn al-qalb al-qāṣi*, 18.

727 For more details and global role of this chronicle, see my article: Kerem Duymus, ‘Politico-Theological Debates in Ghadames between the 1770s and the 1850s from a Global Perspective’, *Afriques : Débats, Méthodes Et Terrains D’histoire* 15 (2024): 1–17.

728 P.A.4., family collection, 105

729 P.A.4., family collection, 76.

730 C. Motylinski, *Le Dialecte Berbère de R’edemès* (Paris, 1904), 72.

merchants. Firstly, as the city was governed by a *hakim*, they were exempt from paying taxes.⁷³¹ Secondly, the dominance of jurisprudence in politics and governance provided a significant guarantee for the accumulation of personal wealth. No sultan, emir, or *paşa* could suddenly seize private property. Court registrations in Tripoli and Ghadames also clearly show that merchants were fully aware of their rights, and they trusted the efficiency of the juridical system.⁷³² At this point, one may question the nature of the executive power if the only authority figure is the *qadi*. Who enforced the law? The local narratives in Ghadames reveal that it was the city's community itself: "If someone does not recognize law, then we do not recognize this man too. Without part of his community, a man is no better than a wild animal in the desert."⁷³³ This was indeed not a unique case for Ghadames. As Warscheid clearly showed, the same structure existed in the Tuwat region and was even justified by local jurists using legal arguments.⁷³⁴

The economic development of the city around the 18th and 19th centuries provides further evidence to the efficiency of the common juridical sphere in the Central Sudan. Due to the competitive relations Ghadamesian merchants could not do business in some cities without intermediation of the local shopkeepers, such as being the case in Souf⁷³⁵ in the north-west Ghadames, whereas city's merchants had several residence houses in various cities including Kano and Timbuktu,⁷³⁶ and regions such as Tuwat,⁷³⁷ as well as Sokoto, Katsina, Alexandria, and Tunis.⁷³⁸ In some cases, they

731 It is important to bear in mind that there is a clear separation between tribute and tax in the Islamic jurisprudence.

732 D.M.T.L., *Al-Sijiliyat al-shariat*, 11/56.

733 Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023.

734 For more details, see: Ismail Warscheid, 'La Pratique Du Şulḥ Dans Les Oasis Du Grand Touat : Justice Consensuelle et Juridiction Islamique Dans Une Société Saharienne Du Xviii^e Siècle', *REMM* 140 (2016): 147; Ismail Warscheid, 'The Islamic Literature of the Precolonial Sahara: Sources and Approaches', *History Compass*, 2018, 7; Ismail Warscheid, 'The Persisting Spectre of Cultural Decline: Historiographical Approaches to Muslim Scholarship in the Early Modern Maghreb', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 60, no. 1/2 (2022): 166; Warscheid, 'The West African Jihād Movements and the Islamic Legal Literature of the Southwestern Sahara (1650–1850)', 42.

735 For the rivalry between Soufian and Ghadamesian merchants, see: Muhammad Omar Marwan, 'Al-Hayat al-Iktisadiyat Wa-l-Ijtima'iat Wa-l-Thaqafiat Fi Ghadames Khilal al'ahd al'othmani al-Thani' (Ph.D. Thesis, Jamiat Al-Jazair, 2005), 240. Yet, the business character of Souf was different from Ghadames. The city was the market centre of the region, with more than 300 shops in its city centre. The inhabitants were more preoccupied with running shops than with long-distance trade. The merchants of Ghadames were mostly suppliers of these shops. To break this monopoly, some shop owners in the south regularly tried to trade directly with the south, bypassing Ghadames. As a result, there was a long-term negotiation and competition between Soufian shop owners/merchants and Ghadamesian merchants. See: Al-Arabi Al-Zubayri, *Al-Tijarat al-Kharijiyat Li-Sharq al-Jazayir* (Al-Jazayir: Al-sharqiyat al-wataniyat li-linashr wa-l-tawziyi, 1972), 154–55.

736 Binbaşı Ömer Subhi, *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi ile Büyük Sahra ve Sudan*, ed. Şefaattin Deniz (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2020), 37.

737 See: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, an undated letter from the 19th century.

738 Yusha, *Madinahu Ghadames Eabr Al-Asur*, 63.

also possessed lands, as was the case in the Azawad region.⁷³⁹ Some merchants were even wealthy enough to provide substantial credit to the *Paşa* of Tunisia in the 1850s.⁷⁴⁰

However, the late 18th century was a period of deep transformation for this long-standing economic and legal tradition. As the ancient gold trade with Timbuktu, which was the main goods in the trans-Saharan trade for centuries,⁷⁴¹ came to an end around 1830, merchants had to find new goods to transport.⁷⁴² The deep economic connection of Ghadames with Mahres,⁷⁴³ (present-day Algeria) Mزاب⁷⁴⁴ (present-day Algeria) and Souf was disappearing by the late 18th century, as city inhabitants were orienting themselves towards Fezzan and Siwan.⁷⁴⁵ This was also case with Tripoli. Yusuf *paşa's tadbir* system many Ghadamesian merchants directed their business to Tunis in lieu of Tripoli.⁷⁴⁶ The civil war after 1830 further strength this trend. Hussein *paşa* of Tunisia also personally supported these merchants for their business in Tunis.⁷⁴⁷ These transformations became further complicated when the Ottomans established direct rule in Tripoli in 1835. Although Yusuf *paşa* began to apply *tadbir* in the whole Tripolitania after 1811, the governors he appointed for Ghadames never actually arrived in the city or governed it. They continued to live in Tripoli, and collect the tribute from Ghadames.⁷⁴⁸ As discussed in Chapter 2, the new rule of Ottomans in Tripolitania was similar to Yusuf *paşa* in terms of the application of *tadbir*; nevertheless, they recognized the need for *islah* to counteract the corruptive tendencies of *ray*. In this regard, the Ottomans did not appoint a *bey* (Tr. [in his specific case] director) or governor, who would never go there, as Yusuf *paşa* had done, but a *müdür* in 1838 to apply *idara* under the control of *islah* in this peripheral city. This marked the first time in centuries that Ghadames had an additional *hakim* than judge. Still, an Ottoman *müdür* arrived in Ghadames only in 1843. The first assigned *müdür* was killed by the members of Ghuma's uprising, while en route to the city.⁷⁴⁹ The arrival of the new

739 See: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1841.

740 Bashir Qasim Yusha, 'Al-Ghadamissiyun Fi Rihlat al-Hashaishi', *Majallat Al-Buhuth al-Tarikhiyya* 5 (1983): 254.

741 For more details, see: Badraddin Misbah, 'Tijarat Al-Sahra Bayn al-Jazayir Wa Gharb Ifriqiya Mundh 10-13h/16-19m' (M.A. Thesis, Université d'Adrar, 2015); Ben Moussa Jamila, 'Tijarat Al-Dhahab Bayn al-Maghrib al-Islami Wa-l-Sudan al-Gharbi: Min al-Qarn al-Thalith Ila al-Khamis Hijriun' (Ph.D. Thesis, Jamiat Al-Jazayir, 2001).

742 The last time a significant amount of gold was transported from Timbuktu to Ghadames was in 1831. Thereafter, this trade had no more visible role. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1831.

743 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1802.

744 P.A. 4., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1789.

745 'Interview No. 24: With Hussein Al-Mazdawi in Tripoli, 2023'.

746 In some years between the 1790s and 1830s, the *paşa* of Tunisia even planned to impose tribute to Ghadames, considering the city part of his rule. Nora Lafi, 'Ghadames Cite-Oasis Entre Empire Ottoman et Colonisation', in *La Libia Tra Mediterraneo e Mondo Islamico*, ed. Federico Cresti (Milano: Giuffr , 2006), 59.

747 An order issued by Hussein *paşa* in 1833 on behalf of a Ghadamesian merchant clearly illustrates this trend. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, an order dated as 1833. Especially after 1830, there was a rapidly growing manufacturing industry in Tunisia. C.C.M. Tunis (3), 1835-1881.

748 Yusha, *Madinahu Ghadames Eabr Al-Asur*, 62.

749 Yusha, 21.

müdür, accompanied by a temporary army to ensure compliance with his rule, caused great unrest among the city's inhabitants, as evidenced by private letters from that time. One of these letters recounts how the *müdür* immediately forced all residents to pay a large sum of money as punishment for the death of the previous *müdür*, even though he was killed by Ghuma's supporters. In the same letter, the city's merchant tells his business partner in Kano that Ghadames is now under the occupation of "despot Turks".⁷⁵⁰ In the same year, another merchant writes to his relative in Timbuktu that he considers to leave city because of the "Turkish oppression".⁷⁵¹

These were, indeed, not exaggerated reactions, since the beginning of civil war in Tripoli around 1830s, and thereafter during the uprising of Guma, Ghadamesian merchants were no more going to Tripoli, but Tunis, and even Annaba in Algiers to reach Mediterranean coast.⁷⁵² In this regard, paying a tax to a city they no longer visit was an immense economic loss for them. This new reality also posed a challenge for the judge of Ghadames, as the city's inhabitants sought clarification on the legal situation. Unlike his predecessors, the judge acknowledged the rule of the Ottomans, providing a theological justification by referencing Abu Hamid al-Gazali's (d. 1111) interpretation of the theological doctrine of Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari (d. 936). He argued that, "as al-Gazali said on al-Ashari that since the whole force (*shawka*) in the world belongs to God, presence of a very powerful ruler, regardless of his legality or despotism, can be only the will of God. In that case, what remains for others is to see this oppression as an examination from God".⁷⁵³ In other words, with this theological explanation, the judge affirmed the legality of the Ottoman rule in Ghadames.⁷⁵⁴ Nonetheless, this was not a justification of the political reality at any cost. The judge was aware of the implications of this new interpretation. In response to a question concerning the war between Ghuma and Ottoman authorities, the judge reiterated his theological argument, saying "everything is in the hand of God, whatever will come [from this war] will come from Him".⁷⁵⁵ In other word, since the Ottomans' legitimacy is based on their power derived from this theological

750 P.A.4., family collection, 2.

751 P.A.4., family collection, 4.

752 P.A.4., family collection, 18, 24.

753 J.G.T.M, uncategorized, dated as 1855.

754 This seemingly small difference, justified by theology rather than jurisprudence, actually causes a deep distinction in governance. Theological justifications often overlook the juristic discourse and bypass jurisprudence in general. In this regard, theological arguments tend to engage in political discourse that goes beyond the limits of the governing principles of *idara* and, in some cases, *tadbir*, which are more or less jurisprudence-conform. Theological justification is the only way to advocate for *riasa* since it conflicts with jurisprudence. In this respect, the judge employs a specific intellectual strategy. While he is justifying the Ottoman rule with theology; thereupon, implying the application of *riasa* by the Ottomans, he carefully uses the instrument of *shawka* by citing Al-Gazali. By doing so, he states that the authority of the Ottoman *padişah* is legal only because he has power, and if once he loses his power, then it is entirely legal to reject him. For the same kind of discussions in Bornu, see Chapter 2.

755 P.A.5., uncategorized, dated as 1846.

interpretation, if there are other powers challenging them, both sides have equal legitimacy. In this respect, in the case of a possible victory against the Ottomans, the judge recognizes the legality of rebellion as well.

The initial oppressive policies of the *müdür* were primarily motivated by the ongoing war against Ghuma, not the application of the *idara*. The Ottomans faced significant confusion regarding the complexity of this uprising movement between 1835 and the 1840s, perceiving every local community as a potential threat. However, as the uprising diminished significantly between 1845 and 1848, Ottoman policies underwent a fundamental shift. Instead of punishing and oppressing the community of Ghadames to find out whether they support Ghuma, they turned their attention to the economy around 1845. In fact, that was also the year that Ghadamesians quickly adapted themselves in the new reality. For instance, in 1845, notables of Ghadames sent a letter to the *vali* of Tripoli complaining that their caravans were attacked by Shaanba.⁷⁵⁶ They demanded a patrolling division between Souf and Ghadames against plunders of Shaanba. In the same year, the *vali* ordered the establishment of this division with 60 soldiers.⁷⁵⁷ In this regard, Ghadamesian merchants, after a brief period of shock – such as paying tax – of having a *hakim* who was not a judge, also began to experience the advantages of this situation. The *müdür*, possessing political and, in extreme cases, military power,⁷⁵⁸ was able to offer personal guarantees to merchants. Although the *müdür*'s actions did not exceed the limits of Sharia law, his bureaucratic power proved more effective in finding swift resolutions for them. For instance, in 1850, one merchant advised his friend, who faced a contractual issue with his business partner, to seek resolution through “*bay*” (Tr. *bey*), i.e. Ottoman *müdür*, to solve his problem quickly.⁷⁵⁹ In 1852, another Ghadamesian merchant informs his partner in Ghat that the “*bash agha*” (Tr. *baş ağa*), i.e. Ottoman *müdür*, had promised to retrieve his stolen caravan from bandits, and he successfully fulfilled his promise.⁷⁶⁰ Additionally, around 1853, the Ottoman authorities discussed safeguarding the interests of Ghadamesian merchants in Kano upon hearing rumours of a potential invasion by Bornu. In his letter to the *vali* of Tripoli, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan made it clear that “Kano is the main hub of the Ghadamesian merchants, we should take some measure for such a possible invasion”.⁷⁶¹

756 D.M.T.L., Tijarat, dated as 1845.

757 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1845.

758 In the Ottoman administration, only the *kaymakam* and the *vali* had control over the army. A *müdür* could only ask the *kaymakam* or *vali* for help in case of an emergency.

759 P.A.4., family collection, 15.

760 P.A.4., family collection, 129.

761 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1853.

Consequently, the residents of Ghadames adjusted their legal and economic practices in response to the new circumstances, particularly after 1850 when they acquired a *müdür* as *hakim* different from judge. The presence of a *müdür* was not intended to abandon Maliki jurisprudence, as the *müdür's* role only extended beyond tax collection to include conflict resolution and political decision-making. The social and economic life was still under the rule of Maliki jurisprudence as long as people did not go directly to the *müdür* for expedient resolutions. Merchants responded to this new situation by directing all of their caravans to Tripoli in the 1850s – also to avoid further payment of tribute to go to Tunis or to Algiers. Following this, after 1850, Ghadames became one of the most important caravan hubs of Tripoli and of the Ottoman rule.⁷⁶² Throughout the remainder of the century, the primary concern for the people of Ghadames shifted from the legality of Ottoman rule and the reliance on juristic arguments for political decisions to the careful calculation of taxes, ensuring that the benefits of having a *müdür* were not outweighed by the tax burden, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.

4.2. *Tadbir* as Tradition: A Bornu-style Sultanate in Tripolitania - Fezzan (Murzuq)

Fezzan, with its capital in Murzuq, stood out as a unique case within the central Sahara region, as it functioned as a sultanate amidst various cities and regions that were governed under the system of *idara*. Although during 18th and earlier 19th century the sultanate was under the rule of a dynasty originally from Morocco, Awlad Muhammad, the whole administrative structure as well as principle of governance was modelled after the sultanate of Bornu as the Kanem Empire ruled in Fezzan for 300 years between 1250-1550.⁷⁶³ Accordingly, tradition administrative titles were derived from Kanuri titles, and the system of governance was shaped by *tadbir* as was the case in Kanem/Bornu during these centuries.⁷⁶⁴ The sultanate of Fezzan in the early 19th century exhibited typical characteristics of the application of *tadbir* in a Bornu-style, that is to say without focusing on one specific implementation of *tadbir* such as *ray* or *islah*, instead applying *tadbir* according to local context. For instance, the Sultan of Fezzan was appointing the local administrative from Murzuq.⁷⁶⁵

762 Atrocities of the French colonial invasion forces in Algeria around the 1850s also contributed to this trend, as many merchants from Mzab, Wargala, and Souf either immigrated to Ghadames or shifted their trade business in Ghadames-Ghat route. Buslim Salih and Uzwayid Bialhaji, 'Tijarat Al-Qawafil Bayn al-Jazayir Wa Ifriqiyya Janub al-Sahrafi al-Eahd al-Uthmani Wa Dawriha al-Hadari', Majallat Rawafid Li-l-Buhuth Wa-l-Dirasat, 2017, 120. One of these merchants was Mohammad Ayadi Ahmad bin Balla, who became famous among Ghadamesians. See: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a court register dated as 1860.

763 Hosan Ali Al-Dhikel, 'Al-Rawabit al-Tarikhiyat Bayn 'iqlim Fazan Wa Dawlat Kanem Barnu 656-957 h., 1258-1550 m.', *Jami'at Sabha Li-l-'ulum al-'insaniyat Majalatan* 21, no. 2 (2022): 188–98.

764 Recep Nasir Al-Anf, *Madinat Murzuq Wa-Tijarat al-Qawafil al-Sahrawiyat Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasie Eashr, Dirasat Fi al-Tarikh al-Siyasi Wa-l-Iqtisadi* (Al-Markaz al-wataniya li-lmahfuzat wa-l-dirasat, 1998), 186.

765 Habib El-Hesnawi, *Fezzan under the Rule of the Awlad Muhammad* (Sebha, 1990), 172.

In another example, if someone died without having an heir, his possessions passed directly to the Sultan, not to the community treasure (Ar. *bayt al-mal*).⁷⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Sultan of Fezzan presided a court of appeal (Ar. *mahkama al-istinaf*), which is typical for *tadbir*, as this practice mentioned as "redressing the grievances" (Ar. *radd al-mazalim*) in the classical Islamic texts.⁷⁶⁷

The urban life in Murzuq possessed distinct characteristics that set it apart from neighbouring cities such as Ghadames, Ghat, and Bilma. Correspondences from the 19th century reveal that despite the significant trade activities in and around Murzuq, only a few city residents were directly involved in trans-Saharan trade. Many active traders in the city were actually from Sokna⁷⁶⁸ and Hun,⁷⁶⁹ they had only residences in Murzuq to operate their caravans.⁷⁷⁰ Main economic activities around the oasis outside Murzuq was production of dates⁷⁷¹ and natron.⁷⁷² Most of the city inhabitants were occupied with the craft production, such as knives, swords, copper pottery. They sold them to merchants who visited the city. To properly coordinate their production, these craftsmen sought information from other cities to estimate the potential number of caravans that might visit Murzuq.⁷⁷³ For this reason, it became customary for trans-Saharan caravans to utilize Murzuq not only as a transfer point but also as a place of rest, given that the city served as the primary service hub for these caravans.⁷⁷⁴ Additionally, as caravans traditionally travelled to Tripoli, many merchants outside of Tripoli employed local representatives to buy trans-Saharan products before they transferred to Tripoli.⁷⁷⁵ For instance, a private letter in 1849 reveals that a local representative in Murzuq was working for 4 different contractors who were from Benghazi, Baghdad, Cairo, and Awjila.⁷⁷⁶ Due to the cosmopolitan nature of the city, even Britain expressed interest in conducting trade in Murzuq through the use of agents. They established a vice-consulate in the city around

766 Al-Anf, *Madinat Murzuq Wa-Tijarat al-Qawafil al-Sahrawiyat Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasie Eashr, Dirasat Fi al-Tarikh al-Siyasi Wa-l-Iqtisadi*, 188. That was a striking issue for Uthman dan Fodio during his jihad movement. As was seen in Chapter 2. For him, this practice was a typical characteristic of an "non-islamic" policy.

767 See Chapter 1.

768 Al-Mukhtar Ithman Al-Afif, *Madinat Sukna: Dirasat Tarikhiat Lil-Awdae al-Siyasat Wa-l-Iqtisadiat Wa-l-Ijtimaeyat Wa-l-Ilmiat (1835-1911)* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2002), 105.

769 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, ed. Arı İnan (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 34.

770 Interview No.1: Meeting with the Elders of Murzuq in Sebha, 2023.

771 Dates had a historical and even cultural importance in Fezzan. Thanks to its substantial contribution to the wealth of the people in the region, many proverbs and songs were dedicated to dates. Huda Abdulrahman Al-Alam, 'Al-Nakil Wa Tamuruha Fi Mutasarifiyat Fazan Bayn al-Darayib al-Uthmaniyat Wa-l-Iqtisad al-Harfi Wa-l-Mathur al-Ijtimayi Min Khilal Eayinat Wathayiqiyat Jadida (1842-1875m)', *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 22, no. 1 (2023): 113–15.

772 Binbaşı Ömer Subhi, *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi Ile Büyük Sahra ve Sudan*, 43.

773 P.A.6., uncategorized letters from the 19th century.

774 D.M.T.L., *Tijarat*, dated as 1852.

775 P.A.6., uncategorized, dates as 1855.

776 P.A.7., uncategorized, dated as 1849.

1843.⁷⁷⁷ Nonetheless, their agents quickly found themselves overwhelmed by the complexity of the transactions, leading the vice-consul to shift his focus towards establishing diplomatic relations with Bornu.⁷⁷⁸

Another crucial detail regarding economic activity in Murzuq was the practice of enslavement. Thanks to having a sultan, different from Ghadames and Kavar/Tibesti, the inhabitants of the region had an army, and many people were active as soldiers. In times of peace, however, these soldiers turned into plunderers who attacked Tibesti and Borku to enslave the Teda people because they did not consider them Muslim. Many of these soldiers had no other occupation due to the economic gain they received from their salary from the sultan and/or the slave trade. In that regard, being a soldier/plunderer was a special profession in the region called *Fazazna*. These people were also a key part of al-Mukni's enslavement campaigns between 1813 and 1821. Thus, they established Murzuq as a hub for the slave trade without requiring significant exports from southern Central Sudan.⁷⁷⁹ Nonetheless, the volume of this trade remained at less than 100 enslaved people annually.⁷⁸⁰

All these practices had to be redefined during the first part of the 19th century. Firstly, from 1811 to 1813 the sultanate of Fezzan officially ceased to exist through the involvement of al-Mukni under the order of Yusuf *paşa*. Secondly, with the outbreak of a civil war in Tripolitania around 1830, Fezzan came to be under control of the Awlad Sulaiman dynasty. Although this dynasty never established its own sultanate before, they held considerable power in the central Sahara region prior to 1830. In the 1690s, they attempted to invade the city of Ghat but were unsuccessful.⁷⁸¹ Similarly, in the 1760s, they sought to extract tribute from the city of Ghadames.⁷⁸² In this regard, by the time this dynasty assumed power in Fezzan in 1830, they were already well known. Nevertheless, their reign was highly influenced by the war they waged, first against Yusuf *paşa*, thereafter against Ottoman *valis* in Tripoli. Consequently, the focus of the dynasty was on forging alliances in Morocco, Cairo, and Bornu, rather than concentrating on governance in Fezzan.⁷⁸³ Following the

777 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 101/9.

778 M.J.L.D.T., *Wathayiq wa-l-makhtutat*, No. 51.

779 Abubakr Salim Al-Mahdi Al-Shaybani, 'Madinat Murzuq Wa Dawruha Fi Tijarat Al-'abur al-Sahrawiyat Khilal al-Qarn al-Taasi Eashar', *Jami'at Sabha Li-l-'ulum al-'insaniyat Majalatan* 20, no. 3 (2021): 133.

780 See my article: Kerem Duymus, 'Contribution au rôle de la traite des esclaves dans le Sahara tripolitain au XIX^e siècle : nouvelles découvertes en Libye et en Turquie', *Revue d'Histoire Méditerranéenne* 6, no.2 (2024): 195–208.

781 Hajj Osman bin Omar and Adolf Krause, 'Hausa Chronicle of Ghat in "Aufzeichnungen Über Die Stadt Chat in Der Sahara"', *Zeitschrift Der Gesellschaft Für Erdkunde Zu Berlin* 17 (1882): 276.

782 B.N.F., *Manuscrit Arabe*, No. 1891.

783 Muhammad Ahmad Al-Tuwir, 'Thawrat 'Abd Al-Jalil Saif Al-Nasr Dida al-Hukm al-'Uthmaniyy Fi Libiya, 1831-1842' (Budapest, 1991), 189–149.

Ottoman victory in 1842, the remaining members of the dynasty were forced to leave the region and sought refuge in Kanem.

The new Ottoman rule in Fezzan after 1842, in fact, did not bring significant changes for Murzuq. Since Fezzan was a sultanate, the Ottomans appointed a *kaymakam* to Murzuq, whose role was the same as previous sultans in terms of applying the *tadbir*. Nevertheless, the application of *tadbir* was no more based on the Bornu-style, rather than Ottoman-style. The core implementation remained the same, whereas especially the issue of tax and fee had crucial dissimilarities. For instance, El-Hanewi detects 23 types of tax and fees during the reign of Awlad Sulaiman around the 1810s.⁷⁸⁴ In the 1840s, the number of tax and fees was drastically reduced to 6.⁷⁸⁵ That was especially because of the particular instrumentalization of *tadbir* in the Ottoman governance. In the Ottoman *tadbir* system, the implementation of *ray* was tightly controlled by *islah*, and numerous standardization reforms were introduced by the Tripolitan *valis*, particularly in relation to taxation and fees. One such reform was related to the standardization of tax collection procedures. Previously, tax collection was based on a negotiation between farmers and tax collectors.⁷⁸⁶ A document in 1848 exhibits the details of this new procedure in case of harvest-tax: "... First, city council of Murzuq (Ar. *majlis al-bilad*) should estimate the average harvest of date in this year, and register that to the *kaymakam*. According to the proportion defined by the state, the *kaymakam* calculates the estimated tax payment for each community and sends it to his *müdürs* in rural areas. Ultimately, they collect the calculated amount."⁷⁸⁷

In this respect, after the 1840s, Fezzan underwent a series of administrative standardization and bureaucratization processes as a result of the implementations of *islah*. Most importantly, the further application of *tadbir* in Fezzan enabled the Ottomans to swiftly establish themselves as a substantial military presence, which had far-reaching implementations for the neighbouring cities, as will be discussed on the following pages.

4.3. When *dairat al-siyasa* Corresponds to the Communal Law: Case of Ghat and Kawar (Bilma)

⁷⁸⁴ El-Hesnawi, *Fezzan under the Rule of the Awlad Muhammad*, 179–85.

⁷⁸⁵ Abu Bakr Othman Al-Qadi, *Fazan Wamarakizuha Al-Hadariat 'abr al-'ushr* (Sebha: markaz dirasat wabhadh alshra'i, 1989), 65.

⁷⁸⁶ Interview No.1: Meeting with the Elders of Murzuq in Sebha, 2023

⁷⁸⁷ D.M.T.L., Idara, 134/1.

Ghat and Kavar serve as a notable illustration in the realm of governance, wherein their shared characteristics may not be readily apparent without a comprehensive conceptualization. Their dissimilar societal backgrounds make it hard to discern how these two different communities developed a similar system of governance due to the various influences of Kel Tamasheq and Teda communal cultures. Their role in the trans-Saharan route also rendered them a part of an immense Islamic community, which further shaped their recognition as well as transformation.

4.3.1. Kel Azgher and Ghat

One of the most formidable challenges in understanding governance in Ghat is the entangled relationship between the sultan (Tm. *amanokal*) of Kel Azgher and sheikh (Tm. *amchar*) of Ghat.⁷⁸⁸ As *amonakl* of Kel Azgher had not settled and continued their nomadic lifestyle, most governmental issues went to the *amchar* of Ghat, although people were still considering *amonakl* as their sultan.⁷⁸⁹ Notwithstanding their military power, the *amonakls* of Kel Azgher were known to rule with *idara*. Their role was related to involving cases only in emergency situations. For instance, between 1867 and 1870, a local conflict broke out within the Amangasetten community regarding the selection of a new chief. After the conflict turned into reciprocal plunder and killing, *amonakl* of Kel Azgher Akhunukan assembled conflicting parties to solve the problem.⁷⁹⁰

Unlike the exceptional case of Agadez, there was no capital city for any Kel Tamasheq community in the Sahara during the 19th century. This does not imply the absence of cities in the lands of Kel Tamasheq, but in the northern Kel Tamasheq world, cities were considered as an “open-city” without any claim to rulership.⁷⁹¹ Similarly, the city of Ghat was in the region that was under the control of Kel Azgher; yet, the sheikh of the city was the *amchar* of Ghat, who belonged to a family, called al-Ansari, and migrated from Tuwat.⁷⁹² For instance, traditional rivals of Kel Azgher, Kel Hoggar, could regularly visit Ghat for trade without encountering any issue. Even in times of war, Ghat had nothing to fear from an invasion by Kel Hoggar, only plunder. It was a deep cultural taboo in the northern part of the Kel Tamasheq world to invade the land or cities of other Kel Tamasheq

788 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, ed. Ömer Hakan Özalp (İstanbul: Özgü Yayınları, 2014), 416–17.

789 Aknara Walad Al-Naqra, *Al-Tawariq: Min al-Huwiyyat Ila al-Qadiya* (Nouakchott: Al-Markaz al-Muritaniyu li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Buhuth Al-Astiratjiya, 2014), 62.

790 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 82–83.

791 Muhammad Saeed Al-Qasar, *Al-Tawariq - 'arab al-Sahara al-Kubra* (Markaz dirasat wa-ibhath ashawn al-sahara, 1989), 64.

792 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, ed. Yüksel Kaner (İstanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2011), 131. In fact, the al-Ansari family first settled in the village of Barakat. Only thereafter did some family members settle in Ghat. *Shatev, Zatochenieto vu Sakhra-Fezanu*, 148.

societies. In a period of war, for instance, Kel Hoggar could attack and plunder the whole Azgher region and all settlements, but they would never consider staying there, and always return to the Hoggar region.⁷⁹³ With this advantage, the primary role of Ghat's *amchar* was principally being a *hakim* in the city, fostering a peaceful relationship with Kel Azgher communities as well as visiting merchants by applying *idara*. He had no dynastic right to collect any kind of tax, since he was chosen by the community.⁷⁹⁴ For this reason, he had to summon a council from the community for important political and economic decisions.⁷⁹⁵ Likewise, his duty was to execute the community law which is determined through communal consensus.⁷⁹⁶

However, unlike Ghadames, this particular form of governance did not originate from Islamic scholarship, but was instead encompassed by it. For instance, oral narratives state that in important meetings there was always a scholar; yet, not a *qadi* (Ar. judge), whose role was not checking whether the decisions are in accordance with Maliki jurisprudence, since these scholars were not mastered in jurisprudence, instead to look if the decision conflict with the main principles of Islam. In other words, communal law did not have to derive from Islamic law, but it must be flexible enough to align with Islamic principles.⁷⁹⁷ In this context, not surprisingly, the instrument of *dairat al-siyasa* was the most suitable form of governance in this context, complementing communal law. The fundamental role of the *amchar* of Ghat was to maintain balance of power among the various communities of the Kel Azgher society and its inhabitants, as was the function of communal law.⁷⁹⁸

It should also be kept in mind that this reconciliation role of *amchar* did not provide him with any real political or social power. In comparison to the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher, the *amchar* of Ghat held a less prestigious position. This was not because he lacked military prowess or because he was not a Kel Azgher; rather, he was a settled Hakim. According to the cultural norms of the Kel Azgher

793 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 156.

794 Al-Qasar, *Al-Tawariq - 'arab al-Sahara al-Kubra*, 54.

795 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 416.

796 Interview No.2: Meeting with the Elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023. In Ghat, one of the doors of the city is called *bab al-khayr* (Ar. door of goodness). According to oral accounts, in this place, reconciliation among different groups was made.

797 Interview No.4: With Jarmah Abd al-Rahman in Ghat, 2023. Yet, there were some borderlines that even communal law could not go beyond. For instance, when French authorities in Algiers declared a arbitrary man as caliph, and sent him to Ghat to establish some connections, he was immediately and categorically rejected, since there were strict conditions to be a caliph in the Islamic law. See: G. Gardel, *Les Touareg Ajjer* (Paris, 1961), 120. It is also important to note that since the communal law deeply linked to the community itself, these kinds of communal laws were also justified by some Islamic jurist with the argument that in the absence of a *hakim* and judge, the decision of the Islamic community (Ar. *jamaat*) bare as same juristic availability as sharia. Hence, under some circumstances the communal law gains the form of sharia, as was the case in Ghat but also some other places in the Sahara such as Tuwat. For instance, see: Ismail Warscheid, *Droit Musulman et Société Au Sahara Prémoderne: La Justice Islamique Dans Les Oasis Du Grand Touat (Algérie) Aux XVIIe – XIXe Siècles*, (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

798 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 194.

communal law, being a free man was associated with being a nomad, so a settled ruler such as the *hakim* of Ghat had a negative perception. Some settled Kel Azger communities in the city also faced the same treatment.⁷⁹⁹ In this regard, being the *hakim* of Ghat held no real promise for the *amanokal*.⁸⁰⁰ Similar cultural norms, sharply separating settled and nomadic communities, shaped the demographic dynamics in the region. For instance, in the gardens of Ghat and villages, which were important to supply visiting merchants,⁸⁰¹ mostly freed enslaved people (Tm. *attarag*) worked,⁸⁰² as the garden work considered even the worst then being settled, as such works associated with being slave.⁸⁰³ This cultural code, in fact, was the most significant foundation for the continuity of the *amchar* in Ghat without involvement of *amanokal*. In spite of his crucial military power, the city remained safe from any oppression. In other words, the instrument of *dairat al-siyasa* in the application of *idara* was a natural result of the communal law in and around Ghat.

This governing strategy had specific consequences, such as a tributary system that ensured sustainable security for the trans-Saharan trade between Ghadames and Agadez for centuries. Ghadamesian merchants held a monopoly on trade between Tripoli and Agadez⁸⁰⁴ and were required to pay tribute to the powerful Kel Azgher community, primarily the Oraghen and Imanghassaten communities. This allowed them to travel safely from Ghadames to Ifeṛwan.⁸⁰⁵ Upon reaching Ifeṛwan, they had to pay another tribute to the community of Kel Away from Air in order to continue to Agadez without problem.⁸⁰⁶ Through this payment, Kel Tamasheq communities in the Azgher and Air regions were not only providing safety for caravans but also promising to compensate any lost. If another community or some bandits were to plunder the caravan, then, as evidenced by a letter from 1853, it was the responsibility of paid Kel Tamasheq community to pursue the attackers and recover caravan.⁸⁰⁷ Additionally, Kel Tamasheq communities were renting or selling camels for caravans.⁸⁰⁸ In this context, each merchant had a specific client relationship with various Kel Tamasheq communities. After paying their tribute before setting out on their

799 Cami Baykurt, 212.

800 Interview No.3: With Ahmad Ain Muhammad Mustafa in Ghat, 2023.

801 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 172–73.

802 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 143.

803 Muhammad Abdalrahman Abdullatif, 'Al-ṭawāriq āṣḥāb al-ṣaḥrā' al-kubrā', uncategorized, P.A. 2.

804 Al-Mukhtar Al-Jadal, *Tijarat Al-Kawafil al-Sahra al-Libiyya, Wizarat Al-Thaqafat Wa-l-Hadarat* (Trablus: Culture & Civilization Ministry of Libya, 2013), 19.

805 Ifeṛwan was one of the most important stops in the trans-Saharan trade between Ghat and Agadez. The city was established by Kel Azgher, who built several gardens to supply merchants with food. Aboubacar Adamou, *Agadez et Sa Région* (Paris: Études nigériennes, 1979), 34.

806 Interview No.2: Meeting with the Elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023.

807 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, dated as 1853.

808 For instance, see: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1884.

journey, the merchants received a representative from the Kel Tamasheq community that they paid, named by merchants as *sadiq* (Ar. friend), while Kel Tamasheq called them *amid* (Tm. friend).⁸⁰⁹ Nevertheless, this tribute was perceived as insulting by Ghadamesians because such a payment was declared illegal by the Ghadamesian scholars, such as Abi Bakr Al-Ghadamisi. According to him, this type of forced payment could only be deemed legal if the Kel Tamasheq communities had no other means of survival in the Sahara and were collecting this money as a form of aid rather than a business model.⁸¹⁰ However, it was evident to all merchants that the tribute they were required to pay was an integral part of the business model employed by the Kel Tamasheq communities. For this reason, they paid this tribute to be able to run their business further; yet, naming it as *garamat* (Ar. fine).⁸¹¹ Conversely, the scholars in Ghat referred to this payment as *ujrat* (Ar. fee), based on the assertion made by Jalaladin al-Suyuti that communities providing safety in perilous regions for travellers and merchants have the right to demand a fee from them. The Kel Azgher communities named this payment as *sebdar* (Tm. giving a gift to a souvenir).⁸¹² Additionally, the private letters demonstrate that if merchants visit Ghat, as it was not uncommon for them to bypass the city due to the lack of services compared to Murzuq, they had to pay to the *amchar* of Ghat a sum of money, which is named as *ujrat al-tahrir* (Ar. liberation fee).⁸¹³ The main distinction between *garamat* and *ujrat al-tahrir* for Ghadamesian merchants was the calculation of the amount and the procedure to pay. The *garamat* was calculated based on the total value of the caravan, whereas *ujrat al-tahrir* was a personal payment regardless of the value of caravan. More importantly, the *garamat* was a payment that is demanded, *ujrat al-tahrir*, on the other hand, was a payment that is expected.

These different names illustrate the remarkably complex nature of the cultural, political, and economic interactions between three different groups. For Kel Azgher, the giving of a gift by visitors to the chief of the community, proportional to their wealth, was a self-evident phenomenon that could be reminded to visitors if they failed to comply with this "self-evident" cultural norm.⁸¹⁴ the giving of a gift to a community sheikh was not a cultural norm, as such gifts or payments were

809 Muhammad Abdalrahman Abdullatif, 'Al-ṭawāriq āṣḥāb al-ṣaḥrā' al-kubrā', uncategorized, P.A. 2.

810 Al-Ghadamisi, *Taḍkīr al-nāsī wa-talyīn al-qalb al-qāsī*, 18.

811 P.A.4., family collection, 10. It is important to remember that this practice was also problematized by several scholars, such as Abd Al-Karim Al-Magili (d. 1504) and Al-Muhtar Al-Kunti in Timbuktu around 1810s. Different from Al-Ghadamisi, Al-Magili categorically rejects such payment, see: Hiskett, 'An Islamic Tradition of Reform in the Western Sudan', 585. Al-Kunti, on the other hand, names this tribute as *mudara*; namely, something that one should pay to keep power balances. See: Sayidi Muhammad Al-Sagīr, *Kitab Al-Taraif Wa-l-Talid* (Lisbon), folio. 300, M.S. Arabic 6755, BNP.

812 Interview No.2: Meeting with the Elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023.

813 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, dated as 1851.

814 Interview No.3: with Ahmad Ain Muhammad Mustafa in Ghat, 2023.

neither demanded nor expected.⁸¹⁵ In this regard, the Ghadamesian merchants considered the “reminder of the self-evident proportional gift” by Kel Azgher as a clear “demand for payment”. Furthermore, the Ghadamesian merchants were aware of the specific regulations of the Maliki law due to the *hisba*-based system of governance in Ghadames. Any kind of gift or payment that was not defined as legal by the Sharia, was a kind of oppression and punishment for them, as being illegal. Thus, the same payment had two names with completely different connotations by Kel Azgher and Ghadamesians. Interestingly, the cultural norms in Ghat were almost *in-between*. For Ghatians, some gifts, albeit not proportional, are expected to be paid by visitors to the chief of the community. In that case of Ghat, on the other hand, it was not a self-evident cultural norm. Conversely, it was even culturally taboo to ask for a gift or to remind to present some gifts.⁸¹⁶ However, if the visitors did not present a gift, they could expect a cold reception and treatment; yet without any consequences. For Ghadamesian merchants, this practice was not related to giving a gift, as giving a gift was not a cultural norm for them, but a clear expected payment, thereby naming it “fee”. Nevertheless, as it was not “demanded” but expected, it was not illegal for Ghadamesians, prompting them to name it in a neutral manner.

In this context, intriguing cultural, political, and economic interactions between various groups necessitated the maintenance of a balance through the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa*. Furthermore, not only communities but also each individual actor, including the *amchar* of Ghat, was entitled to benefit from this tributary system by also personally engaging in trade in the 18th and 19th century.⁸¹⁷ Although, it is very atypical in the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa* having a ruler who also runs a business on his own personal account, in case of Ghat, the local sources show that the *amchar* also made trade on his personal account, which is, in fact, a typical feature for the application of *tadbir*.⁸¹⁸ This practice often led to a lack of trust from the Ghadamesian communities residing in the central Sahara towards the Ghatian and Kel Azgher communities in the late 18th century. From their perspective, these people were applying *idara*, and leaving an impression that the *hakim* of Ghat or *amanokal* would not utilize their bureaucratic power to engage in trade, which makes them strong competitors for merchants, in the background; yet, this was a common practice in Ghat and among Kel Azgher communities.⁸¹⁹

815 Interview No.5: with the elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023.

816 Interview No.2: Meeting with the elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023.

817 B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 122/3.

818 P.A.2., uncategorized, dated as 1850.

819 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, ed. İ.Ö. Bostan (İstanbul: Çamlıca Yayınları, 2018), 119.

In the case of the payment to the Kel Tamasheq community, merchants were granted security. To provide this, however, the representative of the community who collects tribute was not personally accompanying the caravans, but sending them a guide called *khabir* (Ar. expert) a different individual from *sadiq*. That was another step that merchants had to take, but not in the form of tribute; rather, it was a salary.⁸²⁰ The role of the *khabir* was essential for the continuity of Kel Tamasheq's control in the central Sahara apart from their military power. In practice, this agent was the only person who knew the *alamat* (Ar. extracted knowledge) system for merchants and their caravans. This was a knowledge system that is exclusively in the possession of the Kel Tamasheq community. In practice, it was a complex guiding system to find the right way in the Sahara. The *khabir* possessed the ability to interpret stars and sand dune formations to determine the correct direction,⁸²¹ as well as decipher the hidden meanings of various signs left by his community members in the desert.⁸²² Therefore, not only militarily to have security but also epistemologically, the Ghadamesian merchants depended on the Kel Tamasheq community to help them cross the desert. Whilst the practice of collecting tribute for security was not unique to the Kel Azgher community in the central Sahara, as the nomadic Shaanba Arabs⁸²³ between Souf and Ghadames also employed a similar system, often leading to conflicts with the Kel Azgher communities,⁸²⁴ the system of *alamat* that Kel Azgher communities were using in the region made them the solemn authority to know and control the trade routes.

This tributary system, however, began to change – at least formatively – around the 1840s. After 1845, the Ottoman authorities from Ghadames and Murzuq began to appear as an important military power in the region, which had a particular meaning in the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa* of

820 Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023.

821 Binbaşı Ömer Subhi, *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi ile Büyük Sahra ve Sudan*, 73.

822 Interview No.3: With Ahmad Ain Muhammad Mustafa in Ghat, 2023.

823 Although Shaanba Arabs had a similar nomadic life-style such as Kel Azgher and Kel Hoggar, and more importantly, imposing a similar kind of tribute to the merchants, passing through the lands that they control, there was an old rivalry between them and Kel Tamasheq societies. While Kel Hoggar and Kel Azgher regularly sought alliances from the neighbouring countries, such as from the Ottomans and from Air as well as Tibesti, when they were in conflict with each other, they regularly excluded Shaanba from possible alliances. Instead, in many cases, they stopped their wars against each other to organize a common attack on Shaanbas. Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 168. Nevertheless, this hostility was not necessarily related to an ethnic conflict. In fact, around the 1860s, an Arabic community from Algeria decided to flee the Azgher region after experiencing atrocities at the hands of French colonial invaders. In Ghat, they requested to settle in the city and its surrounding areas, demonstrating their desire to integrate into the local society. *Amchar* of Kel Azgher assembled all community leaders, and following an internal discussion, he accepted their demand. The Arab community asked a *shahadat* (Ar. testimony) document from *amchar* to secure their future. However, *amchar* said that this is not their tradition to issue such documents. Instead, they will give them a special symbol to mark their animals. Thus, everyone will know that now they are Kel Azgher. In other words, they were even eager to overcome cultural differences. Amahin, 172.

824 Muhammad al-Arabi Al-Zubayri, *Al-Tijarat al-Kharijat Lilsharq al-Jazayiri 1792m-1830m* (Al-jazair: al-Sharikat al-wataniyat lilnashr wa-l-tawzi', 1972), 188. For instance, between 1821 and 1826 there were several reciprocal plunders between Shaanba and Kel Azgher; see: P.A.8., uncategorized, letters from 1821, 1824, 1826.

idara. The application of *idara* granted to the *amchar* of Ghat aimed at maintaining power balances in the region, to redefine the Ottoman's newfound influence. This shift coincided with a new war between Kel Azgher and Shaanba Arabs between Ghat and Ouargla in 1846, which weakened the power of the Kel Azgher community.⁸²⁵ Following the 1840s, members of the Sanussiyya religious brotherhood also settled in Ghat and advocated for the strict implementation of Maliki jurisprudence in lieu of communal law.⁸²⁶ In this regard, in 1845, the *amchar* of Ghat personally visited the Ottoman *kaymakam* of Fezzan and took with him an envoy from the Kel Azgher to discuss a possible Ottoman rule in Ghat. The *kaymakam* reported this discussion to the *vali* of Tripoli. In his response, the *vali* states that he appreciates the effort of the *kaymakam* to expand the rule of the Ottomans but further emphasizes that “we are aware of the role of Kel Azgher in the security of trade routes, but if they would demand Ottoman rule, then they should stop collecting tribute from merchants.”⁸²⁷ Discussions stopped until a clarification from Kel Azgher. However, in 1849, the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher was ready to accept the conditions of the Ottomans due to the personal lobbying activities of Owinayt ag Kalala, a prominent figure among Kel Azgher communities.⁸²⁸ Hence, the *amchar* of Ghat sent an official letter to Tripoli to demand an Ottoman flag, a judge, and official recognition as *müdür*, with the signatures of some Sanussiyya members, many Ghat inhabitants and some elders of Kel Azgher.⁸²⁹ However, their demand was rejected by the *vali* of Tripoli. The official response cited the impropriety of the request in terms of Ottoman bureaucratic protocol. The underlying reason was the deep ignorance of the Ottoman government in İstanbul. In their internal correspondence, the Ottoman government stated that “since this city is the key point to reach the southern Sudan, it would be meaningful to control it. But the inhabitants of the city are known as “orderless wild people”, so the *kaymakam* of Murzuq maybe can go personally there to see the situation.”⁸³⁰

The official rejection of the *amchar* of Ghat took nearly four years to be received, primarily due to extensive correspondence between Tripoli and İstanbul. Eventually, in 1854, the *amchar* of Ghat personally visited the *kaymakam* of Murzuq to learn the progress. Different from the *vali* of Tripoli and the Ottoman government in İstanbul, the *kaymakam* possessed a better understanding of the actual situation in the region, and instead of waiting further orders from İstanbul, he immediately

825 P.A.9., uncategorized, dated as 1846.

826 P.A.3., uncategorized, letters from the 19th century.

827 D.M.T.L, *Idara*, dated as 1845.

828 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 75.

829 P.A.1., uncategorized, dated as 1849.

830 B.O.A., *İrade Dahiliye*, 18969.

appointed the *amchar* as the *müdür* of Ghat.⁸³¹ However, despite receiving a judge, an Ottoman flag, and a regular salary, no soldiers were dispatched to Ghat.⁸³² That was, in fact, because of the Ottoman administrative system, as *müdür* had no authority to control any armed division; yet, have the right to demand military help from the *kaymakam* in case of urgency. In contrast to the *müdür* in Ghadames, who was sent from Istanbul, the *amchar* of Ghat was relieved of the duty of tax collection. Consequently, no significant change, especially in the tribute system, really took place in Ghat around the 1850s, but the *amchar* of Ghat had a new role as *müdür*. The city had a judge, and the *amchar* had to apply *idara* not only through the instrument of *dairat al-siyasa* but also depending on the cases, he had to implement the instrument of *hisba*. Most importantly, *amonakl* of Kel Azgher was no more the only military power that *amchar* of Ghat engaged with. Now, he could request military intervention from Murzuq in some cases. These minor changes led to numerous challenges between the Kel Azger communities and the Ottoman authorities throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, as will be seen in Chapter 6.

4.3.2. Teda-Tibesti and Kavar (Bilma)

The Kavar Oasis was in a similar position to the Ghat in the trans-Sahara trade. It served as a crucial stop and control point between Murzuq and Ngazargamu/Kuka. However, Kavar's importance lay in its salt production, which dates back to ancient times.⁸³³ The oasis was the hub for salt trade in the whole southern Central Sudan, which made the region very important, as salt trade had an essential role in the whole trans-Saharan trade,⁸³⁴ even attracting the interest of the Ghadamesian merchants.⁸³⁵ Although the ancient inhabitants of the region were Kanuri communities, in the 19th century the region was under the control of Teda groups from Tibesti, while some Kanuri groups were still in the oasis.⁸³⁶ The oasis's governance strategy was based on the nomadic cultural codes of the Teda and the tradition of Maliki jurisprudence followed by Kanuri inhabitants as well as regular Arab merchants. The ruler of the oasis, known *derde* (Td. ruler), held a similar role to the *amchar* in Ghat, with no dynastic legacy.⁸³⁷ Likewise, his role was to mediate

831 B.O.A., *İrade Dahiliye*, 915.

832 B.O.A., *İrade Dahiliye*, 625.

833 Al-Nani Vuld Al-Huseyn, *Sahra Al-Mülesimin* (Bengazi: Dar Al-Medari Al-Islami, 2007), 441.

834 For more details, see: Halima Ben Ali and Safia Abdoui, 'Manajim Al-Milih Fi al-Sahra Wa Dawruha Fi Aizdihar Rijarat al-Hawadir' (M.A. Thesis, Jamiat Adrar, 2020).

835 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, an undated letter from the 19th century.

836 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 140–50.

837 Peter Fuchs, *Die Völker Der Südost-Sahara: Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi* (Wien, 1961), 110.

conflicts in and between communities,⁸³⁸ and he did not collect any tax, only received some gifts.⁸³⁹ Despite being incorrectly referred to as a *sultan* or *mai* (Kn. sultan) by non-Afro-Islamic agents,⁸⁴⁰ the community of Kavar and neighbouring regions considered him as *hakim*. The *derde* had only a real presence in daily life if there was a conflict or a need for a political or diplomatic decision, as is typical of a *hakim*.⁸⁴¹ The court registrations from Kavar around the 1850s indicate that, unlike Ghat, there was a Kanuri *qadi* presence in the oasis. The juridical sphere, however, was carefully divided between this judge and *derde*. The judge was primarily concerned with cases related to divorce, inheritance, and murder, whereas political, economic, and diplomatic matters were not within his purview. Individuals seeking resolution for political or economic matters were directed to the *qadi ali* (Ar. great *qadi*/judge) which was the name of *derde* in the legal context.⁸⁴² Indeed, *derde* lacked knowledge of Maliki jurisprudence. Still, he played the same role in communal law, deciding on political issues. Similar to Ghat, around 1845, some Sanussiyya members were mentioned in the court registers. From this standpoint, the governance strategy in the oasis mirrored that of Ghat, where the *amchar* received a judge from Murzuq in 1854, that is to say, applying *idara* by using *dairat al-siyasa* and *hisba* in a certain regulation. Again, similar to the relations between Kel Azgher and Ghat, although Kavar was in a region that is under the control of Teda from Tibesti, there was no vassalage system between them. In fact, the cultural distinction between nomadic and settled lifestyles was more pronounced in the case of the Teda from Tibesti. Being settled and engaged in daily garden works was for Teda from Tibesti not just a less prestigious life-style, but as an insult to their nomadic culture, since they consider such works only for criminals and enslaved people.⁸⁴³ Consequently, settled Tedas in Kavar were regarded as “inferior” by the Tedas from Tibesti.⁸⁴⁴ Interestingly enough, Arab merchants in Murzuq held a contrasting perspective. They considered the Tedas in Kavar to be part of the global Islamic community, while the nomadic Tedas

838 Rottier, ‘Une Mission Au Tibesti’, *Supplement Afrique Française* 7 (1925): 85.

839 Interview No.8: Meeting with the Abu Bakr Mustapha from Kavar in Al-Qatrun, 2023.

840 Gustav Nachtigal, *Sahara Und Sudan* (Berlin, 1879), 528. After considering *derde* wrongfully as sultan, a French agent was shocked to see that the *derde* around 1900 was a very old man almost totally blind and deaf, definitely without power from the Eurocentric perspective. Henri Gadel, ‘Notes Sur Bilma et Les Oasis Environnantes’, *Coloniale, Explorations, Missions* 7 (1907): 371.

841 Interview No.8: Meeting with the Abu Bakr Mustapha from Kavar in Al-Qatrun, 2023.

842 P.A.10., court registration, dated as 1845.

843 Andreas Kronenberg, *Die Teda von Tibesti* (Wien: Verlag Ferdinand Berger, 1958), 4; Charles Lecoq, *Dictionnaire Ethnographique Teda* (Paris: MIFAN, 1950), 189.

844 André Salifou, ‘Colonisation et Societes Indigenes Au Niger, de La Fin XIX^e Siecle Au Debut de La Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale’ (Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Toulouse), 90.

from Tibesti were considered "non-Muslim" plunderers.⁸⁴⁵ This sharp contrast caused noticeable tension between the Fezani merchants and the Tedas from Tibesti.

This tension was frequently renewed due to the complicated negotiation system of trans-Saharan trade between Fezan and Bornu. Different from Kel Azgher around Ghat and Kel Air around Ifferwan, Teda communities from Tibesti never built a tributary system for merchants who wanted to cross the desert.⁸⁴⁶ Instead, they regularly patrolled the caravan routes, demanding exorbitant payments from anyone they encountered. Dissimilar to the tribute system employed by the Kel Tamasheq, these negotiations for payment took place in the middle of the desert, with the Teda groups posing a direct threat, which was often resulted for merchants to lose a significant portion, or even all, of their products.⁸⁴⁷ What is more, paying this forced tribute did not guarantee security. Throughout the rest of the journey, other Teda groups could intercept the caravan and demand more payment. In other words, encounters between the Teda communities from Tibesti and trans-Saharan merchants in the central Sahara often escalated into violent conflicts. In fact, Tedas from Kawar suffered from these violent encounters because the Tedas from Tibesti did not consider them to be part of their own society. Yet, against a common rival such as Kel Azgher, they were fighting together.⁸⁴⁸ The absence of a tribute system and the constant threat of Teda attacks forced Fezzan merchants to cross the desert accompanied by armed escorts. According to oral narratives, that was the main reason for having a sultan in Murzuq, unlike Ghadames. Since the Ghadamesian merchants did not require armed forces for trade due to the Kel Tamasheq's tributary system, it is believed that they also did not require a sultan responsible for dispatching such armed divisions and collecting taxes.⁸⁴⁹ Also, differently from the Kel Azgher around Ghat, Teda from Tibesti were not running any trade on their own account on the trans-Sahara route. Their trade activities were limited to local markets, yet they possessed a large number of camels and mostly acted as caravan owners.⁸⁵⁰ The Tedas in Kawar were involved in trade. Still, these merchants only came to Ghat if they received a sufficient amount of cereals from Damargu in exchange for salt. They would then

845 Jérôme Tubiana, *Contes Toubou Du Sahara* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007), 18; Interview No.7: Meeting with the Elders of Al-Qatrun in Al-Qatrun, 2023.

846 Kronenberg, *Die Teda von Tibesti*, 8.

847 Interview No.6: Meeting with Muhammad Hasan Bin Suwawi from Murzuq in Sebha, 2023.

848 Kronenberg, *Die Teda von Tibesti*, 101.

849 Interview No.6: Meeting with Muhammad Hasan Bin Suwawi from Murzuq in Sebha, 2023.

850 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 120.

try to sell the cereals in Ghat.⁸⁵¹ Meanwhile, there were also several merchants in Ghat who engaged in the same trade via Agadez.⁸⁵²

In the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa*, the *derde* of Kavar consistently reassessed the power dynamics in the central Sahara. For instance, until 1849, the *derde* visited Agadez to cultivate a positive relationship with the sultan, in order to seek assistance in times of urgency such as the plundering of the oasis.⁸⁵³ Nevertheless, since 1830s, the oasis had been subjected to frequent attacks of Arab communities from Fezzan, who took advantage of the power vacuum in Murzuq during the civil war in Tripoli, and members of Awlad Sulaiman, who had to leave Murzuq in 1842 and came to Kanem close to Kavar.⁸⁵⁴ The Sultan of Air in Agadez responded to these attacks by dispatching the armies to the region.⁸⁵⁵ Nevertheless, in 1849, the *derde* of Kavar began to view the Ottoman presence in the central Sahara as more significant than the traditional alliance with Agadez and sent an official letter to Murzuq requesting Ottoman protection in the region. Unlike the case of Ghat, he promptly received an Ottoman flag and appointment as Ottoman *müdür* in Kavar.⁸⁵⁶ As a result, after one year, in 1850, when British vice-consul in Murzuq tried to establish a diplomatic affair with the *derde*, he informed the British agent that “I am under the Ottoman rule, so I cannot make anything with you without permission of Ottomans.”⁸⁵⁷ Interestingly enough, the British agent did not believe him and continued to report to London that Kavar is open for future British involvement. In 1859, the *derde* even personally came to Tripoli to meet with the *vali*, which the topic of the meeting is unclear.⁸⁵⁸

Now as the *müdür* of the oasis, the *derde* began to cooperate with the *kaymakam* of Murzuq to put an end the raids conducted by Arab communities and Awlad Sulaiman. The *kaymakam* swiftly compelled the local communities to engage in plundering activities in Kavar, whereas evading

851 Hajj Osman bin Omar and Anonym interviews, ‘Aufzeichnungen Über Die Stadt Chat in Der Sahara’, ed. Adolf Krause, *Zeitschrift Der Gesellschaft Für Erdkunde Zu Berlin* 17 (1882): 301.

852 ‘Interview No. 21: With Salahuddin Al-Tarqi in Ghat, 2023’.

853 Prévot, ‘Rapport: Communiqué à l’institut Français d’Afrique Noire’, in *Confins Libyens*, ed. Gentil, 1909, 34. According to a local story of Teda from Tibesti, Agadez had a historical role for Kavar. This story narrates that once there was a conflict among Teda communities to choose a *derde*. Accordingly, they decided to send two candidates to Agadez and ask the sultan of Agadez to choose one of them as *derde*. Kronenberg, *Die Teda von Tibesti*, 78–79.

854 Interview No.7: Meeting with the Elders of Al-Qatrun in Al-Qatrun, 2023.

855 Adamou, *Agadez et Sa Région*, 74.

856 B.O.A., İrade Dahiliye, 15368. According to local sources in Al-Qatrun, the north-most Teda settlement in the southern Murzuq, in 1849, there were some Sanussiyya members were settled in the village. It is an open question whether they also played a role for Tedas in Kavar to convince their *derde* to demand Ottoman rule. See: M.M.A., uncategorized, dated as 1849.

857 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 101/26.

858 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 179.

attacks from Awlad Sulaiman posed a long-term challenge.⁸⁵⁹ However, the appointment of Kavar's *derde* as *müdür* had a significant impact on the Teda communities in Tibesti, prompting the *derde* of the Tibesti region to also seek Ottoman protection by sending a letter to Murzuq in 1849. In a similar manner, he also quickly received the appointment.⁸⁶⁰ However, this *derde* was not satisfied with the appointment, since he did not receive any armed forces. Furthermore, he believed that the Ottoman's failure to send an armed division was due to economic reasons, and in 1852, he decided to promise the right of use a salt lake around Tibesti for Ottomans, and in return demand a garrison. The *kaymakam* of Fezzan explained that the reason is not economic but bureaucratic, since *müdürs* have no right to have a garrison but demand armed division from the *kaymakam* in time of emergency.⁸⁶¹

In terms of governing strategy, this new appointment did not bring about any significant changes in Kavar, since *derde* was already applying *idara* in a manner that it was expected from the title of *müdür*. For instance, similar to Ghat, he did not have to collect any tax for the Ottomans. However, with this new direction, Kavar severed its diplomatic ties with Agadez and became an integral part of the Ottoman bloc in the central Sudan for the remainder of the century and even tended to *tadbir* in the late 19th century, as will be seen in the Chapter 6.

4.4. *idara* Tended *tadbir*: Sultanate of Air

Not only was Agadez the most prominent capital in the Kel Tamasheq world, it was also the hub of century-long political and diplomatic relations with the global Islamic world. Regardless of its distance from the central regions and cities such as Cairo, Baghdad, or İstanbul, scholars and agents of Agadez were presence throughout the whole Islamic world for centuries.⁸⁶² This extensive global interconnectedness was also the driving force behind the establishment of the sultanate. Although it is not very clear exactly when the sultanate was created, it is well-known that the sultanate was affiliated to the Mamlukian caliphate in Cairo during the 15th century, together with the sultanate of Bornu.⁸⁶³ During the 16th century, for instance, the scholars of Essouq, whom some part thereafter migrated to Agadez, were regularly corresponding with the famous scholars in Cairo such as Al-

859 In 1851, Tripolitan *vali* gave an order to the *kaymakam* of Murzuq to defend Kavar against bandits for any price. But in many cases, it was beyond the power of the *kaymakam*. B.O.A., Sadaret Amedi Kalemi Defterleri, 37-18.

860 B.O.A., İrade Dahiliye, 15368.

861 B.O.A., Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Nezaret ve Devair Yazışmaları Evrakı, 71-70.

862 Sidqi Ali Ayazko, *Al-Islam Wa-l-Amazigh* (Rabat: Al-Huya, 2002), 42

863 Anonym, *Bada'i al-Zuhur Fi Waqa'i al-Duhur* (İstanbul, 1931), 63.

Suyuti.⁸⁶⁴ This connection fostered a deep respect of Al-Suyuti and his ideas on governance in the following centuries.⁸⁶⁵ In the 19th century, several Kunta families who were settled in-Gall further maintained this legacy.⁸⁶⁶ The legacy of *tadbir*, in this regard, played a formative role in the formation of the sultanate of Air.⁸⁶⁷ Nevertheless, dissimilar to the sultanate of Fezzan in Murzuq, the core administrative structure in Agadez was built in accordance with the Hausa-States. In this respect, the sultan had a role to apply *tadbir* in a broad sense, such as personally involving to trade and appointing administrators from the centre, using mainly Hausa titles for administrative offices such as *hakimai* (Ha. chief, hakim). Nevertheless, due to the fact that the city was in the region of Kel Air, Kel Tamasheq cultural codes also played a significant role through the natural tendency of the communal law to *idara*, and more specifically to the instrument of *dairat al-siyasa*. There were also crucial cultural differences between northern Kel Tamasheq, such as Kel Hoggar and Kel Azgher, and southern Kel Tamasheq, such as Kel Air and Iwilimmeden. For instance, legitimacy was based on matrilineal origin in the north and patrilineal origin in the south. Thus, *hakims* in Ghat were chosen among the relatives of recent *hakims*' mother, in Agadez, sultans were chosen among the relatives of the recent sultans' father.⁸⁶⁸ Another noticeable difference was related to the titles and roles. In the Azgher region, the *amonakl* had a status similar to that of a sultan, while the *amchar* was more like a sheikh. In the Air region, there was literally a sultan, albeit without being the *amonakl*. The title *amonakl* did not exist in the south, as they used the term *tabl* or *tambari*. A *tabl* had a symbolic drum (Tm. *tabl*) showing his leadership status. In this regard, in the late 18th century, the *amchar* of Agadez was the Sultan of Air, and *amonakl* or *tabl* of the region was the chief of Kel Away.⁸⁶⁹ According to Muhammad Al-Sayyidi, in Agadez, these differences were also the reason of the dissimilar political system between Ghat and Agadez. For him, Kel Azgher of Ghat were excluded by the Islamic communities long time due to their matrilineal legitimacy system, as it was considered "non-islamic". Hence, the sheikh (Tm. *amchar*) of Ghat lacked the support from central powers in Cairo, İstanbul, and Morocco, and *amonakl* gained too much power on *amchar*. Accordingly, sheikhs in Ghat could be only a *hakim* apply *idara*. Agadez, on the contrary, thanks to its patrilineal system, gained very early full support of above-mentioned centres. Along this line, the rulers of the city achieved to dominate *tabl* and reduced their status to a drum-bearer or military

864 J. O. Hunwick, 'African Perspectives', *C.U.P.*, 1970, 7–33.

865 E.M. Sartain, 'Jalal Al-Din Suyuti's Relations With the People of Takrur', *Journal of Semitic Studies* 6, no. 2 (1971): 193–98.

866 Adamou, *Agadez et Sa Région*, 31.

867 Norris, *The Tuareg: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel*, 1975, 41.

868 Abd Al-Rahman Al-Fulani, 'Al-ṭawāriq āṣḥāb al-ṣaḥrā al-kubrā', uncategorized, P.C. 7.

869 Abd Al-Rahman Al-Fulani.

commander, and being only the regent of the sultan.⁸⁷⁰ Oral accounts further support this consideration, claiming that with these advantages, rulers in Agadez were able to create a sultanate.⁸⁷¹ It is highly probable that also many other historical, political, social, and economic factors played a role in the early acceptance of Agadez in the Islamic world, in spite of being simply patrilineal. Nevertheless, this consideration and narrative illustrates the role of differentiation among Kel Tamasheq societies to justify their own autonomy.

This political dissimilarity further shaped the system of governance as well. For instance, as a sultan, the ruler of Agadez had right to levy taxes. However, the Kel Air groups involved in trans-Saharan trade were exempt from customs duties.⁸⁷² Similarly, the *tabl* of Kel Air, who was from the Kel Away community, had no obligation to pay any tax to the sultan. This created a significant political disparity between the *tabl* and the sultan during the 19th century. The *tabls* were more interested in the activities of trans-Sahara trade between Ghat-Agadez-Kawar, and the sultan was mostly preoccupied with the political changes around northern Sokoto throughout Adar and Damargu.⁸⁷³ This dissimilarity can be attributed to the fact that both local *amchars* in Adar and Damargu were part of the vassalage system of the Sultanate of Air and paid annual tribute by contributing to the most significant portion of the Agadezian Sultan's treasury.⁸⁷⁴ However, as a typical characteristic of the *tadbir*-based vassalage system, there were regular power shifts and conflicts between the *Sultan* of Air and Adar as well as Damargu. For example, when the Sultan of Air attacked Katsina in 1805, the *amchar* of Adar supported Katsina to prevent the Agadezian Sultan from gaining a powerful presence near Adar.⁸⁷⁵ Similarly, it was not uncommon for the people of Adar to depose the newly appointed *amchar* chosen by the Sultan of Air, and instead, install another individual on the throne.⁸⁷⁶ These actions were not necessarily acts of rebellion against Agadez; rather, a means for the *amchars* and people of Adar to safeguard their own authority whenever an opportunity arose, which is a typical practice in the application of *tadbir*.

In this respect, during the 19th century, the Sultan of Air was regularly forced, especially by the *tabl* of Kel Away and the *amchar* of Adar, to tend his *tadbir* application to *idara*. It is of utmost to state that neither the *tabl* nor the *amchar* of Adar were categorically against the Sultan of Air and his

870 For instance, even around the 1810s when Kel Away gained much power, *tabl* of Kel Away could not act more than being the regent of the sultan, see: Muhammad Al-Sayyidi, 'Tarāḡim al-'ulamā' Bāḡrām', uncategorized, P.C. 8.

871 Interview No.12: with Seydou Kawsen Mayaga in Agadez in 2023.

872 Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie*, 290.

873 Hamani, 329.

874 Hamani, 291.

875 Hamani, *L'Adar Précolonial (Republic Du Niger) - Contribution à l'étude de l'histoire Des Etats Hausa*, 151.

876 Hamani, 152.

tadbir application. But if their own interests were at stake, they were demanding *idara*. Consequently, the core question in terms of governance in the earlier 19th century was whether the Sultan of Air should have enough power to impose his *tadbir* application, or whether he should tend to keep power balances among various actors by shifting the governing strategy in the direction of *idara*.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Sultan of Air played a more central role in the region, clearly imposing *tadbir* and launching major military campaigns against Iwilimedden and Gobir.⁸⁷⁷ As a means of justifying the sultan's authority, an origin story was fabricated.⁸⁷⁸ According to this narrative, during the early days of the sultanate, the Kel Tamasheq communities faced internal conflicts in selecting a sultan. They decided to dispatch an envoy to İstanbul, and ask the Ottoman *padişah* to give one of his sons as a Sultan of Agadez. Allegedly, the Ottoman *padişah* gave one of his sons, called Yusuf, and he became the first ruler in Agadez. For this reason, the ruling dynasty is named as *İstanbulawa* (Ha. [someone] from İstanbul)⁸⁷⁹ Although there is no concrete evidence supporting this account in the Ottoman archives,⁸⁸⁰ it was not rare that several Ottoman *fermans* were issued to various Kel Tamasheq communities between 17th and 20th centuries by entitling them to create a sultanate in name of the Ottoman *padişah*.⁸⁸¹ Nevertheless, it is important to note that these documents did not originate from İstanbul but were instead drafted by local governors and agents to extend Ottoman control in the Sahara.⁸⁸² Still, these unauthentic *fermans* had enough real impact on the political discourse. For instance, in the 18th and 19th centuries, Sultans of Air depicted themselves as relatives of the Ottoman *padişah* in their Friday prayer.⁸⁸³

877 Adamou, *Agadez et Sa Région*, 72.

878 Norris, *The Tuareg: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel*, 1975, 71.

879 Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie*, 133–35.

880 Despite the lack of written records, the possibility of an early connection between the Kel Tamasheq and the Ottomans should not be easily disregarded. For instance, regarding the *İstanbulawa* story, there is also another famous story named Bagzan. According to the oral accounts, the first *İstanbulawa* Yunus came from İstanbul with a horse. Thereafter, they crossed this horse race with a race from the mountain of Bagzan. They gave the first horse from this hybrid race a Turkish name, “*çimova bulut*”, whose present-day Tamasheq derivative is “*tchimouaboulout*”. Interview No.12: with Seydou Kawsen Mayaga in Agadez in 2023. This is a typical horse's name among the nomadic Turkmen communities, as they call the multicoloured horses with this name. As the pre-modern nomadic communities left very few traces on the written records, their interregional and intercontinental interactions are still a huge gap in the historical research. Hopefully, one day we will be able to understand the unknown world of the global nomads.

881 For instance, the scholars of Essouq claimed that they received around the 16th century a *ferman* from the Ottoman *padişah* to create a sultanate in the Sahara on his behalf. Abduljabbar Alqadir, ‘Al-ğawhar al-ṭamīn fī aḥbār ṣaḥrā’ al-mulattamīn’, P.A.12, uncategorized.

882 In fact, such unauthentic *fermans* were available throughout the whole Sahara. Also, Kel Hoggar had received one. B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56.

883 Abd Al-Rahman Al-Fulani, ‘Al-ṭawāriq āṣḥāb al-ṣaḥrā’ al-kubrā’.

However, the authority of the Sultans of Air faced with a challenge when in the 1750s Kel Away communities, who long-lived between Zinder and Kuka but move towards west pushing Kel Geres away in the 17th century,⁸⁸⁴ began to migrate to eastern Agadez and to gain control on the trade with Kavar and Ghat.⁸⁸⁵ Different from the other Kel Tamasheq communities in Air, Kel Away considered themselves not really part of the region, but connected with Awjila, being relatives of Majabran merchants.⁸⁸⁶ They were also aware of the trade dynamics around Kavar and its importance, which greatly shaped their rise to the power in the region. In the beginning of the 19th century, there were two others, and this time many formidable challenges for Air. The immense expansion of the Uthmaniyya caliphate around 1810 also caused fundamental changes around Adrar, since they had to find the best position for themselves between Sokoto and Agadez. In that regard, the political and military power of the sultanate of Air was greatly challenged, and even quickly surpassed by the Sokoto forces in the south.⁸⁸⁷ In the north, around the same years, several armed forces from Kel Hoggar communities began to raid Iferrwan and northern Agadez. To counter these attacks, in 1814, the Sultan of Air had to create an alliance with the Iwilimmeden, granting them many privileges.⁸⁸⁸

Agadez's reaction to this unexpected transformation in southern Adrar was more pacifist. Except for the Kel Geres community in eastern Adrar, there was no motivation among the Kel Air to initiate a war against the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. On the other hand, there was another jihad movement in the western Adrar between 1807 and 1813 under the leadership of Muhammad al-Jaylani, who was greatly supported by the Sokoto forces, and even achieved the capture of Adrar in 1818.⁸⁸⁹ In this respect, the Sultan of Air was not only under the pressure of anti-Sokoto bloc around Adrar but was also threatened by the jihad of pro-Sokoto al-Jaylani. Accordingly, the Sultans decided to partially shift their *tadbir* application into *idara*, and preferred to keep the new power dynamic in balance by making an alliance with Sokoto to avoid the further development of jihad and to hope that the Sokoto forces will win against anti-Sokoto bloc.⁸⁹⁰ Nonetheless, this was not a quick and easy transformation, as several interest groups, such as Kel Geres, al-Jaylani, the *amchar* of Adrar, *tabl* of Kel Away, were involved. Between 1810 and 1835, the sultanate of Air began to approach to the

884 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 109.

885 Ismael Al-Arabi, *Al-Sahra al-Kabir Wa Shawatuha* (Algier: Muwassasat al-Vataniyya li-l-Kitab, 1983), 191–93.

886 Adamou, *Agadez et Sa Région*, 27. The existence of several Tamasheq words in the Awjilan Arabic is also a possible sign of this relation.

887 Hamani, *L'Adrar Précolonial (Republic Du Niger) - Contribution à l'étude de l'histoire Des Etats Hausa*, 158.

888 Adamou, *Agadez et Sa Région*, 72.

889 Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie*, 364–69.

890 Knut Vikor, *The Oasis of Salt: The History of Kavar, a Saharan Centre of Salt Production* (Bergen, 1999), 215.

Sokoto with many internal conflicts and even a brief civil war. The decisive moment that made the new power dynamic clear for everyone in Air was the victory of Sokoto against *sarkin* Gobir and his many alliances, including Kel Geres, in a war around 1836.⁸⁹¹ After this victory, the anti-Sokoto bloc collapsed, and Sokoto turned its interest to internal issues by leaving al-Jaylani mainly alone in his jihad. By aligning with Sokoto, not being part of it as al-Jaylani desired, or being against it as Kel Geres hoped, the Sultans of Air, on the one hand, protected their autonomy in the Air, but on the other hand, left their century long *tadbir* application. In the subsequent years, the caliphs of Sokoto regularly intervened in the internal affairs of the sultanate. In the new power dynamic, the Sultans of Air were forced to apply *idara*, respecting the power practices of the Sokoto to some extent.⁸⁹² This marked the end of the vassalage system, as the sultanate no longer possessed sufficient power to assert its authority. Adar and Damargu, however, continued to send regular gifts, not tribute anymore, to keep the political affairs alive. In spite of this, the sultanate of Air was still able to control the trade between Ghat and Katsina/Kano.⁸⁹³ One of the core factors in this control was the essentially good relations with Kel Azgher. The Sultanate of Air was in a constant state of war with all of the neighboring Kel Tamasheq societies. The Kel Azgher were the only exception. There is no single war between Kel Air and Kel Azgher known so far. According to Al-Shawi Amahin, the reason for this deep friendship was not only economic connectedness through trade but also a cultural link. He argues that some communities in Kel Azgher believe the story that around 15th century, some of their families travelled to Kavar and then to Bornu. Then, they noticed that Air is the best place for their camels. So, they came to the region and established the city of Tinshimane. Thereafter, with the arrival of other several Kel Tamasheq communities they built city of Agadez. Thus, many Kel Azgher communities consider the inhabitants and Sultans of Air as their relative.⁸⁹⁴

After a long tendency, around the 1840s, the sultanate of Air entirely abandoned the application of *tadbir*. This had further consequences also for the various actors in the region. Especially the *tabl* and his Kel Away community greatly enjoyed this new governing system, and after 1830s they openly dominated the control on the trans-Sahara trade between Ghadames-Ghat-Kano, by-passing Agadez to avoid any possible payment for their clients.⁸⁹⁵ This indeed caused crucial economic losses in Agadez, adding this to the losses of tributary payments by Adar and Damargu. In this

891 Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie*, 357.

892 Hamani, 373.

893 For instance, until the end of the 19th century, most of the gold came to Tripoli from Agadez via Ghadamesian merchants. Until the 20th century, there were two scales used to measure the value of gold in Ghadames: one local scale and one Agadezian scale. 'Interview No. 23: With Hajj Al-Hadi Al-Tawhami in Ghadames, 2023'.

894 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 92.

895 Hamani, *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie*, 413.

regard, it is not surprising that around 1850, European agents began to report Agadez as a ghost city.⁸⁹⁶ However, the Kel Away also began to lose control of the salt trade between Kavar-Damargu-Kano after the 1860s, when Awlad Sulaiman left Fezzan in 1842 and began to raid all caravans around Kavar. It took almost 20 years, until around the 1880s, for Kel-Away to regain control. Consequently, economic activities around Air could not improve until the 1880s.⁸⁹⁷

In this context, following a prolonged political alignment with Cairo and İstanbul, the Sultanate of Air turned its interest to the southern Sudan after the 1810s. With this new orientation, the Sultans of Air left their application of the *tadbir*, carrying the new consequences of the application of *idara*. The role of Air Sultans greatly diminished after around the 1830s, whereas other Kel Air communities began to play significant roles in being the new driving forces in the massive economic development after the 1880s.

4.5. Patterns and Dynamics of the Trans-Sahara Trade in the Central Sudan During the 19th Century

Although the “trans-Saharan trade” is a well-known phenomenon for the historians,⁸⁹⁸ there is limited understanding of its patterns and dynamics in the central Sudan, particularly in relation to governing systems. While the dissemination of Islam, powerful families, and the slave trade were mostly named as driving forces behind this trade,⁸⁹⁹ in the case of Central Sudan, local sources paint a different picture.

First, non-Afro-Islamic agents and consuls regularly reported in the 19th century that the slave trade was the most important part of the trans-Saharan trade. Without it, the entire trade would have collapsed.⁹⁰⁰ To support this argument, they estimated numbers such as between 4000 and 8000 enslaved people annually brought to Tripoli. Local court registers, private letters, most importantly Ottoman tax registers clearly refute these claims. According to these authentic sources that provide exact numbers, the number of enslaved people annually transported to Tripoli was between 50 and

896 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 101/37.

897 Muhammad Said Al-Gashat, *Al-Tawarik: Arab al-Sahra al-Kabir* (Beirut: Dar Al-Arabiyyat lil-Mevsuwat, 2008), 300–301.

898 The origin of this trade goes back to the ancient times, see: Al-Shareef Hamid, ‘Tijarat ‘iqlim Fazan Eabr al-Saharai, Khilal Aleasur al-Kilasikiya’, *Jami’at Sabha Li-l-’ulum al-’insaniyat Majalatan* 20, no. 3 (2021): 230–37.

899 For instance see: Al-Safi Muhammad, ‘Al-Usar al-Tijarat Bi-Mintaqat Wad Nun Wa Dawruha Fi Tanshit al-Rawah al-Tijari Bayn Difatayal-Sahra’, *Al-Majallat al-Ifriqiyat Li-l-Ulum al-Insaniyat Wa-l-Ijtimaiyati*, 2021, 41–67; Ghislaine Lydon, *On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

900 For instance, see: B.P.R.O., Commonwealth Office, 2/13; A.E.F., Tripoli C.C., 35.

450 during the 19th century. Exact records in the Ottoman and Arabic sources further reveal the proportion of the slave trade in the trans-Saharan trade in Central Sudan. According to these records, the proportion of the volume of slave trade in the trans-Saharan trade oscillated between 1.52% and 18.15%. In other words, the slave trade had no central role in the trans-Saharan trade as claimed by non-Afro-Islamic agents and uncritically repeated in the Anglophone/Francophone research literature.⁹⁰¹

Second, contrary to the belief of some historians, Arab merchants did not dominate the culture of central Sudan.⁹⁰² In many cases, it is unclear which cultural traits originated from which region because they mixed so deeply.⁹⁰³ For instance, despite their presence in various parts of the region, Arab merchants predominantly spoke Hausa rather than Arabic or Tamasheq when they left Ghadames.⁹⁰⁴ In the case of Ghat, Tamasheq, and in some cases also Turkish and Arabic, was common among city inhabitants, rich merchants preferred to speak Hausa, since it was deemed as the most poetic and philosophical language.⁹⁰⁵ Similarly, on the route of Murzuq-Kawar-Kuka, all merchants had to speak Kanuri if they wanted to run their business. This cultural difference between both routes was so sharp that in the registrations of caravans using the route of Murzuq to reach Tripoli no single Hausa words used; for the products that were actually bought from Hausaland, the word of *Afnu* (Kn. Hausa) was mentioned.⁹⁰⁶ In the case of Murzuq, for instance, the influence of Kanuri culture was very dominant. Most of the folk stories of the city pertained to a forbidden love between a poor Fezzani merchant and one of the daughters of the *mai* of Bornu.⁹⁰⁷ Furthermore, in their global information network, Kel Azgher did not need intermediaries of Arab merchants. Instead, people, and in some cases the whole family or community, called *Inislemen* (Tm. Muslim scholar) travelled very far regions that are connected to the Sahara through trade such as Oran,

901 For much more details pertaining to the sources and numbers concerning the slave trade in the Central Sudan, see my article, Kerem Duymus, 'Contribution au rôle de la traite des esclaves dans le Sahara tripolitaïn au XIX^e siècle : nouvelles découvertes en Libye et en Turquie', *Revue d'Histoire Méditerranéenne* 6, no.2 (2024): 195–208

902 For such claims, see: Salah Hasan Al-Suwriyu, *Al-'alaqat Bayn Libiyya Wa Shu'ab al-Sahara' Fi al-Qarn al-Taasiy Eashar Wa 'awayil al-Qarn al-Eashrin Min Klilal Ba'd al-Wathayiq al-'uthmaniyati*, 'Amal Nadwat al-Tawasul al-Thaqafi Wa-l-Ijtimayi Bayn al-Aqtar al-Afrikiyat 'Ala Janibay al-Sahara (Trablus: Kuliyat Al-D'awat Al-Islamiyat, 1998), 209; Muhammad, *Al-Aslam Fi Tshad Nadwat al-Islam Wa-l-Muslimun al-Atahum*.

903 For a comparative anthropological work examines Sebha and Kano, see: Hasan, 'Kwatancin Al'adun Kaciya a Kano (Nijeriya) Da Sebha Libya', *Jami'at Sabha Li-l-'ulum al-'insaniyat Majalatan* 22, no. 1 (2023): 76–81.

904 Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023.

905 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 196. Especially in Tunisia, there was a big Hausa community, which increased the dissemination of Hausa culture and language. Ahmad Timbuktayyi, *Hetka al-sitr amma ala'hi, sudan tunis min al-kufr*, B.N.T. Manuscrit, 18626.

906 D.M.T.L., *Al-Sijiliyat al-shariat*, 15/6.

907 For one of these stories, see: Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 134.

Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, İstanbul, and even Marseille. These people regularly wrote reports to Kel Azgher leaders with regard to political situations and prices of the goods in the markets.⁹⁰⁸

Third, the impact of Islam through Maliki jurisprudence was more complex than simply providing a common law for everyone. Except for the city of Ghadames prior to 1843, there was no comprehensive application of Maliki jurisprudence on the political issues in the central Sahara during the 19th century. Issues concerning marriage and heritage were strictly regulated by the Maliki jurisprudence, whereas in the case of economic issues its application was intricately linked to the principles of governance and the implementations of these principles. In this respect, for instance, there was a common use of *shahadat al-nakl* (Ar. confirmation of testimony) in juristic cases.⁹⁰⁹ Different from *hukm* (Ar. verdict), this ruling cannot compel someone to execute this demand. This secondary ruling applies in cases involving inhabitants of different cities who do not come to the process. That is to say, the *qadi* is not available to issue a *hukm*, since as a juristic principle, he has to hear both sides of the case to be able to issue a *hukm*. If one party is not present, the *qadi* can only issue a testimony of the demand's authenticity. In doing so, he leaves the final decision to another *qadi* or ruler. For instance, the *qadi* of Ghadames can issue a *hukm* for the inhabitants of his city, which must be executed. However, if there is someone from Ghat or Murzuq in the case, and does not come to the process, he could only issue the testimony of the authenticity of the demand. That is to say, the *hakim* of Ghat or the *sultan* of Murzuq should personally decide whether he would execute this demand.⁹¹⁰ In cases involving European merchants, the issue depended even more on rulers and bureaucracy. For example, a letter from around 1851 states that an Arab merchant with a debt issue involving a British trader had to present his *shahadat al-nakl* to the Murzuq city council to file a complaint about an unpaid debt. The city council registered this complaint and sent it to the *kaymakam* of Murzuq. He wrote an official letter to the British vice-consul to inform him about registration and demand that he call the British merchant regarding this conflict. Ultimately, the foreign ministries of Britain and the Ottoman Empire had to get involved in the case.⁹¹¹ In the reverse instance, if a local merchant did not pay his debt, the European merchant would contact his consul, and the same bureaucratic process would take place.⁹¹² In this case, the

908 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 414.

909 There were mainly two types of *shahadal al-naql*. The first one is the testimony of authenticity of an oral testimony. In this case, *qadi* writes the whole text. The second one is the testimony of authenticity of a written testimony (*sanad ma'qud bishahada*). In this case, the *qadi*, mainly approves the already written text as authentic. Interview No.9: Meeting with the Elders of Sokna, 2023.

910 For instance, see: P.A.4., family collection, 126-127.

911 M.J.L.D.T., *Wathayiq wa-l-makhtutat*, No. 44.

912 A.N.T., *Reports*, 232/457, d. 10.

role of Maliki jurisprudence was limited to proving the authenticity of the testimony; the rest were bureaucratic and diplomatic decisions.

Nevertheless, this does not indicate that there was no interest in pursuing Maliki-based solutions to address the various challenges encountered. Indeed, individuals seized every opportunity to secure a favourable resolution to their disputes. For instance, if people were dissatisfied with the decision of a *qadi* in their own city or region, they could seek a second opinion from another *qadi* in a different city or region. This would allow them to ascertain whether a different decision would be reached.⁹¹³

In some instances, individuals even approached a *qadi* or *mufti* from a different school of law, such as the Hanafi and Shafi. In Ghadames, correspondence exists indicating that some merchants petitioned a Hanafi *mufti* in Tripoli for a fatwa regarding their cases, as they were discontented with the resolution of a Maliki *qadi*.⁹¹⁴ In the absence of a *qadi*, people continued to adhere to Maliki law, particularly in matters of sale and purchase. In such cases, the public was already aware of the appropriate procedures. In this regard, even in the absence of a *qadi*, individuals would prepare a document that clearly defined the persons and sold goods or property in question, with the signature of several witnesses.⁹¹⁵ Such documents, as long as they were issued properly, played a judicial role even centuries later. For example, in 1865, a Ghadamesian family presented to the *qadi* a document pertaining to a land dispute that was 219 years old. This document had originally been issued by the community in the absence of a *qadi*. The *qadi* validated the document.⁹¹⁶

The use of Maliki law also created substantial roles for women and enslaved people, especially in trading cities. While men were on long-term business trips, women were responsible for managing properties, including buying and selling them. Most merchants gave their wives official power of attorney, thereby granting them the legal right to act on their own behalf without waiting for their husbands to return.⁹¹⁷ In some particular cases, such as the absence of a husband or father, the women were having full authority for the family properties. For instance, in 1854, a woman in Ghadmes, called Maryam Mimi Ahmad bin Jira, wanted to sell a property that was granted as foundation (Ar. *waqf*) by his relatives. As she was in need of sustenance, she wanted to sell half of it. The *qadi* of Ghadames, Muhammad al-Siddiq bin Yunis,⁹¹⁸ asked for a *fatwa* from the Hanafi

913 For an example, see: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a court register dated as 1892.

914 For instance, see: P.A. 4., uncategorized, an undated letter from the 19th century.

915 See: P.A. 4., uncategorized, a register dated as 1727.

916 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a court register dated as 1862.

917 See: P.A. 23., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1857.

918 Awlad Yunus had a special role in Ghadames. Since the early 18th century, the members of this family were occupying the *qadi* office in the city. 'Interview No. 23: With Hajj Al-Hadi Al-Tawhami in Ghadames, 2023'. There were also some jurist members in the family, who issued a *fatwa*. For such a *fatwa*, see: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a

mufti in Tripoli. After receiving the confirmation from Tripoli and from the *qadi*, Maryam was able to sell it.⁹¹⁹ In another case, merchants were sending enslaved people on the trip, issuing them also a power of attorney. Depending on the hardness of the trip, it was also common to make a *tadbir* contract with the enslaved person, promising him his freedom if he returned from the business trip successfully.⁹²⁰ It was also common for merchants from Ghadames, Sokna, and Awjila to send enslaved people to Tripoli to conduct business. Furthermore, merchants provided weapons for the enslaved people, which sometimes caused problems. For example, in 1888, an unnamed enslaved person arrived in Tripoli from Awjila carrying his sword. City officers did not allow him to enter the city since it was forbidden for civilians to enter with a weapon. He had to leave his sword with the officers until he left the city again.⁹²¹

Fourth, the differences between the various principles of governance also played a significant role for the juristic cases. An example of this can be seen in a court register that took place in 1847 involving a Ghadamesian merchant and his business partner from Ghat, who originated from Agadez. The merchant obtained a *shahadat al-nakl*, and presented it to the *hakim* of Ghat. The *hakim* found the debtor and “recommended” him, as a *hakim* can call for reconciliation but cannot force it, to pay the money back for the sake of his future business; yet, the debtor failed to comply. Accordingly, the merchant travelled to Agadez, and sought justice from the sultan. In contrast with the *hakim* of Ghat, the sultan personally repaid his money back and took over the case against the debtor.⁹²² This case serves as a typical example that Ghadamesians used to illustrate the most effective approach to conducting trade: “live under *hakim*, sue under sultan.”⁹²³ Likewise, living under a sultan posed a significant risk, as another court register in 1882 demonstrates. Around the 1880s, a Ghadamesian merchant, who was living in Kano, passed away, leaving behind a substantial debt, and no registered relatives to claim his inheritance. But one of the debtors of this merchant was Yahya bin Qaduwa, the vizier of Kano's Emir. The vizier convinced the Emir to require the relatives of the deceased to assume responsibility for the inheritance if they visited Kano. On one

fatwa 1869. Although there was also a *mufti* in Ghadames after 1843, as Ottoman appointed someone from Awlad Harun following the demand of Ghadamesina people, existing documents show their reluctance to involve in many cases, prompting *qadi* of Ghadames to ask fatwa from Tripoli, Tunis, or Essouq. ‘Interview No. 22: With Abubakr Harun in Tripoli, 2023’.

919 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a court register dated as 1854.

920 Baraka Atiq was one such case. He was sent to Kano by Al-Haj Abdullah bin Saleh bin Harun from Ghadames in the 1880s to make a business trip with power of attorney. Following his successful return, he was freed. Thereafter, he made several similar trips to Kano. Around 1890s, he was even settled in Kano, working his as a business partner of Al-Haj Abdullah Harun. P.A. 4., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1897.

921 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1888.

922 P.A.4., family collection, 123.

923 Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023.

occasion, the deceased merchant's uncle visited Kano, and the Emir coerced him into taking on the debt as part of the inheritance. To inform his business partner of the potential consequences, this man delivered a *shahadat al-nakl* to the *qadi* of Ghadames. According to his testimony, the Emir of Kano issued a *hukm* to take heritage of his relative by coercion and oppression (Ar. *jabal wa qahr*).⁹²⁴ The *qadi* of Ghadames confirmed his rightness and “recommended” to his business partners in Ghadames to make a reconciliation (Ar. *sulh*) with him, rather than breaking their contract. In this regard, it was common practice for merchants to have their main residence in the cities that are under the rule of *idara*, while they preferred to run their business, or having temporarily residence, in the cities that are under the rule of *tadbir*.

Fifth, the pilgrimage (Ar. *hajj*) constituted an important aspect of trade, as merchants utilized this opportunity to navigate between various governing bodies. In Hijaz, there were already several settled people from the Central Sudan, who were assisting pilgrims from the region and holding official positions within the Ottoman state.⁹²⁵ It was also customary for affluent merchants and scholars to undertake the pilgrimage. For instance, in the 1870s, a merchant from Ghat named Hajj Salim bin Ahmad Katli embarked on the pilgrimage and even established a business and scholarly network for himself. Following his return, he maintained a correspondence with his associates in Mecca, engaging in commercial activities and establishing foundations for scholars.⁹²⁶ The Siwa oasis in Egypt played a pivotal role in this trade and scholar network, facilitating connections between Mecca and Central Sudan through Egypt. For instance, in the 1840s, a sheikh in the oasis, Yusuf Al-Siwani, had a personal relationship with the Khedive of Egypt. He maintained close relations with the families of merchants from Ghadames, Ghat, Sokna, and Awjila. In numerous instances, he facilitated trade from Mecca to Central Sudan by introducing these merchants to the Khedive of Egypt.⁹²⁷

The final significant aspect of the trans-Saharan trade was the efficiency of information dissemination. In fact, the local sources exhibit that merchants would not purchase any goods until they were aware of the prevailing market prices in their intended selling location.⁹²⁸ This practice

924 P.A.4., family collection, 137.

925 ‘Interview No. 23: With Hajj Al-Hadi Al-Tawhami in Ghadames, 2023’.

926 P.A. 2., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1871.

927 ‘Interview No. 24: With Hussein Al-Mazdawi in Tripoli, 2023’.

928 In this letter, for example, the merchant criticizes his younger relative in Kano, and says that he should never buy any product in Kano without knowing its price in Tripoli. P.A.4: Private Archive of Bashir Qasim Yusha [Ghadames, Libya], No. 62. In another example from 1856, a Ghadamesian merchant wrote his cousin in Kano the prices of ostrich feather and tanned skin in Tripoli, thereby he can decide in Kano if he wants to buy, or how many buy etc. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1856.

was particularly noteworthy given the considerable distances between markets such as Kano and Tripoli, or Kuka and Tripoli. Nevertheless, merchants overcame these geographical barriers by regularly dispatching caravans carrying letters. In this regard, every single caravan was also a post service in the region. For instance, a Ghadamesian merchant could know the prices of ivory around Tunis, Tripoli, Murzuq, Zinder, Kano, Kuka, Nupe, and Yola.⁹²⁹ The letters were not only pertaining to prices but also family affairs, gossips regarding other families, and political situation as well. For instance, in 1899, al-Muhktar bin Ahmad al-Thani in Ghadames wrote his cousin Ahmad bin Abubakr al-Thani, who was in Kano, to inform him that a merchant, member of al-Mana family, died in Tunis, and a merchant, member of Ibn Harun family, died in Tripoli in the same year. He also mentions the new politics of Tripolitan *vali*.⁹³⁰ Additionally, any kind of encounter in the desert by the caravans was a moment for quick exchange for all actual information. In this regard, merchants could get much information concerning their goal destination before arriving.⁹³¹

Conclusion

The central Sahara had a central role in the trans-Saharan trade for centuries, including the new developments in the 19th century. The patterns and dynamics of this trade were deeply shaped by the socio-historical transformations and various governing strategies in the region. Especially two core principles of governance were crucial in the central Sahara during the first half of the 19th century: *idara* and *tadbir*. Two sultanates, Fezzan and Air, were applying *tadbir* with different historical backgrounds. Particularly some cities/oasis such as Ghadames, Ghat, and Kavar as well as nomadic communities in their surrounding such as Kel Azgher and Teda from Tibesti were implementing various instruments of *idara*.

Concerning the *tadbir* application, as a part of a long trade partnership between Murzuq and Kuka, not only the Kanuri language became dominant in the trade between these cities. Likewise, the administrative structure and governing strategy of Fezzan were greatly influenced by the *tadbir*-model of Bornu. Conversely, the Sultanate of Air was under the impact of the linguistic and political culture of Hausaland. The transformations in terms of governance had different directions in these sultanates. The sultanate of Fezzan underwent numerous dynastic changes after 1811, and finally in 1842, became the administrative centre of an Ottoman *kaymakam*; yet, the core of the governing

929 P.A.4., family collection, 23.

930 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1899.

931 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 71.

strategy remained unchanged. There were minor adjustments only in the case of the various instrumental implementations of *tadbir*, since the development of *tadbir* in Bornu and the Ottoman Empire had a different historical background. The sultanate of Air, on the other hand, experienced more fundamental changes in its governing principles as respond to the radical transformations in the power dynamics around the region as well as internal social complexities. In this respect, Agadez was applying Huasa style *tadbir* at the beginning of the 19th century. This gradually changed between 1808 and 1838 with the emergence of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate as the most powerful actor in the region. Thus, the sultanate, which was situated itself for centuries in a domain that is in contact with Cairo and İstanbul, directed its diplomatic affairs toward Sokoto. In fact, this transformation was also part of the political and diplomatic strategy of the sultanate. By shifting the principle of governance from *tadbir* to *idara* in order to situate themselves better in the new power dynamics, the Sultans of Air also began to lose their power and central role. Nonetheless, it allowed for the preservation of autonomy and created a favourable environment for various Kel Tamasheq communities as well as actors to take advantage of the new economic developments, without fearing from any possible invasion of the Sokoto Caliphate, and without any possible oppression of the Sultans of Air.

In the case of Ghadames, Ghat, and Kavar, the application of *idara* remained determining during the first half of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the instrumental implementation of this principle varied for each city/oasis. In Ghadames, thanks to its long scholar tradition, Maliki jurisprudence played a central role by leading toward a strict implementation of *hisba*. In the case of Ghat, due to the fundamental influence of the cultural cods and communal law of Kel Azgher, the city had the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa* as a natural consequence of their socio-historical background. Different from both of them, the oasis of Kavar combined both instruments with a particular regulation. Depending on the circumstances, the *hakim* of Kavar would implement *hisba* or *dairat al-siyasa*. However, between 1843 and 1854, these cities and oasis of Kavar underwent a crucial change in the power dynamics of the region. With the strong presence of the Ottoman Empire, all political actors redefined their position.

Ghadames was compelled to accept the Ottoman rule by force around 1843, and had a *müdür* from İstanbul additional to the *qadi*, who was the only *hakim* of the city. Consequently, their historical and juridical rejection of the Ottoman legacy shifted to a theological and economic acceptance around 1850. The reception of the Ottomans in Ghat and Kavar, on the other hand, differed significantly. In fact, in 1849, they actively sought the rule of the Ottomans in their own city and

oasis. Unlike Ghadames, they did not receive a *müdür* from İstanbul, but their recent *hakims* were appointed as *müdür*. That granted them further opportunity to maintain their own governing strategy, whilst Ghat was about experiencing long-term changes and challenges that were not visible until 1870s due to the newly appointed *qadi* and necessary implementation of *hisba*.

In this regard, around the 1810s, the central Sahara region was characterized by a collection of interconnected yet distinct governing bodies that facilitated and changed trans-Saharan trade through various means. Over the course of approximately four decades, the majority of the region came under the administrative control of the Ottoman Empire, whereas the remaining portion, especially central and southern part of the Air sultanate, fell under the diplomatic influence of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate; nevertheless, local *sultans* and *hakims*, except the sultanate of Fezzan, retained their position of power. Furthermore, the administrative control of the Ottomans resulted in a standardization in terms of governing strategy from Ghadames and Ghat to Kavar. This change caused a slow but long-standing transformation in the power dynamics around the region. The Ottomans gained more and more control and power in the central Sahara. Kel Azgher and Teda from Tibesti began to lose their control and advantages on the trans-Saharan trade. Similarly, with the influence of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, the authority of the sultanate of Air tended to weaken. This granted the opportunity especially to Kel Away community to take advantage of this power vacuum. Therefore, this community became one of the most powerful actors in the trans-Saharan trade during the latter half of the century. These initial changes, though seemingly formative, laid the groundwork for more significant transformations and expansions in both the political and economic realms throughout the remainder of the 19th century.

PART II: ERA OF EXPANSION

Introduction: New Frames with Old Contents

The first half of the 19th century in Central Sudan was significantly shaped by the reform initiatives of various actors. However, the latter half of the century exhibited a distinct dynamic. Still, notable figures such as the al-Titiwi family and Muhammad Baṣala in Fezzan, al-Ansari family in Ghat, Sanussiya sheikhs in Berka, Tinimoun in Damagaram, Kosso in Muniyo, Majo Karafi in Kano, Abdulsalam in Ilorin, Haman Sambo in Tibati, as well as Kobur and al-Sanussi in Dar Kuti, played pivotal roles in the expansions of this period. A common characteristic among these actors is that none were from the central part of the powers such as Sokoto, Tripoli, Kuka, and Abeche. Some of them were even merchants or local sheikhs, lacking ties to any dynastic lineage or aspirations for dynastic rule. In contrast to the actors of the earlier part of the century, these individuals did not pursue any reformist agendas; rather, they sought to leverage the newly established *tadbir* systems within their respective central authorities to either extend their influence into peripheral regions or establish new centres of power in those areas. During this period, there was a notable absence of discourse pertaining to prospective reforms in governance in the aforementioned major power centres, with the exception of the ongoing efforts by the Ottomans to adapt to the realities of the Sahara. The rulers of Tripoli, Sokoto, Kuka, and Abeche primarily focused on identifying the most effective strategies for engaging with their rapidly expanding and increasingly powerful peripheral regions.

The al-Titiwi family and Muhammad Baṣala paved the way for the Ottoman expansion beyond the Sahara. As merchants from Fezzan, they also undertook unofficial missions on behalf of the Ottomans and articulated a vision for the Central Sudan entirely governed by Ottoman authority—an aspiration that was far beyond the imagination of any Ottoman officials in Tripoli or ministers in İstanbul at the time. Consequently, they played a crucial role in the establishment of Ottoman rule in Bornu during the 1870s. Similarly, the al-Ansari family of Ghat persuaded both the Kel Azgher and the Ottomans to implement Ottoman governance in the Azgher region, making Ghat its administrative centre, notwithstanding the absence of any such plans from the Ottoman administration. In essence, these local actors from Fezzan and Ghat formulated their own vision and strategy for Ottoman rule in the Sahara and beyond, also realizing their own interest, with İstanbul

largely aligning itself with their ambitions. Sanussiyya sheikhs had different aspirations, having an ambivalent relation with the Ottomans. Along this line, they created a new *idara*-based political-economic bloc in the Zuwaya Sahara centred around Kufra, establishing themselves as a religious but also politic-economic actor between Benghazi and Abeche. Still, with the increasing threat from French colonial forces towards the end of the 19th century, they began to shift their system to *tadbir*, creating an alliance with the Ottomans.

The increasing influence of the Ottoman Empire on trans-Saharan trade and the Bornu region provided opportunities for Tinimoun in Damagaram and Kosso in Muniyo to create a balanced relation with Kuka, still being its vassal, while building a considerable wealth and political power thanks to new dynamics in the trans-Saharan trade. In this context, they benefited from the stable *tadbir* system in Kuka and held it in high regard. However, they also developed their own *tadbir* system, which proved to be highly efficient, presenting themselves acting on behalf of Kuka. This strategic manoeuvring enabled them to avoid direct conflict with Bornu, simultaneously diminishing the influence of Sokoto and capitalizing on the trade routes that now traversed their territories. In this respect, both vassal states evolved into powerful entities within their respective regions over a few decades, thereby shaping the historical trajectory of Bornu according to their own interests.

During the same period, Majo Karofi in Kano pursued a similar trajectory, capitalizing on the stable *tadbir* system in Sokoto and altering trans-Saharan dynamics due to the decline of Katsina and the ascendancy of Zinder, capital of Damagaram, and Kano. As a result, by the late 19th century, Kano emerged as the most economically and politically powerful emirate within the Caliphate, thereby extending the influence of Sokoto. At least until the 1890s, Kano managed to maintain a harmonious relationship with Sokoto, avoiding conflict. In contrast, Abdulsalam in Ilorun and Haman Sambo in Tibati adopted a different approach. Their expansion was characterized not by economic and political growth, as seen in Damagaram, Muniyo, and Kano, but rather by military conquests that enabled them to establish their own formidable emirates. Their ambition for relentless expansion surpassed that of the ruling elites in Gwandu and Sokoto. The reach of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate extended into distant regions through these peripheral actors, leading the ruling elites in Gwandu and Sokoto to lose sight of the true extent of their caliphate. For instance, in the early 1900s, as British colonial forces advanced towards Sokoto, the caliphate continued to expand significantly throughout the Adamawa region.

Dar Kuti emerged as a unique case in the Central Sudan. A local scholar, Kobur, played a founding role in establishing Dar Kuti as a regional power, maintaining its status as a vassal state of Wadai. This allowed Dar Kuti to avoid conflicts with Abeche. Being fundamentally different from the other above-mentioned actors, he followed the *idara* rule, similar to Agadez and Gwandu, which provided noticeable political and economic success. However, his son and successor, al-Sanusi, transformed this *idara*-based political and economic expansion into *tadbir*-based military expansion, again with a considerable success. During the period from the 1870s to the 1890s, Abeche faced challenges from the Zubayir and Mahdist movements. Al-Sanussi extended the Kuti state over extensive territories. Similar to the experiences of Gwandu and Sokoto, Abeche lost its ability to monitor the extent of Kuti's territorial expansion.

The remarkable and often unforeseen success of various actors necessitated their re-engagement with the governance system to maintain control over their domains. Hence, they navigated a delicate balance between the authority of their central state and the most effective implementation of their respective governance systems, which did not always work well. Consequently, they adopted specific political strategies that diverged from the recommendations or practices endorsed by their central authorities. Simultaneously, these central powers were compelled to establish a means of interaction with these successful peripheral actors to sustain their ongoing expansion, thereby granting them a degree of flexibility. This dynamic led to unexpected outcomes for peripheral regions, particularly for local non-Muslim populations in the Adamawa region, who faced policies that could be characterized as exterminatory, resulting in a legacy of horror associated with the name Uthmaniyya. Conversely, in the case of Dar Kuti, non-Muslim communities experienced a level of abundance and security that they could not find even in Abeche.

Apart from the expansionist *tadbir* systems, the western region of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, governed by Gwandu and the Sultanate of Air, implemented an *idara* system during the latter half of the 19th century. In Gwandu, the *idara* system contributed to regional stability, effectively maintaining the existing status quo without pursuing territorial expansion. The ruling elites exhibited contentment with the prevailing conditions and demonstrated no aspirations for further expansion. In that regard, by the end of the century, they not only continued to employ the *idara* system but also upheld their scholarly belief in its efficacy as the optimal form of governance. Conversely, the *idara* system in Air followed a divergent trajectory. Unlike its counterpart in Gwandu, which preserved the status quo, the implementation of *idara* in Air led to a gradual erosion

of power in Agadez, as other political entities gained prominence. Accordingly, following the 1870s, the Sultans of Air transitioned from the *idara* system to *tadbir*, ironically in an effort to maintain the status quo, without having any ambition for expansion. These two cases underscore the significance of local political and economic contexts as well as conditions in shaping governance systems.

The immense *tadbir* bloc from Tripoli to as far as Tibati, created in the first half of the 19th century, facilitated the formation of a political-economic bloc under this governance system. Notably, a substantial volume of goods originating from Ilorin/Muri, Tibati/Adamawa, and Kuti state did not reach the nearby Atlantic coasts; instead, they were directed towards Tripoli and Benghazi along the Mediterranean coast, traversing through Kano, Zinder, Ghat, Ghadames, as well as Murzuq and Kufra. The volume of goods transported along these routes across the Sahara was so considerable that by the 1880s, the ports of Tripoli and Benghazi were unable to adequately manage their exportation to the global market. In this regard, between the 1880s and 1900s, commodities such as ostrich feathers, ivory, and tanned skins from Central Sudan dominated the international trade, establishing Tripoli and Benghazi as pivotal centres in global commerce.

In conclusion, there were minimal alterations in the content of the system of governance within Central Sudan during the second half of the 19th century, which largely retained its characteristics from the earlier part of the century. However, the frame of the political landscape and territorial boundaries underwent significant transformation and renewal.

5. From *idara* to *islah*: Administrative Complexities of the Ottoman Empire in the Central Sudan

5.1. New *idara* system of Abdulhamid II and the Sanusiyya

5.1.1. Complex Legacy of Abdulhamid II

During the late 18th century, the Ottoman Empire underwent consistent administrative, military, and legal reforms through the application of *tadbir* until the 1870s. The ascension of Abdulhamid II to power in 1876 marked a new era for the empire that extended until 1909. Diverging from his predecessors in the 19th century, Abdulhamid II displayed a critical stance towards the *tadbir* system, instead favouring the application of *idara*. His objective was not merely to restore the "ancient order" but to establish a novel *idara* system rooted in the caliphal tradition. Consequently, during his rule, Abdulhamid II chose to adopt the title of caliph over that of *padişah*.⁹³² Nevertheless, after almost 75 years of continuing reform movements, a fresh cohort of military commanders, officers, and scholars emerged, committed to advancing further reforms through the application of *tadbir*. This new generation of reformists differed significantly from their predecessors. As already analysed previously,⁹³³ earlier reformists viewed the *tadbir* system from a global perspective, contending that Ottoman-Islamic epistemology provided adequate tools for implementing necessary reforms, whereas the new reformists approached *tadbir* from an Eurocentric standpoint. They posited that required reforms could only be achieved by emulating the practices of European empires, with influential philosophical works on materialism from France and Germany shaping their perspectives.⁹³⁴ Notably, prominent 19th-century reformist Cami Baykurt, who resided in Tripolitania for a considerable period, highlighted Ludwig Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* as a particularly popular text among reformists in the region.⁹³⁵

In this context, the new generation of reformists sought to “modernize” the Ottoman Empire in a manner resembling European empires through administrative reforms, although they encountered numerous obstacles and had to reassess their ideologies. They were also willing to take the risk of engaging in warfare to achieve their goals. On the other hand, Abdulhamid II pursued a dual strategy of *idara*. Initially, he adamantly opposed any conflicts with European powers, opting instead to exploit their rivalries to secure advantageous positions for the Empire without resorting to

932 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, ed. Arı İnan (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 24.

933 See Chapter 2.

934 See: Adel Ziadat, *Western Science in the Arab World: The Impact of Darwinism 1860 - 1930* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986).

935 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 20.

military actions.⁹³⁶ Additionally, he developed a policy of Islamic Unity (Tr. *ittihad-ı islam*) with the aim of uniting all Muslims worldwide under his caliphal authority, transcending existing political and state structures, from Futa Toro in present-day Senegal to Guangdong in present-day China.⁹³⁷ In this second aspect of his strategy, it is noteworthy that he disregarded the existing colonial presence of Russia in Turkmenistan, France in Senegal, and Britain in India, as well as the imperial structure of the Ottomans.

Abdulhamid II's approach towards colonial powers involved a preference for avoiding direct military confrontation, whilst covertly organizing Muslim communities under their dominion for a potential future jihadist revolt. This led to the establishment of a dedicated reception building within the Yıldız Palace in İstanbul to host numerous envoys dispatched by Muslim communities worldwide at the behest of Abdulhamid II. Subsequently, these envoys were provided with confidential correspondence, financial support, and a designated Ottoman representative to accompany them.⁹³⁸ Additionally, a concise publication titled *İstiklal-i İslam* (Tr. independence of Islam) was produced under the directive of Abdulhamid II and disseminated in large quantities to regions such as India and Africa.⁹³⁹

In his opposition to the Ottoman Empire's reformist administrative officers,⁹⁴⁰ Abdulhamid II adopted a unique approach. He allowed for the implementation of *tadbir* in military and administrative reforms. In the meantime, he imposed his own *idara* system in certain areas, such as the foreign office, religious lodges (Tr. *tekke ve zaviyeler*), and religious foundations (Tr. *vakıflar*).⁹⁴¹ Most importantly, in his pacifist strategy towards foreign powers, Abdulhamid II tightly controlled the Ottoman Empire's imperial expansion, particularly in regions like the Sahara, as discussed in previous sections. To prevent military conflicts with France and Britain, he favoured the expansion of *idara* rule over imperial *tadbir* expansion. Thus, he resisted the calls from Ottoman officers in Tripolitania to extend the *tadbir* system into the Sahara for an extended period, only permitting such expansion when deemed essential for further administrative and military

936 Zekeriya Kurşun, *Yol Ayrımında Türk-Arap İlişkileri* (İstanbul: İrfan Yayınları, 1992), 34.

937 İhsan Süreyya Sırma, *II. Abdülhamid'in İslâm Birliği Siyaseti* (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 2007), 50.

938 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği, 40/28.

939 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Başkitabet Dairesi Maruzatı, 17/16.

940 Initially, there was clear suspicion, and then clear criticism of Abdulhamid II's Islamic Union policy from the reformist officers. One of these officers later said: "Caliphal authority has no meaning at all. There are many nomadic communities in Tripoli. They never pay taxes, and once a year, they appear before an officer and say that they are praying for the caliph. Then, no one sees them again. What kind of authority is this?" Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, İstanbul, Nisan [1911/1327], 83 (2), 560.

941 In fact, a new reform for religious lodges and foundations was initiated in 1812. However, Abdulhamid II undermined these reforms by personally contacting the leaders of the *tariqa* and *waqf*. Osman Sacid Arı, 'Meclis-i Meşayih Müessesesi, Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri' (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2003), 134–35.

reforms. In this respect, *tadbir* largely influenced the Empire's domestic policy, whereas the foreign and religious policies were characterized by the *idara* system. This strategy faced criticism from reformist officers, who viewed the application of *idara* in foreign policy as "cowardice" and its implementation in the religious sphere as "regressive corruption."⁹⁴² As given many of these reformist officers were the army generals and high ranked administrative, Abdulhamid II employed a strategic approach by applying *tadbir* to undermine the influence of reformist officers within the military and administrative ranks without engaging in direct confrontation, considering he regularly feared a potential military coup.⁹⁴³

Along these lines, a significant number of these reformist figures were subjected to a widespread policy of exile, with Tripolitania emerging as a common destination. Despite being one of the most remote and impoverished regions of the empire, Tripolitania was deliberately chosen by Abdulhamid II for the exile of reformist officers due to the reluctance of appointed governors to serve there.⁹⁴⁴ Driven by a strong sense of patriotism and a desire for rapid reforms, the reformist officers viewed Tripolitania as a region in urgent need of "modernization." In other words, only these reformist officers would go to this province. Abdulhamid II took advantage of this by appointing almost all Tripolitania officers from the reformist group.⁹⁴⁵ By doing so, on the one side, he sent them to exile there by breaking their activities in İstanbul or central regions, on the other side, he openly rejected to sending them to exile, but merely demanding their service there, as a part of his *tadbir* application. However, this tactic backfired, since Tripolitania soon became a hub of reformist activity.⁹⁴⁶ For instance, during the 1880s, Abdulhamid II commissioned the construction of a prison in Murzuq to detain individuals deemed "political criminals." Many of these "political criminals" were Bulgarian independence fighters. Ottoman politicians and soldiers were also sent there.⁹⁴⁷ However, upon the arrival of reformist officers in Tripoli who had been sentenced to lengthy terms in Murzuq, the *valis*, who were also proponents of reform, promptly released them

942 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 29.

943 That was not an empty anxiety. In 1902, some reformist agents, with the help of the Tripolitan *vali*, planned a military coup against Abdulhamid II. The plan was to secretly bring the army of Tripolitania by ship to İstanbul and occupy the palace. However, it failed. See: Abdulnasır Yiner, 'Müşir Recep Paşa'nın Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı (1842-1908)' (Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2006), 176-77.

944 Abdülhamid Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi 1895-1908* (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2008), 63.

945 In fact, some of Abdulhamid II's special agents complained about these reformist officers in Tripolitania due to their own political agenda. They proposed appointing someone with more "religious virtue." However, Abdulhamid II repeatedly found that it was nearly impossible to find someone other than the reformists who would be willing to work in Tripolitania. See: B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Başkıtabet Dairesi Maruzatı, 66/42.

946 Şükrü Hanioglu, *Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989), 200.

947 Pavel Shatev gives the number of people in the jail of Murzuq in 1906: 51 Bulgarian (including himself), 2 Armenian, 1 Turk, 1 Arab. Shatev, *Zatochenieto vu Sakhra-Fezanu*, 30.

and occasionally assigned them to administrative roles.⁹⁴⁸ Conversely, Serbian, Greek, and Armenian activists advocating for independence did not receive similar leniency or opportunities.⁹⁴⁹

During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II, a particular approach of *tadbir* was employed in response to reformist officers, with a focus on filling administrative positions within the Ottoman Empire. Notably, significant attention was also directed towards the religious lodges. Some leaders of religious lodges held reformist views and challenged the authority of Sultan Abdulhamid II;⁹⁵⁰ yet, the majority of religious brotherhoods experienced a substantial increase in power and influence during his rule. Yet, in the case of Tripolitania, the relations of Abdulhamid II with the religious brotherhoods were firmly complicated. For instance, some branches of the Tijjaniyya received a favourable reception due to their active involvement in resisting French invasion in Algiers and British invasion in Sudan but also rapid expansion in the central Sudan after the 1850s⁹⁵¹, leading Sultan Abdulhamid II to strongly support them in their struggle against colonial powers, whereas some branches of Tijjaniyya in Algeria were allied with France.⁹⁵² Another religious brotherhood that was well-received was the Madaniyya, known for its influence within and beyond Tripolitania, advocating for people's submission to the caliph and participation in jihad.⁹⁵³ These religious brotherhoods aligned well with Abdulhamid II's Islamic Union policy, thereupon receiving significant support and privileges. There was, however, also some religious brotherhoods such as Shadhiliyya, and their sub-branch Arusiyya, in which Abdulhamid II had a more neutral stance, considering they were not in alignment with the Islamic Union policy, but also were not against the caliphal authority of Abdulhamid II.⁹⁵⁴ The Sanussiyya, on the other hand, despite being the most influential in Tripolitania during the 19th century, received a mixed reception from Sultan Abdulhamid II, who at times supported other religious brotherhoods like Madaniyya and Shadhiliyya to diminish the influence of Sanussiyya.⁹⁵⁵

5.1.2. The Role of Sanussiyya in the Central Sudan during the 19th Century

948 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, ed. Ömer Hakan Özalp (İstanbul: Özgü Yayınları, 2014), 45–50.

949 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 6.

950 Cami Baykurt, 25–27.

951 Maïkoréma Zakari, 'Le Développement de La Tijjaniyya Ibrahimiyya Au Niger', in *Islam et Sociétés En Afrique Subsharienne à l'épreuve de l'histoire*, ed. A. Pondoupoulo and O. Goerg (Paris: Karthala, 2012), 204.

952 Hamida Idris Ali Abdülkerim, 'Libya ve Anadolu'da Tasavvuf Hareketleri' (Ph.D. Thesis, Karabük Üniversitesi, 2019), 180.

953 B.O.A., Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 59/15.

954 Salim Güven, 'Ebü'l-Hasan Şazili ve Şaziliye' (Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 1999), 315–16.

955 Kadir Özköse, 'Osmanlı Devleti İle Senusiyye Tarikatı Arasındaki İlişkiler', *Gaziosmanpaşa Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 1, no. 2 (2013): 23–34.

One significant reason for the Ottoman Empire's ambivalent relationship with the Sanusiyya was of a more general nature. As Hamid Idris Ali Abdulkarim analysed, there were fundamental differences between the role of *zawiya* in Tripolitania, especially Sanusiyya *zawiyas* in the desert, and the central part of the Ottoman domain. In the central regions of the empire, there were particularly three different institutions that their role were clearly separated: *medrese* (Tr. university), *kervansaray* (Tr. caravanserai), and *zaviye* (Tr. religious lodge, Ar. *zawiya*). However, in Tripolitania, these three institutions were combined within the *zawiya*, making it a crucial centre for religious, educational, and economic activities.⁹⁵⁶ This integration was highlighted by Sadık El-Müeyyed in the 1890s, noting that Sanussiyya *zawiyas* not only provided services to merchants but also functioned as an independent economic hub alongside their religious functions.⁹⁵⁷

An additional significant contrast existed in terms of doctrine. Abdulkarim highlights that while the majority of religious brotherhoods within the Ottoman Empire adhered to the *tariq al-abrar* (Ar. the path of the righteous) doctrine, many religious brotherhoods in Tripolitania, including the Sanusiyya, followed the *tariq al-ahyar* (Ar. the path of well-being) doctrine.⁹⁵⁸ The meaning of these doctrines lies on a historical context. As also discussed by Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, a distinct division between *faqih*s (Ar. jurists) and *sheikhs* (Ar. religious leaders) was evident in the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, religious brotherhoods, whose leaders were sheikh in the central Ottoman regions focused more on advanced spiritual practices rather than the basic Islamic practices governed by sharia law, which is a fundamental tenet of the “*tariq al-abrar*” doctrine. However, Hilmi further notes that in Tripolitania, this separation was not always present, with sheikhs in rural areas often assuming the role of *faqih* as well. Instead of emphasizing advanced spiritual practices, these religious brotherhoods concentrated on fundamental Islamic practices such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, characteristic of the “*tariq al-ahyar*” doctrine.⁹⁵⁹ Along these lines, the *zawiyas* of Tripolitania took on responsibilities that the state had neglected in the areas of religious authority, the economy, education, and politics. The Ottomans did not view this as inherently problematic as long as the loyalty of these religious brotherhoods remained steadfast, whereas any ambiguity in loyalty led the Ottomans to perceive such religious brotherhoods as a potentially threatening “parallel state.”

956 Abdülkerim, ‘Libya ve Anadolu’da Tasavvuf Hareketleri’, 232. This characteristic is not unique for Tripolitania but for the whole Sahara and Sahel region. Yet, Tripolitania was only unique case in the Ottoman domain.

957 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri’nde Seyahat*, ed. İ.Ö. Bostan (İstanbul: Çamlıca Yayınları, 2018), 102–5.

958 Abdülkerim, ‘Libya ve Anadolu’da Tasavvuf Hareketleri’, 232.

959 Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Tarih-i İslam*, vol. II (İstanbul: Hikmet Matbaası, 1911), 578–79.

The Sanusiyya also exhibited the aforementioned features, as well as distinctive characteristics that set them apart from other religious brotherhoods in the region. Unlike other religious brotherhoods located in central cities, Sanusiyya *zawiyas* were mostly situated in remote desert areas, particularly in the Berka region.⁹⁶⁰ Hence, these *zawiyas* served as crucial hubs where reconciliation efforts were facilitated among nomadic communities. For example, in the 1850s, Sanusiyya sheikhs successfully mediated a peace agreement between the warring Awlad Ali and Uqbiyat communities, which had destabilized the entire Berka region for decades.⁹⁶¹ This reconciliation role, with the implementation of *dairat al-siyasa* in the *idara* system, aligned with the traditional governance practices of local communities by implementing *dairat al-siyasa*.⁹⁶² Legal practices were similar among nomadic groups and villagers residing in remote areas. When conflicts arose, it was uncommon for them to seek a judge, who resides only in central cities. Instead, they would initially present their case to the *imam* and then to the *mukhtar*.⁹⁶³ In the case of Berka, if a resolution was not reached through these channels, they would turn to a Sanussiyya sheikh. Seeking an official judge was considered a last resort. Unlike a judge, these other intermediaries resolved disputes not by applying Maliki law, but through the process of *sulh* (Ar. reconciliation).⁹⁶⁴ Sanusiyya created a general *idara* system that unified various nomadic groups in the southern Berka region, functioning not only as a religious entity but also as a political and governmental organization. This also attracted the attention of the Ottoman Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Paşa, who called the Sanussi Sheikh to Cairo and promised him land and an office. Paşa hoped to expand his influence into the Berka region. However, the Sanussi sheikh rejected the proposal.⁹⁶⁵

Sanusiyya witnessed significant growth towards the southern Sahara region following the appointment of Muhammad al-Mahdi as its new leader in the 1860s. Al-Mahdi dispatched two *mukaddams* (Ar. religious officials) to the south in 1860, with Muhammad al-Barrari establishing a

960 Özköse, 'Osmanlı Devleti İle Sanusiyye Tarikatı Arasındaki İlişkiler', 19.

961 See Chapter 2. Also see: Muhammad Al-Tayyib Al-Ashhab, *Barkah Al-Arabiyya Ams Wa-l-Iyaum* (Cairo: Matba' al-Hawari, 1947), 215–16. In the later period, this reconciliation role was expanded to the other regions. For instance, when some Ottoman soldiers in Murzuq left their weapons due to their unpaid salaries in 1907, they had escaped to a Sanussiyya *zawiya* to wait a reconciliation attempt by the *kaymakam*, as they were sure that inside of *Zawiya* even the *kaymakam* could not dare to harm them. Shatev, *Zatochenieto vu Sakhra-Fezanu*, 104.

962 Fuas Ashaq Al-Khuri, 'Mafhum Al-Sulta Ladaa al-Qabayil al-'arabiyat', *Majallat Al-Fikr al-'arabiyya* 22, no. 3 (1981): 80–81.

963 The title of *mukhtar* indicates the appointed leader of a village. Before the 1870s, these people were selected by the inhabitants and approved by Ottoman governors. Their role was to solve small local problems, but they did not involve tax collection and not receiving any salary. After 1871, they were entitled to tax collection and began to receive salary. See: Nesir bin Musi, *Al-Muhtama' al-'arabiya al-Libiyya Fi al-'ahd al-Othmani* (Trablus: Al-Dar al-Arabiyyat al-Kitab, 1988), 39.

964 Jamil Hilal, *Dirasat Fi Al-Waqie al-Libiyya* (Trablus: Maktabat al-Fikr, 1962), 139.

965 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 193–94.

zawiya in Kanem and forging diplomatic ties with Awlad Sulaiman, whilst Abdullah al-Sunni founded *zawiyas* in Bornu, Wadai, and Baghirmi.⁹⁶⁶ In the same year, another *mukaddam*, Ibrahim Mashruh, set up the first *zawiya* in Bilma, and thereafter moved further south to Zinder. Before his death there, he established the first *zawiya* in the region.⁹⁶⁷ In 1861, another *mukaddam*, Tahir Ishak, was sent to western Darfur to build a *zawiya* there.⁹⁶⁸ Apart from sending *mukaddams*, Sanussi sheikhs also established close friendships with local prominent people, such as al-Bashir bin Mihammad bin Abdullah in Ghadames,⁹⁶⁹

Nevertheless, a notable distinction of the Sanusiyya was the narrative surrounding the Mahdi, with reports suggesting a belief in his Mahdism notwithstanding al-Mahdi never openly declaring himself as such. The initial historical documentation of this narrative dates back to 1874, when the *kaymakam* of Benghazi reported to İstanbul that individuals were spreading millennial stories suggesting the imminent appearance of a Mahdi who would be affiliated with the Sanusiyya.⁹⁷⁰ Subsequently, by the 1880s, this narrative began to manifest in the form of folk poems within communities surrounding Kufra, depicting the figure as the Mahdi, as revealed by Muhammad Tayyeb Al-Ahshab.⁹⁷¹ While traveling in the region in the 1920s, Hassanein Bey encountered the same stories among the Teda communities.⁹⁷² After 1883, there was an immense Mahdist movement in southwestern Central Sudan,⁹⁷³ which created great unrest in İstanbul, since the concept of Mahdi was categorically by-passing the authority of the caliph. Consequently, the Ottomans had a very negative stance against any kind of Mahdist claim, resulting in perpetual suspicion towards the Sanusiyya.

Nevertheless, the dynamic between the Sanusiyya and Ottomans was more intricate than commonly perceived, and diverged from the portrayal of them as fundamental adversaries by non-Afro-Islamic agents.⁹⁷⁴ For instance, Abdulhamid II's interest in the Sanusiyya centred on whether their sheikh claimed to be the Mahdi. the Ottoman government's primary concern, on the other hand, was to ascertain if the Sanusiyya extended their responsibilities to include tasks such as tax collection and

966 Muhammed Tandoğan, 'Afrika'nın Kuzeyini Güneyinden Ayıran Toplum Tevarikler ve Stratejik Konumları: Osmanlı-Tevarik Münasebetleri' (Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2015), 206.

967 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56.

968 Ali Muhammad Sallabi, *Al-Zimar al-Zakiyya Li-l-Harakat al-Senusiyya: Imam Muhammad Ali Al-Sanusi* (Cairo: Maktabat Al-Tabiyyin, 2001), 235.

969 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1896.

970 D.M.T.L., Sanussiyya, dated as 1874.

971 Muhammad Al-Tayyib Al-Ashhab, *Al-Mahdi al-Sanussi* (Trablus: Matba' Maji, 1955), 162–70.

972 Hassanein Bey, *The Lost Oasis* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1925), 99.

973 See Chapter 7.

974 For example, see: H. M. Mathuisieulx, *A Travers La Tripolitaine* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1903), 31.

military formation. Conversely, local officials were primarily focused on the utility of Sanusiyya sheikhs as instruments to enforce their governance and exert authority.

Particularly through the reception of two *fermans* from İstanbul, one in 1860 and the other in 1869, with the grant of privileges but also an official recognition by the state, the Sanusiyya entered a close relationship with the Ottoman authorities.⁹⁷⁵ Subsequently, from the 1860s onward, the Sanusiyya played a crucial role in facilitating the expansion of Ottoman rule in regions such as Kavar and Ghat by advocating for Ottoman authority.⁹⁷⁶ Additionally, in the Berka region, during the emergence of potential rebellions around the 1870s, Ottoman officials initially dispatched Sanusiya sheikhs to pacify the unrest among the populace before resorting to military intervention.⁹⁷⁷ Sanusiyya members also played a central role for the Ottoman officers to collect their tax from the nomadic communities properly. Inasmuch as these communities rarely paid their tax without entering a rebellious movement, such tax collection processes were mostly very violent, resulting in massacre of several people just before the eyes of the Sanusiyya sheikhs.⁹⁷⁸ In spite of occasional tensions arising from such incidents, the Sanusiyya sheikhs refrained from openly criticizing Ottoman rule in public,⁹⁷⁹ opting instead to lodge discreet complaints with authorities in İstanbul.⁹⁸⁰ These complaints garnered significant attention from the Ottoman capital,⁹⁸¹ particularly under the patronage of Abdulhamid II, who supported the Sanusiyya sheikhs against local officers aligned with reformist movements.⁹⁸² Notably, Sultan Abdulhamid II directed special agents dispatched to the region to align themselves with the Sanusiyya, prompting objections from other local reformist officers who viewed this practice unfavourably. For instance, in 1874, the *kaymakam* of Benghazi expressed his discontent to İstanbul, highlighting instances where some Ottoman

975 D.M.T.L., Sanussiyya, *fermans* in 1860 and 1869.

976 Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Senusiler* (İstanbul: İkdâm Matbaası, 1907), 91.

977 B.O.A., Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 29/15.

978 For an example from 1866, see: D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1866.

979 Although Sanusi sheikhs did not put any argument with regard to their silence on the authority of the Ottoman Empire in the region, around the same years in the Tuwat region, local scholars and jurists, who were experiencing the same difficulty with the authority of Morocco, proposed an argument from *tadbir* principle, arguing that as revolting the authority of the sultan would bring much violent, conflict, and war, it is better to obey the rule in terms of public benefit (Ar. *maslaha*). Ismail Warscheid, 'Les Jours Du Makhzen: Levée d'impôt et Relations Communautaires Dans Les Oasis Du Touat (Sud Algérien), 1700-1850', *Revue d'histoire Du XIXe Siècle*, Société de 1848, 59 (2019): 42.

980 Abdulmola El-Horeir, 'Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Ahmad Al-Sharif Al-Sanussi' (Ph.D. Thesis, Lon Angeles, University of California, 1981), 141.

981 For example, in 1895, Abdulaziz Effendi, a special agent of Muhammad Mahdi, came to Istanbul to meet with Abdulhamid II in person and shared with him some complaints concerning the local reformist officers. See: B.O.A., Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Evrakı, 329/25.

982 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 80–81.

officers had joined the Sanusiyya.⁹⁸³ In this context, the relationship between the Sanusiyya movement and local reformist officers exhibited a complex nature. While some officers were satisfied with their collaboration, others viewed the Sanusiyya as a source of trouble. An illustrative example of this dual perspective can be found in the account of Cami Baykurt. Initially, Baykurt strongly criticized the Sanusiyya for introducing tea to Central Sudan, attributing the widespread adoption of this new commodity to excessive consumption and financial waste among the populace.⁹⁸⁴ However, in his later office, Baykurt praised the Sanusiyya for promoting tea consumption, considering it led to a decline in the consumption of *lapia*,⁹⁸⁵ an alcoholic beverage made by cutting date palms, which had been detrimental to date production.⁹⁸⁶

However, particularly in the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire began to harbour continuous suspicions, particularly following reports received by the Ottoman government from French and British consuls in İstanbul regarding an alleged weapon manufacturing operation in Jaghbub, purportedly run by the Sanusiyya. Consequently, a special agent was dispatched to investigate this matter. Inasmuch as Berka was under direct rule of İstanbul between 1864-1870, this agent was directly sent from İstanbul. Upon learning of the dispatch of this special agent, the Tripolitan *vali* immediately contacted İstanbul to halt the investigation, deeming the accusations of weapon manufacturing by the Sanusiyya as preposterous. The *vali* argued that sending an agent to probe such baseless allegations would be an affront to the Sanusiyya.⁹⁸⁷ In the end, the agent returned without conducting the investigation. Nonetheless, suspicions and conspiracy theories propagated by the French and British consuls in İstanbul persisted until 1911.⁹⁸⁸ In 1883, the French and British consuls in İstanbul pressured the Ottoman government to initiate an investigation into the alleged weapon manufacturing operations. İstanbul then dispatched an investigator to Jaghbub with instructions to maintain the secrecy of the investigation. In the investigator's report later that year, it was concluded that there was no tangible evidence to support the existence of the purported weapon manufacturing facility.⁹⁸⁹ However, in 1883, with the emergence of the Mahdist movement in Sudan, Abdulhamid II personally began to harbour suspicions regarding the Sanusiyya, fearing that they might attempt to establish a Mahdi state in Berka. In fact, around the same time, the symbolic

983 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1874.

984 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, ed. Yüksel Kaner (İstanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2011), 23.

985 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 71.

986 Hikmet Naci, *Tarih Boyunca Kuzey Afrika ve Berberiler* (İstanbul: Sulhi Garan Matbaası, 1955), 28.

987 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1870.

988 In fact, in many cases, especially the French Foreign Minister was aware of the fact that they just lie to create a suspicion in İstanbul against Sanusiyya. A.E.F., Tripoli, 16 (1874-1878).

989 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1883.

power of the Sanussiyya was even visible in Tripoli. As by a Russian agent observed in 1884, after the prey in the central mosque of Tripoli during the last days of the Ramadan, people did not react to the appearance or leaving of Ottoman *vali*, but they were so enthusiastic when a Sanussi sheikh appears in the garden of mosque after prey.⁹⁹⁰

In 1886 and 1889, special agents were sent to Jaghbub to ascertain whether Muhammad al-Mahdi designed any claims to Mahdi-hood or exhibited inclinations towards establishing his own state. Both agents similarly reported that there was no evidence to support such claims or tendencies.⁹⁹¹ Muhammad Fuad Shukri suggests that also the leaders of the Sanusiyya had reasons to distrust the Ottomans beyond their harsh treatment of nomadic communities. He points out, during Muhammad al-Sanussi's accommodation in Morocco in 1829, his teacher Muhammad al-Kunduz was executed by the Moroccan sultan at the behest of the Ottomans, who accused him of inciting rebellion against Ottoman authority in Algeria. This event likely had a lasting impact on al-Sanussi and his successors, leading them to maintain a distance from the Ottomans.⁹⁹² Hamid Idris Ali Abdulkarim supports this argument by highlighting the resistance of al-Sanussi's son, Muhammad al-Mahdi, to forming political alliances with the Ottomans. Al-Mahdi notably refused to support the Ottoman Caliph during the war with the Russian Empire in 1876 and rejected requests for assistance from Ubari *paşa* in Egypt during the rebellion against the British in 1882.⁹⁹³ Abdulmolla El-Horeir adds that Al-Mahdi was wary of the covert activities of France and Britain and feared that the Ottomans might take hostile actions against him under their influence. Accordingly, he chose to relocate the Sanussiyya headquarters from Jaghbub to a more southerly location.⁹⁹⁴

One of the significant aspects of this complex relationship involved certain European powers, notably France, Britain, and Italy. Although the French and British consuls stationed in İstanbul were known to spread conspiracy theories pertaining to the Sanusiyya, their counterparts in Tripoli sought to cultivate a friendly rapport with the brotherhood. However, the leaders of the Sanusiyya were cognizant of the atrocities committed by the French in Algeria and the colonial ambitions of the British, leading them to adamantly refuse any official engagement with these powers.⁹⁹⁵ By the 1880s, Muhammad al-Mahdi had even publicly declared a jihad against the French presence across

990 Eliseev, *Po Belu Svetu! Puteshestviya Doktora Aleksandra Yeliseyeva*, Vol. 1:86.

991 Shatab Jasim Muhammad, 'Al-Mawaqif al-Uthmaniyat "iiza" al-Sawat al-Sanusiyyat 1840-1911', *Al-Majalad al-Thaalith Eashra* 13, no. 2 (2015): 180.

992 Muhammad Fuad Shukri, *Al-Sanusiyyat Din Wa-Dawla* (Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1948), 12.

993 Abdülkerim, 'Libya ve Anadoluda Tasavvuf Hareketleri', 207.

994 El-Horeir, 'Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Ahmad Al-Sharif Al-Sanussi', 151–52.

995 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 107.

Africa. In 1895, he dispatched a special envoy to İstanbul to seek support for this jihad, receiving a clandestine endorsement from Abdulhamid II.⁹⁹⁶ Muhammad al-Mahdi did not formally declare a jihad against the British. Still, their apprehension grew during Ubayri *paşa*'s revolt in 1882, fearing potential backing from the Sanusiyya. The British went as far as warning the Ottomans that any hostile actions by the Sanusiyya would be attributed to them that can be resulted with a general war declaration against the Ottomans.⁹⁹⁷ Particularly in the 1890s, the Italians also attempted unsuccessfully to establish diplomatic ties with the Sanusiyya.⁹⁹⁸

The pivotal moment in the complex relationship occurred in 1902. When Britain invaded the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, and French invaded much of the Bornu, Ahmad Sharif took leadership of the Sanussiyya, who had a sympathy for the Ottomans. Accordingly, the relationship between the Ottomans and the Sanusiyya radically changed. Subsequent to these events, the Sanusiyya openly appealed to the Ottoman military for assistance within their territory. In 1904, they even engaged with the Italian consul in Cairo to request military supplies. The Italians were taken aback by this unexpected diplomatic outreach and hesitated to provide weapons to the Sanusiyya due to their own plans to invade Tripolitania. However, upon Ahmad Sharif's assurance that the arms would be used against the French to impede their colonial expansion, the Italians agreed to send the weaponry.⁹⁹⁹ Despite these efforts, the Sanusiyya were unable to effectively resist the French, leading to a gradual decline in their presence in southern Central Sudan, considering they retreated northwards.¹⁰⁰⁰ In 1909, Ahmad Sharif rallied all Sanusiyya members in Africa for a global jihad against the French, with the Ottomans offering indirect support to avoid diplomatic tensions with France.¹⁰⁰¹ When the Italians launched an attack on Tripoli in 1911, the Ottomans and the Sanusiyya combined their forces to openly combat the invasion. Nonetheless, when it became clear to the Ottomans in 1912 that they could not avoid the invasion, they decided to establish a kind of "African Union" for a global revolt against colonial invasions. According to the plans of the Ottoman authorities such as Enver Paşa in 1912, the name of this union would be "Union of African States" (Ar. *ittihad duwal ifrikiyya*), and Sanusiyya should lead them first. However, the Sanusiyya rejected this ambitious plan and instead wanted to create a "Sanusiyya Government" (Ar. *hukuma sanusiyya*), a move that was subsequently acknowledged by the Ottomans.¹⁰⁰²

996 Shukri, *Al-Sanusiyyat Din Wa-Dawla*, 85–88.

997 Muhammad, 'Al-Mawaqif al-Uthmaniyyat "iiza" al-Sawat al-Sanusiyyat 1840-1911', 181.

998 Orhan Koloğlu, *Fizan Korkusundan Libya Mücahitliğine* (İstanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2008), 174.

999 A.M.A.E.I., Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, 147/1.

1000 B.O.A., Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Evrakı, 506/30.

1001 B.O.A., Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Umum Vilayetler Evrakı, 70/7.

1002 M.M.J.B., Manuscript Collection, dated as 1912.

The Sanusiyya was significant to the Ottomans and certain European powers not only because of their influence in the region, but also because of their *idara* system, spanning from Jaghub to Wadai. As previously discussed, the Ottoman Empire implemented a comparable *idara* system beyond its borders in the central Sahara region, extending towards Temassinine, Ghat, Kavar, Tibesti, and Borku. However, in the Berka region, the Ottomans restricted their presence to Jalo/Awjila, whereas the area from these cities to Wadai remained under the Sanusiyya's *idara* rule. Sanusiyya employed both the instruments of *idara*, namely *hisba* and *dairat al-siyasa*, in accordance with their *tariq al-ahyar* doctrine, which entailed the practical application of sharia in daily affairs. When engaging with other local powers such as the Teda from Ouanianga, Zawayya Arabs from Kufra, and Wadai in the south, Sanusiyya favoured the use of *dairat al-siyasa* over strict sharia enforcement. Hence, conflicts among these entities were resolved through *sulh* (Ar. reconciliation) facilitated by Sanusiyya's spiritual¹⁰⁰³ and intellectual¹⁰⁰⁴ authority. Notably, all these powers acknowledged the authority of Sanusiyya, which conferred various benefits, particularly in the context of trans-Saharan trade between Jalo/Awjila and Wadai.¹⁰⁰⁵ Furthermore, in some cases, the Sanusiyya was insisting on the implementation of *hisba* rather than *dairat al-siyasa*. By pressuring for the implementation of *hisba* for cases such as tributary payments, the Sanusiyya prevented the Zawayya Arabs from establishing a tributary system in Kufra similar to that in Kel Azgher in Ghat. According to Hassanein Bey, around the 1850s, the Zawayya Arabs sought to institute a tributary system for merchants akin to that of the Kel Tamasheq in Azgher and Air, but Sanusiyya opposed this approach and instead directed the Zawayya Arabs towards agricultural and merchant guidance activities.¹⁰⁰⁶

The *idara* system was highly esteemed by the Ottomans as a means to prevent potential conflicts.¹⁰⁰⁷ However, due to mutual suspicions, Muhammad al-Mahdi chose to relocate from Jaghub to Kufra in 1894 in order to distance himself from Ottoman influence.¹⁰⁰⁸ This decision raised concerns in Istanbul with regard to the possibility of the Sanusiyya establishing their own state in the desert. Consequently, in the same year, Abdulhamid II dispatched an envoy to Kufra to meet with Muhammad al-Mahdi. The envoy's report highlighted the escalating harshness of Ottoman tax

1003 Sadik El-Mueyyed, *Afrika Sahara-Yi Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 114.

1004 Muhammad Salih Ayoub, *Al-Duru al-Ijtimayi Wa-l-Siyasi al-Sheikh Abd Al-Haqq Al-Taraji Fi Dar Waday Tshad* (Trablus: Jamiyat al-Dawa al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya, 2001), 92–93.

1005 For more details, see: Muhammad Ubaydullah, 'Dawr Al-Harakat al-Sanusiyyat Fi al-Tijarat Eabr al-Sahra (1843-1902)', *Kulliyat Al-Adab Jamiat Bi-Aamari* 284 (2014): 133–49.

1006 Hassanein Bey, *The Lost Oasis*, 64.

1007 Abdalaziz Eazzat, *Hudud Misr Al-Gharbiyat Wa-l-Mawqif al-Dawlia* (Cairo, 1950), 5.

1008 Shukri, *Al-Sanusiyyat Din Wa-Dawla*, 91.

collectors towards nomadic groups in the 1890s, which led Muhammad al-Mahdi to fear similar treatment in Jaghbub. He opted to separate himself from the Ottoman domain. The envoy recommended that this decision be respected and that Muhammad al-Mahdi not be interfered with, as he remained loyal to the caliph.¹⁰⁰⁹ According to Tayyeeb Al-Ashab, the relocation to Kufra and the Ottomans' decision to honour this move had positive outcomes. The intensified trade activities facilitated by the Sanusiyya's *idara* system led to an increase in the volume of trans-Saharan trade.¹⁰¹⁰ Following the implementation of regulations by the Sanusiyya, the trans-Saharan trade route between Benghazi and Wadai gained significant attention after the 1880s. In 1886, for example, Sadık El-Müeyyed noted that Sanusiyya agents were trading ivory purchased in Wadai for 40,000 kuruş in Benghazi.¹⁰¹¹ Italian intelligence agents were also surprised by the effectiveness of the Sanusiyya's governance and trade activities. A confidential report revealed that the Sanusiyya successfully persuaded merchants operating between Benghazi and Wadai, as well as the Teda people residing in Bornu, to join their religious order by fostering collaboration among these diverse groups under their spiritual authority.¹⁰¹² Additionally, French agents noted the Sanusiyya's influence on Teda communities, with many Teda elites sending their children to Kufra for education before assigning them any official duties.¹⁰¹³ Furthermore, the leaders of Wadai, who were members of the Sanusiyya, regularly sent gifts such as ostrich feathers, ivory, and enslaved individuals to Muhammad al-Mahdi, trading them in Benghazi.¹⁰¹⁴

The Sanusiyya's trade network extended beyond Benghazi, with notable figures like the merchant Abdallah al-Kahhal from Damascus conducting business on behalf of the Sanussiyya in Cairo during the 1880s.¹⁰¹⁵ In addition to their commercial endeavours, the Sanusiyya played a significant role in education, with advanced students travelling throughout the Afro-Islamic world and sending numerous printed books to Jaghbub and later Kufra. Notably, Hassanein Bey observed a diverse collection of books from various regions such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Persia, and India in the personal library of a Sanusiyya leader in Kufra in 1924.¹⁰¹⁶ Additionally, the Sanusiyya's

1009 'Sadık El-Müeyyed Layihası (1894)', B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 14/9, 126/9.

1010 Tayyeeb Al-Esheb, *Mahdi Al-Sanusi* (Trablus, 1952), 64–66.

1011 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 106.

1012 A.S.M.A.E.I., P, Libia, 6/6.

1013 C.H.E.A., *Mémoires* vertes, 2355.

1014 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 106.

1015 El-Horeir, 'Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Ahmad Al-Sharif Al-Sanussi', 194.

1016 Hassanein Bey, *The Lost Oasis*, 174.

influence extended across the Sahara, with their *zawiya* establishments spanning from Futa Toro in Senegal to Darfur in the 1880s.¹⁰¹⁷

In this context, there existed a delicate equilibrium between the Ottomans and the Sanusiyya. The Sanusiyya functioned as an extension of Ottoman influence in regions such as Ghat, Kavar, and Borku. They maintained a careful autonomy in Jaghbub, Kufra, and Ouanianga, a stance that was respected by the Ottomans. Despite enduring suspicions over the long term, the Ottomans found favour with the *idara* system of Sanusiyya. On the one hand, the Sanusiyya's *idara* rule facilitated the growth of trans-Saharan trade, leading to significant prosperity in Benghazi. On the other hand, the *idara* system of the Sanusiyya prevented the emergence of a messianic state under a *riasa* system or the establishment of an independent state governed by a *tadbir* system, which were primary concerns for the Ottomans. Consequently, the ambivalent nature of the relationship between the Sanusiyya and the Ottomans did not hinder them from achieving a degree of mutually beneficial cooperation. Notably, their expansion into the southern Sahara region occurred concurrently around the 1860s. In instances such as the expansion into Ghat, Kavar, and Bornu, the Sanusiyya's growth aligned with Ottoman interests, whereas in the case of Kufra and Ouanianga, the Sanusiyya extended their own *idara* system, fostering a favourable stability for Wadai and the Ottomans.

5.2. The Transformation of the Economy and Trade in Tripolitania after the 1850s

5.2.1. Complications of *islah* in Tripolitania

After the 1850s, the Ottoman Empire significantly influenced the economic transformation of Tripolitania by implementing various reforms under the program of *islah*. The Ottoman Empire's role in this process was multifaceted, with differing perspectives on whether they were primarily developers, as suggested by the Ottoman government, or exploiters, as perceived by non-Afro-Islamic agents. The local agents' reception, on the other hand, was much more complex. In spite of the numerous reforms introduced by Ottoman authorities until 1911 to enhance Tripolitania's economy, the outcomes did not always align with expectations. Hence, the application of the *islah* created a complex interaction between local actors and Ottoman officers. Still, this complexity did not deter reformist officers from continuously seeking new avenues for economic advancement.

1017 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası Evrakı, 38/92.

Already in 1850, the Ottoman authorities began to implement new economic strategies, such as sending tools and trainers to introduce silk production in Tripolitania, unfamiliar with this industry.¹⁰¹⁸ In 1856, efforts were made in Tripoli to boost olive and olive oil production by allowing an Austrian company to establish an oil factory in Benghazi.¹⁰¹⁹ Subsequently, both the *vali* and the Ottoman government showed keen interest in expanding olive cultivation in Benghazi, where the climate was conducive and numerous olive trees remained unharvested due to lack of local interest, considering the inhabitants found trade with Wadai more profitable.¹⁰²⁰ Therefore, in 1871, Ottoman government launched a rigorous olive production program, directing the *kaymakam* of Benghazi to plant new olive trees, allocate district funds for watchmen to protect the olive plantations from theft, and exempt farmers involved in olive harvesting from income tax for 15 years.¹⁰²¹ Despite significant growth in olive cultivation, a labour shortage emerged due to the region's low population. To address this, immigrants fleeing Russian army massacres in the Balkans were resettled in Benghazi, while strict controls were imposed on migration from Benghazi to other Ottoman cities.¹⁰²² For instance, in 1870, when the *kaymakam* of Benghazi proposed exiling families who evaded taxes to the Levant, İstanbul rejected the plan.¹⁰²³ In another instance, when some families from Benghazi immigrated to Edirne (present day Turkey) due to drought in their previous village, the *vali* of Edirne ordered by İstanbul to send these families back to Benghazi with the argument that “in contrast to Edirne, in Benghazi, there are too many lands, but so few people... in a time that we are planning to settle all immigrants from Balkan to Benghazi, permitting people from Benghazi to settle in Edirne seems not plausible.”¹⁰²⁴

In 1869, the Ottomans obtained another new impetus to invest in Benghazi beyond the olive production due to the impending opening of the Suez Canal, which was anticipated to stimulate significant transport activities in the Mediterranean. Consequently, the Ottoman government instructed the *vali* to construct a new harbour in Berka, in place of Tobruk, to capitalize on this forthcoming development. Following the harbour's completion, at least 20 families from the Berka region were to be incentivized to relocate to this new harbour city, with the provision of a 10-year tax exemption and a waiver of customs duties until further notice.¹⁰²⁵ During this development, there

1018 B.O.A., Cevdet İktisat, 1327.

1019 B.O.A., İrade Meclis-i Vâlâ, 532/23853.

1020 Binbaşı Ömer Subhi, *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi ile Büyük Sahra ve Sudan*, 51.

1021 Muhammad Ahmad Al-Tuwir, *Al-Ziraat Fi Barigat Fi al-'ahd al-Othmani al-Thaani* (Trablus: Al-Dar al-Jumhuriyat, 1991), 27–30.

1022 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/21.

1023 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1870.

1024 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/21.

1025 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/44.

was a regular decrease in the established economic activities due to the climate change. Upon undergoing many frequent droughts, the number of herds cultivated in the region has fallen to such a low number that in 1873, the *vali* ordered a ban on exportation. The British, heavily reliant on the inexpensive livestock from Berka, were adversely affected by this ban, prompting London to officially request that İstanbul rescind the policy. At the end, İstanbul directed the *vali* to lift the ban, resulting in a subsequent increase in meat prices in the region.¹⁰²⁶ This instance underscores that the Ottoman authorities had to consider not only the responses of local populations to their reform initiatives, but also the reactions of foreign powers, given the region's global interconnectedness. This was indeed also a globally similar problem for other states that are striving to reform their states, since they were fighting against the interests of the European powers, such as the Japan Empire and its Meiji reforms. Interestingly, this common struggle was even known for them. For this reason, in 1868, Japan sent several delegations to the Ottoman Empire to create a collaboration and exchange of knowledge for better reforms and better strategy against the hegemony of the European states.¹⁰²⁷

Particularly around the 1880s, another factor put pressure on the Ottoman authorities to implement *islah*. Following the French invasion of Tunisia in 1878, İstanbul directed the Vali of Tripoli to bolster the local army using the province's budget in preparation for a potential French invasion.¹⁰²⁸ This military expansion in Tripoli continued uninterrupted until 1892, prompted by the invasion of Tunisia and perceived Italian military preparations. The sustained enlargement of the army in Tripoli during this period significantly strained the province's budget. In a report to İstanbul in 1892, the *vali* presented a fiscal overview of Tripolitania (without Berka) for the years in question:¹⁰²⁹

Collected tax (income by *iltizam* system + custom duty) = 10,802,852 *kuruş*

Estimated tax (will be collected at the end of the year) = 4,209,163 *kuruş*

Administrative expenditure: 4,698,965 *kuruş*

Military expenditure: 9,153,887 *kuruş*

1026 B.O.A., Hariciye Siyasi, 1530/32.

1027 Selçuk Esenbel and Chiharu Inbana, *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent* (İstanbul: Bogaziçi University Press, 2003), 309.

1028 D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1878.

1029 D.M.T.L., *Fiscal Registrations*, dated as 1892.

As a result, the *vali* concludes that effective collection of estimated taxes would enable them to offset the financial strain caused by military expenditures. However, failure to collect the full amount of estimated taxes would necessitate financial assistance from İstanbul to sustain its significantly expanded army. In response, the Ottoman government asserted that inasmuch as the army serves the *padişah*, in the event of a fiscal shortfall, İstanbul would provide funding, although this is considered the least desirable outcome.¹⁰³⁰

Upon experiencing difficulties in collecting estimated taxes and receiving funds from Istanbul for military maintenance, the Ottoman government advised the *vali* to implement a new reform program to ensure the province's future self-sufficiency.¹⁰³¹ Also another juridical reform program was developed to standardize the sharia courts in accordance with the Hanafi school of law. Accordingly, all cities in Tripolitani received a Hanafi judge from İstanbul in 1892 in addition to their own local Maliki judge.¹⁰³² The *vali* developed a plan for economic development. In 1895, however, İstanbul already issued a detailed order directing the initiation of a reform program due to anticipated European invasion. According to this plan, since an invasion by *nasara* (Ar. Christian) expected, the *vali* should continue to enlarge the army with the budget of the province. To offset this expense, the *vali* should take some measures, such as creating an ostrich farm as Britain did in South Africa, since they illegally smuggled this animal from Tripolitania in the 1860s¹⁰³³. Additionally, the *vali* was advised to provide merchants travelling to Bornu with new technology guns to defend against potential attacks by the Awlad Sulaiman.¹⁰³⁴ Despite warnings dating back to 1881 regarding the limited economic progress resulting from previous reform efforts, the Ottoman government delayed taking significant action until the 1890s when the necessity of economic development to sustain the large army became apparent.¹⁰³⁵ However, prior to direct involvement by İstanbul in the 1895 reforms, the *vali* had already recognized the impending issue and initiated reforms in the 1880s. In this regard, the total income in 1892 (15,012,015 *kuruş*) twice as high as total income in 1871 (7,137,328 *kuruş*).

1030 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1892.

1031 One contributing factor to tax collection difficulties was the conflict between nomadic communities and the Ottoman Empire, particularly those crossing borders between Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Tripolitania. These nomadic groups strategically timed their movements to avoid tax collection, leading to disputes with Ottoman authorities and escalating tensions. The reaction of the Ottomans was to register the estimated tax as unpaid and owed to for the next year in the sharia court with the hope that one day they will achieve to catch these communities and charge them for every year that they did not pay. As a result, any encounter with the Ottoman officers was escalating to a clash as the communities faced with immense payments. D.M.T.L., Al-Sijiliyat al-shariat, 5/180.

1032 J.G.T.M., unctegorized, a court register dated as 1892.

1033 *Al-Tarki*, Rabi' al-akhir 1328, 138 edition.

1034 B.O.A., İrade Hususi, 39/13.

1035 'Anonym Layiha (1881)' B.O.A., Şûra-yı Devlet Evrakı, 2325/32

Despite this significant rise in revenue, the province faced challenges in meeting its exponentially growing military expenses. In light of the slow progress of economic reforms, the *vali* sought expedited solutions to boost income. One key approach was to enhance the share of collected tax revenue in the total income by reducing the reliance on estimated taxes, which were often difficult to collect efficiently. This led to an increased dependence on the *iltizam* system, where tax collections were auctioned at the start of the year, ensuring a secure income. Consequently, the proportion of estimated tax revenue in the total income dropped from 35% in 1892 to 11% in 1900.¹⁰³⁶ Despite these efforts, military spending saw a substantial surge, escalating from 9,153,887 *kuruş* in 1892 to 19,654,298 *kuruş* in 1907.¹⁰³⁷

Furthermore, this was not the only challenge that the Ottoman authorities were facing. Although the *iltizam* system was already condemned in the original declaration of Tanzimat in 1839 as a corruption, the system's economic benefits, such as providing tax revenue at the start of the year with a guaranteed sum, often outweighed this condemnation.¹⁰³⁸ This was particularly evident in Tripolitania, where the utilization of the *iltizam* system had conflicting implementations for reform efforts under the program of *islah*. Although recognized for its corrupt tendencies, the system also facilitated the integration of local agents into the administrative framework, aligning with the objectives of the Tanzimat reforms. In this regard, in Tripolitania, some officers considered this system appropriate with the Tanzimat reforms, whereby others deemed as the against these reforms. This intricate aspect of the *iltizam* system sparked debates among Ottoman authorities. For instance, in 1869, the *vali* sought permission from İstanbul to appoint local administrative officers due to cost considerations, as appointing individuals from İstanbul incurred significant expenses compared to the willingness of local individuals to work for lower salaries. Nonetheless, İstanbul insisted on dispatching trained officers from the capital to ensure proper *islah* practices, since local agents lacked such training and were prone to implementation *ray*, which inherently tends to corrupt practices. The Ottoman government concluded that they should pay this cost on behalf of the proper *islah* implementation.¹⁰³⁹ The deteriorating economic conditions of the Empire compelled İstanbul to gradually entrust administrative roles to local individuals to reduce costs, notwithstanding this

1036 D.M.T.L., Fiscal Registrations, dated as 1900.

1037 Abdullah Özdağ, 'Trablusgarb Vilayeti'nde İdari ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapı (1876-1911)' (Ph.D. Thesis, Ankara, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2014), 142.

1038 The Ottoman government had a long, paradoxical relationship with this system. In 1840, they canceled the *iltizam* system. However, when this resulted in significant revenue losses, they reintroduced it in 1843. Thereafter, they periodically attempted to abolish it in various regions until the end of the empire. But it was never truly abolished. Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Mâliyesi* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1985), 120–35.

1039 B.O.A., *Aynıyet Defterleri*, Trablusgarb, 915/32.

initial reluctance. The delegation of tax collection duties to local figures emerged as a major point of contention post-1880s. In his 1881 report, Mehmed Nazif Paşa highlighted the challenges associated with assigning tax collection responsibilities to sheikhs in nomadic communities, who often collected taxes arbitrarily without maintaining accurate records. Thus, it was impossible to know “... how much tax they collected and how much they put in their own pocket.”¹⁰⁴⁰ This lack of transparency was also observed in the *iltizam* system, where individuals acquiring tax collection tasks through public auctions failed to maintain proper account books, hindering oversight by officials to ensure appropriate tax collection practices. Furthermore, since the *iltizam* proprietor assigns the task with an approximation prior to the harvest, in the event of a poor harvest, he would compel individuals to pay a substantial sum to prevent a loss in his investment in acquiring the *iltizam*. For instance, a petition from 1855 recounts an incident where an *iltizam* owner visited a village to demand a significant sum of money as *ushr* (Ar. harvest tax). Upon being informed by the residents that the harvest was exceptionally poor that year, and they were unable to meet this demand, they were physically assaulted, and their funds were seized forcibly.¹⁰⁴¹ In another petition from 1889, a farmer reported that the *iltizam* owner confiscated his entire harvest as tax, and when he resisted, his men were dispatched to assault him and seize all his possessions. Subsequently, he sought redress from the judge. The judge issued a *shahadat al-naql* (Ar. confirmation of testimony), which was then forwarded to the *vali* along with his petition.¹⁰⁴² In certain instances, even the municipal council faced allegations of corruption. For instance, in 1883, a collective of Ghadamesian merchants wrote to the *vali* detailing that for the past 5–6 years, the city council had been imposing unjustly high income tax rates on residents. They levy minimal taxes on affluent merchants, who held sway in the council, whereas ordinary merchants were coerced into paying exorbitant tax amounts.¹⁰⁴³

In order to prevent violent incidents, the administrative council of Tripoli issued a directive in 1889 aimed at regulating the tax collection process. The directive outlined various measures, such as ensuring accurate registration of *ushr* collection with the farmer's seal, the presence of an independent observer from the village, and an independent administrator from the state. Additionally, a special ink that could not be tampered with was to be used, and all registration books were to be sent to local *müdürs* and then to the *kaymakam* for verification of accuracy.

1040 ‘Mehmed Nazif Paşa Layihası (1881)’ B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 9/25.

1041 D.M.T.L., Tax Registration, F. 801-900, No. 861.

1042 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1889.

1043 P.A.4., family collection, 145.

Copies of these books were ultimately required to be sent to Tripoli.¹⁰⁴⁴ Prior to this, efforts to enhance accountability had been made in the 1850s through the implementation of new procedures. An illustrative example of such a procedure occurred in 1863 when the outgoing *kaymakam* of Fezzan meticulously recorded all financial accounts for the incoming *kaymakam* in the presence of local representatives and the city council. However, during this process, some local representatives raised concerns concerning alleged illegal tax collection practices, leading to demands for a sharia trial against the *kaymakam* and *müdürs*. In spite of the absence of a sharia trial due to the nature of the conflict being administrative, a public confrontation before the city council ensued, where all representatives presented their complaints and evidence. Ultimately, the *kaymakam* and his *müdürs* refuted the accusations, prompting the city council to determine that they could not take action against the *kaymakam* unless he admitted fault. Consequently, the council advised the representatives to accompany the *kaymakam* to Tripoli and request a trial before the *vali*, considering only he had the authority to rule against the *kaymakam* in this case. The representatives expressed readiness to even travel to İstanbul if necessary.¹⁰⁴⁵ In essence, whilst there were existing preventive measures in place to deter corruption, the complex nature of the process often rendered it inaccessible to ordinary farmers.

The issue of tax collection posed a significant challenge for the Ottoman authorities, proving to be a difficult endeavour. On the one hand, they were struggling to reduce corruptive and illegal actions in the tax collection, which mostly done by local *iltizam* owner, *mukhtars*¹⁰⁴⁶, and corrupted Ottoman officers¹⁰⁴⁷ by taking some measures such as not appointing the same man as *mukhtar* in the next term or not selling the *iltizam* to the same man in the next year as well as giving hard punishment for corruption.¹⁰⁴⁸ Despite these interventions, a report by Mahmud Nedim Efendi in 1904 revealed that corrupt practices among *iltizam* owners, *mukhtars*, and certain officers persisted without significant improvement. A substantial portion of the tax revenue ended up in the hands of these corrupt individuals, resulting in minimal returns for the state and financial burden on farmers.¹⁰⁴⁹ Particularly in Fezzan, a notable transformation occurred where *ushr* collection responsibilities were assigned to *iltizam* owners, predominantly wealthy merchants from Sokna and

1044 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1889.

1045 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1863.

1046 For example, Tripolitan newspapers report in 1900 how local *mukhtars* collect too much tax by putting big part of it in their own pocket. *Al-Gharb*, Rajab 1318, 963 edition.

1047 For an example, see: P.A.4., family collection, 145.

1048 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1892.

1049 'Mahmud Nedim Efendi Layihası (1904)' B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Umum Vilayetler, 68/121.

Hun, after the 1860s. Rampant corruption led to excessive tax collection annually, ultimately leading to the collapse of date production in the region. Farmers either abandoned their lands due to inability to pay taxes or incurred substantial debts to the wealthy merchants. In this regard, during 1858 some villages in Fezzan were the most important centre for date production in the whole Tripolitania, for instance, in Al-Hufra the harvest was 241,200 kg or in Samnu 94,800 kg in year,¹⁰⁵⁰ in 1876, however, the amount of date production was far less than other regions such as Al-Khums and Cahal Al-Garb.¹⁰⁵¹ By 1904, these villages had been deserted, resulting in negligible date production.¹⁰⁵² In this regard, although the Ottomans regularly tried to create a new impetus for agricultural production, such as introducing sugar cane in Ghadames in 1900,¹⁰⁵³ as Al-Tahir Al-Zahir noted, *iltizam* system mostly caused great loss for common people, predominantly farmer. In the meantime, some rich middlemen, mostly merchants, became richer.¹⁰⁵⁴

Although aware of the corrupt nature of the *iltizam* system, the Ottoman authorities were compelled to continue its implementation due to various challenges. For instance, in 1898, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan opted to collect *ushr* through Ottoman officials in lieu of the *iltizam* system and the involvement of *mukhtars*. The estimated *ushr* collection for that year was 895,000 *kuruş*, equivalent to the amount that could have been obtained through selling the task to a wealthy merchant under the *iltizam* system. At the end of the year, they could collect only 231,000 *kuruş*, due to the bad harvest and inaccurate records from previous years, made it difficult to estimate the average harvest.¹⁰⁵⁵ The following year, the authorities reverted to the *iltizam* system to prevent further financial losses. The price of justice being the central tenet of the Tanzimat reforms was too much to pay. In fact, this exemplified how the *iltizam* system not only facilitated corruption but also exploited farmers. Despite being cognizant that the estimated tax price sold under the *iltizam* system exceeded what farmers could afford, Ottoman officials chose to overlook this exploitation in favour of boosting revenue. This exploitation was rationalized by the argument that the funds raised were essential for maintaining the army, which in turn would protect the populace from colonial threats. With the same reason, the Ottomans collected some particular years *inyanat al-sultaniyat* (Ar. war tax) to finance their wars against Russian Empire, especially the collection in 1853 and 1876 created a great unrest, since this forced payment was a massive unexpected loss for the

1050 M.G., Official Documents, dated as 1858.

1051 D.M.T.L., Tax Registration, F. 751-850, No. 814.

1052 'Mahmud Nedim Efendi Layihası (1904)'.

1053 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a tax register dated as 1902.

1054 Al-Tahir Al-Zawi, *Walayat Tarabulus* (Beyrut: Dar al-Fath, 1970), 151.

1055 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Dahiliye, 10/46.

inhabitants.¹⁰⁵⁶ Tax records indicate that throughout the 19th century, Tripolitania made negligible contributions to the imperial treasury, with İstanbul often covering the region's escalating military expenses due to insufficient local revenue.

This was indeed a very complicated policy, considering it involved exploiting the common people to sustain the army and ensuring this exploitation did not incite rebellion. Following the 1880s, Ottoman officers encountered additional challenges in maintaining this delicate equilibrium. These challenges prompted a reevaluation of the governance system. For instance, in 1881, an anonym report states that since İstanbul did not develop a special *islah* implementation, that is to say a proper reform program, for Tripolitania but just copied the central Tanzimat program, which was not suitable for the region, the officers have been forced to implement *ray* to solve the problems efficiently. However, this approach was prone to corruption, as noted by instances of misconduct among officers.¹⁰⁵⁷ Some local officers even openly viewed *ray* as a preferable alternative to *islah*. For instance, in 1885, the Tripolitan *vali* wrote to the *kaymakam* of Al-Khums to inform him that he had received several complaints about his violent practices on the local people by using his own personal reasoning, i.e. *ray*. In his response, the *kaymakam* openly confirmed this hearing by stating that this is the only way to disqualify the corruption and collect the tax properly. In other words, he clearly supported the implementation of *ray*. However, the *vali* responded that this practice is wrong as it would implement *ray* only in the war conditions as it did before the 1850s. Since there is no such situation anymore, the *kaymakam* has to implement *islah*.¹⁰⁵⁸ This particular instance highlights a divergence in governance systems between the *vali* and *kaymakams*, a trend that became more prevalent around the 1890s. An example from 1890 involving the *kaymakam* of Benghazi illustrates the similar challenges faced in enforcing the Land Registry Law (Tr. *Tapu Yasası*) which had been introduced in 1858 but had not been effectively implemented for three decades. At this point, the *kaymakam* points out the paradoxical nature of *islah* in the region. He argued that this law was prepared to disqualify corruption in the tax collection. In the traditional system, *mukhtars* collected the *ushr* from farmers according to their own reasoning (*ray*) without registering how many fields each family has. The state aimed to prevent corruption by registering all fields to its rightful owners to determine tax obligations accurately. However, when attempts were made to enforce this law, local resistance arose due to fears of increased tax burdens. Consequently, the *kaymakam* delayed the application of the law as being part of the *islah* program by tasking *mukhtars* to document tax

1056 For this reason, myriad of petitions were written to Tripoli to compliant. See: P.A.4., family collection, 146.

1057 'Anonym Layiha (1881)'.

1058 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1885.

collection with great accuracy, enabling oversight and accountability. Hence, if some families complain with regard to any excessive tax collection, he could check the register. If the register is not true, he would sue the *mukhtar*.¹⁰⁵⁹ In spite of the *kaymakam*'s deviation from the reform program by implementing *ray*, the Ottoman government, in 1878 Berka was assigned to direct administrative control of İstanbul, approved the solution. This approach, very risky by nature for officials, highlighted the dilemma they faced in balancing the need for *ray* involvement with the uncertainty of acceptance from higher authorities. This caused mostly a great fear for the officers, as they were compelled to implement *ray* to solve some problems; yet, in case the *vali* or the Ottoman government do not confirm it, they faced with the accusation of corruption and mostly even quickly fired. Along this line, officers were divided in their approaches, with some opting for cautious consultation with higher authorities, leading to inefficiencies due to slow communication, while others preferred to implement *ray* independently, risking dismissal if their actions were not endorsed. Over time, the fear of repercussions pushed officers towards seeking approval from higher authorities as the safer option. According to Sami Çölgeçen, especially after the 1890s, this administrative reality triggered a great stagnation in terms of economic and administrative development, considering the officers had to wait several months an answer for even very simple decisions, which at the end forced the local people to solve their problem by self considering Ottoman administration miserable.¹⁰⁶⁰

Apart from these difficulties, in 1857 with the pressure of Britain the Ottomans banned the slave trade from Maghreb. Nonetheless, since slavery is one of the oldest principles in sharia, abolishing it was impossible for the Ottomans. To justify the ban on trade, the authorities used the excuse of bad treatment of the enslaved people.¹⁰⁶¹ The ban was initially declared by authorities, but enforcement was not actively pursued in Tripoli until the 1860s due to other pressing issues such as the Ghuma rebellion. A significant step was taken in 1863 when the Tripolitan *vali* issued a directive to strictly enforce the ban, threatening confiscation of enslaved individuals and imprisonment of merchants for 1 year who continued the trade.¹⁰⁶² Nevertheless, there existed practical ambiguity regarding the ban's application, particularly in cases where enslaved individuals were sold within private residences, necessitating increased monitoring by officials, whereby selling any enslaved people in the open markets was still strictly forbidden, as is also evidence in a court register from 1887, shows a merchant brought 10 enslaved people to the city market to sell, being

1059 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1890.

1060 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 161.

1061 Hamdi Atamer, 'Zenci Ticaretinin Yasaklanması', *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 3 (1967): 23–29.

1062 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1863.

jailed, and all enslaved individuals were freed.¹⁰⁶³ Furthermore, there existed a legal grey zone, since the procurement of enslaved individuals for personal use was not considered part of the slave trade if they were acquired directly from outside Ottoman borders. For instance, the Ottoman officers, who needed servant in their houses, continued to order a couple of enslaved people from Kuka.¹⁰⁶⁴ However, in 1893, the *vali* Ahmed Rasim Paşa ended this legal ambiguity by sending a circular to all *kaymakams* with the information that he banned also to order any enslaved people from southern Central Sudan regardless their origin.¹⁰⁶⁵ In the same year, he wrote a personal letter to the sultan of Damagaram, Tinimoun, who was the most active agent in the slave trade, to stop selling any enslaved people to Tripolitan merchants.¹⁰⁶⁶ Since the slave trade had no meaningful role in the trans-Saharan trade, this ban did not cause a great change in the development of the trade. However, the Ottoman authorities continued to act with caution to avoid unexpected unrest.

5.2.2. New Dynamics and Development in the Trans-Sahara trade

As the non-Afro-Islamic agents believed that the slave trade was the most important element of the trans-Saharan trade, with the ban of this commerce, they consistently asserted a decline in trade within the central Sahara region during the 19th century.¹⁰⁶⁷ This assertion has been widely embraced by scholars outside of Libya and Turkey, who lacked access to the original local sources for verification.¹⁰⁶⁸ The narrative of decline in the trans-Saharan trade was a mixture of the belief that reduces all economic activities in the Sahara to slave trade, and with the ban of slave trade after the 1850s, considering an ultimate collapse, that has anti-Ottoman propaganda, by claiming that the “despot Turks” prevent the economic development, and that was influenced by colonialist ideologies, by defining the region as underdeveloped chaotic place that needs a European intervention. In fact, the academics such as Nesir bin Musi, who was able to examine the local sources with the awareness of the fundamental deficits in the non-Afro-Islamic sources already clearly stated that during the 19th century there was no such decline in the trans-sahara trade.¹⁰⁶⁹ In reality, even at the beginning of the 20th century, the trans-Saharan trade was still experiencing grow in different goods.

1063 D.M.T.L., *Sijiliyyat Al-Mahkamat*, dated as 1887.

1064 For one example from 1882, see: D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1882.

1065 D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1893.

1066 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1893.

1067 One of the myriad examples, see the Italian reports: A.S.M.A.E.I., P, *Libia*, 161/1.

1068 For just an example, see: M. F. Le Gal, ‘Pashas Bedouins and Notables: The Ottoman Administration in Tripoli and Bengazi 1881-1902’ (Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan, Princeton University, 1990).

1069 Musi, *Al-Muhtama’ al-’arabiyya al-Libiyya Fi al-’ahd al-Othmani*, 158.

Several sources provide clear evidence of a significant rise in trade activities across the Sahara region following the conclusion of civil conflicts and uprisings in the 1860s. An example of this is seen in the migration of numerous Jewish merchants from Tuscany to Tripoli in 1865 for business, as reported by French authorities, who were surprised by this movement and the growing importance of trans-Saharan trade.¹⁰⁷⁰ In 1868, Ghadamesian merchants began to go Yola to buy ostrich feather and ivory directly from the Emir of Adamawa.¹⁰⁷¹ Around the 1870s, the number of active Ghadamesian merchants in Kano was so big that a Hausa merchant was working on behalf of 6 different merchants from Ghadames.¹⁰⁷² The establishment of robust trade networks between Benghazi and Wadai further contributed to the expansion of commerce. A Tunisian envoy in Benghazi expressed astonishment in 1876 at the bustling markets filled with goods.¹⁰⁷³ Especially around 1881-1883 the trade volume was so immense that merchants were writing in their letters their satisfaction concerning the cheap prices of ostrich feather and ivory in Kuka, and high prices in Tripoli,¹⁰⁷⁴ this led to congestion at the ports of Tripoli due to oversupply of ostrich feathers in the city harbours, resulting in a temporary deflation in the local market.¹⁰⁷⁵ In 1881, a Ghadamesian merchant, called al-Habib Hiba, mentions that since it is impossible to export ostrich feathers from the harbour of Tripoli, many merchants are going to Tunisia to export their goods personally.¹⁰⁷⁶ In another case, in 1882, court records document a Tripolitan merchant who, impressed by the increased trade volume in recent years, made substantial investments in ostrich feathers. Then, he experienced a significant short-term drop in prices due to delays in shipping. Consequently, when the merchant attempted to sell large quantities of ostrich feathers in Tripoli, he struggled to find buyers, resulting in the bankruptcy of his businesses.¹⁰⁷⁷ The trans-Saharan trade experienced a notable surge during this period, particularly in the supply of ostrich feathers, which reached unprecedented levels. The supply was so immense that it took almost 4 years for the Tripolitan harbours to ship the products properly to (mostly) France. Accordingly, by 1887, the French markets were inundated with large quantities of ostrich feathers, leading to a sharp decline in prices in Paris.¹⁰⁷⁸ Despite this short-term crisis in the ostrich feather trade, the trans-Saharan trade

1070 A.E.F., Turqie C.C.C., 42, 55.

1071 P.A. 4., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1868.

1072 This Hausa merchant was named Abubakr bin Muhammad, the Ghadamesian merchants were: Hajj Tahir bin Harun, Abubakr bin Ahmad al-Thani, Muhammad bin Belqasim Hayba, Al-Siddiq bin Yunis, Muhammad al-Bashir al-Wanshi, Ahmad bin Abdullah bin Ibrahim. J.G.T.M., a letter dated as 1871.

1073 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1876.

1074 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1882.

1075 See some letters from 1881: P.A.4., family collection, 63 and 67.

1076 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1881.

1077 D.M.T.L., Mahkamat al-Tijarat, dated as 1882.

1078 A.E.F., Turqie C.C.C., 46, 316.

remained resilient, since merchants swiftly diversified their investments into other commodities such as ivory (primarily to London) and tanned skins (primarily to the USA).¹⁰⁷⁹ This strategic shift resulted in a substantial increase in export volume from Tripolitania, surpassing export levels by twofold in 1885 in compare to 1881.¹⁰⁸⁰ Correspondence from a Soknian merchant in 1889 further attests to the favourable market conditions, with the merchant noting the affordability of goods in the Kuka market and the high prices of Tripoli products in the Kavar market.¹⁰⁸¹ The attraction to the trade was so great that even some Ottoman soldiers began to invest the Trans-Saharan trade with their salary.¹⁰⁸² To provide enough infrastructure and labour for huge caravans, the Ottomans exempted people who would work as caravan leaders (Tr. *kafile başı*).¹⁰⁸³ Encouraged by these profitable conditions, affluent Jewish merchants in Tripoli established a prominent company named *Wutburuyu* in 1890 to transport a significant quantity of ostrich feathers from Kuka. By 1891, this company had transported ostrich feathers valued at 137,749 *kuruş*, equivalent to half of Fezzan's tax income from agriculture during the same period.¹⁰⁸⁴ This also facilitated the rise of wealthy family companies in Ghadames, that were able to run their business from Kano to Tripoli via Ghat and Ghadames, entirely through their agents and having more than 2000 camels for their own transportation business.¹⁰⁸⁵ In 1892, the Ottoman *müdür* of Ghat, Hamadu al-Ansar, mentions in one of his letters, sent to a Ghadamesian merchant, called Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Belqasim, that the goods are flowing from the all directions, such as from Timbuktu, Kano, and Yola with very good prices. He shares his satisfaction, seeing unexampled big caravans.¹⁰⁸⁶ However, the trade expansion faced a setback with the fall of Bornu to Rabillah forces, leading to a stagnation in trade growth from 1893 to 1907, as reported by Cami Baykurt.¹⁰⁸⁷ Nonetheless, this stagnation happened already in the zenith of the trade. In this regard, there was no economic loss for anyone. Ghadamesian merchants were still happy with the abundance of trade and goods in 1899.¹⁰⁸⁸ As a result, it was not surprising for British agents to counter Ghadamesian merchants in Nupe and Adamawa in 1900.¹⁰⁸⁹

1079 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 49–53.

1080 Binbaşı Ömer Subhi, *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi ile Büyük Sahra ve Sudan*, 55.

1081 M.G., Family Collections, dated as 1889.

1082 In 1888, Nur Effendi, an Ottoman soldier stationed in Ghadames, gave power of attorney to Hajj Ahmad bin Hamud, a Ghadamesian merchant, to collect goods he had ordered from Ghat and Tripoli. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a register dated as 1888.

1083 Aqil Muhammad Al-Birbar, *Dirasat Fi Tarikh Libiya Al-Hadithi* (Malta: Mansurat ELGA, 1996), 57.

1084 D.M.T.L., *Tijarat*, dated as 1891.

1085 For instance, see: M.G. Merry, 'Renseignements Commerciaux Sur Le Mouvement Des Echanges Entre La Tripolitanie et Le Soudan Central', *Bulletin du comite de l'Afrique française* (Paris, 1893).

1086 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1892.

1087 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 307.

1088 P.A. 4., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1899.

1089 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 403/254.

Trade volumes remained stable until 1906, with Baykurt noting the collection of 170,000 *kuruş* in customs duties from caravans between Agadez and Ghadames in 1905, which was the same to the 1890s.¹⁰⁹⁰

It is noticeable to observe such a regular increase in the trans-Saharan trade, if it is given the fact that especially around Kavar the caravans were under regular attacks of Awlad Sulaiman from Kanem till 1893, which merchants were regularly complaining about this trouble.¹⁰⁹¹ Nonetheless, a significant shift occurred after 1901, altering the course of trans-Saharan trade. The presence of the French in southern Kavar and Kanem-Bornu instilled fear among merchants. After their many years of attempt when French could not achieve to canalize this trade to Algeria, they resorted to indiscriminate massacres of merchants in the central Sahara, considering for French officers that was the only way to monopolize the trans-Saharan trade to the benefit of French commerce.¹⁰⁹² To avoid any possible bloc against them, an intense propaganda campaign was initiated in 1901, claiming the Sanussiyya is the biggest enemy of Awlad Sulaiman, and the Kel Tamasheq are the biggest enemy of the Sanussiyya. Thus, in the same year, the Sanussi sheikh wrote personal letters to the Kel Tamasheq leaders and Awlad Sulaiman to disregard “these propagandist lies”.¹⁰⁹³ Also French officers were aware of the fact that their propaganda campaign did not work as they hoped. One of the officers recounts how they attacked a civilian trade caravan near Kanem in 1902, killing everyone, primarily Kel Tamasheq, and stealing their belongings. Upon returning to Bornu, they claimed to have been fighting an armed Kel Tamasheq militia that was terrorizing the region. Nevertheless, the officers were unhappy to admit that “... the local people do not believe all these false stories that we are telling”.¹⁰⁹⁴ Following the failure of this propaganda campaign, French colonial invasion forces began to indiscriminate massacre across the Sahara. The reports concerning massacres first began to reach Tripoli from Wadai.¹⁰⁹⁵ Especially, the massacre of all individuals in a Fezzani caravan between Kavar and Kanem by French forces in 1902 prompted the Ottomans to advise merchants to seek alternative trade routes.¹⁰⁹⁶ Nonetheless, soon French forces began to massacre also the merchants around Ghat.¹⁰⁹⁷ They even appeared before Djanet, declaring that soon they will be part of the French empire, removing their Ottoman flag.¹⁰⁹⁸ Being unable to avoid these

1090 T.B.M.M.A., Meclis Görüşmeleri, 9 June 1906.

1091 For one such complaints see this private letter: M.G., Family Collections, dated as 1889.

1092 Capt. Moll, ‘Situation Economique de La Region de Zinder’, Renseignements coloniaux (Paris, 1901), 197–98.

1093 M.M.J.B., Sanussiyya, a letter from 19 Shaban 1319 [1901].

1094 A.N.O.M., Tchad, 13, 1902, report of Dubois.

1095 B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezâreti Mektubî Kalemi, 527/20.

1096 B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezâreti Mektubî Kalemi, 556/57.

1097 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 174.

1098 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 170.

massacres and illegal entrances by the French colonial invasion forces, the Kel Azgher communities began to strengthen their power by stopping any other conflicts.¹⁰⁹⁹ In 1903, the Ottomans received another news from southern Ghat that French massacred all people in a caravan from Ghat.¹¹⁰⁰ In the same year, a Ghadamesian merchant, called Ahmad bin Belqasim, wrote a letter to *amonakl* of Kel Azgher to inform him that French officers are paying a huge sum of money to Arab communities around western Algeria and southern Tunisia to kill literally all Kel Azgher people. The merchant recommends that he should consider immigrating to Fezzan to rescue his people.¹¹⁰¹ These brutal incidents escalated around 1906, posing a formidable challenge to Ottoman authorities and merchants, ultimately leading to a decline in trade,¹¹⁰² since it was literally impossible for the Tripolitan merchants to go south.¹¹⁰³ By 1910, French authorities officially labelled Kel Azgher, Teda from Tibesti, and Fezzani merchants as “armed enemy groups”, ordering their massacre if they attempted to enter Agadez, Kawar, and Kanem.¹¹⁰⁴ Two Ottoman officers, Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, who personally observed this era of terror from 1902 to 1911, summarize their impression as follows: “... The French committed so many massacres that they left few people alive. They killed thousands of women and children. They even killed countless babies. And all of this happened in the name of civilization. This is the civilization that they brought to Africa, just death”.¹¹⁰⁵

In spite of this era of massacres, Tripolitan merchants managed to sustain trade until 1907.¹¹⁰⁶ However, after this point, it was literally impossible to conduct trade. For instance, the inhabitants of Ghadames wrote a petition to the *vali* in 1910 by summarizing the transformation of the whole 19th century: “... after 1843, we paid annual [farm] tax of 125.000 *kuruş*... In 1864 it increased to 153.000 *kuruş*. In 1888, İstanbul revised the tax, and it became 204.000 *kuruş* annually... Thanks to our flourishing trade and regular income increases, we were able to pay this tax without a problem. However, the trade has been impossible for a couple of years now because of the French... This year [1910], there was a massive drought, so we could not harvest any dates... We ask for tax exemption for our survival.”¹¹⁰⁷ Consequently, between 1907 and 1911, the trans-Saharan trade experienced a

1099 In 1902, Kel Azgher communities asked Ghadamesian elites to initiate a reconciliation between Kel Azgher and Shaanba Arabs. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1902.

1100 B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi, 717/44.

1101 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1903.

1102 B.O.A., Dâhiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi, 405/1.

1103 B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi, 623/87.

1104 A.N.F., Turqie, 200 MI 606, 1910.

1105 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 182–83.

1106 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 159.

1107 D.M.T.L., Tijarat, dated as 1910.

rapid and drastic decline, leading to the bankruptcy of numerous merchants, if they or their agents were already not murdered by French forces. With the Italian invasion in 1911, trans-Saharan trade was officially banned and criminalized by Italian, French, and British authorities.

The nearly six-decade period of growth in trans-Saharan trade from the 1860s to 1902 was driven by various factors, notwithstanding encountering numerous obstacles. One significant factor was the expansion of Ottoman rule in the central Sahara post-1850s, which established a unified regulatory framework for all commercial activities. Central to this regulatory system was the emphasis on resolving conflicts through legal proceedings or direct intervention by the Ottoman gendarmerie forces. The migration of the Awlad Sulaiman from Fezzan to Kanem following the loss of Murzuq in the 1840s posed a persistent challenge for both merchants and Ottoman authorities. The Ottomans faced difficulties in extending their authority over the Sahara until the late 1850s, leading to a tumultuous period lasting a decade in the Kavar region. On the one hand, Awlad Sulaiman plundered the Fezzani caravans around the region. To compensate their loss, Fezzani communities also plunder the caravans from Tibesti, Agadez, and Kanem around Kavar. In 1858, the *hakim* of Kavar, who had assumed the role of Ottoman *müdür*, corresponded directly with the *vali* of Tripoli to report incidents of plundering by the Awlad Sulaiman and express dismay over the actions of the Fezzani communities. He states in his letter, “we know that the Awlad Suleiman plunder because it is their way of life. But how can our Fezzani brothers plunder our region? Are we not the children of the same sultan?”¹¹⁰⁸ The *müdür* sought reparation for the losses incurred by the Fezzani communities. Subsequently, the *vali* instructed the *kaymakam* of Fezzan to locate these communities and retrieve the items taken from Kavar. In 1860, Kavar was able to recover their possessions.¹¹⁰⁹ Still, the *vali* was unable to address the assaults by Awlada Sulaiman due to the absence of a substantial military presence to send Kavar.¹¹¹⁰ The Murzuq-Kuka route was intermittently obstructed following the raids by Awlad Sulaiman. Thanks to the coping strategies of the merchants, that did not result in the decline of the trade, as will be seen in the following

1108 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56.

1109 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56.

1110 In fact, the main force in the region against the attacks of Awlad Sulaiman was Kel Away from Air, who were providing protection to Kavar. Between 1850 and 1860, several reciprocal attacks damaged the trade greatly. At the end, Awlad Sulaiman managed to move Kel Away to Agadez and began to control Kavar till the 1880s. Especially private merchant letters provide great details pertaining to this conflict. For instance, see: P.A.4, family collection, 39 and 47. However, rivalry between the Sultan of Air and *tabl* of Kel Away also confused the *müdür* of Kavar. Although he asked for Ottoman rule in his region, reducing his relations with Agadez with the belief that the Ottomans would provide better security, in reality, neither Agadez nor Tripoli was able to do that but Kal Away. Nevertheless, they were not interested in providing security to Kavar. Their aim was to push back the Awlad Sulaiman from the region to secure their control in Damargu area.

pages.¹¹¹¹ The Ottoman Empire's involvement in conflict resolution notably expanded post-1860s. Especially the enduring rivalry between Kel Hoggar and Kel Azgher,¹¹¹² as well as Kel Tamasheq and Teda from Tibesti and Borku, frequently led to retaliatory attacks and looting, disrupting caravans in the area for short-term. In an effort to mitigate this rivalry, the Ottomans endeavoured to offer incentives to these communities, such as tax exemptions, by entrusting them with security responsibilities in their respective territories, rather than engaging in plundering expeditions.¹¹¹³ Nonetheless, this strategy did little to deter the raiding activities of the Tedas, which held significant traditional and cultural significance among the communities. Consequently, merchants in Sokna lodged complaints with the *kaymakam* of Fezzan in 1889 regarding losses incurred due to Teda attacks.¹¹¹⁴ Despite the *kaymakam*'s efforts to seek compensation from the *müdür* of Tibesti and Borku, a substantial portion of the nomadic communities, driven by their own motives and interests, remained beyond their control. Accordingly, in 1899, the Ottomans opted to establish a new local gendarmerie division equipped with modern firearms.¹¹¹⁵ This measure also failed to yield the anticipated outcomes. Still, the Ottoman policy of conflict resolution and compensation proved effective in certain instances, whereas the merchants often had to address numerous challenges independently. Additionally, they voiced concerns regarding the inefficacy of Ottoman oversight. Notably, around the 1900s, certain Teda groups pillaged caravans near Ghat and traded the stolen goods in the Murzuq market. When Ghatian merchants personally saw their products in the market, protested the situation to the *kaymakam* by saying, "do not see that these products are from Agadez and no Teda makes trade with Agadez. How can you not notice that these are the stolen goods!"¹¹¹⁶ In instances of neglect by the Ottoman authorities, merchants were compelled to devise their own strategies. An illustrative case is that of the Kavar oasis circa the 1900s, where, after prolonged appeals for an Ottoman garrison went unanswered, the residents of Anay, the foremost settlement for caravans arriving from Fezzan, vacated the town due to frequent raids and relocated to the mountainous region. Here, they constructed new dwellings equipped with storage facilities for caravan goods. To safeguard against losses, they would seal off the mountain entrance at night or

1111 British vice-consul in Murzuq, regularly reported such strategies, see: B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 84/1144.

1112 Especially around the 1860s and the 1880s, two destructive wars broke out between Kel Hoggar and Kel Azgher, see: P.A.9., uncategorized, dated as 1861; J.G.T.M., uncategorized, dated as 1884. But there were some periods that also Kel Adagh from Ifoghas also plundered caravans around Ghat by attacking Kel Azgher. See an example from 1892, J.G.T.M., uncategorized, dated as 1892.

1113 Kolağası Ali and Mirliva Ahmed Nuri, 'Afrikâ-Yi Osmani'den Trablusgarb ve Bingazi ve Fizan'a Dair Malumat' (1883), İ.Ü.N.K., Yazma Eserler, 5002.

1114 M.G., Family Collections, dated as 1889.

1115 B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi, 2221/57.

1116 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 169.

upon receiving signals from sentries stationed at the mountain's zenith.¹¹¹⁷ Additionally, the *müdür* of Kavar initiated a new kind of currency in the region, which were some kinds of beads. People of Kavar were exchanging the currency that they received from trade immediately with these beads. The rationale behind this practice was to thwart potential robbers by offering only beads of nominal value instead of currency in silver or gold. Given that the beads held worth solely within the Kavar community and were meticulously documented by the director, which person possessed how many beads, any loss incurred would be mitigated.¹¹¹⁸ In a similar way, the Kel Azgher communities resorted to clandestinely procuring advanced firearms from İstanbul via Greek smugglers to enhance their security, rather than relying solely on Ottoman intervention.¹¹¹⁹

In this regard, In certain instances, merchants perceived seeking assistance from the Ottomans as futile, opting instead to reach out to prominent families for support. Correspondences exchanged between 1880 and 1900 from regions such as Zinder, Bornu, and Wadai to influential families in Murzuq and Sokna exemplify this practice.¹¹²⁰ Observations made by Italian spies also highlighted this trend, noting that individuals would continue to seek alternative solutions as long as there was a scarcity of gendarmerie available for safeguarding trade routes, particularly in Tripoli where resources were allocated to defend against potential invasions.¹¹²¹ Private correspondence from Ghadames further corroborates these instances.¹¹²² Nevertheless, merchants persisted in exerting pressure on Ottoman officials by emphasizing their responsibility for ensuring security. For instance, in 1876, merchants from Tripoli informed the *vali* with regard to the challenges faced in trading with Wadai, citing issues of insecurity and inadequate infrastructure, prompting them to question when the *vali* would fulfil his duties effectively.¹¹²³ In other words, the merchants not only considered the Ottoman bureaucracy as miserable, they also forced the Ottoman officers to face this fact.

Another important factor in the transformation of the trade dynamics was the tax policy of the Ottomans, also being related to the system of governance. Especially between 1845 and 1850 there was noticeable mobility among various communities due to the recent political changes. In 1845, some families from Sirte relocated to the oasis of Sokna. According to the reports of the *kaymakam*

1117 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 140–43.

1118 H.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 122/3.

1119 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 175.

1120 For instance, see: M.J.L.D.T., *Tijarat*, 684.

1121 A.U.S.M.E., P, Libia, 162/2.

1122 P.A.4., family collection, 74.

1123 D.M.T.L., *Tijarat*, dated as 1876.

of Fezzan, initially exempt from taxes during Yusuf *paşa*'s reign, they were now subject to the *tadbir* system and required to pay farm taxes, notwithstanding their region's unsuitability for agriculture. To avoid issues with Ottoman officials, they opted to settle in Sokna, where farming conditions were more favourable.¹¹²⁴ In another case, in 1849, some Majabran merchants in Murzuq decided to sell their accommodations in the city and canalize their trade to Wadai in lieu of Bornu. According to the observation of the city council members, since in Awjilo/Jalo they are still under the *idara* rule, they paid less tax. Along these lines, to take this advantage, they prefer to centralize their accommodations in these regions instead of Fezzan.¹¹²⁵ These immigrations were also noticed by Italian colonial authorities in their historical revisionism. They narrated this mobility as a result of "ruthless exploitation of despot turks."¹¹²⁶ In fact, the Ottoman authorities were cognizant of these movements, viewing them as a natural consequence of rapid political changes and initially refraining from intervention. However, by around 1855, local merchants observed the lack of understanding among Ottoman officers in Fezzan regarding trans-Saharan trade and its intricacies, prompting a shift in the Ottoman response. A Tripolitan merchant named Muhammad Tahir, engaged in trade activities in the regions of Murzuq and Ghadames, submitted a formal request to the *vali* by detailing that following the cessation of military operations around 1850, merchants in Tripoli, Sokna, Hun, and Murzuq were anticipating improved support for trade from Ottoman officials. This included enhanced security for merchants and a reduction in tax burdens, particularly in comparison with *Majabran* merchants. The *vali* took the matter seriously and forwarded the petition to İstanbul for guidance on appropriate actions to be taken. With reference to the 3% - 9% customs duty rates (3% for exports, 9% for imports, totalling 12% for merchants engaged in both activities), the Ottoman government decreed that no additional income tax should be levied on merchants, contrary to the practices reportedly enforced by Fezzani authorities.¹¹²⁷ Ironically, around the same years, the British Consul was reporting to London that "greedy despot Turks take a 25% custom duty from merchants... by destroying the whole trans-Saharan trade with also further additional income taxes."¹¹²⁸ In reality, the Ottoman authorities, by reducing taxation on merchants to 3% - 12% customs duty in 1855, were even laying the groundwork for further reforms. In 1862, the governor of Tripoli communicated to İstanbul the vital role played by merchants from Ghadames in facilitating the trans-Saharan trade route from Kano and Agadez to Tripoli, leading to

1124 D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1845.

1125 P.A. 7., uncategorized, dated as 1849.

1126 Enrico Petragani, *Il Sahara Tripolitano* (Roma: Sindacato Italiano Arti Grafiche, 1928), 44.

1127 B.O.A., Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Umum Vilayetler Evrakı, 183/88.

1128 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 101/41.

a decision by İstanbul to grant these merchants a tax exemption from custom duty as requested by the governor.¹¹²⁹ The Signing of the disputed Ghadamesian Agreement by the French in the same year strengthened this tax exemption policy of the Ottomans to break the influence of French,¹¹³⁰ and Ottomans sent some agents to Ghat to monitor further French activities.¹¹³¹ However, inasmuch as Ghadamesians also derived income from a date farm, they were obligated to continue paying a farm tax.¹¹³² Concurrently, in the same year, the *vali* implemented a new tax reform for merchants across Tripolitania. The *vali* eliminated the 9% import tax on goods transported from southern Central Sudan.¹¹³³ Thus, merchants transporting goods from Kano and Kuka to Tripoli were no longer subject to custom duties, only the merchants who were exporting them from Tripoli had to pay 3%. Accordingly, around 1900, 86% of the whole income of the Tripolitania was the farm and income [from manufacture] tax, considering the trans-Saharan trade was barely taxed but registered.¹¹³⁴ This adjustment by the Ottomans established favourable *idara* conditions for merchants following the 1860s, while still operating under the *tadbir* system. Consequently, they could take advantage of not paying tax, and also taking advantage of getting security by the armed Ottoman gendarmerie. This change in 1862 sparked significant interest in trade, leading some affluent farmers to opt for investing in commerce rather than expanding their agricultural activities, also to escape the exploitive practices of the *iltizam* system in the collection of farm tax. Additionally, Ottoman officers were instructed by İstanbul to treat any demands or complaints from merchants properly, resulting in instances where the Ottoman bureaucracy served the interests of merchants. For example, in 1866, when a caravan from Wadai to Benghazi was disrupted due to frontier issues between Wadai and Darfurian nomads from the eastern Sahara, merchants sought assistance from the *kaymakam* of Benghazi. As a result, a large caravan was organized under the protection of the Ottoman gendarmerie, with a Sanussiyya sheikh named Fuzayil Efendi appointed as the leader of the mission and sent to Abeche.¹¹³⁵ The favourable conditions of the trans-Saharan trade quickly gained recognition beyond the Ottoman Empire, especially by Jewish communities in Europe, who were experiencing antisemitic oppression with the rising imperial ideologies. Especially following the year 1865, several Jewish merchant communities from Tuscany, Livorno,

1129 B.O.A., İrade Meclis-i Vâlâ, 21578.

1130 Najmi Rajab Diaf, *Madinat Ghat Wa Tijarat Al-Qawafil al-Sahrawiyat Khilal al-Qarn al-Taasie Eashar* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 1999), 126.

1131 Ibrahim Mayasi, *Tawasu Al-Istimar al-Faransi Fi al-Janub al-Gharbi al-Jazayiri (1881-1912)* (Al-Jazayir: Manshurat Al-Muthaf Al-Watani li-l-Mujahidi, 1996), 5.

1132 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 85.

1133 B.O.A., Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları, 21576.

1134 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 92.

1135 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/23.

Marseille, Manchester, and the island of Jarba in Tunisia were immigrating to Tripoli to focus their business on the trans-Saharan trade.¹¹³⁶ Another contributing factor to the heightened interest among Jewish merchants in Tripoli was the establishment of the civil commerce court in 1850 by the Ottomans. This court provided assurance to Jewish merchants, minimizing juridical risks in their business dealings, particularly in navigating the complexities of the Maliki law. With the introduction of the new and clearly written commerce law and commerce court, Jewish merchants were able to leverage the favourable trade conditions without facing legal constraints.¹¹³⁷ Remarkably, in some instances, even some Ghadamesian merchants, who were having problems with their partners in Kano, went this commerce court in lieu of traditional sharia court.¹¹³⁸ These policies collectively fostered a perception among local residents that any endeavours, initiatives, and investments in the trans-Saharan trade would receive substantial support from the Ottoman administration. Consequently, the latter half of the 19th century emerged as a prosperous era for merchants to amass wealth previously unattainable.¹¹³⁹ In this regard, the Ottomans were balancing their fail to secure the trade routes, granting additional bureaucratic services and tax exemptions.

Nonetheless, not all Ottoman policies aimed at supporting the trans-Saharan trade were successful. An example of this is seen in 1880 when the Tripolitan *vali* attempted to enhance the trade route from Timbuktu to Benghazi, which had greatly declined in the early 19th century, by establishing settlements between Ghat and Murzuq and relocating Kel Azgher communities there. Despite constructing houses in the area, the Kel Azgher communities were reluctant to settle there, even when offered the houses for free.¹¹⁴⁰ Still, the *vali* persisted in his belief in the effectiveness of this approach. In 1885, he instructed the *kaymakam* of Fezzan to build houses to settle nomadic Arab communities, aiming to channel them into service sectors for trade.¹¹⁴¹ However, this policy did not yield significant results for the Ottomans. Many nomadic merchants preferred the flexibility of the existing *idara* conditions in trade and viewed settling in Ottoman-planned regions as excessive interference, conflicting with their business practices as well as with their nomadic lifestyle. Therefore, the Ottomans provided special privileges to merchants under the *tadbir* system, whereas striking a balance between the *idara* and *tadbir* policies proved to be a challenging task for them.

1136 A.E.F., Turqie C.C.C., 42, 55.

1137 Ahmad Sidqi Al-Dajjani, *Libiyya Qabl Al-'ihtilal al-Itali* (Trablus: Al-Matbaat al-Faniyat al-Haditha, 1971), 203.

1138 For an example from 1871, see: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1878.

1139 Ahmed Saied, 'Commerce et Commerçants Dan Le Sahara Central' (Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Provence-Aix-Marseille, 1996), 326. For instance, when the Ottomans asked for donation to the Ottoman army fighting against Russian Empire in 1879, the people of Tripoli were able to donate 300,000 *kuruş*, while the brother of the mayor of the city Omar Al-Qarqani alone was able to donate 20,000 *kuruş*. A.N.T., Reports, 232/457, d. 17.

1140 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1880.

1141 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1885.

The factors contributing to the growth of trans-Saharan trade post-1860s, primarily influenced by Ottoman policies, do not solely attribute the economic development in the Sahara during that era as a success solely of the Ottomans. Indeed, the Ottomans did create advantageous conditions for trade; yet, local merchants' initiatives and new discoveries also played a significant role in driving the long-term expansion of trade volume. Interregional partnerships and networks were already key drivers in trans-Saharan trade. There was a noticeable increase in density and scope post-1860s.¹¹⁴² The influx of Jewish merchants to Tripoli around the 1860s led to many Soknian merchants forming partnerships with them to conduct extensive trade operations between Bornu and Tripolitania.¹¹⁴³ By the 1890s, these partnerships even led to the establishment of the first *international companies*.¹¹⁴⁴ The intensifying trade activities, particularly between 1875-1885, prompted several Soknian merchants to acquire residences in Kuka and Kano through collaborations with local Hausa and Kanuri merchants.¹¹⁴⁵ The personal and economic ties between the al-Ghazali al-Sukni family in Sokna and the al-Kanemi dynasty in Kuka post-1860s further bolstered and expedited the strengthening of the network between Tripolitania and Bornu.¹¹⁴⁶ One result of these dense relationships was the formation of family connections. In the second of the 19th century, most of the Tripolitan merchants who were active in Kano and Kuka also had wives from these cities by being part of the local communities.¹¹⁴⁷ Additionally, Tripolitanian merchants expanded their networks beyond these regions. For example, in the 1870s, Ghadamesian merchants began collaborating with the Bey of Tunisia, Tunisian merchants, and Algerian merchants.¹¹⁴⁸ By the 1890s, some Ghadamesian merchants had even established a presence in Cairo, including within the Egyptian Khedive's palace.¹¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, Majabran merchants in Awjilo/Jalo formed strong partnerships with Wadai, with some conducting business on behalf of the *kolak* of Wadai.¹¹⁵⁰

During the post-1860s period, Tripolitan merchants exhibited a keen interest in expanding their trade networks by circumventing previous intermediaries. An example of this is seen in 1866 when

1142 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 63.

1143 M.G., family collections, dated as 1865.

1144 D.M.T.L., *tijarat*, dated as 1891. As already explained in Chapter 1, the concept of “nation” (Tr. *millet*) existed in Ottoman jurisdiction for centuries. In this regard, these newly established international companies were still Ottoman companies, as the “nations” involved them were not “foreign nations” (Tr. *ecnebi milletler*) but “Ottoman nations” (Tr. *milleti osmani*) such as Greeks, Turks, Arabs, and Jews. These new international companies were mostly a joint venture by Jewish, Turkish, and Arab merchants.

1145 For instance, see these two letters: M.G., family collections, dated as 1876 and 1884.

1146 M.G., family collections, dated as 1860.

1147 Abdullah Bieayyu, *Dirasat Fi Al-Tarikh al-Libiyya* (Alexandria, 1953), 205.

1148 P.A.4., family collection, 51.

1149 P.A.4., family collection, 90.

1150 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 64.

Soknian merchants entered into a contract with a Bengazi merchant to export goods directly from Kuka to İzmir (present-day Turkey).¹¹⁵¹ This trade venture later extended to İstanbul.¹¹⁵² By the 1870s, a Ghadamasian merchant named Hajj Muhammad bin Ahmad took the initiative to personally export goods to Manchester and Paris.¹¹⁵³ The 1880s witnessed a surge in trade activities, prompting merchants to explore unconventional regions where they had not historically been active. Notably, some Ghadamesian merchants, who traditionally conducted business between Timbuktu, Kano, and Agadez, began venturing into Kufra, Wadai,¹¹⁵⁴ and eventually Darfur.¹¹⁵⁵ Around the same time, with the increasing integration of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate to the trans-Saharan trade, particularly some Ghadamesian merchants began to settle in Sokoto,¹¹⁵⁶ and thereafter run their business in Nupe.¹¹⁵⁷

This expansion was further supported by local Hausa, Pullo, and Kanuri merchants who independently engaged in trans-Saharan trade, with merchants from Bida and Yola running caravans from the south to Tripoli and even exporting products to İstanbul and other European cities.¹¹⁵⁸ As early as the 1850s, American and British missionaries visiting Ilorin encountered Hausa merchants engaged in trade routes between İstanbul, Tripoli, and Ilorin.¹¹⁵⁹ In 1908, Sami Çölgeçen was similarly surprised to meet such merchants in Yola and Bida, who shared accounts of their trading activities from Tripoli to İstanbul.¹¹⁶⁰ These direct trade links with İstanbul facilitated the exchange of goods between Tripolitania and other Ottoman territories. For example, in the latter half of the 19th century, Tripolitan merchants began importing wood from cities like Ordu and Giresun (present-day northern Turkey).¹¹⁶¹ Indeed, ostrich feathers and ivory were among the most popular traded commodities, although their sources faced depletion due to increasing demand. Until the first half of the nineteenth century, ostriches could be found in any region of Tripolitania. Around the end of the century, the merchants had to travel until Yola and Baghirmi to buy their feathers.¹¹⁶²

1151 M.G., family collections, dated as 1866.

1152 M.G., family collections, dated as 1908.

1153 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, dated as 1870.

1154 Binbaşı Abdülvahid, *II. Abdülhamid Zamanında Bir Osmanlı Binbaşının Gözünden Libya*, 85.

1155 P.A.4., family collection, 83.

1156 P.A.4., family collection, 136.

1157 P.A.4., family collection, 135.

1158 In the 1880s, a Pullo merchant from Adamawa, called Hajj Ibrahim bin Ali, who was conducting trade between Yola and Tripoli, was preparing to travel to England to sell his goods personally there. Hajj Osman bin Omar and Anonym interviews, 'Aufzeichnungen Über Die Stadt Chat in Der Sahara', 318.

1159 Hakeem Olumide Danmole, 'The Frontier Emirate: A History of Islam in Ilorin' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1980), 104–10.

1160 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 307–47.

1161 Hikmet Naci, *Tarih Boyunca Kuzey Afrika ve Berberiler* (İstanbul: Sulhi Garan Matbaası, 1955), 26.

1162 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 214.

Particularly with the intensification of trade between Berka and Wadai after the 1870s, which the main goods in the trade was ivory,¹¹⁶³ caused a compelling challenge for the merchants from Ghadames and Murzuq to find enough ivory who were receiving this article from their Hausa and Kanuri partners. These partners were, in fact, exporting them from Yola and Baghirmi, which, with the increasing demand from Wadai after the 1870s, providers from Yola and Baghirmi were mostly sending their products to Abeche rather than to selling to Hausa and Kanuri merchants. Following this, by 1900, the market in Ghat and Ghadames primarily featured tanned skin and ostrich feathers, with ivory becoming scarce.¹¹⁶⁴

However, it should be noted that there was a significant emphasis on these commonly traded products. Still, it does not imply that merchants did not engage in the trade of other goods. In the latter part of the 19th century, as their capital increased, merchants began to diversify their product offerings and explore new markets. To this end, many Tripolitan merchants embarked on journeys across the Islamic world, from Tripoli to Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus,¹¹⁶⁵ Baghdad,¹¹⁶⁶ and even as far as Java (modern-day Indonesia), in search of new business opportunities. For instance, in 1867, a Tripolitan merchant named Ahmad Dribbika was involved in importing textiles from Damascus and Java, which were then transported to Wadai to trade for ivory.¹¹⁶⁷ These travels led to the establishment of new trade networks and the introduction of unfamiliar currencies to the region. By the 1880s, the variety of currencies in circulation in Tripoli had increased significantly, prompting the city council to publish an official list detailing their exchange rates. According to this list, the following currencies had a presence in the city: Ottoman, British, French, Austrian, Naples, Russian, Papal State, Prussian, Norwegian, Holland, Indian, Tunisian, and Egyptian.¹¹⁶⁸ Especially merchants from Hun, were well interested in various textile products from the different part of the world. According to oral accounts, especially 7 types of textile were very common among the Hunian merchants: *qumash basma* (Ar. textile from Anatolia), *qumash jawi* (Ar. textile from Java, Indonesia), *qumash Hundi* (Ar. textile from India (via Persia)), *qumash Dublin* (Ar. textile from Dublin, Ireland), *qumash iskandaraniyya* (Ar. textile from Alexandria, Egypt), *qumash al-Mahmudi* (Ar. textile from Cairo, Egypt), *qumash Yamani* (Ar. textile from Yemen).¹¹⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that textiles originating from the U.S.A., Britain, and France were perceived unfavourably in the region

1163 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 94.

1164 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 307.

1165 For instance, see: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a court register dated as 1850.

1166 See: J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a court register dated as 1907.

1167 D.M.T.L., majlis al-shariyya, dated as 1867.

1168 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1889.

1169 'Interview No.10: With the Ahmad Al-Titiwi in Hun, 2023'.

as a result of their poor quality. Oral testimonies from Ghat indicate that numerous merchants from Ghadames suffered significant financial losses when attempting to export inexpensive textiles from these aforementioned countries, considering they encountered difficulties in finding buyers for such products.¹¹⁷⁰ In this regard, the Tripolitan merchants had their own global network, beyond any direct domination of the French or British agents, which rendered them great rivals of the French and British enterprises, resulting in their massacre especially by French forces after 1902.

A significant development also emerged in Tripolitania around the 1860s that made a substantial impact on local trade rather than trans-Saharan trade. This development involved the utilization of esparto grass (Tr. *halfa otu*), an endemic plant in northern Africa, for paper production by British manufacturers.¹¹⁷¹ Initially, British merchants monopolized the product, driving local prices down notwithstanding its high value in European markets.¹¹⁷² However, with the entry of French and Italian merchants seeking the same resource in the 1880s, the British monopoly dissolved, leading to a surge in local prices and prompting a "gold rush" among communities to harvest the grass growing abundantly on hillsides. By the 1880s, the export value of esparto grass to London reached 188,576 pounds, surpassing that of ivory (24,500 pounds) and ostrich feathers (162,500 pounds).¹¹⁷³ The volume of exports in 1888 was 46,000 tone, which was a record year.¹¹⁷⁴ In 1900, the volume reduced to 30,000 tonnes due to the overexploitation of the plants. Consequently, the *vali* of Tripoli suggested increasing taxes on the product to avoid its overexploitation.¹¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the uncontrolled and excessive harvesting of esparto grass led to an environmental crisis by 1904, resulting in the near extinction of the grass along the coast. By the 1910s, esparto grass had disappeared entirely from Tripolitania.¹¹⁷⁶

The factors outlined above contributed to a significant increase in local and trans-Saharan trade from the 1860s to the 1902, leading to the emergence of numerous wealthy merchants in various cities such as Tripoli, Benghazi, Awjila/Jalo, Ghadames, Sokna, Hun, Murzuq, and Bilma.¹¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, the trade industry became highly profitable, and the volume of trade grew substantially, necessitating the involvement of a greater number of merchants in Tripolitania. Starting in the 1860s, there was a notable rise in female participation in trade activities. For

1170 'Interview No.2: Meeting with the Elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023'.

1171 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 881/7027.

1172 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1885.

1173 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 101/69.

1174 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 25.

1175 B.O.A., Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 209/82.

1176 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 27.

1177 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 146–50.

instance, when Tripolitan merchants decided to participate in an international merchandise exposition in Paris in 1867, out of the 60 selected merchants, 10 were women.¹¹⁷⁸

Conclusion

The *tadbir* system of the Ottoman Empire in the Tripolitania during the latter half of the 19th century was confronted with a multitude of challenges. Interestingly, the most formidable opponent of the application of *tadbir*, and its specific implementation of *islah*, was none other than the Ottoman *padişah* Abdulhamid II himself. Through his own Islamic Union politics, which relied on the application of *idara*, Abdulhamid II even supported several religious brotherhoods, and most notably the Sanusiyya, against the influence of reformist officers, who were willing to apply *tadbir* and actualize radical reforms (Tr. *islahatlar*). The growing influence of the Sanussiyya between Benghazi and Wadai, and their application of the *idara* system, further created tensions in the Ottoman administration. In addition to this, various merchant communities throughout Tripolitania frequently petitioned the *vali* for tax exemptions, requesting exclusive *idara* treatment for themselves. Notwithstanding the aforementioned political pressures and lobbying activities, the reformist officers persisted in their efforts to implement *islah* in Tripolitania. The Ottoman government also lent its support to the implementation of these reforms, particularly in light of the growing threat posed by Italy to the city of Tripoli. To fund the expansion of the military in Tripolitania for defence, Tripolitan officers were compelled to implement prompt and effective reforms. Although the income of the province considerably increased throughout the remainder of the century, the volume of growth in the army remained unattainable, resulting in numerous instances of financial transfers from İstanbul to Tripoli.

The consequences of all these complexities and dilemmas for the Ottoman officers were multifaceted. In order to increase the income of the province, well-known corrupt tax collection procedures, such as the *iltizam* system, were maintained for the purpose of achieving short-term gains. In the long term, this resulted in a significant decline in agricultural production, since farmers were left at the mercy of wealthy merchants. Ironically, this occurred concurrently with the implementation of numerous reforms in the 1850s, which were designed to enhance agricultural activities. The reform plans dictated from İstanbul were not always aligned with the local realities of Tripolitania. This resulted in policies that were paradoxical from the perspective of the

¹¹⁷⁸ D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1867.

inhabitants. In essence, the Ottoman officers were facing the same unique context of Tripolitania as once Yusuf *paşa* had faced. The implementation of *islah*, as exemplified with success in Tunisia and Egypt, two prominent sources of inspiration for the Ottoman government, did not yield comparable outcomes in the region, which was historically shaped by trade rather than agriculture or manufacturing. In this regard, the emphasis placed on agriculture and manufacturing in the implementation of *islah* did not yield the anticipated results in Tripolitania, considering the region lacked the necessary infrastructure and potential for such development. It is noteworthy that the Ottoman officers recognized this fact over the long term, primarily through the lobbying efforts of merchant communities. In this regard, especially after the 1870s, the trans-Saharan trade, once again, became the most significant economic activity. By the end of the century, some Ottoman officers had come to accept that the creation of a Tunisia or Egypt in Tripolitania was unfeasible. Instead, they sought to establish a hub of global trade, with connections spanning from Indonesia to the USA.

Consequently, the long-term implementation of *islah* by the Ottomans resulted in significant alterations to the province, the majority of which were detrimental. Although the growth of the army, mainly at the cost of the losses of farmers, and further *islah* implementations delayed the invasion of Tripoli by Italia until 1911, the invasion of Tripoli by Italy was ultimately inevitable, occurring in 1911. *Idara* privileges, supported by *tadbir* infrastructures and exclusively granted to the merchants, on the other hand, created an unprecedented period of expansion in the trans-Saharan trade. This expansion exceeded the domination of the European powers in the global markets, thereby positioning Tripolitan merchants as rivals to British and French enterprises, finally leading their massacres after 1902. In this regard, Tripolitan merchants, with their great ambitions and visions as well as with the support of the Ottomans, even established an immense Afroglobal trade. However, this was ultimately destroyed by colonial invasions, leading to the rise of the Eurocentric global trade.

6. Ambivalent Expansion of the Ottoman Empire towards the Sahara and Conflict with France

6.1. Expansion of the Ottomans in the Sahara and Beyond

After the 1850s, the Ottoman Empire focused on applying *tadbir* through *islah* in Tripolitania, indicating a shift away from discussions of governance and only further implementation of *tadbir*. However, the Ottoman approach to the Sahara region differed significantly, revealing several deficiencies in their understanding. For example, when Murzuq came under Ottoman control in 1842, the Tripolitan *vali* speculated that Bornu might not be too distant and could potentially be receptive to Ottoman authority. He therefore instructed the *kaymakam* of Fezzan in 1844 to dispatch an envoy to Bornu to assess the ruler's willingness to voluntarily accept Ottoman rule.¹¹⁷⁹ The *kaymakam*, in turn, selected a merchant named Husseyin al-Titiwi from Hun for this unofficial mission, directing him to convey a narrative suggesting that the ruler of Bornu would receive protection from the Ottoman army if he accepted Ottoman rule.

6.1.1. Rule of *idara* and *mutawalliyat*

This marked the commencement of enlisting local figures for unofficial missions on behalf of the Ottoman interests, significantly influencing the Ottoman Sahara policy for the remainder of the century, as will be discussed in subsequent sections. Notably, Husseyin al-Titiwi's report does not reference Omar al-Kanemi, who wielded actual power in Bornu, but rather *Mai* of Bornu, Ibrahim IV, who held a largely symbolic position. After propagating the benefits of potential Ottoman rule, he was summoned by Ibrahim IV for discussions. During this meeting, Ibrahim IV explicitly expressed his reluctance to cede his sultanate to the Ottomans for military protection, emphasizing his interest solely in procuring weapons from them.¹¹⁸⁰ Concurrently, in 1845, Omar al-Kanemi also approached the *kaymakam* of Fezzan to inquire with regard to purchasing weapons from the Ottomans. However, the manner in which al-Kanemi initiated contact with the *kaymakam*, by dispatching his letter through a British agent, provoked the Ottoman authorities.¹¹⁸¹ Faced with urgent requests for weapons from both parties, the *vali* suspected preparations for a civil war and opted not to intervene.¹¹⁸² In light of the clear lack of interest from both sides, the Ottoman authorities concluded that they had reached their maximum influence in the region and deemed further political engagement in the Sahara unnecessary.

1179 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1844.

1180 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1846.

1181 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1845.

1182 Indeed, the *vali*'s suspicions were validated when a civil war erupted in Bornu in 1846 between Omar al-Kanemi and Ibrahim IV, resulting in the latter's demise. Consequently, the Sayfawa dynasty ceased to exist, and the Al-Kanemi family assumed complete control in Bornu.

It is important to note that the Ottoman authorities had a very limited understanding of the Sahara, primarily focusing on Bornu, and were entirely unaware of significant centres such as Ghat, Agadez, Kavar, and Tibesti. For this reason, when the *amchar* of Ghat personally appealed to Murzuq for Ottoman authority in Ghat in 1845, the Ottoman government in İstanbul had no knowledge of the location of Ghat. This, however, quickly changed between 1845 and 1850, when *hakim* of Kavar and Tibesti also sought Ottoman rule in their domain. This posed a challenge for Ottoman authorities, as their initial involvement in Tripolitania in 1835 was primarily aimed at enforcing *tadbir*. Whilst they had made progress in this regard by the 1840s, the new demands from Ghat, Kavar, and Tibesti presented a problem. The complexity of implementing *tadbir* through *islah*, along with the dissimilar administrative structures in these regions compared to the Ottoman administration, led the Ottomans to believe that applying *tadbir* in these areas was unfeasible.¹¹⁸³ Hence, they devised a strategy to address the specific conditions in the Sahara. This involved recognizing that the rulers in these regions held the title of *hakim*, rather than sultan. From this standpoint, they defined two separate spaces of governance. The first category, known as “*hudud-ı Devlet-i Aliyesinde*” (Tr. inside of the border of the Great State), refers to regions inside the border of the Ottoman Empire, including the entirety of Tripolitania, which was considered part of the Empire. This category entailed the application of *tadbir*, as it was the official governance system throughout the Empire in the 19th century. The second category, “*idare-i Devlet-i Aliyyesinde*” (Tr. under the *idara* rule of the Great State), denotes regions that are under the *idara* system of the Ottomans. As also the term used for this category indicated, the primary governance system for these regions was *idara*. Importantly, the regions in the second category were not regarded as part of the Empire, but rather as under the rule of their *idara* rule.¹¹⁸⁴

With this strategy, the Ottoman authorities created a proper space of governance for Ghat, Kavar, and Tibesti. In this regard, they would not be part of the Ottoman Empire, as they do not enable to apply *tadbir*, but their *hakims* could be appointed as Ottoman *müdürs*. In 1850, these three regions/cities were under the *idara* rule of the Ottomans. This system marked the Ottoman Empire's presence in the Sahara for the remainder of the century. Some Ottoman officers even clearly stated that this was the only efficient way of governing, and the truth behind the success story of the Ottoman Empire in the Sahara.¹¹⁸⁵ The expansion of the *idara* rule, however, prompted internal

1183 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 192.

1184 Binbaşı Abdülvahid, *II. Abdülhamid Zamanında Bir Osmanlı Binbaşının Gözünden Libya*, ed. Süleyman Kızıltoprak and Deniz Şefaattin (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2020), 105.

1185 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 196.

discussions among Ottoman officials regarding the extent to which it should be expanded, including the potential expansion towards Agadez and the Uthmaniyya caliphate, and the timing of integrating these regions into the Ottoman border. The expansion of the Ottoman *idara* rule in the Sahara led to a heightened interest in trans-Saharan trade by Ottoman officials. Recognizing the potential for establishing strong political-economic relations with influential actors such as Bornu, Wadai, and the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, the Ottomans sought to create a secure and prosperous trade network. With similar preoccupation, in 1853, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan initiated an economic bloc by signing a trade agreement with the Osumanu I, the Emir of Kano, and Omar al-Kanemi in Bornu.¹¹⁸⁶ Thus, the *kaymakam* appointed a man called Sayyid Ali, who, according to the archival documents, was from Murzuq but had been living for years in Kano, as the representative of the Ottoman merchants in Kano.¹¹⁸⁷ In the same year, the *kaymakam* also sent a Majabran merchant¹¹⁸⁸ from Awjila, who was currently in Murzuq and preparing to go Wadai, with the same agreement to Muhammad Sharif, the *kolak* of Wadai.¹¹⁸⁹ Although the *kolak* of Wadai did not respond to the *kaymakam* of Fezzan, as he was not considering making a trade with Fezzan but with Benghazi, the inclusion of Kano and Bornu in the economic bloc designated by the *kaymakam* of Fezzan marked a significant development in the Central Sudan.

However, the *kaymakam*'s efforts were met with a significant challenge. The tripolitan *vali* and the Fezzani *kaymakam* were regularly corresponding with Kano, Bornu, and Wadai. Soon they became aware that, especially since 1850, two European agents, James Richardson and Heinrich Barth, who were introducing themselves in the southern Central Sudan as travellers, had been instructed by the British consul in Tripoli to act as British spies in the region.¹¹⁹⁰ In accordance with this secret spy mission, they were disseminating conspiracy theories in Kano and Bornu, alleging that the "despotic Turks" were enemies of African people and were preparing to invade and enslave them.¹¹⁹¹ Additionally, reports indicate that Omar al-Kanemi was preparing a military mission, but due to the

1186 D.M.T.L., Tijarat, dated as 1853.

1187 D.M.T.L., Tijarat, dated as 1853.

1188 Unfortunately, his name was unreadable in the document.

1189 D.M.T.L., Tijarat, dated as 1854.

1190 After the 1840s, there was a deep British interest in the Sahara, as Britain opened a vice consular in Murzuq in 1843, and in Ghadames in 1850. While official narrative regarding this diplomatic expansion was monitoring the slave trade on the behalf of abolishment organizations, the real interest of the officers was to check the activities of the French agents in the Sahara, as Britain were highly concerned with a possible French domination in the region after the invasion of Algeria by French. Ali Ahmad Al-Miftah, 'Ruyat Britaniya Min Khilal Qunsuliha Wa-l-Dawlat al-Uthmaniyyat Min al-Taharukat al-Faransiyat Fi al-Sahra al-Kubra (1850-1881m)', Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences 20, no. 3 (2021): 156. Also around 1848, Britain learned the French plans related to proposing a Maltese colony in Tripoli under French protection to control the trans-Saharan trade. Lafi, 'Les Relations de Malte et de Tripoli de Barbarie Au XIXe Siècle', 139.

1191 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1853.

influence of the conspiracy theories propagated by Richardson and Barth, he feared that the Ottomans would soon appear in Bornu with an army, causing him to delay his plans.¹¹⁹² Consequently, the Ottoman authorities suspected that Omar al-Kanemi might interpret the new trade agreement as a pretext for a military operation by the Ottomans, leading them to refrain from further diplomatic efforts to avoid misunderstandings. The situation even worsened when Sheikh Abdurrahman seized power in Bornu through a military coup in 1854. Due to the current fragile situation, Abdurrahman and Omar al-Kanemi suspected that the Ottomans would now take advantage and invade. Therefore, Abdurrahman wrote a letter to London seeking support against Omar al-Kanemi and the Ottomans. Meanwhile, Omar was doing the same.¹¹⁹³

In actuality, the *vali* prepared a letter for Abdurrahman proposing friendly relations and collaboration. However, while the letter was en route to Murzuq, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan learned that Omar al-Kanemi had regained power through a counter-military coup. Consequently, he sought guidance from the *vali* on how to proceed.¹¹⁹⁴ Initially, the *vali* decided to await further details from the region. After a few months, he became convinced that Omar al-Kanemi would retain power, prompting him to write a letter to him. In this correspondence, the *vali* explicitly states that the Ottomans were not involved in Abdurrahman's military coup and had always maintained a positive relationship with Omar al-Kanemi.¹¹⁹⁵ To underscore their amicability, the *vali* declared that the Ottomans would not levy any taxes on caravans operating under Omar al-Kanemi's personal account.¹¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, Omar al-Kanemi was still influenced by British conspiracy theories, and upon regaining power, he regularly wrote to British vice-consul in Murzuq, seeking the support of the Britain against the Ottomans and even proposed the opening of a British consulate in Kuka.¹¹⁹⁷ Accordingly, Ottoman diplomatic activities were limited to a trade agreement for the subsequent five years, whereas Hajj Muhammad al-Titiwi was appointed to oversee the affairs of the Tripolitan merchants on behalf of the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁹⁸

1192 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1853.

1193 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 101/45.

1194 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1855.

1195 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1855.

1196 B.O.A., Cevdet Maliye, 3230.

1197 B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 160/36.

1198 Muhammad al-Titiwi was a prominent person in Kuka, not only his connections to the Ottomans but also related to his knowledge with regard to the region and his personal intelligent network on behalf of the Ottomans. For example, when a German agent was killed between Bornu and Wadai in 1858, the British consul in Tripoli had to ask Muhammad al-Titiwi for information. As the Ottomans were also concerned with the death of the agents, Al-Titiwi personally researched the case to determine if there was any danger to Ottoman interests. Yet, he was sure that the death of the agent had nothing to do with the Ottomans or other rulers in the region. A.L.I.L., 282/23b-c. Additionally, in 1863, another German agent, who was willing to investigate the death of his colleague, had arrived Kano and planned to travel to Wadai. Yet, he was lacking of money due to bad preparations. At the end, it was once

In the meantime, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan endeavoured to expand economic relations into a political relationship. An intriguing debate found in archival materials serves as a pertinent example of this. In 1859, the residents of Murzuq decided to renovate the central mosque in the city and requested funds from the *kaymakam* for this purpose. However, the city treasury did not have sufficient funds for the project. At this juncture, the city council (Ar. *meclis-i bilad*) proposed an interesting idea to seek assistance from Tripoli. In their appeal, they indicated that a large date palm field containing 7200 trees, situated around Murzuq, was owned by a relative of Omar al-Kanemi. Since he was the sultan of Bornu, they believed he would not require financial assistance and thereupon sought to inquire if he would donate these trees as a foundation (Ar. *waqf*) to the mosque.¹¹⁹⁹ However, following an investigation, the city council of Tripoli responded that this field could not be designated as a foundation because it did not belong to the al-Kanemi family, but rather to the Ottoman state.¹²⁰⁰ In essence, this field had been leased to Omar al-Kanemi around 1858 to bring him closer to the Ottoman domain, thereby assuring him that there was no threat to his position from the Ottoman side.

The Ottomans were entirely focused on Bornu in these years, whereas an unexpected event brought a new debate to İstanbul. In 1855, a Maltese merchant in Benghazi gave many valuable products as credit to some merchants to take in return ivory from Wadai. However, Majabran merchants in Awjila planned to avoid this enterprise to protect their own monopoly in this trade, and they attacked the caravan. They apparently attacked and plundered the wrong caravan. It belonged not to the Maltese merchant, but to the *kolak* of Wadai.¹²⁰¹ The *kolak*'s clients went to Benghazi to ask the Ottomans for help. They said that the large amount of ivory they were transporting was intended for donation to the Hijaz. Nonetheless, they lost everything.¹²⁰² The Ottoman officers opened an interrogation for the case. They also began to collect more information pertaining to the sultanate of Wadai, to know who actually the *kolak* is.¹²⁰³ Interestingly, the clients of the *kolak* also used this first diplomatic relation with the Ottomans as a chance to complain. Finding 9% export and 3% importing custom duty very high, they demanded to pay only 5% for both of them.¹²⁰⁴ Following the positive reception of the Ottomans for tax reduction and compensating for the loss of his caravan,

again Muhammad al-Titiwi who lent him money for his trip, as being the representative of the Ottomans. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 1863, 03.11.1863 edition.

1199 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1860.

1200 D.M.T.L., Waqf, dated as 1860.

1201 *Staats- Und Gelehrte Zeitung Des Hamburgischen Unpartheyischen Correspondenten*, 18, 8.05.1862 edition.

1202 B.O.A., İrade Hariciye, 172/9390.

1203 B.O.A., Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Meclis-i Vâlâ Evrakı, 88/9.

1204 B.O.A., Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Meclis-i Vâlâ Evrakı, 88/9.

the *kolak* used this opportunity to establish an official diplomatic relation with İstanbul. In 1859, he sent a personal letter to the *padişah*, to share his pleasure of support and help of the Ottomans. He also informed the *padişah* that now they pray for the Ottoman caliph on Friday pray, and he is ready to follow any order from İstanbul.¹²⁰⁵ The *padişah* was satisfied with this announcement and sent a special gift to the *kolak* of Wadai. Interestingly enough, no further action was taken to extend the empire's rule to Wadai. Different from Bornu, for instance, there was no interest in İstanbul to create an Ottoman rule in Wadai. On the other hand, around the same years, the diplomatic relations with Bornu were suspended notwithstanding several attempts by the Ottomans.

This situation radically changed when Britain gradually lost interest in Central Sudan, and in 1860, they even stopped all diplomatic and spy activities in Bornu as well as Kano, Kavar, and Murzuq. This marked a turning point in the relationship between Bornu and the Ottomans, as British conspiracy theories no longer held sway in the region.¹²⁰⁶ Consequently, in 1861, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan received a direct order from İstanbul to initiate new diplomatic efforts to improve relations with Bornu and other states.¹²⁰⁷

It is also important to note at this point that during the seven-year period from 1853 to 1860, the Ottomans established extensive diplomatic ties with Kano, Bornu, and Wadai. However, they did not engage with Timbuktu, Agadez, or Sokoto. According to oral accounts, this was due to the categorical refusal of Ghadamesian merchants to conduct unofficial missions in these cities on behalf of the Ottomans, as they sought to maintain their trade monopolies by avoiding involvement of any further political or economic actor.¹²⁰⁸ As already mentioned earlier, in the trade with Bornu, many merchants from Tripoli, Hun, Sokna, and Murzuq were active, and in the trade with Wadai, merchants from Awjila, Jalo, and Benghazi shared main activities.¹²⁰⁹ But in the trade with Timbuktu, Agadez, and Sokoto, Ghadamesian merchants had an absolute monopoly. Hence, to keep their monopoly during the Ottoman presence in Tripolitania and the Sahara, They avoided collaborating with the Ottomans and successfully kept them away from trading with Timbuktu,

1205 B.O.A., Sadaret Âmedî Kalemi Defterleri, 65/62.

1206 Sheikh Ali Bani Kyari, 'Borno-Ottoman Relations in the Nineteenth Century' (Bornu History Conference, Maiduguri, 1987).

1207 B.O.A., Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları, 20493.

1208 Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023.

1209 See Chapter 4.

Agadez, and Sokoto.¹²¹⁰ The Ottomans remained unconnected to these cities and could not initiate any diplomatic relations for many years.

In 1862, following a direct order, the *kaymakam* once again dispatched a member of the al-Titiwi family from Hun, Muhammad al-Titiwi, to Bornu. His objective was to establish an unofficial diplomatic channel between Omar al-Kanemi and the *kaymakam* of Fezzan in order to enhance their diplomatic ties.¹²¹¹ In the same year, the *kaymakam* even proposed the transformation the *müdüriyet*¹²¹² of Kavar to the *kaymakamlık*¹²¹³ of Kavar. Accordingly, the oasis should receive an Ottoman garrison, apply *tadbir* and pay tax. In his report to İstanbul, he asserted that the salt lake of Kavar generated sufficient revenue for the oasis to support essential administrative structures and taxation. However, his proposal was rejected on the grounds that such actions, particularly the establishment of a military garrison, could lead to misunderstandings in other regions.¹²¹⁴ This was, in fact, the beginning of a long debate regarding the status of Kavar among the Ottoman authorities during the rest of the century.

Following a significant improvement in diplomatic relations with Bornu after 1862, the *vali* of Tripoli appointed an individual named Muhammad Başala to undertake a crucial unofficial mission.¹²¹⁵ His task was to engage in lobbying efforts to persuade Omar al-Kanemi to accept Ottoman rule.¹²¹⁶ In the same year, Başala delegated this duty to a merchant named Abdurrahman Burkan, rather than undertaking it himself.¹²¹⁷

1210 For instance, around 1880, a Ghadamesian merchant, Hajj Muhammad Al-Ghadamisi, was appointed as a minister of trade in Kano by the Emir. The ottomans were surprised that they did not know this man at all. See: Interview No.11: With the Malam Abubakr in Kano, 2023.

1211 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1862.

1212 “A district governed by a *müdü*”. In these districts, the core system of governance was *idara*. Hence, they had no military garrison, but also did not pay tax.

1213 “A district governed by a *kaymakam*”. In these districts, the principal system of governance was *tadbir*. Hence, they had a military garrison in their service, but they had to pay tax.

1214 B.O.A., İrade Meclis-i Vâlâ, 22191.

1215 This is an interesting example in Ottoman history for the 19th century, in terms of appointing a local merchant for such a crucial mission without integrating him into bureaucratic structures. In this regard, as Muhammad Başala was not an Ottoman officer, his mission was unofficial regardless of its importance. This created a significant gap in the Ottoman archives for this mission.

1216 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1865.

1217 As the entire mission was unofficial, there are no records in the Ottoman administration's archives regarding the biographies of these individuals, notwithstanding their pivotal roles in the Ottomans' expansion in the Sahara. However, private family archives in Libya and some court registers as well as oral narratives provide many details pertaining to them. For example, a document in the Tripoli archive reveals that Muhammad Başala acted as a legal witness in a contractual dispute among merchants in Sokna in 1853. Under his stamp, it was written that he is from Sokna and a member of the city council of Murzuq. D.M.T.L., Tijarat, dated as 1853. Another document in the city archive of Sokna, which is a letter written by Muhammad Başala in 1856, indicates his close association with a friend in Tripoli who served as the *vali*'s secretary. M.G., Family Collections, dated as 1856. But probably one of the most important document found in the private family archive of Awlad bin Kabah in Sebha is a meeting protocol of the city council of Murzuq in 1855. In this document three names appear: Muhammad Başala, Abubakr

Thanks to local and interregional connections, Bařala, a resident of Tripoli since 1865, and his agent Burkan in Kuka effectively conducted lobbying activities. After three years, in 1868, Burkan even informed Bařala that Omar al-Kanemi was willing to accept Ottoman rule on the condition that he would retain power.¹²¹⁸ At this juncture, the Ottoman authorities encountered a bureaucratic challenge. The application of the *idara* system in Ghat, Kavar, and Tibesti was deemed a suitable solution to align the Saharan context with the Ottoman bureaucratic framework, as the governors of these cities/regions were already implementing the *idara* system. Nonetheless, when the *shehu* of Bornu accepted Ottoman rule, it was not feasible to integrate him into this system for several reasons. Primarily, as a *sultan* rather than a *hakim*, he could not be appointed as a *müdür*, but rather as a *kaymakam* or *vali*. Nevertheless, the absence of a concrete and complex Ottoman administrative structure in Bornu precluded the appointment of the *sultan* as a *kaymakam*. The problem became clear when Omar al-Kanemi sent a letter to the *vali* of Tripoli, signing it as *mutasarrif* of Bornu, a title that is between *vali* and *kaymakam* in rank. The resolution to this predicament was initiated by the Tripolitan *vali*. In 1869, he designated the entire land of Bornu as *waqf* (Ar. foundation) on the name of the Ottoman *padiřah*, and appointed Omar al-Kanemi as *mutawalli* (Ar. trustee) of this foundation. Additionally, in the same document, Abdurrahman

al-Titiwi, Abdurrahman Burkan. According to the note under their stamp, Bařala was no more member of city council but an individual merchant from Sokna (Ar. *tajir al-Sukni*), al-Titiwi – as seen in the earlier chapters, the members of the al-Titiwi family run many non-official missions for the Ottomans in Bornu, while Ottoman administrative sources never mentions their other occupations – was the municipal treasurer (Ar. *amin al-sunduq*) of Murzuq, and Burkan was the vice deputy of the chamber of merchants (Ar. *naqib al-asharf*) in Murzuq. P.A. 14, uncategorized, dated as 1855. In other words, these individuals, who undertook unofficial missions for the Ottomans in the Sahara and beyond, were local residents of Hun, Sokna, and Murzuq, and also held administrative positions. Along these lines, they were neither official agent sent from İstanbul nor random merchants in Fezzan. Instead, they were local merchants who had been working with the Ottoman administration for a long time. It is important to note that they continued their own trade activities while carrying out these unofficial missions for the Ottomans. Furthermore, as a reward for their efforts in these unofficial missions, they were exempted from customs duties. Particularly noteworthy is a document indicating that al-Shafif Burkan, the brother of Abdurrahman Burkan, who was a merchant in Murzuq, participated in the international "Merchandise Expose" in Paris in 1867, showcasing goods transported from Bornu with his brother in Kuka. D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1867. Additionally, oral traditions suggest that Bařala's association with Bornu had a significant basis. According to these accounts, Bařala had a close relationship with the al-Ghazali family in Sokna, who held administrative positions during the Yusuf *pařa* era. It is narrated that Muhammad al-Ghazali, a prominent member of this family, participated in al-Mukni's military campaign in 1817 in Bornu to aid al-Amin al-Kanemi. During the campaign he lost his life, and al-Kanemi wrote a personal letter to his family in Sokna, offering his support and friendship. Ali Said Masud, 'Al-Alaqt al-Siyasiyat Li-l-Usrat al-Qaramanliyat Ma Fazan Wa Manatiq Ma Wara al-Sahra Fi Eahd Yusuf Basha, 1795-1832', *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 20, no. 3 (2021): 101. This relationship endured through their descendants until 1893. Interview No.9: Meeting with the Elders of Sokna, 2023. Numerous letters in the city archive of Sokna corroborate these accounts, including correspondence from al-Amin al-Kanemi and later from Omar al-Kanemi to the al-Ghazali family, demonstrating both their commercial and personal ties. For example, in a letter from 1860, Omar al-Kanemi shares personal details concerning his life, emotions regarding certain events, and his religious practices. M.G., Family Collections, dated as 1860. It is therefore inferred that Bařala was personally introduced to the friendship of Omar al-Kanemi by the al-Ghazali family. Interview No.9: Meeting with the Elders of Sokna, 2023.

1218 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1868.

Burkan was appointed as the second vizier of Bornu on behalf of the Ottoman *padişah*.¹²¹⁹ In the same year, the *padişah* sent a personal letter along with the Ottoman Empire's flag to Omar al-Kanemi to express gratitude for his acceptance of their authority.¹²²⁰ In 1870, Omar al-Kanemi responded to the *padişah* expressing thanks for his appointment, and titled his letter “from the *mutawalli* of Bornu to his great sultan” (Ar. *min al-mutawalli Bornu ila sultani al-azimi*).¹²²¹ In the same year, the *vali* wrote to Omar al-Kanemi, offering to fulfil any of his needs and inquiring about the possibility of capturing giraffes in Bornu and sending them to İstanbul for the *padişah*'s palace.¹²²² The archival documents, however, do not provide any reason why Omar al-Kanemi decided to accept the Ottoman rule. One can only speculate that with the rising power of Tinimun around 1860, and losing Muniyo, Kutus, and Ngourbaye to Damagaram around 1868, Omar al-Kanemi might have considered the actual power situation in the region fragile for him, and sought a possible protection against the expansion of Damagaram.

It is noteworthy that in the history of the Ottoman Empire, there is no precedent for declaring an entire territory as *waqf* and its ruler as *mutawalli*. This was a truly unique solution devised specifically for the case of Bornu. In the Afro-Islamic epistemology, on the other hand, there were clear examples of this possibility. For instance, Abdullahi dan Fodio, referring to the famous *Mudawanna* text of Maliki jurist Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Qasim al-Utaqi (d. 806), states that the lands captured through jihad automatically becomes a *waqf*. This means the ruler can temporarily grant people the right to cultivate the land, but cannot give it as property, as it does not belong to state or ruler, but to *umma* (Ar. Muslim community).¹²²³ In the Ottoman-Islamic epistemology, there was no such consideration. However, declaring an entire territory as *waqf* was possible, being an extreme interpretation of *irsadi vakıf* in the Ottoman-Islamic epistemology. This concept mainly implies a large plot of land or farm belonging to the *umma* as a *waqf*. Although rulers cannot claim ownership of such *waqf* (but appoint a trustee), they can use the income from these *waqf* for public projects instead of paying from the state treasury.¹²²⁴ In the Ottoman Empire, there were many implementations of *irsadi vakıf*, albeit it never extended to declaring a whole land as *irsadi vakıf*. In this regard, declaring the land of Bornu as *waqf* and its ruler as *mutawalli* was already a known case in the Afro-Islamic epistemology, which explains the immediate recognition of Omar al-Kanemi,

1219 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1869.

1220 B.O.A, İrade Dahiliye, 1286/42101.

1221 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1870.

1222 D.M.T.L. Tıjarat, dated as 1870.

1223 Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Ta’līm al-rāđi fī asbāb al-iḥtişaş bī mawāt al-arāđi’, N.N.A., P/Ar 2, 22.

1224 Ahmed Akgündüz, İrsâdî vakıf, *Türk Diyanet Vakfı Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 22, (Ankara, 2000). 448-450.

whilst in the Ottoman-Islamic epistemology, it was imaginable in extreme cases, which explains why there was no such example in the Ottoman history; yet, its existence was not unacceptable. Additionally, the significance of this solution lies in granting Omar al-Kanemi the authority to implement *tadbir* without the requirement of holding the position of *kaymakam* or *vali*. In fact, *mutawalli* is a very specific juridical term that clearly defined by Sunni jurists, and by definition, a *mutawalli* is considered a person who manage/govern a foundation using his personal reasoning (*ray*).¹²²⁵ In this regard, Omar al-Kanemi, now as *mutawalli*, was permitted to apply *tadbir* through *ray* in Bornu without undergoing bureaucratic transformation.

As a *waqf*, the land of Bornu was exempt from taxes and excluded from having an Ottoman garrison. Ultimately, this appointment resulted in minimal practical changes in Bornu. However, the intellectual and bureaucratic considerations of the Ottomans had a long-term impact on Bornu. As the sultan in Bornu was given leeway for personal decision-making (*ray*), he had a range of choices available to him. These included the option to assert significant autonomy for himself, as observed between 1869 and 1885, or to act in alignment with the interests of the Ottoman Empire, as seen between 1885 and 1893. As a result, in 1869, the Ottoman Empire expanded its rule (but not its border) from Tripoli to Bornu by applying three different systems of governance: 1) system of *tadbir* in Tripolitania (mainly coastal side, including Ghadames, and Murzuq), 2) system of *idara* in the Sahara (including Awjila/Jalo, Ghat, Kawar, and Tibesti), 3) system of *mutawalliyat* (with the implementation of *ray*) in Bornu.

Following this success in 1873, Başala redefined their mission with an ambitious plan, communicating to Burkan the need to visit Katsina, Kano, Baghirmi, and Wadai in order to persuade them to accept Ottoman rule.¹²²⁶ It is noteworthy that Başala demonstrated awareness of the fact that Katsina and Kano were under the authority of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate; yet, he appeared indifferent to this fact. The mission outlined in the letter was presented as a personal initiative of his rather than an official directive from Ottoman authorities. It is plausible that Başala formulated this plan in response to perceived efforts by Ottoman authorities. In the same year, the Tripolitan *vali* proposed a significant overhaul of the *idara* system, seeking permission from İstanbul to establish garrisons in Ghat, Kawar, and Tibesti and convert them into *kaymakamlık* through taxation. However, İstanbul rejected this plan, citing that it was not the opportune time to invest in such a substantial transformation.¹²²⁷ In contrast, Başala's plans did not require official

1225 TDV *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 32 (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995), 217–20.

1226 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1873.

1227 B.O.A., Aynıyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/20-25.

authorization from İstanbul, as his missions were unofficial in nature. This is still a very interesting case, as Başala, without being an Ottoman official, was striving to expand the rule of the Ottomans in the entire Central Sudan, whereas the Ottoman officials had no such a great ambition at the moment.

During this period of political manoeuvring, economic activities in Kano and Bornu continued as usual. However, between 1871 and 1873, the Ottoman authorities began to receive complaints regarding trade with Wadai. In 1871, prominent merchants from Awjila and Jalo submitted a petition to the *kaymakam* of Benghazi reporting that their caravans travelling to Wadai had been attacked by Tedas from Borku, resulting in significant losses. Additionally, a drought had severely impacted their date harvest, leading to their inability to pay taxes.¹²²⁸ As the Wadai route fell under the domain of the Sanussiyya according to the Ottomans, they chose not to intervene.¹²²⁹ Consequently, they took no action against these plunder attacks. It was only in 1873 that the Ottoman authorities learned that the *kolak* of Wadai had taken the initiative to drive the Tedas in Ounianga to the mountains of Borku, thereby securing the route for merchants once again.¹²³⁰ Although in 1880, the Ottomans tried to take some measures to ensure security and facilitate the journey for the trade between Wadai and Benghazi, such as opening new water wells around Kufra, these projects were sabotaged by Zuwaya communities around Kufra to avoid any possible Ottoman influence and rule in the area.¹²³¹

This example illustrates the threefold nature of trans-Saharan trade in the Central Sudan around the 1870s. Although the rule of the Ottomans immensely expanded in the Sahara, as they applied the system of *idara* in a big part of the region, other actors still played a crucial role. In the route of Ghadames-Agadez-Sokoto, the Sultan of Air and the Uthmaniyyan Caliph took the lead in regulating and securing trade; in the route of Murzuq-Kawar-Kuka/Kano the Ottomans were in charge; in the route of Awjila/Jalo-Kufra-Abeche, the regulations and actions of the *kolak* of Wadai with the cooperation of Sanusiyya prevailed. The similar complex structure was also observable regarding the control of the sources of salt in the Central Sudan.¹²³² The main salt source of Ghat, Agadez, and the western part of the Uthmaniyya caliphate was Kawar, which was under the rule of

1228 D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1871.

1229 See Chapter 5.

1230 Binbaşı Ömer Subhi, *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi ile Büyük Sahra ve Sudan*, 69.

1231 'Interview with Yunus Badis [Al-Fashir] by W.E.J. Bramley in 1940. O.A.C. 23'.

1232 Indeed, the salt trade was a very old and complex activity in the Central Sudan. While there were some predominant centres, such as Kawar, Ngourbaye, and Ouanianga, there were many local producers and merchants who ran their businesses outside of the aforementioned centers. Cf. Paul Lovejoy, *Salt of the Desert Sun: A History of Salt Production and Trade in the Central Sudan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

the Ottomans. In Bornu, Tibesti, Borku, and the eastern part of the Uthmaniyya caliphate the salt transported from Ngourbaye region and since the 1870s, sultan of Damagaram was controlling the main part of it.¹²³³ Wadai imported salt from Kufra and Ouanianga through Majabran merchants, who were running their business under the headship of Sanussiyya.¹²³⁴

If we return to Başala's political plans, the end of his mission is unclear. After 1873, Abdurrahman Burkan's name no longer appears in any documents. It is uncertain whether Burkan successfully fulfilled his mission. So far, the only information about Burkan after 1873 is derived the oral narratives of his successors, who are currently living in Bengazi. According to their family history, Burkan resided in Kuka for an extended period and married a Kanuri woman named Aisha, with whom he had three children. Despite harbouring a strong desire to return to Murzuq and visit İstanbul, Burkan unexpectedly passed away in 1875. His wife returned to her father's house but further bared the name of al-Burkani. The al-Burkani family lineage persisted in Murzuq through his brother and in Kuka, later in Maiduguri, through his children. It was also relayed to me that Burkan undertook numerous journeys in southern Central Sudan, likely in fulfilment of the task assigned to him by Başala. However, there is no record, even in oral accounts, of the outcome of his mission.¹²³⁵

6.1.2. Experimenting with *tadbir* and Expansion of *mutawalliyat*

In 1875, the Ottoman Empire's Sahara policy reached a significant turning point. The *vali*'s proposal to convert Ghat into a *kaymakamlık*, along with Tibesti and Kavar, was deemed unnecessary by İstanbul. However, when conflict erupted between Kel Hoggar and Kel Azgher, resulting in the capture of over 2000 camels from Kel Azgher by Kel Hoggar outside the walls of Ghat in 1874, the *müdür* of Ghat reached out to the *kaymakam* of Fezzan.¹²³⁶ In his correspondence, he described the dire situation of the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher, Ahnuhen, and proposed that if the Ottomans supported him in his war against Kel Hoggar, he would accept Ottoman rule over his entire domain, i.e., in the

1233 Maïkoréma Zakari, 'Contribution a l'histoire Des Population Du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas Du Mangari (XVIe - XIXe Siècle)' (Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris VII, 1983), 357–58.

1234 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 94.

1235 Interview No.13: With the Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Burkani in Benghazi, 2023.

1236 There were frequent conflicts in the Azgher region, especially after 1867. The first conflict was a civil war within the Kel Azgher society from 1867 to 1870, which was only resolved with the involvement of the Ottoman *vali*. Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 82–83. The second was the military conflict between Kel Hoggar and Kel Aztgher after 1870, which reached its zenith in 1874. Hajj Osman bin Omar, 'Hausa Chronicle of Ghat in "Aufzeichnungen Über Die Stadt Chat in Der Sahara"', ed. Adolf Krause, *Zeitschrift Der Gesellschaft Für Erdkunde Zu Berlin* 17 (1882): 281–83.

entire land of Azgher.¹²³⁷ In response, the *kaymakam* sought to take this opportunity. However, he also recognized the need to dispatch an official army to Ghat would be time-consuming due to bureaucratic procedures. Therefore, he opted to send Shati Arabs, under the command of Ali bin Muhammad al-Gharbani, who enjoyed similar privileges to Kuloğlu by virtue of their military service, to Ghat to assist Kel Azgher in their conflict against Kel Hoggar.¹²³⁸ The *kaymakam* also pledged that any spoils obtained by the Shati Arabs would be theirs.¹²³⁹ Following their successful return after a few months, the *vali* dispatched a small division to Ghat to establish a garrison in the city and convert the district, now encompassing the entire domain of Kel Azgher, into a *kaymakamlık* by appointing the *müdür* as the new *kaymakam*.¹²⁴⁰ A representative of Kel Azgher was also designated as the district's treasurer. As per this appointment, Kel Azgher was to collect their tribute as an official customs duty in the name of the Ottomans, while maintaining clear records of all collections, as they were obligated to pay a portion of it as tax to Tripoli.¹²⁴¹ Consequently, in 1875, the territory of Azgher was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire as a *kaymakamlık*, with its administrative centre located in Ghat. The *amonakl* of Kel Azgher was appointed as an Ottoman *amir* (Tr. director) of the trade in the Azgher region, tasked with the collection of customs duties and maintenance of security. Following this development, Ghat was recognized as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, situated within its imperial borders. It was also the last city in the southern Sahara that an Ottoman coin, called *al-riyal al-Ghati*, printed after 1880.¹²⁴²

From the perspective of Kel Azgher, the situation differed from simply adhering to the rule of the Ottomans. This distinction was particularly evident to the *kaymakam* of Ghat in subsequent years, who was a military commander dispatched from İstanbul. This *kaymakam* observed that female relatives of the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher regularly visited the city and expected to be served a tea ceremony by its predominantly merchant inhabitants. After witnessing this pattern, the *kaymakam* noted that these women never visited his residence for a tea ceremony. He inquired why they did not visit him. Their response indicated that, as all the settled inhabitants were under the authority of the *amonakl*, they were obligated to show respect and provide service to him and his relatives. But in the case of the *kaymakam*, they said, “you are sultan/authority, we are sultan/authority, then who

1237 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/150-155.

1238 Ahmad Ragib Farag, ‘Madinat Ghat Al-Libiyat Bayn al-Uthma al-Faransiyat Wa-l-Saytarat al-Uthmaniyat 1860-1900m’, *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 20, no. 3 (2021): 87.

1239 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/155-160.

1240 B.O.A., İrade Dahiliye, 49/188.

1241 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/170.

1242 P.A. 4., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1883.

should serve to whom? For this reason, we may not visit you". Hence, the *kaymakam* concluded that Kel Azgher viewed the rule of the Ottomans as a mutual collaboration between equal parties, rather than an obligation to be obeyed.¹²⁴³ This perspective, however, did not pose a significant issue for the Ottoman authorities, as long as Kel Azgher did not engage in conflict with them. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in subsequent sections, this apprehension of the Ottomans materialized in 1885.

The rapid integration of Ghat into the *tadbir* system served as a catalyst for the *kaymakam* of Fezzan to consider extending the same administrative transformation to Tibesi and Kavar, with potential ambitions to include Borku one day. In 1878, the *kaymakam* initiated correspondence with Ibrahim Mekumi, Teda *müdür* of Tibesti, and Sulaiman bin Salih, Kanuri *müdür* of Kavar, expressing his intention to appoint them as *kaymakam* and establish a garrison in their respective territories. Additionally, a letter was sent to Muhammad Lanka, Teda *derde* of Borku, proposing the title of Ottoman *müdür* in his domain under Ottoman rule.¹²⁴⁴ Interestingly, at the same time, in 1879, the *kolak* of Wadai personally invited the *kaymakam* of Fezzan to Abeche, which the *kaymakam* happily took a trip with 10 soldiers and some Majabran merchants. However, the theme of their meeting did not pertain to making a trade agreement or any possible Ottoman rule in Wadai, rather the invasion of Darfur by the Ottoman agent Zubayir. In this regard, the *kolak* of Wadai informed the *kaymakam* that he has always had good relations with the Ottomans. For this reason, they should stop Zubayir from attacking Wadai.¹²⁴⁵

Following his return to Murzuq to actualize his plans for Kavar, Tibesti, and Borku, the *kaymakam* faced a bureaucratic problem. His plans required permission and support from the *vali* for the appointments and the creation of new armed divisions to be dispatched to these regions. However, he did not receive any response from *vali* for his plans. After waiting for 2 years in vain, in 1880, the *kaymakam* proceeded to appoint Ibrahim Mekumi as the *kaymakam* of Tibesti and Muhammad Lanka as the *müdür* of Borku, as Teda of Borku were under attacks of the forces of Wadai, they eagerly accepted the rule of the Ottomans, despite lacking the authority to do so without the *vali*'s consent.¹²⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the *kaymakam* was unable to establish a garrison in Tibesti or collect taxes

1243 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 211.

1244 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 148.

1245 Interestingly, there is no information in the Ottoman archives regarding this trip and meeting. Probably, the *kaymakam* never reported this event to Tripoli and İstanbul. Yet, thanks to a merchant from Awjila, called Muhammad Ibrahim, who personally accompanied the *kaymakam* on his trip to Wadai, we know these details. For his letter regarding these events, see: P.A. 25., a letter dated as 1880.

1246 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 523/1.

due to the limited income of the Tedas. It was not until 1886 that the *vali* became aware of Ibrahim Mekumi receiving a salary equivalent to that of a *kaymakam*, prompting the *vali* to criticize the *kaymakam* and reduce Mekumi's salary to that of a *müdür*.¹²⁴⁷ In fact, the *vali* was not against the idea that one day Tibesti should be a *kaymakamlık*. His stance was rooted in the belief that without the ability to establish a garrison and collect taxes, paying a *kaymakam* salary to the *müdür* was a wasteful expenditure. In this regard, the *vali* did not object to the appointment of the *derde* of Bornu as *müdür* and approved this appointment. Interestingly, however, the *padişah* Abdulhamid II took the case of Tibesti personally, and sent the rest of the salary for Ibrahim Mekumi from his personal account by keeping him as the *kaymakam* of Tibesti.¹²⁴⁸ Accordingly, Tibesti remain as *kaymakamlık*, and in this regard considered as the part of the Ottoman Empire, without receiving any garrison but also without paying tax. Kavar, on the other hand, did not receive the appointment as *kaymakam*.

Back in 1878, whilst the *kaymakam* of Fezzan began to plan a *tadbir* system in Tibesti, Kavar, and Bornu, the *vali* developed also his own plans.¹²⁴⁹ The *vali* corresponded with Zinder, Bornu, Katsina, and Kano, informing them of his intention to establish an Ottoman garrison in Kavar and integrate the oasis into the imperial domain. This move was independent of the Fezzani *kaymakam*'s plans. The purpose of these garrisons was to provide security for merchants from their respective regions and to create a military alliance with these rulers to safeguard the trans-Saharan trade. However, only the *mutawalli* of Bornu responded positively, expressing willingness to collaborate with the *vali* as needed.¹²⁵⁰ In spite of this unsuccessful attempt, in the same year, the *vali* received an unexpected letter from the *hakim* of Temassinine in the land of Hoggar. The *hakim* reported that the war between Kel Hoggar and Kel Azgher had shifted from Ghat to Temassinine, causing significant damage to the city's inhabitants. Consequently, the *hakim* expressed readiness to accept Ottoman rule in his domain if the Ottomans promised to end the war and provide additional security, as was the case in Ghat. The Tripolitan *vali* rapidly sent a small division to ensure the security and contacted the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher to force him to make a pace with Kel Hoggar. At

1247 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 523/2.

1248 B.O.A., Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 295/46. For a detailed account of the personal agenda of Ottoman *padişah* Abdulhamid II, see Chapter 5.

1249 This separation between the *vali* and the *kaymakam* of Fezzan was due to their different political affiliations. The *vali* of Tripoli was a prominent member of the reform movement, while the *kaymakam* of Fezzan was a special agent of the *padişah* Abdulhamid II, leading to political rivalry between them.

1250 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 149.

the end of the year, the conflict was over, and the *hakim* of Temassinine was officially appointed as the Ottoman *müdür* by receiving an Ottoman flag.¹²⁵¹

During the period of 1878-1880, significant alterations were observed in the Ottoman Sahara. Ghat and Tibesti ceased to be governed under the Ottoman *idara* system and were instead incorporated into the Ottoman Empire as *kaymakamlık*, thereby being required to implement *tadbir*. Additionally, Temassinine and Borku, regions previously unrelated to the Ottoman Empire, were integrated into the Ottoman *idara* system.

During this two-year period, the Tripolitan *vali*, the Fezzani *kaymakam*, and *padişah* Abdulhamid II each pursued their own strategies for the Sahara. A fourth actor also re-appeared in the same year with his plans. After the possible fail of Abdurrahman Burkan, due to his sudden death in 1875, but also with the inspiration of a rapid success in Temassinine, Ghat, and Tibesti, in 1878, Muhammad Başala personally embarked on his plan, visiting the southern part of the Central Sudan, and spending four years in Kuka before returning to Tripoli in 1882. Subsequently, submitted a comprehensive personal report directly to the Ottoman *padişah*, detailing his vision and activities during this period. The report documents his personal encounters such as Abubakr Temini (Ottoman *müdür* of Kavar), Omar al-Kanemi (Ottoman *mutawalli* of Bornu), Tinimoun (sultan of Zinder), Hajj Muhammad Belho (*tabl* of Kel Away in Air) and some unnamed notables of Kel Azgher as well as Kel Hoggar. Furthermore, he personally corresponded with Sheikh Abdu (the Uthmaniyyan Caliph in Sokoto), Muhammad Bilu (Emir of Kano), Abubakr bin Ilyas (*hakim* of Mandara), Muhammad Kertike (Sultan of Baghirmi), Sheikh Abduljalil (*hakim* of Kanem), and Sayyid Yusuf (*kolak* of Wadai).¹²⁵²

After four years of lobbying, Başala reported that all rulers in Hoggar, Air, Sokoto, Zinder, Mandara, Baghirmi, and Wadai, with the exception of Abduljelil in Kanem, were willing to accept the role of an Ottoman *mutawalli* in their respective countries. He suggested that an official appointment, declaring their land as *waqf*, and the hoisting of the Ottoman flag would be sufficient for them to acknowledge Ottoman rule. In the event that these efforts were not persuasive, Başala proposed the possibility of the Ottomans dispatching divisions to establish garrisons in the regions to serve these countries. He even recommended to the *padişah* that their official appointment and Ottoman flag should be sent with a Senussi member, as they held high prestige in the region.¹²⁵³

1251 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 523.

1252 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56, 2-4.

1253 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56, 5.

However, *padişah* Abdulhamid II never responded to Başala. Thus, his unofficial mission to create an immense Ottoman *mutawalliyat* in the whole southern Central Sudan and his privileges fall into the uncertainty. In 1887, he once again wrote a detailed report concerning the political and economic dynamics in the southern Central Sudan. At the end of his report, he encouraged the *padişah* to take action to expand the rule of the Ottoman Empire, as the conditions are perfect for that.¹²⁵⁴ Once again, he never received any answer.¹²⁵⁵

In 1882, upon Başala's return from his mission to Tripoli, a new dynamic emerged in the rivalry between the *kaymakam* of Fezzan, who was affiliated with the *padişah* Abdulhamid II, and the *vali* of Tripoli, who was on the side of the reformist movement. During this time, the *kaymakam* sought permission from the *vali* to establish Kavar as a *kaymakamlık* by deploying an armed division. Nevertheless, the *vali* responded by deeming such an action as overly aggressive for the region, suggesting a focus on improving trade conditions in the Sahara rather than engaging in political matters.¹²⁵⁶ In fact, the same *vali* had previously planned to send an armed division to Kavar in 1878. Furthermore, albeit rejecting the *kaymakam*'s plan, the *vali* later decided to send an armed division to Kavar in an effort to prevent the *kaymakam* from deploying his own troops there. However, the army commander of Tripoli, who was aligned with the *padişah* Abdulhamid II, refused the *vali*'s order to go to Kavar. Consequently, the *vali* lodged an official complaint with İstanbul, accusing the commander of corruption for refusing the order on the grounds of climatic conditions, which, for the *vali*, was not at all the case.¹²⁵⁷ This bureaucratic conflict within the Ottoman administration hindered the realization of the plan to establish Kavar as a *kaymakamlık* in 1882, as the reformist, such as *vali*, and monarchist officers, such as the army general of Tirpoli and Fezzani *kaymakam*, sabotaged each other's plans. The result of this internal bureaucratic conflict

1254 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56.

1255 Nearly a decade later, in 1892, while in Murzuq, Başala was accused of tax evasion and conducting an "illegal" mission without the knowledge of Ottoman authorities. Fezzani authorities viewed him as a dangerous individual with clandestine spy connections to southern Central Sudan, leading to his transfer to İstanbul for trial. B.O.A., Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Evrakı, 255 – 32. However, he was promptly released in İstanbul and even granted a salary for his service in the previous unofficial mission on behalf of the Ottomans. Subsequently, in 1895, his name reappeared in Ottoman archives, since he accused numerous officers in Fezzan of attempting to sabotage his life and business. B.O.A., Bâbîâlî Evrak Odası Evrakı, 692 – 51895. For the remainder of his life, Başala frequently travelled between Tripoli and İstanbul to seek compensation against the legal actions of his adversaries. While his unofficial mission between 1865-1870 facilitated the integration of Bornu into Ottoman rule, his second unofficial mission to bring the entire southern Central Sudan under Ottoman rule between 1873 and 1882 proved unsuccessful. Despite being disregarded by the Fezzani officials, although these officials were politically affiliated with the *padişah* Abdulhamid II rather than the reformist movement, *padişah* Abdulhamid II granted him additional privileges for his service.

1256 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1882.

1257 B.O.A., Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 278.

was the fact that Kavar further remained as *müdüriyet* for the following years, while ironically both sides in the Ottoman bureaucracy aimed to transform it into *kaymakamlık*.¹²⁵⁸

In addition to the discussions concerning Kavar, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan was also actively involved in Saharan politics in 1882. Especially one report he wrote to the *vali* illustrates a very significant detail regarding the development of the trade agreement with Kano and Bornu, signed already in 1853. The *kaymakam*'s report indicates that they were informed of the death of the ruler in Sokoto (Tr. *Sudan-ı Kebir hakimi*) and Zinder. Hence, the *kaymakam* corresponded with the *kaymakams* of Ghat and Tibesti, as well as the *müdür* of Kavar, regarding this news. But more interestingly, a letter was also sent to the Sultan of Agadez, assuring him that notwithstanding the deaths of the rulers in Sokoto and Zinder, the new rulers were committed to upholding the trade agreement. The *kaymakam* expressed intentions to renew the agreement and advised the Sultan of Agadez not to be concerned regarding its continuity.¹²⁵⁹ It suggests that by 1882, the trade agreement between Kano, Bornu, and the Ottoman Empire had expanded to include Zinder, Sokoto, and Agadez. Unfortunately, the archival materials do not provide information on the specific timeline of Sokoto, Zinder, and Agadez joining this agreement. However, it seems possible that these states were concerned with the trade, as the Awlad Sulaiman from Kanem began to terrorize the Kavar region after the 1860s.¹²⁶⁰ This This might have prompted them to conclude a treaty with the Ottomans to mitigate the possible loss around 1870. These agreements effectively incorporated nearly all the southern Central Sudan into the trade bloc, which remained in place until the invasion of Rabillah in Bornu in 1893.

In that particular year, the *kaymakam* initiated communication with the *kolak* of Wadai in relation to a grievance. A group of Teda merchants from Borku had been subjected to looting by armed militants from Wadai in 1882. Consequently, the merchants lodged a complaint with the *müdür* of Borku, who then brought the matter to the attention of the *kaymakam*, seeking his intervention. The *kaymakam* subsequently dispatched an official correspondence to Abeche, asserting that Borku falls under the jurisdiction of the Ottomans, and any aggression against the Tedas of Borku would be

1258 Binbaşı Abdülvahid, *II. Abdülhamid Zamanında Bir Osmanlı Binbaşının Gözünden Libya*, 107.

1259 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1882.

1260 Aboubacar Adamou, *Agadez et Sa Région* (Paris: Études nigériennes, 1979), 74. In the late 19th century, Awlad Sulaiman played a complex role in the Central Sudan. On the one hand, they were regularly at war with the Ottomans, attacking the trade caravans around Kavar. On the other hand, they were relatives and political allies of the al-Kanemi dynasty in Kuka, taking the responsibility to protect Kanem against the possible invasion of Wadai. In this regard, although the Al-Kanemi Dynasty took on the role of the Ottoman *mutawalli* in Bornu, they continued to support the Awlad Sulaiman. Apparently, the Ottoman officers were not entirely aware of this close relation as they never complained to Kuka for that.

construed as an affront to the Ottomans. The *kaymakam* demanded prompt restitution for the losses incurred, which the *kolak* expeditiously dispatched to the Tedas, comprising the items that had been plundered by the militants from Wadai.¹²⁶¹

The political and economic situation in Central Sudan remained unchanged until 1885. During that year, the Ottoman authorities were once again compelled to intervene in numerous cases. The most significant event was the rebellion in the village of Barakat, close to Ghat. According to the oral accounts, in 1885, three sheikhs from Wargala, under French control, came to Ghat. Upon their arrival, two of them, sheikh Hamid and sheikh Kali,¹²⁶² began to propagate that the rule of the Ottomans is illegal by contacting some rival Kel Azgher communities to convince them to dethrone the recent *amonakl* and *kaymakam*. They also found support from a local Kel Tamasheq scholar in Barakat, called sheikh ag Abkar.¹²⁶³ When their rebellious activities were uncovered, two sheikhs left the city and moved to Barakat by openly calling a jihad against the Ottomans' rule. The *kaymakam* of Ghat sent the armed division from the city garrison to Barakat in order to arrest two sheikhs. When the Ottoman division arrived at the village and tried to arrest them, the followers of the sheikh opened fire. After a short clash, two sheikhs fell to death, whereas their followers were victorious against the Ottoman division. Subsequently, they put the city under siege, triggering the *kaymakam* to call *amonakl* to defend them. When the *amonakl* arrive in Ghat, he was assassinated by his rivals, who were on the side of the jihadist rebellions. Upon the death of the *amonakl*, a maternal relative of the deceased *amonakl*, Yahya ibn Sidi Muhammad, who was poised to assume the position of *amonakl*, was called to Ghat, considering he was in Bornu at this time.¹²⁶⁴ Nonetheless, whilst he was en route, he was approached by the third sheikh. Until this time, he had remained silent in Ghat. His name was sheikh Seyif Abubakr.¹²⁶⁵ The sheikh convinced him that it was the Ottomans who killed *amonakl* with the help of the *kaymakam*, and they are planning the same for him. Accordingly, the new *amonakl* rejected entering the city, demanding that the *kaymakam* be handed over to him as a prisoner. The *kaymakam* sought guidance from Murzuq and Tripoli and deliberated on the situation. The *amonakl* Yahya seized the city and began to attack anyone entering or leaving. This state of affairs persisted until 1886, resulting in significant losses

1261 Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*, 158.

1262 The oral accounts do not name these sheikhs, but according to Bashir Qasim Yusha, at least two of them were called with in the text mentioned names. See: Bashir Qasim Yusha, *Ghat Malamih Wa-l-Dirasat al-Tarihkiyyat* (Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2011), 69.

1263 The *müdür* of Ghat, al-Safi al-Ansar, personally gives this information to a Ghadamesian merchant called Ahmad bin Salim. See: P.A. 2., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1884.

1264 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 169.

1265 Local oral accounts also do not name this sheikh, but according to Ottoman records, his name was Sheikh Seyif Abubakr. See: Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 200.

of life. In that year, the siege came to an end, and the entire Ottoman garrison in the city was annihilated, along with the *kaymakam*. The *amonakl* Yahya himself also perished, but the sheikh Abubakr remained in the city, continuing to incite opposition to Ottoman rule.¹²⁶⁶ A letter from the judge (Ar. *qadi*) of Ghat to the judge of Murzuq and Tripoli in 1885 indicates that he convened the city's notables to adjudicate the sheikh for his war propaganda, which led to the deaths of many Muslims, and accused him of being an unbeliever/enemy of Islam (Ar. *kafr*). The court's verdict upheld these accusations, sentencing him to death.¹²⁶⁷ However, the sheikh promptly departed the city and headed towards Kwar and thereafter to Kanem. Soon the Ottomans took control back in Ghat and the entire region in 1886. Still, the Ottoman authorities were concerned that now the sheikh would incite the Awlad Sulaiman against the Ottomans and instigate an attack on Murzuq, since they received some information that Yahya was already contacted with Awlad Sulaiman for a joint attack to Ghat, but Awlad Sulaiman preferred wait to see the reaction of the Ottomans.¹²⁶⁸ In reality, even before Yahya, Kel Azgher communities were in contact with Awlad Sulaiman. In 1869, they concluded an alliance. Awlad Sulaiman was supporting Kel Azgher against their war on some Teda communities, and Kel Azgher communities were exempting Awlad Suliman members from tribute in the trade around Ghat.¹²⁶⁹ However, this close relation did not trigger Awlad Sulaiman to join the *amonakl* Yahya. In 1885, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan wrote a letter to the *mutawalli* of Bornu enclosing the judge of Ghat's verdict. He reported that a French spy, bearing the title of sheikh, had incited Kel Azgher to rebel against the Ottomans and was now in the vicinity of Kanem, intending to do the same with Awlad Sulaiman. According to the information they had received, Awlad Sulaiman had not heeded him, and he might now be en route to Bornu. For this reason, the *kaymakam* advised that if they encountered him around Bornu, they should promptly execute him, considering he had been sentenced to death.¹²⁷⁰ In the archival materials, there is no more information about the end of this man thereafter.

During the period of 1885-1886, while the Ottomans were preoccupied with Ghat, significant developments were also occurring in Bornu. A new *mutawalli*, Shehu Hashimi (1885-1883), assumed the power following the brief rule of Shehu Bukar Kura (1881-1884) and Shehu Ibrahim Kura (1884-1885). Shehu Hashimi communicated his ascension to the *kaymakam* of Fezzan and

1266 Interview No.2: Meeting with the Elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023.

1267 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1885.

1268 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, dated as 1885.

1269 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 168.

1270 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1886.

requested the renewal of his appointment, along with the dispatch of a new Ottoman flag.¹²⁷¹ The *vali* acknowledged his appointment and sent an Ottoman flag, accompanied by a letter expressing satisfaction, stating “your previous relative did a great job in Bornu on behalf of the Ottomans so far, you are also like your ancestors, that makes us happy”.¹²⁷² Furthermore, a noteworthy discussion arose regarding the hierarchical position of the *mutawalli* in the correspondence. The new *mutawalli* sent three enslaved individuals as gifts: one for the *kaymakam* of Fezzan, one for the *vali*, and the last for the *padişah*. However, the *vali* perceived this gesture as a misunderstanding of bureaucratic hierarchy. He clarified that in the Ottoman bureaucracy, the custom is for gifts to be sent from lower-ranking officials to higher-ranking ones. For instance, a *müdür* can send a gift to the *kaymakam*, then to the *vali*, and finally to the *padişah*. Conversely, a *vali*, being higher in the bureaucratic hierarchy, can only send a gift directly to the *padişah*. Indirectly, the *vali* indicated that the *mutawalli* of Bornu held a status equivalent to that of a *vali*. Consequently, the *vali* informed the *mutawalli* that he had sent all three enslaved individuals received from Bonu directly to the *padişah*.¹²⁷³

The rise of Shehu Hashimi to power marked a significant development in the region. Unlike his predecessors, he possessed a strong religious character and held a deep admiration for the Islamic Union (Tr. *ittihad-ı islam*) policy of *padişah* Abdulhamid II.¹²⁷⁴ He also married with the sister of Shehu Hashimi, who was a Tripolitan merchant appointed by the *kaymakam* of Fezzan as Ottoman representative of Bornu in 1882 after returning Muhammad Başala to Tripoli.¹²⁷⁵ Upon assuming leadership, Shehu Hashimi promptly formulated his own plans for implementing an Ottoman *mutawalliyat* system across the entire southern Central Sudan, and informed İstanbul concerning that, also sharing his pleasure to collaborate with İstanbul.¹²⁷⁶ In response to the Tripolitan *vali* in 1885, he communicated his intention to advocate for the benefits of the *mutawalliyat* system to Sheikh Umaru, the Uthmaniyyan Caliph in Sokoto, and encourage the establishment of a similar system within the Uthmaniyya caliphate under Ottoman rule.¹²⁷⁷

At this juncture, no additional information found in archival materials pertains to the response of the Uthmaniyyan Caliph to this plan. Nevertheless, the oral accounts in Agadez suggest that a meeting

1271 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1885.

1272 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1886.

1273 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1885..

1274 Kyari, ‘Borno-Ottoman Relations in the Nineteenth Century’. For this policy, see Chapter 5.

1275 Kyari Mohammed, *Bornu in the Rabillah Years, 1893-1901: The Rise and Crash of a Predotary State* (Maiduguri: University of Maiduguri Press, 2006), 23.

1276 B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 78/24.

1277 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1885.

took place in 1885 in Agadez with a representative from Sokoto and Zinder, following which a joint commission was dispatched to İstanbul.¹²⁷⁸ Although the specifics of this meeting and the purpose of the journey to İstanbul remain unknown to the local inhabitants, a significant document confirms the arrival of this commission in Ghat around 1885-1886 and reveals their mission. According to this document, the commission arrived in Ghat and was received with a special ceremony. They informed the *kaymakam* of Ghat that, upon learning of French military activities in the Sahara, they sought to engage the Ottomans in discussions to form a formidable political bloc under the protection of the Ottoman Empire against the French. However, inasmuch as they departed from Ghat to Murzuq, coinciding with the time when the *amonakl* Yahya of Kel Azgher besieged the city and began to attack individuals entering or leaving, all members of the commission were killed by the *amonakl*'s troops, resulting in the failure of the entire mission.¹²⁷⁹ Afterwards, the *kaymakam* of Ghat was accused of failing to properly inform the mission about security conditions. For example, the local merchants were immediately aware of the possible danger after Yahya arrived in the region. In 1886, some Ghadamesian merchants, who were in Agadez and preparing for their return to Ghadames, wrote a letter to Yahya to ask if he would provide them security. Yahya responded that no one would be safe in Ghat until the end of his war against the Ottomans. Thus, the merchants decided to wait.¹²⁸⁰

At this point, it can only be speculated whether it was the *mutawalli* of Bornu directed the attention of Sokoto (and maybe Zinder as well as Agadez) to the increasing military activities of French in the Sahara and encouraged them to seek the rule of the Ottomans for protection. However, the tragic end of the mission promptly halted the *mutawalli*'s plans. Additionally, upon receiving a letter from the Fezzani *kaymakam* regarding a French spy sheikh, the *mutawalli* inferred that the French were involved in the murder of commission members. Particularly after 1887, he began to enforce a stringent policy against French and British agents. For instance, when a French mission attempted to enter Bornu for diplomatic purposes in 1890, the *mutawalli* insisted that they must obtain permission from İstanbul, and denied their entry to Bornu once they had acquired said permission.¹²⁸¹ Same happened to a British mission in 1891.¹²⁸²

1278 Interview No.12: With Seydou Kawsen Mayaga in Agadez in 2023.

1279 B.O.A. Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 122/121.

1280 J.G.T.M., uncategorized, dated as 1886.

1281 A.E.F., Tripoli, 27/8.

1282 J. E. Flint, *Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 171.

6.1.3. New Challenges, Old Ambivalences

After Shehu Hashimi's efforts to extend the Ottoman *mutawalliyat* system throughout southern Central Sudan in 1885-1886, the Ottoman authorities once again abandoned the idea of expanding the *mutawalliyat* system. In 1893, when Bornu fell into the hands of Rabillah, and subsequently the people of Bornu complained to an Ottoman agent who visited the occupied Bornu concerning the Ottomans' failure to protect Shehu Hashimi against Rabillah,¹²⁸³ the *mutawalliyat* system completely disappeared.¹²⁸⁴ Still, with the fact that such a system worked in Bornu for almost 24 years, the Ottoman authorities consistently planned to revive this system, disregarding another fact that it provided no protection for the ruler against the *riasa* rule of Rabillah or the future French and British forces. For example, in 1896, the Tripolitan *vali* received confidential information from Osman Zikri, a merchant from Benghazi, and Hüseyin Serir, a merchant from Wadai, regarding the *kolak* of Wadai. According to these informants, the *kolak* of Wadai inquired with Tripolitan merchants with regard to whether the Ottomans would provide protection if he accepted their rule. Consequently, the *vali* proposed sending a mission to Wadai to establish a new *mutawalliyat* system, which could serve as a model for Rabillah and Sokoto, and potentially expand Ottoman rule throughout southern Central Sudan.¹²⁸⁵ Nonetheless, Abdulhamid II also received two another secret reports from Wadai in the same year. The first report was personally sent by the Sanussi sheikh, Muhammad al-Mahdi. He informed the *padişah* that if İstanbul sent some prominent scholars and sheikhs to Wadai, they could convince the *kolak* to recognize the caliphal authority of the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁸⁶ According to the second report, what the *kolak* of Wadai really hopes was not a *mutawalliyat* model as was the case in Bornu, but creating a common army with the Ottoman Empire being an Ottoman *paşa* in Wadai.¹²⁸⁷ Confused with these different reports concerning the real intention of the *kolak* of Wadai, It took the Ottomans 3 years to decide what they should do.

In the meantime, the Ottomans were also preoccupied with other issues. Following the year 1886, the Ottoman authorities directed their primary attention towards the trade agreement established with Agadez, Sokoto, and Zinder. The status of Kavar, whether it should remain as a *müdüriyet* or be upgraded to a *kaymakamlık*, became the subject of prolonged internal deliberations within the

1283 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 242.

1284 Still, the Ottomans did not lose their interest in Bornu. In the following years, a complicated diplomatic policy took place between the Ottomans and Rabillah. For more details related to this, see my forthcoming article: *Ottoman Empire, Bornu and Rabillah: A Complicated Relation between the 1840s and 1900s*.

1285 B.O.A., Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Umum Vilayetler Evrakı, 35/88.

1286 B.O.A., Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 157/139.

1287 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Askeri Maruzat Evrakı, 35/88.

Ottoman bureaucracy. Especially the fact that after the 1890s, the *müdür* of Kavar began to apply *tadbir* by implementing *ray* as an active merchant in the trans-Saharan trade further stipulated the discussion among the Ottoman authorities.¹²⁸⁸ Furthermore, due to the regular attacks of Awlad Sulaiman to the caravans from Murzuq around Kavar created a general expectation by the local merchants as one of the private letters in 1889 shows: "... hopefully soon Ottoman will create a garrison in Kavar to put an end such attacks."¹²⁸⁹ A special agent from Tripoli even conveyed to İstanbul that the *müdür* of Kavar had amassed wealth through his involvement in trade, and that the flourishing trade had generated considerable prosperity for the populace at large. Along this line, the agent concluded that Kavar had already begun to implement *tadbir*, and thereupon it was appropriate to elevate its status to a *kaymakamlık* and commence tax collection.¹²⁹⁰ However, the anticipated authorization for this transformation did not come from İstanbul. Ironically, in 1892, the *müdür* of Kavar, Sheikh Abdulkadir, personally journeyed to Tripoli to meet with the *vali*. According to the report of Abdulhamid II's special agent, who also had a personal audience with the *müdür*, Sheikh Abdulkadir had long awaited an appointment from İstanbul and an armed division. He believed that the people of Kavar possessed sufficient wealth to pay taxes and, in return, warranted a garrison for security. Accordingly, he sought the transformation of Kavar into a *kaymakamlık*.¹²⁹¹ Still, he was compelled to depart to Kavar without securing the anticipated appointment. The archival materials do not provide any reason for rejection.

After five years of ongoing debate concerning the status of Kavar and three years of discussion related to the Wadai, in 1897, the *kaymakam* of Fezzan communicated to İstanbul that the military activities of the French and British in the region had evolved into a significant threat. He stressed the urgency of transforming Kavar into a *kaymakamlık* and establishing a garrison there, considering failure to do so could result in illegal attacks and territorial claims by these European powers.¹²⁹² Similar to other previous demands, İstanbul did not respond to this request, and permission was not granted, since the government was preoccupied with debates on Wadai. In 1899, the Ottoman government decided to appoint *kolak* of Wadai as an Ottoman general, sending him a special military medallion.¹²⁹³ Additionally, in order to model his army after the Ottoman imperial army and structure his ministry of finance, two special agents were sent to Wadai from Istanbul in

1288 M.G., Family Collections, dated as 1892.

1289 M.G., Family Collections, dated as 1889.

1290 B.O.A. Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 295/46.

1291 B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 122/2389.

1292 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1898.

1293 B.O.A., Bâbîâli Evrak Odası Evrakı, 12347/1001009.

1899: one from the Ministry of War and the other from the Ministry of Finance.¹²⁹⁴ Their very positive reception in Abeche, and an official ceremony held by the *kolak* of Wadai declaring himself as the *paşa* of Wadai on behalf of the Ottoman Empire hit the front pages of many Ottoman newspapers, creating an enthusiastic mood that finally the Ottomans are taking action to save Muslims in the West Africa.¹²⁹⁵ Even some French newspapers, such as *Le Soleil de Midi*, were surprised with this big ceremony and recognition of the Ottoman authorities in Wadai.¹²⁹⁶ In 1900, the central army of Wadai was re-formed, and some Waday army commanders received special titles and medallions from İstanbul.¹²⁹⁷

Despite this noticeable transformation in Wadai, the Ottomans were not able to decide whether they should convert Kavar into a *kaymakamlık* and establish a garrison.¹²⁹⁸ Only around the end of 1901, the Ottomans sent an envoy to Kavar to inform the *müdür* Said Ramadan that they would soon make Kavar a *kaymakamlık*. However, the *müdür* waited so long for a decision from Istanbul that he got in touch with a Sanussiyya sheikh for protection in the meantime. The *müdür* informed the Ottoman envoy that they should now ask the Sanussiyya sheikh to confirm that the *müdür* will become a *kaymakam* and receive an armed division.¹²⁹⁹ Nonetheless, by this time, French armed forces were already in proximity to the region, and it did not take long for them to disregard the Ottoman *idara* system and unlawfully occupy Kavar, as warned in the final letter to the *vali* by the last *müdür* of Kavar, Sayyid bin Ali.¹³⁰⁰ Kavar never achieved *kaymakamlık* status and fell victim to colonial invasion without receiving any protection from the Ottomans. Similarly, Temassinine was illegally occupied by French forces, whilst the Ottomans only resorted to a weak diplomatic protest. These failed policies were heavily criticized by reformist intellectuals¹³⁰¹ as well as by the *valis*¹³⁰². Notably, the special agents of *padişah* Abdulhamid II were actively engaged in Kavar, Sokoto, and Bornu in line with his Islamic Union policy.¹³⁰³ However, their activities were primarily focused on gathering information and advocating for a jihad against potential French and British

1294 B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemî, 2278/124.

1295 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve Ataşemiliterlik, 34/29.

1296 B.O.A., Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı, 402/39.

1297 B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemî, 2279/124.

1298 B.O.A., İrade Hususi, 1319/88.

1299 Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci, *Trablusgarb*, 175.

1300 B.O.A., Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 278.

1301 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 150–75.

1302 D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1891.

1303 The underlying premise of this policy was the belief that the local population in the Central Sudan was more aligned with the title of caliph than with the title of *padişah*. Consequently, *padişah* Abdulhamdi opted to leverage his caliphal title and disseminate jihadist narratives in the region, rather than establishing Ottoman rule and providing protection. For example, see: B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 3/34.

invasions, instead of creating any system of governance. In this regard, these agents were mostly selected Senussi members. For instance, in 1901, two Senussi sheikhs, al-Sharif al-Sanussi and al-Hajj al-Sanussi, were dispatched to Kavar to further investigate the recent situation in Sokoto and Bornu.¹³⁰⁴ Their actions primarily served to incite the local population to take up arms against the impending invasion by the French and British, rather than providing tangible material support or protection. In fact, that was exactly the policy of Abdulhamid II's Islamic Union strategy against the Ottoman Empire's regional expansion.

Following the fall of Bornu in 1893, the influence of the Ottomans significantly diminished in southern Central Sudan. However, in the face of colonial incursions by the French and British, prevalent narratives emerged in the region suggesting that the Ottomans would come to their rescue. In 1908, Ottoman intellectual Sami Çölgeçen directly encountered one such story from the Emir of Yola, who was now under British colonial rule. The Emir relayed to Sami Çölgeçen that some scholars referenced a clandestine text authored by Uthman dan Fodio, in which he purportedly explained that as the end of the world draws near, "Turks" would emerge from the east to combat the "devil" in the final war.¹³⁰⁵ These narratives also persisted in Agadez even after the fall of Tripolitania to Italian colonial forces in 1911.¹³⁰⁶

However, after reaching its peak expansion around 1880 and maintaining this for 13 years until the invasion of Rabillah to Bornu, the Ottomans gradually lost control in the Sahara following 1893. By 1904, Temassinine, Kavar, and Bornu were no longer under Ottoman rule, leading to the collapse of the *idara* and *mutawalliyat* systems. However, the *tadbir* system in Ghat, Tibesti, and Borku, along with the rest of Tripolitania, continued to exist until 1911. Ultimately, the Ottomans were forced to withdraw their garrisons only after the fall of Tripoli to the Italians.

The ambivalence expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Sahara and beyond was marked with a plurality of actors and agendas, as exhibited in the previous sections. However, beyond this Afroglobal layer, in which the Central Sudanic actors shaped the region, there was also an Eurocentric global layer that deeply influenced the politics of İstanbul in general. This layer was mainly the reason of the silence of the Ottoman government for many demands from the actors in the Central Sudan, since they had to carefully calculate if they would be ready to a whole conflict or even war with French and Britain for some regions in the Sahara. In this regard, they had to play an

1304 D.M.T.L., Tijarat, dated as 1901.

1305 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 304.

1306 Interview No.12: With Seydou Kawsen Mayaga in Agadez in 2023.

intriguing diplomatic game, which also contributed to their ambivalence politics in the Central Sudan.

6.2. Ottoman-French Conflict in the Tripolitania and Sahara

The complexity of the Ottoman rule in the Sahara and beyond was far beyond from capability of any non-Afro-Islamic agent to understand. This further contributed to their own imperial and colonial agenda, considering they created their own version of reality regarding the Central Sudan. This reality stemmed not only from their ignorance but also from their intentional distortion of facts influenced by their ideological biases. French agents, for example, often depicted Tripolitania as a “turc colony” and trans-Saharan merchants as “wild tribes”, reflecting a distorted view fuelled by exotic conspiracy theories and colonialist fantasies.¹³⁰⁷ Similar misrepresentations were observed among Italian, British, and German agents, who portrayed Sahrawi communities as imitators of “backward Arabs”,¹³⁰⁸ portraying the local rulers as “bloodthirsty barbarians”,¹³⁰⁹ who are randomly murdering innocent merchants,¹³¹⁰ since they “have no idea about politic and economy”.¹³¹¹ Missionaries also contributed to this narrative by organizing events that denigrated the perceived “primitiveness” of local communities, despite facing resistance from the inhabitants who viewed these missionaries as “primitive”.¹³¹² The Ottoman authorities were aware of the ignorance displayed by these agents, as evidenced by instances where Ottoman officers, like Mustafa Bey, found traveller accounts, such as Heinrich Barth's, to be lacking in credibility due to misrepresentations and ignorance.¹³¹³ Similarly, upon arriving in Murzuq in the early 1900s, the *kaymakam* of Ghat, Cami Baykurt, who could read English, French, and German, discovered discrepancies between the French traveller accounts he had read and the actual situation on the ground.¹³¹⁴ Furthermore, the supremacist world-view held by these non-Afro-Islamic agents further clouded their understanding, leading to not only the loss of lives among their own agents but also

1307 For a prominent example, see: H. M. Mathuisieulx, *A Travers La Tripolitaine* (Paris: Libraire Hachette, 1903), 39–49.

1308 Attilio Brunialti, *Algeria, Tunisia e Tripolitania* (Milano: Fratelli Traves, 1881), 190.

1309 Emile Julien, ‘Le Dar-Ouadai’, *Afrique Française, Bulletin Du Comite de l’Afrique Franfaise: Renseignements Coloniaux* 14, no. 1 (1904): 54.

1310 H. Carbou, *La Region Du Tchad et Du Ouadai*, vol. Tome II (Paris: Leroux, 1912), 122–24.

1311 G. Nachtigal, *Sahara Und Sudan: Ergebnisse Sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika*, vol. Dritten Teil (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1889), 155–75.

1312 Musi, *Al-Muhtama’ al-’arabiyya al-Libiyya Fi al-’ahd al-Othmani*, 188.

1313 B.O.A., *Evrakı Maarif Nezareti Maruzatı*, 2/10.

1314 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp’tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 105.

highlighting their dependence on local assistance and Ottoman support for survival in the Sahara region.¹³¹⁵

6.2.1. Level of Strategies in the Conflict

In this regard, the French involvement in the Sahara from the Algerian coast after the 1850s was significantly influenced by these fundamental limitations. To penetrate the region, they relied on two special groups: The Kel Tamasheq and the Ghadamesian merchants. The Kel Tamasheq were key to the French securing the region, while the Ghadamesian merchants were essential to the French achieving economic domination. However, the interactions with these groups led to approximately six decades of conflict and misunderstandings. The initial actions taken by the French in 1854 involved the illegal visit of Ghat by some French agents including a sheikh from Wargala, named Hamza bin Abi Bakr.¹³¹⁶ In their return, they convinced a scholar named, in French sources Sheikh Osman¹³¹⁷ and real name is Osman ag al-Bakri, to serve as a French representative in the Central Sudan and act as a spy.¹³¹⁸ Upon settling himself in Wargala for his mission, Osman ag al-Bakri operated a French caravan from there to Ghat in 1856 to open a trade route for French influence. Nevertheless, upon his arrival in Ghat with the caravan, the *müdür* of Ghat refused him entry and demanded his immediate departure. French authorities attributed this unwelcoming behaviour to the "fanatical religious" nature of the inhabitants;¹³¹⁹ yet, the *müdür* of Ghat later revealed the true reason for the hostility. He informed the *kaymakam* of Fezzan that they are aware of the fact that Osman ag al-Bakri is a French spy and his arrival to Ghat with a caravan pertains to gathering confidential information for French authorities. For this reason, they did not allow him to enter the city and sent him back. They informed him that the city was under Ottoman rule, and that they could not enter without permission.¹³²⁰ In spite of this revelation, the French authorities chose to disregard this fact and continued to act as if the city was not under Ottoman rule. Interestingly, while Osman ag al-Bakri was working on behalf of the French, Owinayt ag Kalala from Ghat, who once convinced the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher to accept the Ottoman authority, was continuing to work

1315 For a very emblematic example, see: B.P.R.O., Foreign Office, 371/149/105.

1316 Muhammad Sayid Al-Tawil, *Al-Sirae al-Duwliyu Eala Madinat Ghadamis Khilal al-Nisf al-Thaani Min al-Qarn al-Tasie Eashr Wa Ineykasatih Eala Tijaritiha*, in *Al-Ilmiyat al-Tarkhiyat Hawl Tarikh Ghadamis* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2003), 203–4.

1317 Tamasheq sources reveal his whole name: Osman ag al-Bakri. Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 76.

1318 A. Bernard and N. Lacroix, *La Pénétration Saharienne (1830-1906)* (Algier, 1906), 22.

1319 Léon Lehuraux, *Les Français Au Sahara* (Algier: Éditions Les territoires du Sud, 1938), 23.

1320 B.O.A., İrade Meclis-i Mahsus, 625.

on behalf of the Ottomans. Nonetheless, different from Osman ag al-Bakri, he was not receiving any directives from the Ottomans, and doing everything with his own personal interest.¹³²¹

Following their failed attempt to appear before Ghat without authorization, the French authorities opted to adopt a strategy akin to that employed by Ghadamesian merchants in their trade dealings. Hence, the French authorities in Algeria contacted *amonakl* of Kel Azgher to negotiate a treaty with him and summoned him to Algiers. The *amonakl* accepted to negotiate with the condition that they have to meet in Ghadames. As a result, in 1862, a French commission from Tripoli dispatched to Ghadames, with the presence of Osman ag al-Bakri from Wargala; yet, under the supervision of the Ottoman authorities. However, the *amonakl* sent his brother Hajj Omar in lieu of attending the negotiations, who was the chief of Ouraghen community of Kel Azgher. Also, the chief of Imanghassaten community of Kel Azgher, Jabur Amghar, joined him.¹³²² According to oral accounts in Ghat, by doing so, the *amonakl* of Kel Azger avoided any general treaty on the name of Kel Azgher by reducing the frame of the negotiations to the level of communal chiefs. Thus, he could keep his position and authority beyond the treaty by practically making the negotiations in vain.¹³²³ Under the observation of the Ottoman authorities, the French commission signed a trade treaty with these two representatives, known in the Anglophone/Francophone research literature as *Ghadamesian Agreement*. However, in spite of the strategic policy of the *amonakl*, the French viewed this agreement as a significant achievement, signalling to them that both Ghadames and Ghat were now accessible for trade and potentially for future colonial endeavours. Despite the perceived success of the agreement from the French standpoint, its legality was illusory for several reasons. First, the veracity of the agreement itself was dubious, considering it was solely evaluated based on its French translation without a thorough examination of the original Arabic version by the French authorities. This oversight has led to numerous complications for the French, highlighting a significant misrepresentation that remains unresolved for them. The primary issue identified in the original Arabic version is that it was composed in a colloquial dialect rather than *fusha* Arabic, as it was authored by individuals lacking official representation. This dialect was not comprehensible to any French experts until the 20th century. Consequently, the French translation of the original Arabic text was notably inaccurate. For instance, the original agreement stipulates that the treaty

1321 Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 75.

1322 Yahya Boueaziz, *Thawrat Al-Jazayir Fi al-Qarnayn al-Taasie Eashar Wa-l-Eishrin* (Al-Jazayir: Dar al-basayir, 2011), 323.

1323 Interview No.2: Meeting with the Elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023.

establishes amicable relations between “*Faransa wa barn tawaruf*”.¹³²⁴ Here, the *fusha* Arabic version of the notion of “*barn tawaruf*” is “*bilad al-tawariq*” (used in Arabic research literature), and its very literal translation is “land of Tuareg” (used in the Anglophone/Francophone research literature). However, as disclosed above, there was neither a representative on the name of all Kel Tamasheqs in the world, nor even any representative of Kel Azgher. The treaty was only between the French officers and the Ouraghen and Imanghassaten communities. As the oral accounts also stress, when Kel Azgher negotiate with groups that are not Kel Tamasheq, they refer to themselves as “*tawariq*.” They do not mean that they speak on behalf of all Kel Tamasheqs worldwide, only their own communities.¹³²⁵ Therefore, the accurate translation of this phrase should read: the friendly relations between “French and the inhabitants of the land that falls under the control of Ouraghen and Imanghassaten communities.” Nevertheless, the French translation of this statement reads: the friendly relations between “*France et la nation de Tuareq*.”¹³²⁶ In other words, the French commission translated the original Arabic text according to their preferences, with the claim that these two chiefs represent the all Kel Tamasheqs in the world as nation rather than the text’s actual content, i.e. being the representatives of two local communities. In this context, the French version of the treaty was nothing more than a French invention.¹³²⁷ Following this significant misinterpretation/distortion, French authorities believed that they had gained unrestricted access to the lands of the Kel Tamasheq communities across West Africa.

With this strong confidence, the French authorities conducted multiple expeditions to In-Salah in the territory of Kel Hoggar and Djanet/Ghat in the region of Kel Azgher. Many of these missions resulted in the deaths of French agents who trespassed into these territories based on a flawed understanding derived from the Ghadamesian Agreement.¹³²⁸ Thirteen years passed before finally a French officer, the consul of Tripoli, recognized the fallacy of this agreement, advising the French authorities in Algeria to disregard its validity.¹³²⁹ At the end, in 1875, a clandestine delegation was dispatched to Ghadames to negotiate a new agreement. However, upon arrival, the delegation

1324 Even the Arabic printing of the text was not accurate. There is no word called *tawaruf* in Arabic, it is *tawariq*. The printed Arabic texts put only one dot (ف), which makes the last letter of the word f, in lieu of two dot (ق), which is q.

1325 Interview No.2: Meeting with the elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023.

1326 *Mission de Ghadames*, 1862 (Alger, 1963), 16–19.

1327 For more details, see: Al-Miftah, ‘Ruyat Britaniya Min Khilal Qunsuliha Wa-l-Dawlat al-Uthmaniyyat Min al-Taharukat al-Faransiyat Fi al-Sahra al-Kubra (1850-1881m)’, 159.

1328 While Kel Hoggar communities had their own political reasons to execute these agents, there were also scholar activities of Sanussiyya and Essouq against any French activities. For instance, Amud Aq Al-Muhktar, who was a prominent commander among the Kel Azgher, and coming from a famous scholarly Essouq family, personally joined such executions. Amahin, *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*, 86.

1329 A.E.F., Tripoli, 16/28.

realized the fact that there is no authorized representative capable of ensuring security across the whole Kel Tamasheq land. Consequently, they adjusted their mission to establish a trade agreement with some Ghadamesian merchants and elites, seeking their collaboration for safe passage to Ghat instead of proceeding independently. According to their report, the commission engaged with members of the city council and affluent merchants to negotiate terms. Nonetheless, when the commission requested assurances of security and exemption from taxes, the merchants clarified that only the *kaymakam*, the city's administrative status had been elevated from *müdürîyet* to *kaymakamlık* in the 1860s, held the authority to address such matters, offering only a general pledge of friendship. Disappointed by this response, the commission departed without finalizing any agreement.¹³³⁰ In 1879, a subsequent covert delegation was dispatched to Ghadames to negotiate a fresh accord with the envoy of Kel Azgher. The strategy entailed fostering amicable relations among other Kel Tamasheq communities upon witnessing certain factions aligning with the French.¹³³¹ Upon ratifying this agreement, which essentially mirrored the terms of the 1862 treaty, containing this time the whole Kel Azgher region, a new expedition was dispatched to In-Salah. The French officers were aware of the fact that In-Salah was in the Hoggar region. They hoped that as they have now a trade treaty with Kel Azgher, Kel Hoggar would receive them friendly, missing the reality that Kel Azgher and Kel Hoggar were in war. Furthermore, owing to prior harrowing encounters, this mission was accompanied by armed forces for protection. This unauthorized military presence in their territory incited significant unrest among Kel Hoggar communities, prompting an immediate assault on the mission to thwart any further unlawful encroachment. A missive intercepted by a French spy in Ghadames, found in the *kaymakam*'s room, revealed that the *amonakl* of Kel Hoggar had apprized the *kaymakam* of an encounter with an illicit French armed contingent on their land, which they subsequently vanquished, citing their prohibition on non-Muslims entering their domain without the Ottoman caliph's consent. However, concerns were raised regarding potential reprisals from these "unlawful occupiers", leading to a plea for Ottoman assistance.¹³³² According to Cami Baykurt, this incident held such significance in Kel Hoggar culture that by the 1900s, Tamasheq folk songs in Ghat recounted the valorous triumph of this operation and their appeals to the Ottomans:¹³³³

1330 A.E.F., Tripoli, 16/44.

1331 A.E.F., Tripoli, 17/56.

1332 A.E.F., Tripoli, 8/71.

1333 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 187. They called French mission as Douveyrat, as Henry Duveyrier, who traveled the region in the 1860s, was the general symbol for French people.

Nékide éfout sé Douveyrat
 Nouar abadé sé Sérirat
 Noussin tiléhat ilazlazintat
 Nikesaghil sezquerin dat
 Foulsinén tindegghin hanin Ghat

*We went to Douveyrat for operation
 By passing the all roads of Serrirat
 Found their camels in the oasis
 and took them to our land
 for the glory of whom in Ghat*

This traumatic incident led to a more aggressive approach by the French authorities, triggering them to abandon their previous strategy of expansion through soft power. Hence, certain French officers in Algeria contemplated a forcible occupation of Ghadames and Ghat. Nevertheless, upon learning of this plan, the French consul in Tripoli promptly informed Paris that such a military intervention would constitute a direct declaration of war against the Ottomans, given that these cities were part of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the consul suggested employing bribery tactics with local merchants to gain economic control over the cities.¹³³⁴ At this moment in 1881, the French consul in Tripoli received an unexpected communication from the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher, offering support to the French in their campaign against Kel Hoggar, in exchange for French assistance in countering potential Kel Hoggar attacks.¹³³⁵ Between 1881-1895, *amonakl* of Kel Azgher continued to contact with the Ottoman¹³³⁶ and French¹³³⁷ authorities simultaneously seeking their aid against Kel Hoggar. Whilst his correspondence with the Ottomans emphasized his control over the land from Temassinine to northern Air on behalf of the Ottomans, requesting their support in the conflict with Kel Hoggar, his letters to the French consul indicate a willingness to acknowledge French authority in the region if they assisted him against Kel Hoggar. However, this dual diplomatic approach ceased in 1895 after Kel Hoggar's decline in power, leading to French emergence as a new rival to Kel Azgher. Subsequently, the *amonakl* of Kel Azgher unequivocally rejected any further diplomatic engagement with French authorities.

This example also illustrates the misunderstanding of the French agents regarding the governance structure in the region. Despite being aware of Ghadames' historical affiliation with the Ottomans, the French consistently overlooked the Ottoman influence in the city and maintained clandestine communication with the local population. Nonetheless, in instances where a *tadbir* application was in place, certain French officials, such as the consul in Tripoli, exercised greater caution in their actions due to the presence of a military garrison in the city. In the absence of any visible military

1334 A.E.F., Tripoli, 20/153.

1335 A.N.F., Tripoli, F.19, 137, 1881.

1336 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 523.

1337 A.N.F., Tripoli, F.27, 252, 1891.

presence, the French authorities automatically assumed the absence of Ottoman authority. They essentially lacked an understanding of the *idara* system. For this reason, French missions utilized Temassinine as a primary stopover for their Sahara expeditions. They remained unaware that the *müdür* of Temassinine was reporting every French activity in the region to Tripoli. For example, around 1880, a French mission was dispatched to Ghat via Temassinine. Prior to their arrival, the Ottoman *vali* had been informed of this mission and inquired with the French consul in Tripoli pertaining to their intentions, leaving the consul surprised by the *vali*'s knowledge of their activities.¹³³⁸

Throughout the 19th century, albeit the French authorities acknowledging Ghadames as part of the Ottoman Empire, they persisted in dispatching covert missions and spies to the city. In 1889, the *kaymakam* of Ghadames observed that certain French spies were spreading a narrative suggesting that historically the city was under the jurisdiction of Tunisia, which was under French colonial invasion since 1882, thereby justifying French intervention.¹³³⁹ In subsequent years, the French authorities continued to send spies to Ghadames and Tripoli to secretly intercept internal communications.¹³⁴⁰ In spite of these efforts, the French were unsuccessful in exerting influence over Ghadames. Therefore, they devised two alternative strategies: 1) recognizing the city's significance in trade, the French aimed to redirect commerce from Ghadames to Tunisia and Algeria, or 2) alternatively, murder all Ghadamesian merchants and disrupt trade routes to undermine commerce for all parties. For the rest of the century, with different proportions, French authorities used these two strategies simultaneously also for Kel Azgher.¹³⁴¹ For instance, they were interested in the application of the agreement made in 1862 and were disappointed with its uselessness. Accordingly, they encouraged Shaanba Arabs in the eastern Algeria to go to the region of Ghadames and plunder their caravans, prompting the *vali* of Tripoli to seek compensation from the French.¹³⁴² Additionally, in 1873, French agents in Wargala attempted to persuade Ghadamesian merchants to conduct trade with Wargala in lieu of Tripoli by offering various privileges. However, the merchants chose to forward these letters directly to Tripoli for information rather than engaging with the French agents.¹³⁴³ Following their short-lived plan to occupy and destroy the city of Ghadames in 1881, the French authorities adopted an alternative approach in 1886. They dispatched

1338 A.E.F., Tripoli, 18/83.

1339 D.M.T.L., *Idara*, dated as 1889.

1340 Documents Diplomatique Français, vol. 2, 55.

1341 Ahmad Rajab Faraj, 'Madinat Ghat Al-Libiyat Bayn al-Eatmea al-Faransiyat Wa-l-Sultanat al-Uthmaniyat', *Jamiat Sabiha Li-l-Ulum al-Insaniyat Majallatan* 20, no. 3 (2021): 85.

1342 A.N.O.M., *Affaire Indigenes*, 29 H 2.

1343 B.O.A., *Ayniyet Defterleri*, Trablusgarb, 915/20-25.

spies to the city with the aim of persuading local merchants to cease trading with Tripoli and instead conduct business in Algeria. The enticement offered was exemption from taxes and potential financial incentives from the French government.¹³⁴⁴ Nonetheless, by the 1890s, it became evident to the French authorities that neither coercive control nor redirection of trade to Algeria was feasible.¹³⁴⁵ Consequently, they resorted to a more drastic measure of murdering the merchants in order to disrupt the trade network that supports the locals and the Ottoman Empire. From then until 1911, over a thousand Ghadamesian merchants fell victim to the violent actions of the French forces.¹³⁴⁶ Despite numerous diplomatic protests from the Ottomans, the French persisted in their ruthless campaign. This period of intense French intervention in Ghadames, particularly post-1890s, marked the culmination of a broader pattern of mass murder that characterized their actions across Algeria. As early as 1868, large numbers of Arab and Berber communities from Algeria sought refuge in Tripolitania to escape the deadly repercussions of French aggression. During the period when Ottoman officers were assisting refugees to settle in the vicinity of Ghadames, concerns arose regarding the potential excuse for a military operation to Ghadames, prompting the Ottoman government to issue a directive instructing the officers to refuse any refugees from Algeria moving forward.¹³⁴⁷ The situation escalated further with the French invasion of Tunisia in 1882, leading to numerous massacres and the subsequent migration of thousands of Arab communities to Tripolitania around 1884. Fearing French intervention but also drawing from past public critique related to abandoning Algerian refugees, Ottoman officers presented the refugees with two choices: relocating to eastern Tripolitania, particularly Benghazi, or returning to their place of origin. The majority opted for the former, and some communities insisted on settling along the border between French-occupied Tunisia and Tripolitania. Consequently, the *vali* dispatched troops to compel their departure from the region.¹³⁴⁸ In 1887, another wave of refugees from Algeria arrived in Ghadames, sparking an internal debate between the *vali* and the *kaymakam* of Ghadames. The *kaymakam* expressed apprehension that the French might exploit these refugees as a pretext for attacking the city, whereas the *vali* assured him that unlike the Tunisian border, the French would be unable to conduct military operations along the Algerian border, thereupon advocating for the acceptance of Algerian refugees as victims of French atrocities.¹³⁴⁹

1344 'Miralay Hüseyin Hüsnü Layihası (1886)' B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 8/27.

1345 Paolo Soave, *Fezzan: Il Deserto Conteso (1842-1921)* (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffré Editore, 2001), 68.

1346 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 331.

1347 B.O.A., Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915/45.

1348 Anonym, 'Afrikâ-Yi Osmani'den Trablusgarb ve Bingazi ve Fizan'a Dair Malumat' (1891), İ.Ü.N.K., Yazma Eserler, 8897.

1349 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1887.

French agents also wanted to have a spy in Ghadames, such as Osman ag al-Bakri from Ghat, for their interest. Before their visit to the city in 1862 to sign a treaty, in 1860 they also secretly met with Muhammad al-Thani, a famous and wealthy merchant in Ghadames.¹³⁵⁰ After promising him the privilege of working as a representative of French commercial companies in Ghadames, they officially applied to Tripoli for recognition of Muhammad al-Thani as the French representative in the city. The Ottoman authorities accepted this with the condition that no one from al-Thani family, including Muhammad himself, would receive French citizenship.¹³⁵¹ Furthermore, the French authorities were unaware that Muhammad al-Thani also worked on behalf of the Sanussiyya. In 1862, he donated a large sum of money to build a Sanussiyya zawiya in Al-Jaghub called the al-Thani Palace.¹³⁵² It took the French authorities almost 20 years to realize that Muhammad al-Thani was working for the Ottomans and the Sanussiyya, not the French. In the 1880s, they began accusing him of being a "religious fanatic" and sought a new secret agent in Ghadames.¹³⁵³

In the further south, finally recognizing the existing rivalry between Kel Azgher and Kel Hoggar, the French implemented a "divide and rule" tactic to manipulate the Kel Tamasheq societies in the region.¹³⁵⁴ Nevertheless, in 1897, when some French spies went to Ghat to establish an alliance with Kel Azgher to support them against Hoggar and in their return celebrated their success,¹³⁵⁵ in the reality Kel Azgher representative were acting as Ottoman spy to inform everything what French agents say to the Ottoman officers.¹³⁵⁶ Similarly, when the Muhammad al-Arusi, who was the son of Muhammad al-Saghir al-Tijjani, working on behalf of the French interest after the 1850s, tried to forge alliances for Kel Azger with the French in 1896, sending several letters to the amonakl and merchants in Ghat. This effort met with resistance, and instead of responding to his letters, Kel Azgher communities forwarded them to the *kaymakam* of Ghat.¹³⁵⁷ Despite years of anti-Ottoman propaganda by French missionaries among the Kel Azgher, these efforts proved ineffective.¹³⁵⁸ Subsequently, around the 1900s, the French resorted to using force to capture the land of Kel

1350 Mahmoud Ahmad Al-Dik, 'Al-Atmea al-Siyasiyat Wa-l-Iqtisadiyat al-Faransiyyat Fi Madina Ghadamis Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasi Eashr', in *Al-Ilmiyyat al-Tarikhiyyat Hawl Tarikh Ghadamis Min Khilal al-Rahalat Wa-l-Muarikhina*, Ed. Nuraddin Mustafa Al-Thani, ed. Nuraddin Mustafa Al-Thani (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhia, 2003), 279.

1351 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi Evrakı, 377/39.

1352 P.A.4., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1862.

1353 A.E.F., C.P.C. Tripoli, 21, 1882.

1354 Al-Alusi, *Al-Tawariq al-Shaib Wa-l-Qadhiyyah Tarikhana Mansiyana, Wa Hadhiran Maqhuran, Wa Mustaqbalan Majhulan*, 219.

1355 A.E.F., Tripoli, 17/56.

1356 B.O.A., Bâbîâli Evrak Odası Evrakı, Trablusgarb, 357.

1357 D.M.T.L., uncategorized, dated as 1896.

1358 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 173.

Hoggar after their divide and rule strategy failed to yield results. This led to numerous massacres, prompting many Kel Hoggar communities, and even the *amonakl* of Kel Hoggar, to seek refuge in Ghat.¹³⁵⁹ French assassination divisions then targeted Kel Hoggar and Kel Azgher communities around Ghat in an effort to disrupt trade in the region.¹³⁶⁰ In several cases, the French authorities even encouraged Shaanba Arabs to attack Ghat and engage in looting activities.¹³⁶¹

During the period of French expansion in the Algerian Sahara and its impact on the Ottoman Sahara, local communities and Ottoman officials became aware that many French, British, and German travellers and mapmakers were serving the interests of colonialism.¹³⁶² A report sent anonymously to İstanbul in 1881 by an Ottoman special agent revealed that these foreign agents were conducting travels in the Sahara under the guise of exploration, with the intention of gathering information and creating maps for future colonial endeavours.¹³⁶³ Another report in 1885 informed İstanbul that French, British, and German spies were moving through Tripolitania disguised as merchants, doctors, or scientists, but were actually collecting intelligence and spreading anti-Ottoman propaganda. When their true motives were discovered by Ottoman authorities, they sought refuge in their consulates in Tripoli, and accused the Ottoman officers of being enemies of civilization and science. Thus, he concludes that claims of conducting scientific research or humanitarian aid campaigns were falsehoods, and they must be cautious against engaging with such agents.¹³⁶⁴ In fact, the Ottoman authorities were well aware of the supremacist rhetoric used by European powers to justify their brutal colonial invasions under the guise of "civilizing" and "developing" regions.¹³⁶⁵ Even Tunisian officers before the 1882, were accusing non-Afro-Islamic agents, serving only to the interest of their state, in lieu of "civilization" and "modernization", considering their efforts were clearly against the benevolence of the community (Ar. *al-maslaha al-umma*).¹³⁶⁶ This awareness was further exemplified in 1924 when Hassanein Bey observed during his mapping expedition in Kufra that local inhabitants were cognizant of the ulterior motives behind mapping activities, as evidenced by the saying, "first they come with tools for mapping, then with guns."¹³⁶⁷ In this regard after the 1890s, the local communities became hostile toward any foreign

1359 Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*, 148.

1360 Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, 303.

1361 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği, 20/31.

1362 Khayreddine Youssef Chatra, 'Al-Astirajiyat al-Kuluniyalıyat al-Faransiyat Fi Ikhda al-Sahra al-Jazariyat', *Majallat Al-Adab* 138 (2021): 96–97.

1363 'Anonym Layiha (1881)' B.O.A., Şûra-yı Devlet Evrakı, 2325/32.

1364 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 10/62.

1365 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği, 19/3.

1366 A.N.T., *Série Histoire*, C 236, 508.

1367 Hassanein Bey, *The Lost Oasis* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1925), 109.

agent. In 1908, Sami Çölgeçen noted that the Kel Azgher, Teda, and Arab communities around Fezzan were using the term “*ingiliz*” (Ar. Englishman), as a derogatory label to criticize behaviours like deceit and theft.¹³⁶⁸ Even today, the word “*ingiliz*” is used in Murzuq to insult someone. Criticism of French and British imperial involvement in Africa intensified after the 1870s, drawing condemnation from Ottoman officials and intellectuals. The explanation provided was that the occupation of African countries by certain entities was purportedly aimed at halting the slave trade, a rationale that failed to convince the Ottomans. An internal document from the Ottoman government in 1882 explicitly stated that “their only interest is to possess African countries. All these narratives about slavery and the slave trade are lies.”¹³⁶⁹

6.2.2. Level of Diplomacy in the Conflict

Apart from all these agents on the ground following certain strategies, there existed a higher diplomatic level of engagement concerning governance and political-economic matters between the French and Ottomans. This interaction occurred through discussions between the foreign offices of France and the Ottoman Empire. Following the Berlin Conference in 1885, attended by Ottoman representative Mehmed Said Paşa, the Ottoman foreign office initiated a diplomatic plan to safeguard regions under their authority, such as Kavar and Bornu. Aligned with the pacifist foreign policy of Abdulhamid II, Ottoman consuls in Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Madrid, and Brussels pursued an intensive diplomatic approach post-1885 to prevent military conflicts while asserting their rights. For instance, in response to a speech by French cardinal Charles Lavigerie in Brussels in 1885 linking Islamic culture to slavery, giving some examples from Tripolitania, the Ottoman Consul in Brussels countered with a newspaper article accusing him of spreading misinformation and Islamophobia.¹³⁷⁰ In 1884, the Ottoman Consul in London informed Istanbul that Britain was planning to invade the entire Gold Coast, as well as Sokoto and Bornu. The consul officially requested an explanation from the British Foreign Office.¹³⁷¹ In 1885, also the Ottoman Consul in Rome began to report that Italians assembly a big army in Sicily with a possible aim to attack Tripolitania for a colonial invasion.¹³⁷² After one year, the consul reported that the Italians' intentions were very serious. Istanbul should immediately begin military preparations for defence

1368 Sami Çölgeçen, *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*, 131.

1369 B.O.A., İrade Dahiliye, 1292-2/102002.

1370 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği, 13/2.

1371 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası Evrakı, 67/82.

1372 B.O.A., Hâriciye Nezâreti Siyasî Evrakı, 1600/71.

and seek possible alliances against the Italians in Europe.¹³⁷³ The Ottoman Consul in Madrid was reporting that, due to the fear of a possible intervention of France to Morocco, Spain is ready to support the Ottomans against the actions of France in the Sahara.¹³⁷⁴

In light of the potential threat of an Italian invasion post-1886, the Ottomans sought to garner support from France, and in the event of French intervention in Ghadames and Ghat prior to Italian involvement, they looked to Spain for assistance. In the case of failing to secure backing, the Ottoman consul in Berlin endeavoured to solicit support from Germany against these potential threats. However, German authorities displayed reluctance to form an alliance with the Ottomans due to concerns that such a partnership could provoke France, particularly following their significant defeat in 1871.¹³⁷⁵

While various European states commenced colonial invasions in Africa, the Ottomans opted to adhere to prevailing Eurocentric international norms and regulations to counter these incursions, marking a notable shift in their foreign policy approach. As already examined previously,¹³⁷⁶ till the Tanzimat reforms after 1810s, the Ottoman Empire had enforced its own international legal framework upon foreign states, rooted in Ottoman-Islamic epistemology and characterized by distinct terminology and discourse, that have great commonalities with the Afro-Islamic epistemology. Nonetheless, post-1810s, the Ottomans acknowledged their inability to impose their international legal standards on foreign powers, particularly European states and the USA. They began to engage in discussions and actions aligned with Eurocentric international law and norms, in the meantime maintaining their Afro-Islamic epistemology-based governance system in Tripolitania domestically. In this respect, in their diplomatic interactions with European states concerning Sahara-related matters after the 1870s, the Ottoman foreign office encountered challenges in translating concepts from Ottoman- and Afro-Islamic epistemology to Eurocentric epistemologies. This led to instances where suitable translations were lacking, and European diplomats sometimes disregarded or failed to grasp the complexity of the Ottoman diplomats' efforts.

In the 1890s, when French forces initiated their invasion of the Sahara and asserted their claim over Kavar and Bornu, the Ottoman Foreign Office issued an official communication to Paris and London, since Britain had also claims on Bornu, to elucidate the Ottoman dominion and impact in the region. The Ottoman Foreign Office delineated the territories under their control and influence

1373 B.O.A., İrade Hariciye, 337/21811.


1374 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği, 28/55.

1375 B.O.A., Hâriciye Nezâreti Siyasî Evrakı, 1620/27.

1376 See Chapter 2.

in this communication, employing terms like "hinterland" and "protectorate" to align with Eurocentric definitions and discourses, recognizing that their own terminology of *tadbir* and *idara* did not resonate within Eurocentric epistemologies of the new international norms. The Ottoman's diplomatic note specified that their territorial frontier extended from Temassinine in the far west, through Djanet, Fachi, and Jado to the west-south, then turning southeast to encompass Zinder, Bornu, Baghirmi, Wadai, and ultimately Dar Runga within the Ottoman sphere. The Ottoman Foreign Office explicitly disclaimed any authority or influence over the sultanate of Air and the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, acknowledging them as independent entities.¹³⁷⁷ As discussed in previous pages, most of these regions and cities were either directly part of the Ottoman *idara* system or vassals of Bornu, which was under Ottoman *mutawalli* rule. The case of Wadai and its vassal Dar Runga was the only complicated one. Although the *kolak* of Wadai proposed his subjugation to Istanbul in the 1850s, the Ottoman government was not interested. Apparently, in the 1890s, they began to remember this diplomatic relation with Wadai to put their claims on this region. In 1896, they even actualized these claims had already been shown in the previous sections. This strategic positioning prevented other European powers from staking claims on these territories. It is noteworthy to stress that despite being crucial trade partners with the Ottoman Empire under longstanding agreements, Agadez and Sokoto did not attract significant interest from the Ottoman Foreign Office. The French and British Foreign Offices neither explicitly acknowledged nor rejected the Ottoman claims, opting to overlook the Ottomans' diplomatic overtures. In 1894, inasmuch as Britain expanded its involvement in Sudan and Darfur, the Ottomans issued another communication to Britain, asserting their dominion and influence over territories including Darfur, Khartoum, Kassala, and "*hatt-ı istiva*" (Tr. equator line). Consequently, as per the Ottoman Foreign Office in 1894, the map of Ottoman Africa was delineated as described below.

1377 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti, Londra, 281.



Map of the Ottoman Africa

Despite these communications, in 1899, the Ottoman Foreign Office encountered a situation where Britain and France disregarded its official diplomatic assertions by entering into an agreement to partition the area from Agadez to Kassala. In response, the Ottoman Foreign Office crafted a detailed communication, delving into Eurocentric epistemologies to bolster their claims. In this not, they state: “... a French delegate had presented a report at the Berlin conference in 1885, asserting that Central Africa was not unpossessed territory open to invasion... [also] legal scholar Frantz Despagne from Bordeaux had emphasized that the right to invade African land could only be exercised if the land was “*res nullius*” (unpossessed)... In other words, French authorities and academics had acknowledged that France lacked the right to invade central Africa as these lands were not unpossessed, and as per the regulations of the Berlin conference, fell within the hinterland of Tripoli, thus affirming Ottoman control... [Furthermore,] Ottomans are in contact with these land since centuries, whereas French had nothing to do with them.”¹³⁷⁸ In response to this note, the French Foreign Office initially argued that Central Africa was devoid of “human” presence, hence classified as “*res nullius*.” Nonetheless, when the Ottoman Consul in Paris pointed out the historical interactions between the Ottomans, Bornu, and Wadai, refuting the argument of “absence of human

¹³⁷⁸ B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 520/249.

presence” for the region, the French Foreign Office claimed to have signed some agreements with local communities, thereupon, asserting their rights in the region. Subsequently, when asked to provide evidence of these agreements, instead of providing these alleged agreements, the French Foreign Office shifted their stance, stating that they would not acknowledge Ottoman claims unless there was a military presence by them in the region. The Ottoman Consul in Paris emphasized that military conquest was not their method of expanding their rule in Africa, contrasting it with the peaceful expansion based on the consent of the local populace, a practice they had followed since the 1850s, trying to explain *idara* in Eurocentric terms. At this point, according to Consul, French Foreign Office severed diplomatic ties with the Ottomans.¹³⁷⁹ Observing the clear paradoxes in each claim of the French Foreign Office, the Consul wrongfully assumed that the French could not take any action, considering it would be illegal.

In actuality, following this interruption, the French authorities swiftly moved to invade Sahara and Bornu upon realizing their inability to present a coherent argument against the Ottomans' claim. Although aware of these efforts, the Ottomans refrained from taking action until 1902. According to Abdurrahman Çaycı, this delay was attributed to the escalating threat of a potential Italian invasion of Tripoli. The Ottomans were cautious not to provoke the French too much, hoping for their support in the event of an invasion in Tripoli.¹³⁸⁰ Nevertheless, when the Italians encountered internal issues in 1902, causing a delay in their invasion plans, the Ottomans once again engaged in diplomatic efforts to thwart the French's “unlawful” invasion of the region. In a communication to Paris in 1902, the Ottoman Foreign Office asserted that: “...any claim of France in Bornu and Wadai is illogical and illegal... The Ottomans contended that their established presence and influence in these territories negated the need for military occupation, emphasizing that only the Ottomans possessed the rightful authority to do so if necessary.”¹³⁸¹ The French Foreign Office, in response, declined to provide an official rebuttal to these assertions, considering the Ottoman Empire as an illegitimate power in Africa. Furthermore, the French warned that any Ottoman military actions to assert control in the region would be construed as a declaration of war.¹³⁸² When the Consul asked the reason of this alleged illegitimacy of the Ottomans in Africa, the French Foreign Office argued that the Ottoman Empire was not sufficiently civilized or developed to assert any claims in Africa. Consequently, the Ottoman Foreign Office realized that the principles of

1379 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 520/263.

1380 Abdurrahman Çaycı, *Büyük Sahara’da Türk-Fransız Rekabeti (1858-1911)* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1970), 116.

1381 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 520 (1902).

1382 A.E.F., Tripoli, 4 (1902).

Eurocentric international law only applied to European states, effectively excluding the Ottomans from its protections. Subsequently, the Ottomans abandoned hopes of diplomatic support to safeguard Tripolitania and the central Sahara, opting instead to rely on their military capabilities. This shift was also influenced by pressure from reformist Ottoman officers in Tripolitania, who were alarmed by the French forces' unauthorized incursion into the Sahara and the government's inaction, since they were not aware of the diplomatic relations. In 1902, the army commander of the Ghat, Rıza Paşa, expressed frustration to İstanbul over the delayed response to the French threat, questioning the government's inaction, as waiting for military provision for years.¹³⁸³ By 1904, tensions between officials in the Ottoman government in İstanbul and Tripolitan officers escalated from complaints to threats. The *vali* of Tripoli, Recep Paşa, wrote to İstanbul that “apparently, you are planning to sell Tripolitania to the French. Know that I will not give it up without a fight.”¹³⁸⁴

Soon, Djanet, Kavar, and Bornu experienced an invasion by French forces, who justified their actions by asserting that the Ottomans did not have legitimate authority in those areas.¹³⁸⁵ However, inasmuch as there were Ottoman garrisons in Ghat, Murzuq, and Tibesti, the French could not dare to declare war against the Ottomans to capture them. In other words, the French perceived the Ottoman *idara* system in the Sahara as a vulnerability that facilitated their invasion, while the Ottoman *tadbir* system in Tripolitania hindered French expansion. That was also the reason why French officials in İstanbul frequently lodged fabricated complaints concerning reformist officers in Tripolitania who advocated for expanding the *tadbir* system in the Sahara, accusing them to incite their dismissal.¹³⁸⁶ The patriotic fervour and military commitment of these officers posed a significant threat to French colonial ambitions, as they viewed Tripolitania and the central Sahara not merely as imperial territories but as their homeland, warranting steadfast defence. Hence, the French government sought to exploit the ideological discord between the reformist officers and Abdulhamid II. The relations between French agents and reformist Ottoman officers were also more complex than simple hostility. Notably, reformist officers in İstanbul maintained cordial ties with the French consul and agents, viewing the French empire as a model for their own transformation efforts. Along these lines, the French Foreign Office engaged with these influential officers in İstanbul to garner their support and exert influence over the Ottoman government.¹³⁸⁷ This dynamic underscored an internal paradox within the reformist movement, considering Tripolitan officers

1383 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Askerî Maruzat, 183/62.

1384 Ebü'l-Muzaffer Recep, *Trablus Ahvali* (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası Matbaası, 1910), 90–91.

1385 H.A., 521/24

1386 B.O.A., Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 521/25.

1387 A.N.F., Turqie, 200 MI 606, 1908.

resisted brutal and violent French expansion, whereas receiving directives from the Ottoman government to implement reform projects mirroring those undertaken by the French in Algeria and Tunisia.¹³⁸⁸

Nevertheless, between these two parties, Abdulhamid II and reformist Tripolitan officers, the Ottoman government followed another strategy. Recognizing the limitations of the diplomatic endeavours led by II. Abdulhamid II's foreign office in offering viable solutions, the government also acknowledged the severe economic challenges faced by the empire over the years. This economic strain had depleted the imperial treasury, making it difficult to fund a substantial army in Tripolitania or support public infrastructure projects like schools and hospitals. At the endm, local wealthy individuals often had to contribute funds for such initiatives.¹³⁸⁹ Furthermore, a series of famines from 1882 to 1889 compelled the government to divert resources, including sending ships loaded with flour to prevent widespread starvation. In response to these crises, a 5% aid tax was imposed on the affluent in 1889 to offset losses incurred during the famine.¹³⁹⁰ By 1902, the government expressed concerns to the Tripoli governor that Tripolitania had not been contributing to the imperial treasury, instead necessitating annual provisions from İstanbul for local sustenance. Thus, the government instructed the governor to implement reform plans to ameliorate the regional conditions.¹³⁹¹

In the 1880s, the government made the decision to arm and train local communities for self-defence in anticipation of a potential invasion, rather than relying solely on the military for protection. Several European newspapers published this as “despot Turks forcing Arabs into the miliary”. In reality, the demand to join the army came from Tripolitan communities already in the 1870s, and the Ottomans ignored this for years.¹³⁹² This new approach, involves recruiting local people into the army, served as a compromise between Abdulhamid II, who opposed direct military action, and reformist officers who advocated for immediate arming. Initially, the government focused on training local communities.¹³⁹³ Nevertheless, at this earlier stage, the government limited their strategy first training local communities in lieu of arming them, as the threat of invasion was not yet imminent. This stance shifted significantly following the French invasion of Tunisia in 1882 and

1388 B.O.A., İrade Dahiliye, 1268/99691.

1389 Muhammad Salheen Khafifi, *Al-Nizam al-Daribi Fi Vilayat Tarabulus al-Gharb (1835-1911)* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2000), 119.

1390 Amal Muhammad Mahjoub, *Al-Awbia Wal Majat Fi Vilayat Tarabulus al-Gharb Kilal al-Ahd al-Othmani al-Thani* (Trablus: al-jami'a al-tarabulus al-gharb, 1998), 29.

1391 B.O.A., İrade Hususi, 96/58.

1392 For more details, see: Al-Dhuwaybi, *Al-Awdea al-Askariyat Fi Tarabulus al-Gharb Qubayl al-Ihtilal al-Itali*, 152.

1393 D.M.T.L., Idara, dated as 1880.

Italy's growing interest in Tripolitania after the colonization of Tunisia and Egypt. Therefore, the Ottomans began not only training but also organizing local divisions. However, they did so separately from the imperial army to avoid potential backlash from the local population. For instance, in 1889, the government called two local representatives from Tripoli, Salim Majisi and Hajj Salim Daghen, to ask their opinion for a possible local division integrated in the imperial army.¹³⁹⁴ Upon receiving positive responses, the government decided in 1892 to establish new local divisions integrated within the imperial army. To ensure a smooth recruitment process and prevent unrest, Sanussiyya sheikhs were appointed to oversee the assembly of this army. These sheikhs propagated that in the case of a jihad declaration of the Ottoman Caliph, all Muslims are obliged to take up arms to fight.¹³⁹⁵ This new approach marked a departure from the previous system involving the Kuloğlu, who were granted tax exemptions for military duties. In 1892, all privileges and responsibilities of the Kuloğlu were officially revoked due to complaints of corruption within their ranks.¹³⁹⁶ They, along with other local communities, were invited to join the new local army under the hierarchy and discipline of the imperial army without receiving any tax-related benefits. This strategic shift aimed not only to establish a new local army but also to foster a sense of collective identity and responsibility. In case of a possible invasion, the local communities should not expect that the imperial army or Kuloğlu will fight for them, but they should be ready to fight for their homeland as being part of the imperial army. That was a doctrine, described by Suat Zeyrek as “living together or falling apart together” (Tr. *birlikte yaşamak ya da birlikte dağılmak*).¹³⁹⁷ Following this new doctrine, after 1900, the newspapers in İstanbul (such as *Darü-l Hilafe*), Tripoli (such as *Al-Kashaf*), and Cairo (such as *Al-Asr Al-Jadid*) began publishing articles to promote the idea of unity between the imperial army and local communities in the face of potential colonial threats.¹³⁹⁸

Conclusion

1394 B.O.A., İrade Dahiliye, 1218/95393.

1395 Nevzat Artuç, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin İttihad-ı İslam Siyaseti Çerçevesinde İttihatçı-Senusi İlişkileri (1908-1918)* (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2013), 61–65.

1396 The Ottoman archives are full of negative reports about the Kuloğlu groups. In 1881, Mehmed Nazif Paşa reported that the groups had no real military ability. They needed real military discipline as part of the imperial army. See: ‘Mehmed Nazif Paşa Layihası (1881)’ B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 9/25. In 1885, Mehmed Namık Paşa reported to İstanbul that the Kuloğlu had been useful against the Ghuma rebellion between 1840 and 1850, but had not worked properly since then. They caused economic loss without providing proper military service. See: ‘Mehmed Namık Paşa Layihası (1885)’ B.O.A., Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 10/24.

1397 Suat Zeyrek, *Meşrutiyet: Osmanlı’da Birlikte Yaşamak Ya Da Birlikte Dağılmak* (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2013), 88.

1398 Ali Mustapha Al-Mısrati, *Sihafat Libiyya Fi Nısfı Karn* (Beirut: Dar Al-Kashif, 1960), 100–110.

In the era of expansion in the Central Sudan during the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was also not an exception, notwithstanding the gradual loss of territory in the Balkans and Caucasus. However, their expansion was significantly marked by the ambivalence politics, creating endless internal debates and conflicts in the Ottoman bureaucracy. This was due to the historical context in which the Ottoman Empire was situated. The divergence of opinion between reformist officers in Tripolitania and Abdulhamid II was reflected in their respective visions of the system of governance for the empire. Conversely, the Ottoman government was compelled to establish a harmonious equilibrium between these two opposing forces, frequently implementing its own distinctive governance strategies. However, the pivotal role in the expansion of the Ottoman rule was played by Tripolitan merchants and civilians. These local agents not only conducted unofficial missions on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, they also formulated their own vision and ambition for an Ottoman rule throughout the entirety of Central Sudan. These ambitious plans were largely met with indifference from İstanbul, since the empire was deeply engaged in complex diplomatic and military interactions with other European states. Therefore, any kind of seemingly local issues rapidly became a global issue with the global vision of numerous local agents and involvement of various Ottoman and French agents, as well as their respective foreign offices.

Under these complexities, the Ottoman Empire had to re-arrange their system of governance in order to align it with the specific circumstances of the Sahrawi region. In this regard, whilst there were several ambitious plans with disparate visions for the region, in many instances, the Ottomans primarily reacted to the evolving dynamics and demands from the local actors. Furthermore, these developments occurred within the context of the diplomatic manoeuvres conducted by the Ottoman Foreign Office. In other words, the Ottoman Empire in Central Sudan had various facets. An Ottoman Empire served as an instrument for local actors to advance their political and military agendas within their respective regions; another Ottoman Empire functioned as a hub of power, with reformist officers seeking to transform the entire Central Sudan in accordance with their personal ambitions; another Ottoman Empire maintained the religious authority, with Abdulhamid II aiming to transcend imperial boundaries and establish a global caliphate; another Ottoman Empire operated as a European actor, aligning with Eurocentric international norms to safeguard their claims; another Ottoman Empire was an African actor, sharing a common epistemology with the inhabitants of the Central Sudan, and excluded by the European states from the “civilized world of Europe”; another Ottoman Empire was a big player *in-between*, granting inspiration for some local

agents to create a global power between Africa and Europe, making the Ottoman Empire a buffer state, thereupon rendering their land impenetrable for invasive forces from Europe.

The multifaceted nature of the Ottoman presence in Tripolitania gave rise to a distinctive set of circumstances that not only posed significant challenges but introduced several inventions and left a complex legacy. It is of the utmost importance to note that the non-military nature of the Ottoman expansion towards the Sahara and beyond, which was covered by *idara* and *mutawalli* systems, had a profound impact on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Sahara and southern Central Sudan. Despite the efforts of non-Afro-Islamic agents to portray the Ottoman Empire as a foreign invader in Africa, particularly in the region of Central Sudan, and the propagation of this conspiracy theory by French and British agents throughout Central Sudan with the aim of creating an anti-Ottoman sentiment, the Central Sudanic states were in fact sending commissions to İstanbul with the intention of creating a new political bloc in order to defend against European colonialism. However, this non-military nature was also exploited by the *riasa* regime of Rabillah and the French, invading any places that they did not encounter with a formidable army. Accordingly, only certain regions, such as Ghat and Tibesti, which were subject to the *tadbir* system, could survive from an initial onslaught of *riasa* invasions due to the presence of an Ottoman garrison. Nevertheless, in a long term, this system of governance also ultimately proved ineffective, considering the *riasa* regime of Italy began to invade the entire region of Tripolitania in 1911. In other words, notwithstanding the Ottomans' enduring internal conflicts and diplomatic complexities, which rendered its expansion ambivalent, the collapse of the entire Ottoman rule in Central Sudan was not a result of this ambivalence. Rather, it was the advent of a new *riasa* age, which the Ottoman Empire was ill-prepared to face.

7. Expansion and Conflict: Political Economic Affairs of Sokoto, Bornu, and Wadai

7.1. New Dynamics of Governance in Sokoto

The death of Muhammad Bello in 1837 marked the end of the reformatory period in Sokoto. Nonetheless, this does not imply that there were no subsequent changes in the governance system employed by the caliphs after 1837. Although it is accurate to state that the following caliphs did not seek to establish a new system, which had been the primary focus between 1804 and 1837, they did modify the governance system in response to evolving circumstances, as well as in accordance with the foundational discourses established by Usman dan Fodio, Muhammad Bello, and Abdullahi dan Fodio.

Abubakr I Atiku, who reigned from 1837 to 1842, serves as a significant illustration of the aforementioned adjustments in governance. During the early years of his rule, he encountered similar insurrectionary challenges as those faced by Bello following the demise of Usman dan Fodio. In this respect, Atiku adopted certain strategies reminiscent of Bello's, such as asserting that he had received secret information from Usman dan Fodio, which purportedly conferred extraordinary power.¹³⁹⁹ Furthermore, Atiku is remembered by the populace in Sokoto for his strictness akin to that of Bello, particularly in maintaining the jihad campaign and mandating regular participation from the community.¹⁴⁰⁰ However, Atiku held divergent views regarding the governance systems of the emirates compared to the caliphate. Bello, in his later years, was a staunch advocate for the idea that not only the caliph but also all emirs should apply *tadbir* to ensure ultimate success. Conversely, Atiku, particularly influenced by his personal involvement in the conflict between al-Bakkay and Bello, harboured reservations with regard to the emirs' application of *tadbir*.

Al-Bakkay's assertion of independence from Sokoto, justified by the principles of *tadbir*, raised concerns for Atiku concerning a similar trend emerging in other emirates amid the various rebellions during his reign. Consequently, when al-Bakkay sent gifts and correspondence to Atiku following Bello's death, Atiku composed a treatise for al-Bakkay outlining the optimal governance system for a ruler. In this document, Atiku articulates the fundamental principles of *idara*, emphasizing that success is contingent upon justice rather than the ruler's authority; he asserts that the ruler's primary responsibility is to implement sharia and thereby ensure justice, and nothing

1399 Wazi Junaidu Bukhari, *Dabt Al-Multaqitat Akhbar al-Muftarqat Fi al-Muallifat* (NNPC, 1959), 31.

1400 Liman Aliyu, 'Chronicle of Sokoto', 5, N.N.A.

more.¹⁴⁰¹ Nevertheless, within the same treatise, Atiku delineates the distinctions between governance in emirates and that in the caliphate. He characterizes the emir as a solemn administrator executing sharia on behalf of the caliph, while positing that the caliph should actively consider the application of *tadbir*. In his argumentation, Atiku contends that, as caliph, one must remain prepared to undertake necessary measures to pre-empt future challenges, a hallmark of *tadbir*. In this regard, Atiku maintains that it is crucial for the caliph to employ *tadbir* to optimize conditions within the caliphate, particularly to ensure the consolidation of the emirates, thereby advocating for a diminished role of the emirs in governance, focusing solely on the execution of sharia.

Following Atiku's death, Aliyu Babba, who ruled from 1842 to 1859, made significant adjustments to the governance system. His rise to power was notably supported by the local communities in Sokoto, who were weary of the protracted jihad campaigns that had persisted for decades. In contrast to Atiku, who compelled participation in jihad through his spiritual and political authority, Aliyu Babba recognized the general reluctance for further military campaigns and opted to allow individuals to engage in their own pursuits, such as agriculture.¹⁴⁰² Furthermore, unlike Atiku, he did not assert any special spiritual claims, such as receiving esoteric knowledge from his predecessors. Notably, he was the first caliph to refrain from intervening in legal disputes by exercising personal judgment (Ar. *ijtihad*), a practice characteristic of his predecessors, Bello and Atiku.¹⁴⁰³ In fact, as expected from him by common people, he favoured the application of *idara* within the caliphate. Simultaneously, he maintained that emirs should also implement *idara*, as evidenced by his correspondence with them.¹⁴⁰⁴

However, the early implementation of *idara* during his reign encountered significant obstacles. One of his relatives openly rejected his authority, and when Aliyu Babba attempted to compel him to reside in Sokoto under surveillance, the relative clandestinely relocated to the southwest and established the Kontagora Emirate between the Nupe and Zazzau Emirates, which was never recognized by Aliyu Babba.¹⁴⁰⁵ Additionally, several local scholars and jurists in Sokoto publicly

1401 N.N.A., Zariprof P/ARI, 28

1402 Umar bin Muhammad Bukhari, 'Tanbīh Al-'Iḥwān Fī Amār al-Sūdān', P.C. 5.

1403 Kyar Tijjani, 'The Force of Religion in the Conduct of Political Affairs and Interpersonal Relations in Bornu and Sokoto', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 270.

1404 Tukur Muhammad Mukhtar, 'Aliyu Ibn Bello (Aliyu Babba), 1842-1859', in *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, ed. Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), footnote 262.

1405 Mukhtar, 111–13.

criticized Aliyu Babba's application of *idara*, even withdrawing their allegiance until he reverted to the previous *tadbir* system.¹⁴⁰⁶ Furthermore, other emirs began to exploit Aliyu Babba's *idara* system by significantly reducing their tribute obligations, reaching historically low levels within the caliphate.¹⁴⁰⁷ In response to the rebellions led by the emirs of Katsina and Hadeja between 1840 and 1850, Aliyu Babba fundamentally altered his governance system. After the 1840s, he ceased to tolerate any deviations in treatment by the emirs. Consequently, he reinstated a stringent application of *tadbir* by initiating several military campaigns and mandating that all emirs utilize cowrie currency for state affairs to establish a centralized standard.¹⁴⁰⁸

The short-term application of *idara* by Aliyu Baba had profoundly negative repercussions on the governance strategies of subsequent caliphs, leading them to exercise increased caution regarding any alterations to the existing political framework. Hence, the promotion of *idara* within the emirates and the application of *tadbir* in the caliphate, as a legacy of Abubakr I Atiku, gained significant respect and prominence from 1859 until the 20th century. For instance, during the 1860s, Caliph Ahmadu Atiku, who reigned from 1859 to 1866, focused intently on realizing a *tabir* project initially envisioned by Bello. He successfully persuaded, at times through coercion, all nomadic Pullo communities between Sokoto and Katsina to enter into agreements with the caliphate. Although the Pullo communities surrounding Sokoto initially resisted settlement, they ultimately accepted the terms proposed by Ahmadu Atiku, which prohibited them from engaging in conflicts with farmers and clearly delineated the regulations governing their seasonal migrations.¹⁴⁰⁹ In the case of the nomadic Fulbe (plural form of Pullo) near Katsina, he managed to ensure their transition to settled village life, effectively ending their nomadic practices.¹⁴¹⁰ The advocacy for *idara* in the emirates continued during the tenure of Ahmadu Rufai, between 1867 and 1873.

Nevertheless, instead of the long-term emphasis for the application of *idara* by the emirates, several emirs never ceased to apply *tadbir*, and in the 1870s, their long-term *tadbir* application, in many cases relying on the implementation of *ray*, began to tend corruption that put burden on the common people. Thus, in contrast to his predecessors, Ahmadu Rufai did not confine his efforts to

1406 Tijjani, 'The Force of Religion in the Conduct of Political Affairs and Interpersonal Relations in Bornu and Sokoto', 270.

1407 C.N. Ubah, 'The Emirates and the Central Government: The Case of Kano-Sokoto Relations', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 313.

1408 David C. Tambo, 'The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9, no. 2 (1976): 191.

1409 Liman Aliyu, 'Chronicle of Sokoto', 7, N.N.A.

1410 Yusufu Bala Usman, 'Transformation of Katsina (1400-1883): The Emergence and Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment of of the Emirate' (Ph.D. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1981), 116–17.

personal correspondence urging emirs to adopt *idara*; instead, he authored public treatises akin to those of Bello, articulating the best governance model for emirs. In these treatises, he explicitly positioned himself to hold emirs accountable for the application of *idara*.¹⁴¹¹ This stance garnered substantial support from the common people in the emirates, who were increasingly suffering under oppressive taxation and monopolistic practices imposed by their emirs.¹⁴¹² Nonetheless, his stringent interventions in the affairs of influential emirs, such as those in Zazzau, incited a new wave of rebellion following the 1870s.

The circumstances surrounding the caliphate were notably complex when Umar bin Ali took the throne in 1881 and ruled until 1891. He was the final caliph to attempt to assemble a caliphal army for a jihad campaign, which ultimately proved unsuccessful.¹⁴¹³ Furthermore, he was the first caliph to experience significant unpopularity among both the general populace and local scholars as well as jurists in Sokoto. This unpopularity was exacerbated by the long-term application of *tadbir* in Sokoto, particularly the unrestricted implementation of *ray* by the caliphs, which began to render the corruption within the caliphal administration increasingly apparent. His massively and unusually increasing personal wealth, especially around the 1880s, caused common people and scholars to distance themselves from the caliph.¹⁴¹⁴ In contrast with the era of Aliyu Baba in the 1850s, local scholars and jurists began to distance themselves from the practices associated with *tadbir*, influenced by the millennial Mahdist movements and their compelling arguments for *riasa*. Consequently, several scholars in Sokoto began publicly criticizing the caliph, urging him to adopt the principles of *riasa* as was once the case in the early days of the caliphate.¹⁴¹⁵

During the reign of Abdulrahman bin Abubakar from 1891 to 1902, the problems became more acute. The caliph's engagement in the political matters of the emirates led to widespread unrest, a stark contrast to the situation four decades prior. Notably, Abdulrahman's involvement in the Kano civil war of 1894 exacerbated public discontent when accusations of corruption emerged, particularly regarding his practice of appointing his sons to nearly all significant positions.¹⁴¹⁶ The

1411 Bukhari, *Dabt Al-Multaqat Akhbar al-Muftarqat Fi al-Muallifat*, 42.

1412 Liman Aliyu, 'Chronicle of Sokoto', 9.

1413 'Taḥdīr Al-ʿIḥwān', P.C. 5.

1414 Usman Abubakar Daniya, 'Umar Ibn Aliyu Babba, 1881-1891', in *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, ed. Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), 199 and 211.

1415 Umar bin Muhammad Bukhari, 'Tanbīh Al-ʿIḥwān Fī Amār al-Sūdān', P.C. 5.

1416 Usman Abubakar Daniya, 'Abdulrahman Ibn Abubkar Atiku, 1891-1902', in *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, ed. Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), 221-30.

persistent critical attitude of scholars and jurists in Sokoto towards the caliph reached a peak during Abdulrahman's rule, resulting in his inability to find a suitable candidate for the position of chief judge in Sokoto. At the end, he was compelled to summon scholars from Adamawa to fill this position, considering no scholar in Sokoto accepted to work under his authority.¹⁴¹⁷

Still, it is noticeable that despite the numerous challenges faced, there was no significant transformation in the governance system of Sokoto. The caliphs frequently encountered difficulties in persuading or compelling the emirs to implement *idara*; however, most of the emirs consistently upheld their application of *tadbir*. For this issue, a particularly noteworthy institution established by Bello, which persisted until the final days of the caliphate, significantly facilitated the caliphs' implementation of their *tadbir* system. This institution was *radd al-mazalim*, the court presided by the caliph personally, which served as a crucial instrument in the *tadbir* system of governance.¹⁴¹⁸ The historical significance of this institution in the caliphate is underscored by its first documented mention in a letter from Bello to the emir of Bauchi in the 1830s, wherein he communicated the outcomes of the *radd al-mazalim* court and requested the emir to enforce its decisions.¹⁴¹⁹ The primary function of this court was to allow individuals in the caliphate to sue any party directly, including the emirs and caliph himself. Notably, it was Bello who quickly recognized the court's potential utility in uncovering confidential domestic political and economic matters concerning the emirs.¹⁴²⁰ Especially during the reign of Aliyu Babba in the 1850s, the court evolved into a mechanism through which the caliphs could intervene in the domestic political and economic affairs of the emirs, including adjudicating matters involving certain officials or personal associates of the emirs.¹⁴²¹ In the latter half of the 19th century, the caliphs not only acquired confidential information regarding the emirs through this court but also routinely intervened in their political and economic matters.

The dynamics associated with the aforementioned changes and the sustainability of the governance system established by the caliphs resulted in a range of unforeseen consequences for the caliphate. The fundamental dynamics and transformations in the peripheral emirates were significantly shaped

1417 Daniya, 230.

1418 See Chapter 1.

1419 "letter from Bello to the emir of Bauchi", uncategorized, K.S.C.B.

1420 For more details see: T.M. Mukhtar, 'A History of Mazalim Court System in the Administration of Justice in Metropolitan Sokoto, 1808-1903' (Ph.D. Thesis, Sokoto, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, 2015), 1808–1903.

1421 Y.Y. Ibrahim, 'Concept and Application of Radd Al-Mazalim in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of the Sokoto Caliphate' (Ph.D. Thesis, Sokoto, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, 2000), 174–203.

by local conditions rather than caliphal policies, whereas the central emirates faced substantial challenges in their political and economic affairs.

7.1.1. The First Wave of Rebellion: Losing Side of the Caliphate

The establishment of the Uthmaniyya caliphate in 1808 marked a significant transformation across the region, yielding numerous benefits for the newly formed emirates, including political cohesion, a substantial domestic market, and the cessation of intercity conflicts among the Hausa cities. Nevertheless, certain emirates soon perceived themselves as disadvantaged within the framework of the caliphate, leading to a surge of insurrections against Sokoto following the 1840s. Katsina was among the most notable of these emirates.

Prior to the jihad, particularly during the 18th century, Katsina held a significant political and economic position among the Hausa states. The city served as the northern gateway to Hausaland for trans-Saharan trade and functioned as a central conduit for trade between the west and east, connecting Yauri to Bornu.¹⁴²² Furthermore, despite engaging in ongoing conflicts with Gobir and Kano during this period, Katsina maintained sufficient power to exert dominance over the region.¹⁴²³ The city emerged as a notable centre for scholarship, particularly attracting Kanuri scholars from Bornu, due to its political and economic influence.¹⁴²⁴ Some of the scholars of the city, such as Muhammad al-Fulani al-Kashnawi (d. 1741), even became a teacher in Al-Azhar University in Cairo, writing several books on astronomy.¹⁴²⁵ Additionally, numerous Kanuri merchants established their wards in Katsina to facilitate trade with the western regions.¹⁴²⁶ As a result, 18th-century Katsina exhibited a metropolitan character, hosting diverse communities from across Central Sudan, including the Kel Tamasheq from Air and Tripolitan merchants from Ghadames, who significantly

1422 M. U. Adamu, 'Distribution of Trading Centers in the Central Sudan in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 65–67.

1423 'Chronicle of Katsina', uncategorized, P.C. 15.

1424 Kalli Gazali, 'The Kanuri Diaspora and Its Islamic Intellectual Impact Outside Kanem-Bornu', in *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, ed. T. El-Miskin et al., vol. Vol 1 (Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013).

1425 Ahmad Muhammad Kani, 'The Place of Katsina in the Intellectual History of Bilad Al-Sudan up to 1800', in *Islam and History of Learning in Katsina*, ed. Ismail Tsiga and Abdalla Adamu (Ibadan: Kenbim Press, 1997), 30–31.

1426 For more details, see: Ali Kachalla, 'The Kanuri in Diaspora: A Case Study of the Kanuri in Kano Zaria c.1503-1900' (M.A. Thesis, University of Maiduguri, 1997).

contributed to the city's historical development.¹⁴²⁷ However, these dynamics underwent a substantial transformation following the jihad of dan Fodio.

In fact, the jihad in Katsina experienced rapid success without inflicting significant destruction. However, the caliphate ultimately failed to eradicate the Katsinawa dynasty, which, after losing control of the city, sought refuge and support in the city of Zinder around 1810.¹⁴²⁸ Following the acquisition of necessary resources, the dynasty established itself near Maradi to strategize for a return to Katsina. Their commitment to reclaiming the city was so intense that they showed little interest in establishing a permanent settlement in Maradi.¹⁴²⁹ Nevertheless, neither the Katsinawa dynasty succeeded in retaking the city, nor did the Katsina Emirate, notwithstanding military assistance from Sokoto, manage to eliminate the threat posed by the dynasty. Consequently, from the 1820s onward, hostilities between Maradi and Katsina persisted until the eventual collapse of the caliphate at the end of the 19th century.¹⁴³⁰ Although the Maradi state was unable to capture Katsina, it effectively isolated the city from the north and instigated terror along its western frontier, thereby obstructing trade routes from the west and north. This isolation led to a significant economic decline in Katsina, prompting the departure of Ghadamesian and Kel Tamasheq merchants.¹⁴³¹ The rapid and severe economic downturn also adversely affected Agadez around 1820, as access to Hausaland was hindered by the blockades imposed by Gobir and Maradi. Sokoto managed to suppress Gobir and restore the trade route to Agadez in the 1830s, thereby averting an economic crisis for the sultanate of Air. Katsina, on the other hand, was unable to resolve its own issues.¹⁴³² By the 1850s, even Kanuri scholars and local Hausa manufacturers began to vacate the city.¹⁴³³

Especially around the 1840s was the turning point for the emirate. Sokoto and other emirates had previously engaged in efforts to defend Katsina against Maradi, whereas the 1840s saw Sokoto and

1427 For more details see: Munnir Mamman, *Tarihin Unguwannin Birnin Kastina* (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2015); Abdullahi Qasim, *Tarihin Masanawa* (Katsina: Self-Publishing, 2011).

1428 Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale, *Tradition Historiques Des Katsinaawaa* (Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1970), 56.

1429 Mahamane Addo, 'Institutions et Imaginaire Politiques Haussa: Le Cas Du Katsina Sous La Dyanstie de Korau (XVe-XIXe Siècle)' (Ph.D. Thesis, Marseille, Université de Provence-Aix-Marseille, 1998), 441.

1430 'Chronicle of Katsina'.

1431 Adamu, 'Distribution of Trading Centers in the Central Sudan in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', 86.

1432 Adamu, 88. Yet, the route between Agadez and Sokoto once again closed around 1870s, when Kel Geres joined Kel Fadey in their war against Kel Away, which rendered the trade route to southern Agadez very dangerous from the north. 'Interview No. 27: With Mohamed Ghabdouwane in Agadez in 2023'.

1433 Bello, *Tarihin Zuriyar Galadima Ahmadu* (Zaria, 2017), 18; Milafiya Aruwa Filaba, 'A History of Karu, Kurape and Kurudu Kingdoms: A Study of Economic, Social, and Political Change Among Gbayi of Central Nigeria in the 18th and 19th Centuries' (M.A. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1994), 251.

Kano capitalizing on the decline of Katsina. Following the defeat of Gobir at the end of the 1838, Sokoto experienced a substantial increase in trade activity from Agadez. In the 18th century, Kano played a rather secondary role as a manufacturing center, whereas Katsina was the centre of trade, around 1840s, this structure further shifted to the south. Kano emerged as a burgeoning centre of trade within the caliphate, and Zaria began to establish itself as the new centre of manufacturing. This realignment of the political and economic centre of the caliphate further altered the routes of west-east trade, which now pass through Kano. Accordingly, by 1840, Kano benefited from Katsina's decline, leading to a gradual neglect of the issues facing Katsina.¹⁴³⁴ For instance, in 1844, the Emir of Katsina initiated raids on the frontier communities situated between Sokoto, Kano, and Katsina in an attempt to secure financial resources, which quickly incited unrest in both Kano and Sokoto. In the same year, caliph Aliyu Babba ordered the deposition of the Emir. However, the emir rejected this directive and declared war against Sokoto. This conflict persisted until the Emir's death in 1855, further exacerbating the decline of the emirate.¹⁴³⁵

A comparable process occurred in several northern emirates, including the Daura Emirate, situated between Katsina and Zinder. The decline of Katsina significantly impacted Daura, which had already experienced tensions with Sokoto in its early stages due to its interactions with the Kel Tamasheq communities.¹⁴³⁶ The conflict between Katsina and Sokoto in the 1850s worsened the situation, culminating in a rebellion by the Emir of Daura against Sokoto in 1860.¹⁴³⁷ In contrast with Katsina, Sokoto was able to swiftly suppress the rebellion led by the Emir of Daura.

In 1850, whilst the Emir of Katsina was still engaged in rebellion, the Emir of Hadeja, close to Daura, also initiated a revolt against the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. This insurrection resulted in the deposition of the reigning Emir, who, disregarding the directives from Sokoto, and sought to establish his independent state.¹⁴³⁸ Given the geographical distance of the Hadeja emirate from Sokoto, the caliph instructed the Emir of Katagum to launch an offensive against Hadeja. Although the Emir of Katagum successfully captured the city, the rebellion led by the Emir of Hadeja

1434 Adamu, 'Distribution of Trading Centers in the Central Sudan in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', 70–86.

1435 Usman, 'Transformation of Katsina (1400-1883): The Emergence and Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment of the Emirate', 159.

1436 Addo, 'Institutions et Imaginaire Politiques Haussa: Le Cas Du Katsina Sous La Dynastie de Korau (XVe-XIXe Siècle)', 1998, 495.

1437 M.G. Smith, *The Affairs of Daura* (California: University of California Press, 1978), 265.

1438 SNP 17/97/5, f. 7, K.S.C.B.

persisted until the 1860s.¹⁴³⁹ The turmoil prompted the neighbouring emirate of Misau to align itself with Hadeja by rebelling against Sokoto.¹⁴⁴⁰

The rebellions that occurred between the 1840s and the 1860s shared a common underlying cause. The establishment of the Caliphate led to an indirect decline of these emirates, primarily due to unresolved political issues with neighbouring states.¹⁴⁴¹ The persistent hostilities from the Maradi State contributed to the deterioration of Katsina and Daura. The ongoing conflicts and blockades between the Caliphate and Bornu significantly hindered trade in the frontier emirates, such as Hadeja and Misau, which were heavily reliant on trade due to their limited agricultural land. Although Sokoto and other emirates initially provided support during the jihad against Maradi and Bornu in the 1840s, their concerns subsequently lost prominence within the caliphate. In this regard, affiliation with the Caliphate ultimately proved disadvantageous for these emirates, culminating in their rebellions during the period from the 1840s to the 1860s.

Throughout the remainder of the 19th century, a new phase emerged for these disadvantaged emirates. Once they experienced great destruction through rebellion between 1850 and 1860, their survival thereafter heavily relied on their new integration into the Caliphate. Consequently, after the 1860s, the newly appointed Emirs were tasked with the reconstruction of their emirates, albeit with diminished aspirations; their focus shifted from restoring previous prosperity to ensure mere subsistence. In this regard, it was mainly Kano emirate involved the war between Katsina and Maradi after the 1860s to save Katsina from a total destruction and secure Kano from any further expansion from Maradi.¹⁴⁴² A significant outcome of this altered dynamic was their complete subjugation to Sokoto even after 1870s some other emirates began to rebel. Additionally, there was a notable trend within the communities to elect new emirs, predominantly scholars who prioritized

1439 In 1855, the situation became so complicated in the region for the Caliphate that the Emir of Kano, Usman I, was personally involved in the case with his army. He even died during this campaign. Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*, 2019, 65.

1440 Tukur Muhammad Mukhtar, 'Ahmadu Ibn Atiku (Zaruku), 1859-1866', in *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, ed. Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), 129.

1441 One pertinent example of this issue is Abuja state, which was established by the exiled Zazzau dynasty that had lost the city of Zaria to jihadist forces in the 1850s. Sokoto achieved in finding a peaceful way to interact with this state. See: Filaba, 'A History of Karu, Kurape and Kurudu Kingdoms: A Study of Economic, Social, and Political Change Among Gbaya of Central Nigeria in the 18th and 19th Centuries', 211. Yet, the problems with other frontier states such as Argungu, Tibir, and Maradi were never solved. See: B.A. Gado, *Le Zarmatarey: Contribution a l'histoire Des Populations d'entre Niger et Dallol Mawri* (Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1980), 11; Usman Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu* (Zaria: Woodpecker Communication Service, 2016), 79.

1442 Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*, 2019, 9.

the application of *idara* over *tadbir*, which was considered as the origin of all problems.¹⁴⁴³ In the ensuing years, new Kel Tamasheq communities migrated to the region. However, unlike in the 18th century, they were unable to engage in trans-Saharan or trans-regional trade. Instead, they participated in small-scale regional trade between the city of Katsina and its surrounding villages.¹⁴⁴⁴ This strategic rebuilding initiative enabled Katsina by the 1890s to safeguard its political and economic interests against the encroachment and expansion of the Damagaram state.¹⁴⁴⁵ Although other rebelled emirates also shows signs of improvement, they were never able to reach pre-jihad levels of welfare.

7.1.2. Second Wave of Rebellion: Winning side of the Caliphate

During the 19th century, the northern emirates experienced a cyclical process of decline, rebellion, destruction, and subsequent rebuilding, largely due to their position on the losing side of the caliphate. In contrast, certain central emirates, including Kano, Zazzau, Bauchi, and Katagum, underwent a markedly different trajectory. Among these emirates, especially the city of Kano and Zaria, were historically important centres. By the 18th century, both cities had established themselves as intellectual hubs, attracting numerous Kanuri scholars.¹⁴⁴⁶ There were also some highly prestigious families in the city of Kano. The Sidi Fari family, for example, was believed to be descended from Al-Maghili's sons and held considerable prestige within the community.¹⁴⁴⁷

In the 1850s, a significant portion of the scholarly community from Katsina was compelled to leave the city, with many relocating to Zaria.¹⁴⁴⁸ Concurrently, a substantial wave of immigration occurred from Gobir to Kano, when communities sought refuge from the protracted conflicts between Tibir (new state of Gobirawa dynasty after the 1838) and Sokoto.¹⁴⁴⁹ Consequently, both Kano and Zaria evolved into prominent centres for scholars and immigrants seeking a peaceful environment within the caliphate during the latter half of the 19th century. The decline of Katsina further facilitated

1443 For instance, see: Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale, *Tradition Historiques Des Katsinaawaa*, 64.

1444 'Interview No. 19: With Yusuf Lawal in Kankia (Katsina), 2023'.

1445 Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale, *Tradition Historiques Des Katsinaawaa*, 66.

1446 For Kano, see: Kachalla, 'The Kanuri in Diaspora: A Case Study of the Kanuri in Kano Zaria c.1503- 1900'. For Zaria, see: Bashir Dalhatu, *Zuriyar Malam Ibrahim Tsoho Dake Kakaki Birnin Zaria* (Zaria: Woodpecker Communication Service, 2001), 5.

1447 'Interview No. 17: With Sharif Abdullah in Kano, 2023'.

1448 'Interview with Alhaji Musa Muazau [Zaria] by Usman Suleiman in 2003'. O.A.C. 1.

1449 For more details, see: Abdurrahman Abubakr Idris and Kabiru Haruna Isa, 'The Place Gobirawa in the Social and Economic History of Kano' (1th International Conference on Gobir, Past and Present: Transformations and Change, Sokoto, 2018).

Kano's emergence as a new hub for trans-Saharan trade, since a majority of Ghadamesian merchants from Katsina migrated to Kano in the 1840s.¹⁴⁵⁰ Furthermore, during the 1850s, a notable influx of Yoruba merchant families arrived in Zaria, drawn by the opportunities presented by new long-distance trade routes originating from Lagos.¹⁴⁵¹ Overall, the jihad movement yielded consistently positive outcomes for both Kano and Zaria. Prior to the onset of jihad, there was a limited presence of the Kel Tamasheq community in the cities. However, following the establishment of a trade route to Agadez via Sokoto, numerous Kel Tamasheq communities began to develop their businesses in these urban centres.¹⁴⁵² The influx of diverse communities and the increase in trade led to significant economic growth in Kano, transforming the surrounding villages into hubs of manufacturing and industry by the 1840s.¹⁴⁵³ For example, in their correspondence from the 1860s onward, the Emirs of Kano frequently counselled their administrators and local populations with their over-motivations, stating, "since God is with us, nothing should hinder our efforts for welfare."¹⁴⁵⁴

Especially in the case of the Zazzau Emire with its capital in Zaria, successful negotiations with Abuja state, facilitated by Sokoto and other emirates, prevented issues similar to those experienced by Katsina. During the 1850s, Abuja emerged as one of Zazzau's most significant commercial partners.¹⁴⁵⁵ Furthermore, military involvement of Zazzau and Bauchi emirates in the Leere and Jos region after the 1850s, on the one hand caused a great destruction for the region, considering Lere-Jos area was an important centre for long-distance trade in the 18th century,¹⁴⁵⁶ on the other hand these military actions enabled Zazzau and Bauchi to centralize long-distance trade within their own territories, effectively establishing a monopoly over trade routes and generating considerable wealth for both emirates.¹⁴⁵⁷ Zazzau emirate subjugated Lere as a tributary,¹⁴⁵⁸ and the thousands of captives were taken during these military campaigns significantly bolstered the cotton plantations, particularly the royal slave farms,¹⁴⁵⁹ of Zazzau and Bauchi, to the extent that they became the

1450 'Interview No. 17: With Sharif Abdullah in Kano, 2023'.

1451 'Interview with Abdullahi Hayatu [Zaria] by Usman Suleiman in 2002'. O.A.C. 1.

1452 'Interview No. 18: With Musa Bakri in Kano, 2023'.

1453 For more details, see: Nura Isah Zubairu, 'The Economy of Wudil Territory in Pre-Colonial Era', *Sokoto Journal of History* 12 (2023): 1–10.

1454 For one of such letters, see: K.S.C.B., HCB/ARC/AML/011.

1455 Alhaji Hasan and Shuaibu Naibi, *A Chorinicle of Abuja* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1952), 16.

1456 'Interview with Bappa Sule Karim [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015'. O.A.C. 14.

1457 'Interview with Maidodo Maisamari [Lere] by Fatimah Bello in 2009'. O.A.C. 15.

1458 Between 1810 and 1849, Zazzau solemnly raided the Lere region. Only in 1849, they appointed an administrator and turned the region into a tributary state. Fatimah Debbo, 'Lere Vassal State of Zazzau Emirate, c. 1804-1903' (M.A. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 2012), 292.

1459 Usman Suleiman, 'A History of Birnin Zaria from 1350-1902' (M.A. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 2007), 134.

largest suppliers to the textile industries of Zinder and Kano.¹⁴⁶⁰ Additionally, rapid economic growth of Zazzau, also triggered further slave raiding in the Zuru area,¹⁴⁶¹ since immense labour power was needed in the city. Thus, the Zuru area was mainly shaped by these raids for the rest of the century.¹⁴⁶² By around 1860, Kano and Zaria had not only become the primary centres for tanned skin production within the Caliphate but also for the entirety of Central Sudan, as they emerged as the main suppliers to Ghadamesian merchants.¹⁴⁶³ Tanned skin produced in Kano was transported to Tripoli and exported to the USA from the 1850s to 1911. After this point, the only rival of Kano was Zinder, considering they were sharing the trade with Agadez and north. This even caused several wars between the two emirates after the 1870s.¹⁴⁶⁴

Despite the numerous advantages and significant economic growth experienced during this period, two fundamental issues emerged. The first problem was the adverse consequences of the prolonged implementation of *tadbir*, particularly the unregulated use of *ray*, which led to an increase in complaints regarding corrupt practices within these emirates by the 1870s, in which particularly Majo Karofi, who ruled in Kano from 1855 to 1883, became a symbolic figure for economic growth and corruption.¹⁴⁶⁵ More critically, the substantial accumulation of wealth by the emirates, thanks to their *ray* implementations, running trade on their own account with the Ghadamesian merchants,¹⁴⁶⁶

1460 'Interview with Umar Farouk Abdulsamad [Zaria] by Usman Suleiman in 2002'. O.A.C. 1.

1461 Slave raiding was already an established practice in the Zuru area, given the long history of the Isgogo slave market. Nonetheless, in the 18th century, most of the enslaved people from the region were transported to the coast. Yusuf Abdullahi and Mansur Abubakar Wara, 'Slave Raiding and Slave Trade in Zuru Emirate: A Preliminary Study on the Isgogo Slave Market, C. 1700-1900', *Dutsin-Ma Historical Review* 1, no. 1 (2018): 339–40.

1462 Yusuf Abdullahi, 'A History of Kasar Fakai, 1850s-1996' (M.A. Thesis, Sokoto, Usmanu Danfodio University, 2014), 75–87. Even the Kontagora Emirate began to involve this raids towards the end of the 19th century, attacking non-muslim communities in the Zuru area. For more details, see: M. Adamu, 'A Hausa Government in Decline; Yauri in the 19 Th Century' (M.A. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1968). Due to this profitable business, only in the late 19th century, some Hausa scholars began to come to the region to disseminate Islam. M.G. Isgogo, 'Islam in Zuru' (M.A. Thesis, Sokoto, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, 1998), 50–55. Yet, only around the 1950s, Islam became the religion of the majority in the region. 'Interview with Audu Dan Gado Shagwa [Wara] by Mansur Wara in 2013'. O.A.C. 24. Some communities from Katsina, who suffered a long decline and a whole rebellion between the 1820s and 1850s, migrated to the Zuru area, to take advantage of steadily growing slave raid campaigns for the rest of the 19th century. Mansur Abubakar Wara and Yusuf Abdullahi, 'The Katsina Factor in the History of Yawuri and Zuru Emirates: A Study of Katsinawa in Diaspora', *Journal of Applied and Theoretical Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (2022): 303.

1463 Habib Al-Hassan, *Zaman Hausawa, Bugu Na Biyu* (Kano: Islamic Publications Bureau, 1988), 49.

1464 Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*, 2019, 10.

1465 Regarding the complaints of the Ghadamesian merchants about the unjust rule of the Emirs of Kano, for instance, see: P.A.4., family collection No. 137. A symbolic event that marked the era after 1840 with the corruption was the re-introduction of the cattle tax (Ha. *jangali*) by the Emir of Kano, Majo Karofi. Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*, 36. For more details regarding the problem of corruption, see: S.U. Lawal, 'The Political Economy of the State in the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminart Examination', in *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, ed. A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandhi (Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990), 164.

1466 Before Majo Karofi came to Kano, there were no direct trade relations between the merchants of Ghadames and the emirs of Kano. He was the first emir to conduct significant trade on his own behalf. For example, in 1858, he imported firearms and paper from the north through his Ghadamesian client, Muhammad Abdullah Haibat.

diminished their relationship with Sokoto to a largely symbolic status. In the 1890s, the Emir of Kano was personally corresponding with the *vali* of Tripoli regarding the trade without informing Sokoto.¹⁴⁶⁷ Hence personal business of emirs became so important for Tripoli in the 1890s that when the civil war on Kano broke up in 1894, the *padişah* in İstanbul was informed with regard to it almost before Sokoto.¹⁴⁶⁸ By the 1870s, especially the Kano and Zazzau emirates had become considerably more powerful and affluent than any other political entity in the region. For instance, in 1860, the Emir Zazzau felt emboldened to conduct raids on his own sub-emirates, such as Keffi, under the pretext that Keffi was not contributing sufficient tribute relative to its wealth. Although the Emir of Keffi sought assistance from Sokoto, their survival against Zazzau's incursions was secured only through an alliance with various non-Muslim neighbouring states, including Karu and Kurape.¹⁴⁶⁹ In fact, in response to these events, the Caliph of Sokoto promptly intervened, dispatching multiple letters to the Emir of Zazzau, instructing him to cease his raids. The Emir disregarded these directives, and the caliph refrained from taking decisive action against him, recognizing that the emirate was one of the most significant economic centres within the caliphate. The military success of Keffi also mitigated a broader crisis for Sokoto. Nevertheless, a similar situation arose in 1870, prompting the Emir of Zazzau to initiate further raids on Keffi. Once again, the Caliph of Sokoto issued warnings and orders to Zazzau. This time, the fate of Keffi rested entirely in the hands of the Caliph, compelling the caliph Ahmadu Rufai to order the deposition of Emir Zazzau. Although the communities in Zaria swiftly succeeded in installing a new Emir, the animosity from the deposed Emir persisted in the subsequent years, resulting in widespread insecurity throughout the Zazzau emirate.¹⁴⁷⁰ Encouraged by this ousted Emir, a member of the Yakubu dynasty in Bauchi similarly renounced his allegiance to the Emir of Bauchi and proclaimed himself the new Emir, thereby dethroning the incumbent. Fearing that this rebellion might spread to other emirates, the Caliph commanded the Misau emirate to launch an offensive against Bauchi and remove the new Emir. The forces from Misau easily captured the city and reinstated the previous

Meanwhile, the Emir of Zazzau conducted trade with the Emir of Kano personally for his own benefit. J.G.T.M., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1858.

1467 In 1892, Ibrahim Dabbo, ruled from 1883 to 1892, wrote to the Tripolitan *vali* regarding the bad quality European textiles that were transported from Tripoli to Kano. He asked *vali* to stop selling such poor-quality textiles to the Ghadamesian merchants because the poor quality caused many contractual conflicts among the merchants. B.O.A., Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi, 3/86.

1468 B.O.A., Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı, 308/117.

1469 'Interview with Atiku Garba Yahya [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1993'. O.A.C. 2.

1470 Idris Jimada, 'Ahmadu Rufai Ibn Shehu Usman Danfodio, 1867-1873', in *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographical History Since 1804*, ed. Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), 150.

Emir; however, the rebellious forces continued their campaign for several years, causing significant devastation in the region.¹⁴⁷¹

It was only around the 1880s that the Uthmaniyya Caliphate successfully subdued rebellious emirs and established a truce with the Ningi¹⁴⁷² and Jos communities, thereby bringing an end to the prolonged conflict between these groups and the regions of Kano, Zaria, and Bacuhi.¹⁴⁷³ The following year, the Dass communities were also incorporated into this truce.¹⁴⁷⁴

Following the rebellions in the 1880s, Bauchi successfully undertook the reconstruction of its security and the restoration of its damaged infrastructure. In contrast, the Zazzau emirate experienced a consistent decline during this period. Around 1880, the Kontagora emirate capitalized on the political instability within the Zazzau emirate, leading to incursions into its tributaries and resulting in significant economic losses for Zazzau.¹⁴⁷⁵ Furthermore, the establishment of a new peace agreement with Ningi and Jos fostered favourable conditions for long-distance traders to re-enter the Lere area, diverting their activities away from Zaria.¹⁴⁷⁶ Consequently, after 1880, the Lere area experienced substantial economic growth, while Zazzau found itself caught between the political pressures exerted by Kontagora and the economic challenges posed by Lere.

In the face of emerging challenges and shifting dynamics, the emirates of Kano and Katagum successfully navigated the conflicts occurring in Zazzau and Bauchi, capitalizing on the opportunities presented by these disturbances. By 1890, Kano and Katagum were the only emirates to dispatch military support to Sokoto in its campaign against Argungu (new state of Kebbi dynasty) and Maradi, motivated not only by their political alignment with Sokoto but also by their considerable economic resources.¹⁴⁷⁷ Nonetheless, the situation underwent a rapid transformation within a few years. The Caliphs in Sokoto implemented stringent measures to counteract the threat of British invasion in the region, appointing new emirs based on their unwavering loyalty to Sokoto rather than through the traditional selection processes of local communities. Other emirates

1471 N.N.A., SNP 7/1778/1909/Account on Yakubu and Gombe, 7.

1472 Some scholars from Kano first occupied the Ningi Mountains to protest the emir's corrupt affairs. Thereafter, it gained many followers. Thus, it became a rebellious pocket in the middle of the Caliphate. Bello, *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*, 2019, 10.

1473 Alkasum Abba and Shuaibu Aliyu, 'Muazu Ibn Muhammad Bello, 1877-1881', in *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, ed. Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017), 186.

1474 N.N.A., SNP 7/1778/1909/Account on Yakubu and Gombe, 6.

1475 'Interview with Gwonyo Garba [Garun Kurama] by Fatimah Bello in 2009'. O.A.C. 15.

1476 'Interview with Sani Miko [Garun Kurama] by Fatimah Bello in 2009'. O.A.C. 15.

1477 For the case of Katagum, see: K.S.C.B., SNP 17/97/5, f. 18. For the case of Kano see: Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 203.

complied with the Caliphs' directives. The affluent and politically influential communities in Kano and Katagum resisted these impositions. Consequently, civil wars erupted first in Kano from 1893 to 1895,¹⁴⁷⁸ and subsequently in Katagum from 1899 to 1902,¹⁴⁷⁹ pitting Emirs appointed by Sokoto against those backed by local constituencies.

The second wave of rebellions occurring between 1870 and 1900 exhibited significant differences from the initial wave, particularly regarding their underlying causes. The conflict between Sokoto and several central emirates, including Kano, Zazzau, Bauchi, and Katagum, did not arise from any perceived disadvantages associated with their affiliation to the Caliphate. Rather, it stemmed from the considerable advantages these emirates enjoyed, which enhanced their power to the extent that they began to disregard Sokoto's authority. Hence, when Sokoto attempted to curtail their economic expansion through political measures aimed at consolidating the Caliphate, these emirates were able to mount an open rebellion against Sokoto.

7.1.3. Never-Coming Expansion: Western Frontier of the Caliphate

The small emirates located on the western frontier of the Caliphate, governed by Gwandu, such as Bitimkogi, Say, Birnin Ngaure, Liptako, Tamkala, and Torodi, were established between 1804 and 1810, with a defining characteristic being their application of *idara*. Unlike other emirates within the caliphate, these emirates did not arise from the deposition of existing rulers or through military conquest; rather, they were primarily composed of small Pullo communities that identified themselves as emirates, striving to maintain a delicate balance of power within their surroundings to ensure their political survival.¹⁴⁸⁰ Furthermore, in contrast to the legacy of Bello in the central emirates, which emphasized the application of *tadbir*, the political dynamics in the Gwandu part of the Caliphate throughout the century were predominantly influenced by Abdullahi's *idara* legacy.¹⁴⁸¹ The sole exceptions to this trend were the Kebbi and Dosso emirates. The rulers of Kebbi willingly acknowledged the authority of the Caliphate; yet, their practice of *tadbir* often led them to exploit

1478 For more details, see: M. Fika, *The Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule, 1882–1940* (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1978).

1479 For more details, see: K.S.C.B., SNP 17/97/5, f. 19–20.

1480 For more details, see: Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016.

1481 One of the notable consequences of this legacy was the establishment of diplomatic and political relations with neighboring states by the emirates. For instance, the Yauri emirate formed a coalition with the Busso states in Borgu to maintain regional power balances, particularly in response to attacks from other Borgu states and the threat posed by the newly established Katagum Emirate. N.N.A., Sokproof/2/10/123. Similarly, when Gwandu forces were unable to capture Ilo to secure a strategic bridgehead for access to Borguland, they opted for a peace agreement with Ilo and subsequently established their own villages further south, near the river. 'Interview with Babu Adam Bamaro [Parakau] by Richard Kuba in 1993'. O.A.C. 9.

any power vacuums that arose. As a result, in 1831, Gwandu occupied Kebbi, and the ruling dynasty was exiled to a neighbouring area, where they established the Argungu state.¹⁴⁸² Notably, in the 1850s, Argungu received support from the Zarma communities, which enabled them to become sufficiently powerful to launch attacks against Kebbi and Gwandu. At this juncture, the Dosso emirate emerged as a significant case; unlike the other western emirates, it was not founded by local Pullo groups but was established by Gwandu following the invasion of certain Zarma territories around 1817.¹⁴⁸³ However, the integration of Zarma communities into the emirate was never fully realized, resulting in frequent rebellions by certain Zarma groups against the emirate. Conversely, the political and social relations between the Zarma and Hausa communities, particularly in Argungu, significantly improved after the 1850s.¹⁴⁸⁴ Although the Dosso emirate was able to suppress these rebellions until 1860, the formation of a coalition between Argungu and several Zarma communities in that year culminated in a substantial assault on Kebbi and Gwandu. This conflict led to the death of Haliru, the Emir of Gwandu, who ruled from 1858 to 1860, in the battlefield and the city of Gwandu was only able to withstand the invasion with assistance from Sokoto.¹⁴⁸⁵ Subsequently, Argungu not only secured its independence but also enabled the Zarma communities to reclaim Dosso.¹⁴⁸⁶ Throughout the remainder of the century, both Dosso and Argungu successfully maintained their autonomy against the pressures from Gwandu and Sokoto.¹⁴⁸⁷

These failures in the region forced not only Gwandu but also Sokoto to follow the system of *idara* with these firmly established states. Sokoto faced similar challenges due to the exiled Gobir dynasty, which established itself in Tibiri as a new state. In response, the caliphs engaged in a diplomatic strategy that involved negotiations with Tibir and Argungu, frequently advocating for truces and facilitating inter-dynastic marriages.¹⁴⁸⁸ The most crucial consequence of failing to eliminate Dosso and Argungu was the isolation of the western emirates from the central regions of

1482 For more details, see: S.A. Balogun, 'The Place of Argunge in the Gwandu History', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 7, no. 3 (1974): 403–15.

1483 Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 82.

1484 For more details, see: Rabi'u Aliyu Rambo and Musa Fadama Gummi, 'The Impacts of Dosso-Kebbi Relationship on Sarkanci in Kebbi' (The International Conference on Kebbi/Dosso Relationship, Dosso, 2014).

1485 Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 164–65.

1486 Mukhtar Umar Bunza, 'Change of the Guards: Vergaries in Dosso-Zarma Relations with Kebbi Kingdom and Gwandu Emirate, 1820-1880s', in *Relations between Dosso, Kebbi, and Sokoto: Spaces, Societies, States, Cultures, Economy & Politics*, ed. A. Bako and B.A. Gado (Niamey: Abdulmumin University Press, 2016), 151.

1487 For instance, in 1890, Sokoto was still busy with the regular attacks of Argungu. See: Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 103.

1488 A.R. Augi, 'The Gobir Factor in the Social and Political History of the Rima Basin, c. 1650-1806' (Ph.D. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1984), 390.

the caliphate. For instance, during the 19th century, Sansana Hausa emerged as a new centre for trans-Saharan trade, attracting merchants from Ghadames and Songhai, as well as local Pullo and Zarma communities.¹⁴⁸⁹ Although the substantial importation of sheep from Timbuktu via Songhai merchants to Sansan Hausa presented a significant opportunity for the western emirates to engage in the tanned skin industry in Zaria and Kano, their lack of connectivity hindered their ability to capitalize on this opportunity.¹⁴⁹⁰ Nevertheless, the growing significance of Sansan Hausa provided an opportunity for the communities in Say to engage in trans-Saharan trade.¹⁴⁹¹ Notably, prominent scholarly families within the city were heavily involved in the trade of ostrich feathers with Ghadames.¹⁴⁹² This economic expansion in Say coincided with the emergence of Malam Dibbo/Jabbo, who established the emirate of Say in the 1810s. Different to other western emirates, Malam Dibbo/Jabbo founded his emirate independently of the Caliphate, only later pledging allegiance to it. Also, fundamentally different from the jihad of al-Jaylani and his *riasa* system in the northern Say, Malam Dibbo/Jabbo neither declared any jihad to establish his emirate, nor applied any *riasa* system, but *idara* system.¹⁴⁹³ Particularly after the 1840s, when western emirates became disconnected from the central Caliphate, Say emerged as a leading centre of scholarship and administration. Thus, the Emirs in the region began to seek counsel from Say for urgent matters rather than attempting to contact Gwandu. Although the Emirs of Say also implemented *idara*, unlike Gwandu, they emphasized the *dairat al-siyasa* implementation rather than *hisba*. This approach resulted in a significant integration of non-Muslim communities into the civic life of Say. Due to the spiritual prestige of the Emirs of Say, Gwandu did not play a central role in Say's affairs and even officially designated them as representatives of Gwandu in the region.¹⁴⁹⁴ Nonetheless, for critical decisions, such as the appointment of an Emir, Gwandu remained the ultimate authority. For example, in 1848, a rivalry emerged regarding the new appointment of an Emir in Liptako.

1489 For more details, see: Hassimi Alassane, 'Sansan Hausa: Prosperity and Decline of an Important Market in Western Niger in the 19th Century', *Sokoto Journal of History* 10 (2021): 35–42.

1490 'Interview with Harune Ide [Sansana Hausa] by Hassimi Alassane in 2021'. O.A.C. 20.

1491 Nevertheless, this trade declined considerably when, around the 1870s, Kel Fadey of Air formed an alliance with Kel Denneq of Iwilimeden against Kel Away. This closed the route to the southwest of Agadez for merchants from the north. 'Interview No. 27: With Mohamed Ghabdouwane in Agadez in 2023'.

1492 Idrissa Kimba, 'Guerres et Societes: Les Populations Du Niger Occidental Au XIXe s. et Leurs Reactions Face a La Colonisation, 1896-1906' (Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Université de Paris VII, 1979), 42–47.

1493 Maïkoréma Zakari, 'L'islam Au Niger', in *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest*, ed. Samba Dieng (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999), 87–88.

1494 All these very significant details come from an oral account, see: 'Interview with Alfa Watu [Say] by Idrissa Kimba in 1974'. O.A.C. 10.

Inasmuch as two candidates sought support from other emirates, including Say and Tamkala, Gwandu intervened swiftly, appointing the candidate renowned for his scholarly contributions.¹⁴⁹⁵

The prevailing conditions in the western region of the caliphate resulted in a stagnation of both economic and political expansion for the local emirates, in contrast to certain emirates in other areas of the Caliphate that successfully capitalized on opportunities for growth.¹⁴⁹⁶ However, unlike the northern emirates such as Katsina, Daura, Hadeja, and Misau, the western emirates did not experience significant disadvantages as a consequence of their affiliation with the Caliphate. Prior to the jihad, the Pullo communities in this region did not enjoy substantial economic or political prosperity, and the jihad did not markedly alter their circumstances, for better or worse. Consequently, their relationship with Gwandu remained relatively minimal yet stable, with Gwandu not experiencing any rebellions from these emirates.

7.1.4. Never-Ending Expansion: Caliphate's Southern-Eastern Periphery

7.1.4.1. Era of the Expansionist Establishment

The southeastern periphery of the caliphate, encompassing the Nupe (Bida) Emirate to the Adamawa (Fombina) Emirate, exhibits distinct characteristics regarding its expansion. The emirates of Nupe (Bida), Muri, and Adamawa, along with certain sub-emirates such as Lafia, Nassarawa, Jama'a from Zazzau and Bauchi, underwent similar processes of establishment that were marked by an expansionist tendency from their inception.

1495 S.A. Balogun, 'The Position of Gwandu in the Sokoto Caliphate', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 288.

1496 For instance, in 1844, the Liptako emirate attempted to initiate a military campaign to assert control over the river region; however, they quickly encountered a coalition of various local communities and ultimately suffered defeat. This event stands as only notable instance of a large-scale attempt at expansion. I.F.A.N., Capitaine Buck, No. 6.

Prior to the jihad movement, Kanuri scholars and merchants were already active in these regions,¹⁴⁹⁷ alongside some Hausa¹⁴⁹⁸ and Pullo¹⁴⁹⁹ groups; however, the majority of local communities lacked an Islamic tradition. An exception to this was the Jukun-Chamba area, where long-standing relations and cultural exchanges with Hausaland and Bornu had influenced the local mythologies. Although Islam had not been widely disseminated,¹⁵⁰⁰ the myths of origin among Chamba and Jukun societies were greatly influenced by Islamic symbolism.¹⁵⁰¹ Still, when jihadist scholars or commanders began to arrive in these regions, they encountered a notable absence of established Muslim communities to bolster their forces.¹⁵⁰² This situation compelled them to meticulously assess the existing power structures within the regions prior to engaging in any military confrontations with local populations.¹⁵⁰³ This fundamental distinction from the other parts of the

1497 For the case of the Nupe area, see: Gazali, 'The Kanuri Diaspora and Its Islamic Intellectual Impact Outside Kanem-Bornu', 179–80. For the case of Tiv-Jukun area, see: 'Interview with Dalhatu Abdullahi [Wukari] by Mordakai Dansanko in 2014'. O.A.C. 13. For the case of Fombina area, see: Ahmed Hammawa and Audu Ali, 'Kanem-Bornu Scholars and the Propagation of Islamic Education in Fombina', in *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, ed. T. El-Miskin et al., vol. Vol 2 (Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013), 175; Hamadjoda Abdoullaye and Mohammadou Eldridge, eds., *Ray Ou Rei-Bouba* (Garoua: O.N.A.R.E.S.T., Institut des sciences humaines, 1979), 169.

1498 This is mainly the case only in the Tiv-Jukun area. There were several merchants in the region who were active in the salt trade, see: Bakoji Sukuji, *The History of Jukun and Kwararafa Kingdom* (Kaduna: Merry-Time Associated Press, 1995), 18. However, oral accounts state a considerable number of Hausa scholars as well, see: 'Interview with Edward Ajibauka [Wukari] by Mordakai Dansanko in 2014'. O.A.C. 13. Some local sources even attribute the establishment of Wukari to two Hausa scholars, Malam Sambo from Kano, and Malam Dikko from Katsina. Abubakar Zakari Bello, 'History of Islam in the Middle Benue Region: A Case Study of Wukari Since C. 1848-1960' (Ph.D. Thesis, Kano, Bayero University, 2000), 40.

1499 Some Pullo nomads were active in Nupe, Keffi, Lapai, and Nassarawa before jihad. 'Interview with Walid Jibrin[Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992'. O.A.C. 2; 'Interview with Shaaba Lafiagi [Kontagora] by Tiwugi Sheshi in 2015'. O.A.C. 4; 'Interview with Godiya Adamu Deye [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1990'. O.A.C. 2.

1500 For more details, see: Danjuma Adamu, *The Jukun and Their King* (Jos: Plateau Publishing, 1982).

1501 In several variations of the myth of origin among Jukun communities, Mekka is mentioned as the origin of Jukun from pre-Islamic times. With the Islamic invasion, they had to immigrate (in some accounts) to Yemen or (in some accounts through Egypt to) Bornu. E.A. Uhweingya, 'The Jukun up to 1900' (B.A. Thesis, Maiduguri, University of Maiduguri, 1981), 8–10; Abereoran Akinwumi, *Shape by Destiny; A Biography of Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi, Kuvyo 11, the Aku- Uka of Wukari* (Ilorin: UniIlorin Alumni Association, 1996), 1. Similar stories exist among the Chamba communities that state they originally came from Sham (today's Syria) before Muslims invaded it. 'Interview with Habu Umar [Donga] by Mordakai Dansanko in 2014'. O.A.C. 13.

1502 For example, see: A.R. Mohammed, 'The Sokoto Jihad and Its Impact on the Confluence Area and Afenmai', in *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, ed. A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandi (Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990), 142.

1503 The only exemption was northern Adamawa, including the Garoua, Maroua, and Rey-Buba communities. These communities were already in the region before the jihad due to their immigration from Bornu. Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale, *Maroua et Pette* (Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1970), 190. Furthermore, they were already in a military clash with local communities in the 1790s; yet, in this earlier phase they were not framing their struggle as jihad. Ahmadu Bassoro and Eldridge Mohammadou, eds., *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle* (Yaoundé: O.N.A.R.E.S.T., Institut des sciences humaines, 1977), 40; Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale, *Maroua et Pette*, 1970, 185–86. Since religion was not their original motive, they had also friendly relations with some local communities. For instance, the Bata states had tributary status with Garoua in the late 18th century, also protecting them from later jihadist period. Bassoro and Mohammadou, *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle*, 96. Nevertheless, around 1800, there was a great collaboration between newly established Pullo chieftaincies, which fought together against local communities, paving the way for the later establishment of various sub-Emirates such as Ngaouandere and Tibati in the south. Abdoullaye and Eldridge, *Ray Ou Rei-Bouba*,

caliphate later greatly shaped the system of governance in these emirates. The above-mentioned emirates did not favour the application of *idara*, as seen in the western frontier, nor were they able to adopt *riasa*, characteristic of the central caliphate during the earlier phase of the jihad. In this regard, their objective was not to establish small emirates solely within their own communities, as might occur under *idara*, but rather to usurp power from existing states, not rulers, as was the case in Hausaland during the jihad. Nonetheless, due to their limited strength, they were unable to engage in direct military confrontations, as would be typical in *riasa*. Instead, they opted to capitalize on dynastic rivalries and ongoing processes of decentralization.

For instance, the Etsu Nupe underwent considerable centralization in the 18th century and established a system of rotating the throne to prevent dynastic conflict.¹⁵⁰⁴ Around 1810, when jihadist Pullo communities began to infiltrate the region, certain members of the dynasty were preparing for civil strife.¹⁵⁰⁵ In the Gbayi area, the Kurape state was also losing authority as previously autonomous regions, such as Karu and Kurudu, gained independence, leading to a more decentralized state structure.¹⁵⁰⁶ In the Jukun area, the ancient Kwararafa state had been undergoing a phase of decentralization since the 18th century due to persistent raids from Bornu.¹⁵⁰⁷ Furthermore, when first jihadist Pullo communities from Gombe began to arrive the region around 1810s, Kwararafa state was so deeply fragmented into four small states,¹⁵⁰⁸ that some Hausa sources long believed that maybe such a state never existed at all.¹⁵⁰⁹ In Fombina, notable local states, such as Bata and Mboum, faced pressure from a new wave of immigration from the northeast beginning in the late 18th century.¹⁵¹⁰ In this context, although the jihadist communities lacked sufficient power in the 1800s to displace incumbent local rulers, they recognized an opportunity for advancement. Their notably amicable approach towards local communities, which contrasted sharply with the examples from other parts of the caliphate, proved to be an effective strategy for avoiding premature conflicts with local groups while they sought to exploit the prevailing political

165.

1504 Sidi Tiwugi Sheshi, *Establishment of Emirate System of Government in Nupeland: The Emirate of Bida as a Case Study, 1832-1857* (Kaduna: Fembo Books, 2000), 37.

1505 Idris Jimada, 'The Establishment of Patigi Emirate: The Historical Background 1810-1898' (M.A. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1991), 207.

1506 'Interview with Tamah Awuba Anyidakuzo [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992'. O.A.C. 2.

1507 Boumo Ezonbi, 'Factoring Inter-Group Relations in the Lower Benue Valley to circa 1900. A.D', *African Journal of Arts and Cultural Studies* 4, no. 2 (2011): 4–6.

1508 These were Wukari, Pindiga, Kona, and Kuteb. 'Interview with Alhaji Gambo Garba [Gombe] by Abubakr Tsangarwa in 2017'. O.A.C. 18.

1509 For details, see: A.A. Fari, 'The Jukun Empire: A Reconsideration' (Univeristy of Maiduguri, History Department Smeinar Paper, Maiduguri, 1984).

1510 Magadji Pierre Le Debonnaire, 'History of Mbe-Sub Division in Northern Cameroon, 1900-2006' (M.A. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 2011), 81.

uncertainties. For instance, in Nupe, when Malam Dendo, the founder of the Nupe emirate, arrived in Nupeland as a nomadic scholar in the early 1800s, he obtained permission from the Etsu Nupe to practice as a doctor and herbalist, as well as to compose various charms for the local populace without presenting any jihadist ambition.¹⁵¹¹ Similarly, in the 1790s, nomadic Fulbe entering Fombina established friendly and contractual relationships with local settled communities, notwithstanding their cultural perception of these communities as inferior.¹⁵¹²

In terms of actualizing the jihad, the emirates exhibited two distinct levels of engagement. The initial level primarily focused on the acquisition of power through *tadbir*. For example, in approximately 1810, Malam Dendo recognized an opportunity to exploit the dynastic conflict in Nupe involving the Jimada, Majiya, and Yikanko dynastic families. He employed a typical strategy within the *tadbir* framework, utilizing a "divide and rule" approach. By supporting the Majiya family, and in the meantime, covertly aiding other factions, he aimed to ensure the eventual loss of power for all parties involved. Additionally, he sought military assistance from Gwandu.¹⁵¹³ Consequently, in 1814, the combined forces of Malam Dendo and Majiya succeeded in assassinating the Etsu Nupe, aided by Gwandu's military.¹⁵¹⁴ Following this event, Dendo began to establish his own communities, benefiting from the privileges granted by the Majiya dynasty, which ultimately led to a power struggle between them in 1821, resulting in Dendo's expulsion from the region. Nonetheless, by around 1830, with the support of the allied forces from Ilorin and Gwandu, he successfully consolidated power over Nupe.¹⁵¹⁵ A similar pattern of strategy was observed in Fombina during the 1810s, where the Adamawa forces formed local alliances, such as with the Mboum, to launch attacks on Laka by capitalizing on existing local conflicts.¹⁵¹⁶ The same was observable around the 1820s when the forces of Adamawa attacked the Sultanate of Mandara, taking advantage of its weakness without providing justification for attacking an Islamic sultanate.¹⁵¹⁷

1511 'Interview with Tswaidan Nupe [Bida] by Tiwugi Sheshi in 2012'. O.A.C. 4.

1512 Angelo Maliki Bonfiglioli, *DuDal. Histoire de Famille et Histoire de Troupeau Chez Un Groupe de WoDaaBe Du Niger* (Paris: Edition de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1988), 34.

1513 Muhammad Sule, *History of the Emirate of Bida to 1899 AD* (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, 2011), 83–84.

1514 N.N.A., SNP 7/1778/1909/Account on Gwandu, f. 9.

1515 See: Dalhatu, Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu, 62–64; Idris Jimada, *The Nupe and the Origins and Evolution of the Yoruba C. 1275-1897* (Zaria: PMB, 2005), 60–65.

1516 Thierno Mouctar Bah, 'Le Facteur Peul et Les Relations Inter-Ethniques Dans l'Adamaoua Au XIXe Siècle', in *Peuples et Cultures de l'Adamaoua (Cameroun)* (Ngaoundéré: Ngaoundéré-Anthropos, 1993), 75.

1517 Sehou Ahmadna, *L'esclavage Dans La Sociétés Traditionnelles Du Cameroon. Le Cas Du Lamidat de Ngaoundéré 1831-1961* (Yaoundé: ENS, 1996), 32. Still, despite several successful wars, Adamawa never managed to eliminate the Mandara dynasty. After every defeat, they immigrated to another region and became powerful again. Muhammadou Elridge, *Le Royaume Du Wandai Ou Mandara Au XIXe Siècle* (Tokyo: ILCAA, 1982), 202.

The second level of engagement pertained to the utilization of the established central emirates to facilitate expansion and ultimately establish sub-emirates. This level is predicated on the application of *riasa*, akin to the practices observed within the central caliphate. For instance, the inaugural Emir of Muri, Malam Harmau, did not receive a flag from Gwandu or Sokoto to lead a jihad; rather, he initiated military campaigns against Jukunland by assuming the role of a military commander for the Gombe emirate.¹⁵¹⁸ Hence, due to the military strength of Gombe, he successfully captured the Lau area in 1817, considering local Jukun communities opted for emigration over confrontation.¹⁵¹⁹ In subsequent years, Malam Harmau expanded his sub-emirates into additional Jukun territories, ultimately controlling a significant area that led to conflicts with Gombe.¹⁵²⁰ The situation escalated to the point of Malam Harmau's death, prompting intervention from Sokoto.¹⁵²¹ Accordingly, in 1833, Muri attained the status of an autonomous emirate directly subordinate to Sokoto, rather than Gombe.¹⁵²² The establishment of the Keffi and Nasarawa sub-emirates followed a similar trajectory characterized by expansion, conflict, and eventual autonomy.¹⁵²³ However, upon achieving autonomy from their respective emirates, these sub-emirates experienced a loss of their primary military advantage. In this regard, their political successes were accompanied by military disadvantages, compelling them to abandon their *riasa* system. Following the 1830s, these emirates and sub-emirates were necessitated to develop their own governance systems. Interestingly, they adopted a strategy that diverged from the legacy of Muhammad Bello, wherein the powerful central emirates employed the *tadbir* system. In contrast, the emirates in the Benue region did not adhere to this legacy; instead, they reverted to the pre-jihad *tadbir* system. In this respect, they exhibited minimal similarities with other emirates within the Caliphate, aligning more closely with the states of Abuja, Tibir, Argungu, and Maradi, i.e., the ancient Hausa dynasties and formidable rivals of the Caliphate in the 19th century.¹⁵²⁴

A significant distinction between these emirates lies in the nature of the *tadbir* model. Bello's *tadbir* model necessitates that emirs adhere to the caliph's directives, whereas the pre-jihad *tadbir* system

1518 I. Abba, 'The Establishment of Gombe Emirate, 1804-1882', in *The Sokoto Caliphate : History and Legacies, 1804-2004*, ed. Hamidu Bobboyi and Mahmood Yakubu (Kaduna: Arewa House, 2006), 18.

1519 'Interview with Bappa Sule Karim [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015'. O.A.C. 14.

1520 N.N.A., SNP 7/1778/1909/Account on Yakubu and Gombe, f. 10.

1521 H. Hamman, 'Dynastic Conflicts and Political Instability in Muri Emirate, c. 1833-1898', in *The Sokoto Caliphate : History and Legacies, 1804-2004*, ed. Hamidu Bobboyi and Mahmood Yakubu (Kaduna: Arewa House, 2006), 149.

1522 'Interview with Malam Usman Miji [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015'. O.A.C. 14.

1523 For more details, see: Zaid Muhammad, *History of Nasarawa Emirate* (Abuja: Garkida Press, 1992), 3.

1524 Filaba, 'A History of Karu, Kurape and Kurudu Kingdoms: A Study of Economic, Social, and Political Change Among Gbayi of Central Nigeria in the 18th and 19th Centuries', 260.

allowed emirs to operate without external authority compelling them to accept specific political mandates. Thus, for the Emirs of the central Caliphate, there were fundamental rules that they could not dare to ignore, otherwise face their deposition, such as a categorical rejection of fighting against each other by making alliances with non-Muslim communities and states. This principle was crucial for the Caliphate's strategy to confront the *sarkins* of Hausaland and to differentiate themselves from traditional *tadbir* practices. In contrast, the emirates surrounding the Benue region frequently engaged in conflicts with one another, often forming alliances with non-Muslim communities or states against other emirates.¹⁵²⁵ After the 1840s, Keffi, Jama'a, and Nasarawa regularly engaged in hostilities to expand their political influence, frequently entering into short-term coalitions with non-Muslim states against each other.¹⁵²⁶

A notable outcome of the implementation of the pre-jihad *tadbir* system was the incorporation of local non-Muslim communities into the administrative framework of the emirates, a practice that was largely considered taboo in other regions of the Caliphate.¹⁵²⁷ Additionally, the promotion of intermarriage with local non-Muslim populations, which was prevalent in the Muri emirate, also represented a significant deviation from caliphal norms.¹⁵²⁸ The remarkable tolerance exhibited towards the religious practices of local communities within the sub-emirates surrounding Benue further distinguished these regions from other parts of the Caliphate.¹⁵²⁹ Such practices facilitated intricate and multifaceted interactions with local populations, enabling these remote areas to maintain a degree of autonomy from the central caliphal authority.¹⁵³⁰ In this context, akin to the Nupe and Adamawa emirates, the newly established sub-emirs and emirs resorted to a "divide and rule" strategy within the *tadbir* system to further their political survival. For example, in the 1850s, the Nasarawa sub-emirate capitalized on a conflict between the Ebira and Opanda states by initially supporting one faction, ultimately asserting dominance over both.¹⁵³¹ Similarly, during the 1880s, the Muri emirate engaged in the conflict between the Wukari state and the Tiv communities to enhance its political influence within the Tiv-Jukunland.¹⁵³²

1525 'Interview with Babu Bature [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1993'. O.A.C. 2.

1526 Filaba, 'A History of Karu, Kurape and Kurudu Kingdoms: A Study of Economic, Social, and Political Change Among Gbayi of Central Nigeria in the 18th and 19th Centuries', 260.

1527 'Interview with Alhaji Dogo Abubakar [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992'. O.A.C. 2.

1528 Mauhmoud Hamman, *The Middle Benue Region and the Sokoto Jihad 1812 – 1869: The Impact of Establishment of the Emirate of Muri* (Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2007), 102–3.

1529 This common pre-jihad practice was also case in Abuja State. Hasan and Naibi, *A Chronicle of Abuja*, 86–87.

1530 'Interview with Musa Dinga [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015'. O.A.C. 14.

1531 A.J. Ohiare, 'The Kingdom of Igu and Opanda C.1700-1939: A Study in Inter-Group Relations' (Ph.D. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 1987), 440–43.

1532 Tesemchi Makar, *History of Political Change Among the Tiv in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Enugu: Fourth Dimenson Publishing, 1994), 45.

Another unique case was also the southern sub-emirates/*lamidats*¹⁵³³ of Adamawa, such as Ngouandere, Tibati, and Banyo. As the founders of these emirates/*lamidats*, Ardo Hamagbo and his son Haman Sambo, were not coming from Hausaland, but were nomadic Fulbe from Bornu that lived with minimum interaction with local Kanuri communities,¹⁵³⁴ their application of *tadbir* was greatly influenced by *pulaaku* (Fl. Pullo code of conduct).¹⁵³⁵ A noteworthy aspect of this code is its explicit reference to the system of *tadbir*, whereas it does not acknowledge analogous systems such as *idara* and *riasa*. This situation exemplifies a fascinating instance of cultural exchange between the nomadic Fulbe and Islamic cultures. For instance, Shede elucidates that a fundamental principle guiding political decision-making within *pulaaku* is *hakkiilo*, derived from the Arabic term *haq* (Ar. the right one). This principle emphasizes the importance of arriving at the correct decision through personal reasoning and caution.¹⁵³⁶ Furthermore, Shede indicates that the integration of the *hakkiilo* principle with a focus on a nomadic lifestyle manifests in one of the most characteristic discourses of the *tadbir* system, specifically the "carrot and stick" approach, which is also reflected in *pulaaku* in its exact form.¹⁵³⁷ In this context, the southern sub-emirates/*lamidats* of Adamawa, very far away from political traditions in the Hausaland, possessed their own *tadbir* system for governance and political-economic matters; however, this system was distinct from both Bello's *tadbir* and the pre-jihad *tadbir*, being characterized instead by *pulaaku tadbir*. This divergence from the other two *tadbir* systems contributed to the unique identity of these sub-emirates/*lamidats*, significantly influencing their expansion following the 1850s.

7.1.4.2. Era of Political and Economic Expansion

Following the 1850s, the southeastern periphery of the Caliphate began to exhibit distinct characteristics. After establishing their core administrative structures through the conquest of foreign territories and ensuring their survival in previously precarious conditions, the emirates

1533 Different from the Kanuri influence in the northern sub-emirates in Adamawa, and jihadist as well as Hausa influence in the central, that is Yola, the southern part of the Adamawa emirate was under strong Pullo influence. In this regard, many "sub-emirs" from the perspective of Adamawa named themselves *lamiida* (Fl. ruler, king) equivalent to *sarkin* (Ha. Ruler, king), and their sphere as *lamidat* (Fl. state, kingdom, country).

1534 The creation of Banyo, Tibati, and Ngaoundere *lamidats*/sub-emirates was deeply shaped by the family affairs. While Ardo Hamagbo was waging jihad to create Banyo *lamidat*/sub-emirate in the 1810, his son Haman Sambo was doing same for Tibati *lamidat*/sub-emirate, collaborating with their relatives, who were active for the creating of Ngaoundere *lamidat*/sub-emirate. Ouba Abdoul-Bagui, 'Le Lamidat de Banyo Des Origines à 1945', in *Mémoire de Maîtrise d'histoire* (Yaoundé: Université de Yaoundé, 1996), 12–17.

1535 Notably, it was only around the 1850s that additional Pullo communities began to migrate to Adamawa from Bauchi, initiating a process of Hausanization in the region, as will be discussed in subsequent sections.

1536 Adamu Shede, 'Fulbe Code of Conduct (Pulaaku) as Portrayed in Their Proverbs' (M.A. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 2014), 114.

1537 Shede, 121–22.

initiated a significant expansion. This extensive growth was partly influenced by local circumstances during the initial establishment phase. As the founder of the emirates had to apply *tadbir* to exploit local conflicts, they also had to apply the same strategy to manage their own followers. In order to rally support for their jihadist objectives, the Emirs offered substantial privileges and political assurances to various communities. As a result, even in the very establishment period, new sub-emirates were created for the army commanders and communities who were joined for the jihad. For instance, the sub-emirates of Nupe, Lafiagi, Tsonga, Lapai, and Agaye rapidly attained autonomy,¹⁵³⁸ whilst a similar phenomenon occurred in Adamawa, where influential sub-emirates/*lamidats* such as Garoua, Maroua, Rey-Buba, Ngaoundere, and Tibati quickly rose to prominence.¹⁵³⁹ This multicentre power dynamic engendered a potential for long-term conflict among the various entities, which manifested frequently.¹⁵⁴⁰ Especially Tibati *lamidat*/sub-emirate openly challenged with Yola for the control of the whole Adamawa, even from the very beginning to the end of the caliphate.¹⁵⁴¹ One reason for this rivalry was that the immense Tibati *lamidat*/sub-emirate was established without any aid or support from Yola. In this regard, Haman Sambo, the founder of Tibati in the 1810s, considered himself politically equal to Modibbo Adama, the Emir of Adamawa, in his efforts to create his own emirate/*lamidat* through war.¹⁵⁴² Conversely, this power structure also facilitated a multicentre expansion, considering each sub-emirs pursued their own expansionist ambitions. The considerable autonomy granted to the sub-emirates provided the emirs with significant latitude, as well as a channel for their expansionist ambitions. This allowed them to incorporate *ray* into their application of *tadbir*.¹⁵⁴³ In contrast, the

1538 'Interview with Patigi Jimada [Patigi] by Aliyu Idrees in 1988'. O.A.C. 3.

1539 Abdoullaye and Eldridge, *Ray Ou Rei-Bouba*, 182. In the case of Adamawa, these sub-emirates were already established well before the establishment of the Adamawa emirate.

1540 For instance, already in 1815, a conflict broke up between Yola and Rei-Buba. Abdoullaye and Eldridge, 173. In the 1840s, the Caliph in Sokoto had to interfere in a conflict between Tibati and Yola. Mukhtar, 'Aliyu Ibn Bello (Aliyu Babba), 1842-1859', 115-16. Around the same years, Yola had to call other sub-emirates once again to attack Rei-Buba. 'Chronicle of Marou', P.C. 13. Yet, the conflict did not resolve until the 1870s. Abdoullaye and Eldridge, *Ray Ou Rei-Bouba*, 205. In 1858, a war broke out between Tibati and Ngaoundere, as Tibati was trying to establish itself as an independent emirate/*lamidat* from Yola thanks to its close relation with Sokoto. However, Tibati lost the war. Hamoua Dalailou, 'Ardo Issa: Batisseur Du Lamidat de Ngaoundere (1854-1878)', in *Acteurs de l'histoire Au Nord-Cameroon*, Ngaoundere-Anthropos 1 (Ngaoundéré: Université de Ngaoundéré, 1998), 41. The same problems were also acute in Nupe. Already in 1834, there was a conflict between Bida and Lafiagi, which solved only with the involvement of Gwandu. Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 72. However, the conflict repeated around the 1850s, which this time Ilorin was involved in the case to solve. 'Interview with Jonas Nakorji [Patigi] by Aliyu Idrees in 1988'. O.A.C. 3.

1541 Abwa Daniel, 'Le Glaive et Le Coran : Deux Modes de Penetration de l'islam Au Cameroon Au XIX^{ème} Siecle', in *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest*, ed. Samba Dieng (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999), 67-68.

1542 A. Sali, 'Le Lamidat de Tibati Des Origines à 1945', in *Mémoire de Maîtrise d'histoire* (Yaoundé: Université de Yaoundé, 1993), 17-23.

1543 For instance, the Emirs of Keffi and Nasarawa personally involved in trade by creating some degree of monopoly. This policy was in general the result of the local conditions that let the emirs tend to the implementation of *ray*. For instance, due to insecure routes in the region and the Emir of Zazzau's inability to ensure security in remote areas,

central Emirs in the regions such as Bida, Muri, and Yola gradually found themselves unable to implement *tadbir* effectively and were compelled to transition their governance approach to *idara*, from the 1850s to the 1870s, in order to maintain a balance of power among the sub-emirates and the Caliphate, as was also the case in Ilorin.¹⁵⁴⁴

The transformation in governance within major centres was closely linked to both administrative and social changes. For instance, in the wake of a significant surge in trade activities throughout the Adamawa emirate during the 1850s, numerous Hausa merchant and scholarly communities began to establish themselves in Yola. A notable consequence of this emerging dynamic was the Hausanization of the administrative framework in the city and surrounding. Prior to the 1850s, the administrative structure of the Adamawa emirate exhibited a dual character. In the northern sub-emirates, such as Maroua and Garoua, administrative institutions were heavily influenced by Bornu, predominantly utilizing Kanuri titles for officials.¹⁵⁴⁵ In the southern sub-emirates, particularly in Ngaoundere and Tibati, Pullo titles were prevalent throughout the administration.¹⁵⁴⁶ Initially, Yola's administrative system also reflected a Pullo character. However, following the 1850s, administrative positions were restructured to align with the Hausa system and titles. This transition in the sub-emirates occurred later, around the 1870s, and was limited to certain areas, such as Garoua.¹⁵⁴⁷

The Hausanization process in Yola resulted in the emergence of a scholarly community that increasingly engaged in political matters. For example, during the 1850s, numerous scholars in Yola began to voice their opposition to the ongoing jihad movement in Adamawa. They claimed that the jihad already granted the acquisition of sufficient land and the enslavement of individuals, advocating for a cessation of jihad in favour of agricultural development and religious pursuits. However, the Emir of Adamawa at the time, Lamido Lauwal, who remained committed to the implementation of *tadbir*, disregarded these protests. In 1870, the new Emir, Lamido Sanda, who

the Emirs of Keffi and Nasarawa created a heavily armed, state-owned caravan system. Other merchants could transport their goods only through these caravans. 'Interview with Atiku Garba Yahya [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1993'. O.A.C. 2. One of the another reason for this local condition is the consolidation of Karu, Kurape and Kurudu states surrounded by the caliphal powers. These states remained as small independent pockets in the middle of caliphal powers, granting chances for the non-Muslim communities, who were regularly suffering from the raids of the various emirates, to escape into their country. These states also greatly contributed to the unsecured trade routes as a response of attacks by emirates. 'Interview with Tamah Awuba Anyidakuzo [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992'. O.A.C. 2.

1544 For example, the Emir of Adamawa could not take any action against a sub-emirate without having the confirmation and aid of the other sub-emirs. Abdoullaye and Eldridge, *Ray Ou Rei-Bouba*, 179. In the case of Nupe, several times the emirs had to let the Emir of Gwandu interfere in their affairs to avoid conflicts. Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 65.

1545 Bassoro and Mohammadou, *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle*, 79–89.

1546 'Interview with Abbo Hamadama [Tibati] by Ahmadou Sehou in 2006'. O.A.C. 16.

1547 Bassoro and Mohammadou, *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle*, 72.

initiated a transition from *tadbir* to *idara*, altered state policy and heeded the scholars' concerns. Following this change, Yola experienced a significant reduction in raiding activities.¹⁵⁴⁸ A similar transformation occurred in Muri during the 1870s, where the Emir, Muhammadu Nya, invited various Hausa merchants and scholarly communities to his emirate, thereby facilitating a shift from the Pullo administrative system to a Hausa system, which also granted scholars greater rights to participate in governance.¹⁵⁴⁹ Hence, central cities increasingly evolved into administrative hubs with diminished expansionist aspirations, whereas sub-emirates emerged as the primary catalysts for territorial expansion.

In the 1840s, the military forces of the sub-emirates of Nupe extended their reach to the northern borders of Ondo and Edo states through their raiding expeditions.¹⁵⁵⁰ Nevertheless, their significant expansion commenced in the 1850s, during which they first penetrated Esanland. At this early stage, they just raided the region and returned back.¹⁵⁵¹ In the same period, they successfully seized Lokoja, establishing a trade post there.¹⁵⁵² The second phase of their expansion occurred in the 1870s, during which they extended their authority westward from Lokoja by capturing Kabba and establishing a permanent military base there.¹⁵⁵³ During the same period, they began to transition their raiding activities in Esanland into a tributary system. By the 1880s, the emirate forces had constructed a military garrison in Auchi, from which they dispatched troops southward to collect tribute; in instances where tribute was not forthcoming, they resorted to raiding the area.¹⁵⁵⁴ Notably, between the 1870s and 1880s, their presence in Auchi was tenuous due to local resistance. However, by the 1890s, the emirate forces had solidified their control in Auchi and began to send military contingents to the northern villages of Benin City.¹⁵⁵⁵

1548 Martin Njeuma, 'Sokoto and Her Provinces: Some Reflections on the Case of Adamawa', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 327.

1549 'Interview with Jauro Dinga [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015'. O.A.C. 14.

1550 Adam Abdullah Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, ed. Abdalhafiz Dusu (Alexandria: Maktabat al-Iskandariyat, 2014).

1551 Dawood Omolumen Egbefo, 'The Nupe Invasion of Esanland: An Assessment of Its Socio-Political Impact on the People, 1885-1897', *Haskenmu* 1 (2008): 6.

1552 Mohammed, 'The Sokoto Jihad and Its Impact on the Confluence Area and Afenmai', 148. Afterwards, this trade post became one of the Caliphate's most important weapon import stations, making the Nupe emirate the primary source of weapons for Gwandu and Sokoto. N.N.A., SNP 7/1778/1909/Account on Gwandu, f. 19.

1553 Mohammed, 'The Sokoto Jihad and Its Impact on the Confluence Area and Afenmai', 144-49.

1554 Egbefo, 'The Nupe Invasion of Esanland: An Assessment of Its Socio-Political Impact on the People, 1885-1897', 7.

1555 Mohammed, 'The Sokoto Jihad and Its Impact on the Confluence Area and Afenmai', 152.

In the case of Muri and Adamawa, the expansion had dual facets. Specifically, the southern sub-emirates engaged actively in military and political expansion, while the northern and central regions concentrated on agricultural production. Particularly during the 1850s, the Muri emirate began to cultivate raw cotton on a large scale, prompting the Emir to encourage his military commanders to extend their territorial reach to the south in pursuit of additional land.¹⁵⁵⁶ Consequently, by 1860, the Gassol and Bakundi sub-emirates were established, resulting in the exile of several Jukun communities.¹⁵⁵⁷ Particularly after the 1860s, the Muri emirate emerged as a significant centre for raw cotton production within the entire Caliphate.¹⁵⁵⁸ Bauchi's vassal states,¹⁵⁵⁹ especially Awe, Wase, and Keana, also capitalized on this expansion by launching raids into the region during the 1860s.¹⁵⁶⁰ A second period of expansion in the region commenced in the 1880s, driven by local conflicts between the Tiv and Jukun communities.¹⁵⁶¹ The forces of the Muri emirate successfully subdued the Wukari state and several Chamba and Tiv communities, integrating them into a tributary system and extending their authority to Katsina-ala.¹⁵⁶² However, throughout these expansion efforts, the emirate forces were unable to capture Jalingo, a significant Jukun state

1556 The production of raw cotton and textiles had a historical and traditional role in Jukunland. Toryina Ayati Varvar, 'The Role of Trade in the Pre-Colonial Economy of Tivland', *African Journal of Economy and Society* 5, no. 2 (2005): 13.

1557 Nadir Abdulhaid Nasidi, 'The Spread of Islam in Muri, 1817-1953: The Contributions of the Emirs', *Lapai Journal of Nigerian History* 12, no. 2 (2021): 94–95.

1558 Saad Abubakar, 'A Survey of the Economy of the Eastern Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 115.

1559 The difference between "vassal state" and "sub-emirate" was a unique case for the Benue region. Different from the other parts of the caliphate, in this region, some non-Muslim local chiefs sent their commander or children to Bauchi and Muri, asking for a flag for jihad. While in these centres these agents were recognized as Muslim and received flags, they only took advantage of creating their own political entity in their region without building any kind of emirate system. Hence, especially after the 1850s, several such vassal states in the region were acting on behalf of Bauchi and Muri, acting as a ruler in their area, and never considering themselves as emirs. For more details, see: Hamman, *The Middle Benue Region and the Sokoto Jihad 1812 – 1869: The Impact of Establishment of the Emirate of Muri*, 137. In some cases, these vassal states even proved much efficiency compare to the other sub-emirates. For instance, around the 1890s Awe and Keane vassal states were initiating regular raids to Tivland, whereas Lafia sub-emirate was busy with some internal conflicts. Hence, in the 1890s, some Tiv communities took advantage of the passive affairs of Lafia by capturing the southern parts of the sub-emirate to compensate their lost to Awe and Keane. Makar, *History of Political Change Among the Tiv in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, 49.

1560 A.H.A., Ciroma Collection. Dated as 1861.

1561 Mordakai Sule Dansonka, 'Intergroup Relations in Wukari and Donga Areas, 1900-1922: A Case Study of the Jukun And Chamba Peoples' (Ph.D. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 2016), 44. Before the 1840s, the Tiv and Jukun communities had a peaceful relationship. However, the situation changed by 1845. 'Interview with Jibrin Amfani [Wukari] by Mordakai Dansonka in 2014'. O.A.C. 13. One of the core reasons for this conflict was the salt mines in Arufu and Akwana. As these two mines were the most important production centers of salt in the entire Jukun-Tiv region, the control of these mines became an issue of rivalry and conflict between Jukun and Tiv communities. Terhemba Wuam, 'Tiv Exchange Relations in the Nineteenth Century: A Study of Commodities, Markets, Trade Routes and Currencies', *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History* 9–10 (2010): 126–27.

1562 N.N.A., Muriproof SNP 834/1913.

located in proximity to the emirate's capital.¹⁵⁶³ This objective was ultimately achieved in 1891, facilitated by the involvement of European agents who provided the Emir with cannons to breach the walls of Jalingo.¹⁵⁶⁴ By the 1890s, the Muri emirate reached its zenith in terms of economic and political expansion, bolstered by substantial agricultural production and the tribute payments from the Tiv, Jukun, and Chamba states.¹⁵⁶⁵

Other sub-emirates within the Benue basin illustrate a comparable dynamic. During the 1850s, there was significant political expansion marked by the consolidation of the Nasarawa sub-emirate. Especially as a result of the *ray* implementation of the Emirs and through their involvement, by 1850 some new trade routes were established connecting Zaria to Katsina-ala. As previously noted, by the 1870s, this route had emerged as one of the most vital trade connections in the region. Already around the 1850s, Keffi began to play a central role in this long-distance trade.¹⁵⁶⁶ This was not only because they were in the middle of the route, but the Emirs of Keffi also understood the role of trade for their economic ambitions. For instance, the emirate frequently conducted raiding expeditions into the Jos area, which was home to several Murcam communities renowned for their contributions to the long-distance trade; yet, the emirate's forces refrained from attacking these communities.¹⁵⁶⁷ Concurrently, raiding campaigns were initiated against southern communities near the Benue River. By the 1870s, the Nasarawa sub-emirate successfully reached the river and established Loko village as a strategic point.¹⁵⁶⁸ They then began launching attacks on Tiv communities located on the opposite bank of the river, continuing until the 1890s.¹⁵⁶⁹

1563 Jalingo played a significant role in the Muri emirate. While other Jukun states were forced to accept Muri's tributary system, Jalingo successfully defended itself. However, this created great hostility toward the city from Muri. For this reason, for example, while symbolically important Jukun shrines in Wukari were destroyed by Muri forces and greatly respected, when emirate forces finally captured Jalingo, they destroyed all shrines in the city. Nathan Irmiya Elawa, 'Jukun History and Society', in *Understanding Religious Change in Africa and Europe: Crossing Latitudes* (Springer, 2020), 53.

1564 Nadir Abdulhaid Nasidi, 'The Role of Lambe in the Spread of Islam in Muri Emirate: The Contribution of Muhammadu Nya (1874-1896)', *Jalingo Journal of History and Archaeology* 3, no. 1-2 (2015): 8. Katsina-ala was not only historically an important centre of trade. For instance, as a result of this trade connection with Hausaland, almost all Jukun chiefs could speak Hausa. Samuel Ajayi Cowther, *Journal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers Undertaken by Macgregor Laird in Connection with the British Government in 1854* (London: Church Missionary House, 1855), 140-41. Furthermore, especially around the 1870s, the city received great attraction by Hausa merchants who were using this route to reach Banyo and Tibati *lamidats*/sub-emirates of Adamawa. Adamu, 'Distribution of Trading Centers in the Central Sudan in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', 89.

1565 Nadir Abdulhaid Nasidi, 'The Jihad and the Establishment of the Fulbe Emirate of Muri (1817-1926)', *Wudil Journal of Humanities* 1 (2016): 10.

1566 'Interview with Alhaji Dogo Abubakar [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992'. O.A.C. 2.

1567 Adamu, 'Distribution of Trading Centers in the Central Sudan in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', 79.

1568 'Interview with Tukura Azaki [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1993'. O.A.C. 2.

1569 'Interview with Alhassan Garba Abdulrahman [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992'. O.A.C. 2.

All these examples of expansion were firmly unique to the Caliphate. The situation in Adamawa, on the other hand, represents an extreme case in terms of its expansionary dynamics. No other emirates or sub-emirates in the Caliphate experienced a level of expansion comparable to that achieved by the sub-emirates of Adamawa. Notably, the central and southern sub-emirates/*lamidats*, including Rei-buba, Tibati, Banyo, and Ngaoundere, successfully asserted their authority over a vast expanse of territory. Nonetheless, these sub-emirates exhibited a distinctive governance structure, as previously discussed in relation to the *pullakoo* tadbir, which enabled them to formulate a specific strategy for their expansion.¹⁵⁷⁰

The expansion strategies employed by other sub-emirates, such as those in Nupe or the Benue basin, remained relatively the same. The forces of the emir would initially conduct raids into foreign territories, subsequently establishing a pattern of repeated incursions. Eventually, these raids transition from active military engagements to the collection of tribute, considering local communities prefer to offer tribute rather than engage in protracted conflict. In the case of Adamawa, this pattern largely did not manifest until the 1890s. The primary distinction lay in the conduct of the raiding campaigns. In the sub-emirates around Benue, these campaigns were primarily aimed at acquiring booty and enslaving individuals, either as tribute or as a result of raids. Conversely, the campaigns in Adamawa were characterized by a more destructive approach, involving the incineration of villages and the extermination of local populations, alongside the enslavement of select individuals, therefore excluding any possibility of the tribute system.¹⁵⁷¹ This method proved unsustainable, as the annihilation of local communities necessitated the continuous pursuit of new territories for further booty and enslaved people. Consequently, military expansion in Nupe, Benue, and Muri exhibited a more periodic nature, whereas the campaigns in Adamawa consistently resulted in further territorial gains.¹⁵⁷² In this regard, between the 1840s and 1890s, the southern region of the Adamawa emirate experienced regular expansion southward, reaching the northern villages of Yaoundé.¹⁵⁷³

1570 This unique system left a very negative legacy in Ngaoundere, even among Muslim communities. Although the emirate forces used jihad as their main discourse for military expansion, their indifference to spreading Islam or applying Maliki law is considered a form of deep corruption within the emirate. 'Interview with Yerima Mohaman [Ngaoundere] by Hamoua Dalailou in 1995'. O.A.C. 22.

1571 Théodore Takou, *Justice Traditionnelle, 'justice Indigène' et Règlement Des Litiges Au Cameroun: Le Cas Du Lamidat Ngaoundéré* (Yaoundé: Presses Universitaires de Yaoundé I, 1998), 14–25.

1572 For instance, see: Dalailou, 'Ardo Issa: Batisseur Du Lamidat de Ngaoundere (1854-1878)', 28.

1573 A.N.C., 1AC 1744/2.

The first important change in the southern sub-emirates of Adamawa happened around the 1870s. In this period, the famous *lamiida* of Ngaoundere, Ardo Issa, reigned from 1854 to 1878, began to create walled towns (Ar. *ribat*) on the frontier to facilitate the military expansion by using these places to procure the army. The notable towns were Kounde, Gaza, Yangamo, and Bertoua. These towns quickly became a trade centre for Hausa and Kanuri merchants, since these places were the best opportunity for them to buy ivory and enslaved people at the cheapest price. Furthermore, to produce necessary foods, some local communities were excluded from the extermination and allowed to live in these towns running the farms.¹⁵⁷⁴ Only by the late 1890s did a notable shift in military strategy occur due to the considerable distance, rendering military campaigns increasingly impractical. Thus around 1898, the sub-emirates/*lamidats* of Ngaoundere and Rei-buba began to implement a tribute system in their more distant territories. With this new tributary system, towards the end of the century, Ngaoundere's forces extended beyond Kounde, Gaza, and Baya in the southeast, till Mambère in the south and Bangui in the east,¹⁵⁷⁵ and the forces of Rei-buba advanced to the beyond Lakka and Lame.¹⁵⁷⁶

The long-term expansion that occurred between the 1840s and 1890s was significantly bolstered by the influx of Pullo immigrants from Bauchi to Adamawa,¹⁵⁷⁷ considering the sub-emirates were notably deficient in manpower.¹⁵⁷⁸ These local conditions presented formidable challenges to the sub-emirates. A critical aspect of the militaristic nature of the raids and the Pullo communities' aversion to agriculture was the extensive proliferation of slave farms (Fl. *dumde*).¹⁵⁷⁹ For example, certain northern sub-emirates, such as Garoua and Maroua, faced limitations in their expansion due to the presence of Bornu and Mandara, leading them to transport a substantial number of enslaved individuals from Ngaoundere to establish slave farms in their realm.¹⁵⁸⁰ This phenomenon was noted by various European agents, who wrongfully interpreted the transportation as part of a larger long-distance slave trade. However, private records from Kanuri merchants engaged in the slave trade present a different narrative. For instance, a letter from 1879, authored by Kanuri merchant Ibra

1574 Dalailou, 'Ardo Issa: Batisseur Du Lamidat de Ngaoundere (1854-1878)', 28.

1575 Daniel, 'Le Glaive et Le Coran : Deux Modes de Penetration de l'islam Au Cameroon Au XIX^{ème} Siecle', 64–65.

1576 Kerem Duymus, 'The Political Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate after the 1850s: The Triple System and Its Dynamics' (M.A. Thesis, Bayreuth, Universität Bayreuth, 2021), 75.

1577 Tea Virtanen, 'Performance and Performativity in Pastoral Fulbe Culture' (Ph.D. Thesis, Helsinki, University of Helsinki, 2003), 51.

1578 Saleh Abubakar, 'Aspects of an Urban Phenomenon: Sokoto and Its Hinterland to c. 1850', in *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979), 126.

1579 While such slave farms existed in every part of the caliphate on various scales, in the case of Adamawa their number was uniquely high. Bassoro and Mohammadou, *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIX^e Siècle*, 130.

1580 Bassoro and Mohammadou, 112.

Laka, who was involved in trade between southern Adamawa and Kuka, provides critical insights. In this correspondence, he informs his business partner in Sokna pertaining to his previous transactions: he exported Kola Nuts from Banyo and Tibati, and enslaved individuals from Ngaoundere, which he identifies as the sole location for acquiring a significant number of enslaved people. He notes that he settled nearly all the enslaved individuals he purchased in Garoua, specifically mentioning 76 individuals, for agricultural purposes, intending to bring only three particularly “troublesome” enslaved individuals to Kuka.¹⁵⁸¹ As previously discussed, the volume of slave trade between the Sahel and Tripoli was very low,¹⁵⁸² indicating an insufficient demand for the purchase of hundreds of enslaved individuals. Nonetheless, as illustrated by the aforementioned example, this does not imply the absence of the slave trade throughout the region. In fact, the trade was substantial within the Adamawa emirate, considering there was a pressing need for labour in agriculture.¹⁵⁸³ In this respect, it was far more profitable for merchants to utilize these individuals for farming and subsequently sell the agricultural products, rather than directly selling the enslaved individuals themselves.¹⁵⁸⁴

Still, this was a radical change for the region. Although slavery already existed in the region in two forms—local practices and jihadist slavery by Bornu and Baghirmi before the Adamawa emirate—the emirate gave it a special character.¹⁵⁸⁵ In the 18th century, local slavery primarily served a symbolic social function rather than an economic one,¹⁵⁸⁶ and the scale of jihadist slavery by Bornu and Baghirmi during this period was considerably less than that observed in the 19th century.¹⁵⁸⁷ However, with the formation and expansion of the Adamawa emirate, slavery became integral to the emirate's existence, acquiring a pronounced economic dimension and significantly increasing its scale.

The external slave trade had almost no economic impact,¹⁵⁸⁸ whereas the internal system of slavery within the emirate generated substantial manpower. A considerable number of individuals were

1581 P.A. 20., uncategorized. Dated as 1879.

1582 See Chapter 4.

1583 Bassoro and Mohammadou, *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle*, 73.

1584 Abubakar, ‘A Survey of the Economy of the Eastern Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century’, 116.

1585 For more details, see: Alioum Idrissou, ‘Pratiques Esclavagistes et Serviles Chez Les Béti Du Cameroun Aux XIXe et XXe Siècles’, *Cahier Des Anneaux de La Mémoire* 14 (2011): 92–117.

1586 Kidnapping people into slavery was not a common phenomenon, for example. Sehou Ahmadou, *Stratégies de Résistance à l’esclavage Dans Les Lamidats de l’Adamaoua (XIXe -XXe Siècles)* (Yaoundé: ENS, 2012), 11.

1587 Adam Mahamat, ‘Esclavage et Servitude Dans Les Abords Sud Du Lac Tchad’ (Ph.D. Thesis, Ngaoundéré, Université de Ngaoundéré, 2007), 24, 41, 68.

1588 See: Abubakar, ‘A Survey of the Economy of the Eastern Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century’, 116.

forcibly relocated from the southern regions, particularly Ngoaoundere, to northern areas such as Garoua and Maroua.¹⁵⁸⁹ The phenomenon of slavery in the emirate was distinctive not only due to its magnitude but also because of its operational characteristics. In contrast to other regions of the Caliphate, where the Hausa administrative system allowed enslaved individuals to exercise certain rights under sharia and facilitated their integration into society through the acquisition of the Hausa language, such opportunities were largely absent in Adamawa. For instance, various oral accounts from Tibati and Ngaoundere recount that “Hausa in Adamawa had no discriminative consideration for enslaved people. As long as they accepted to convert to Islam and began to speak Hausa, they were considered as Hausa who one day would be free. In many cases, Hausa merchants in Adamawa gave one of their daughters as wives to their clients who were enslaved. Such things would never happen by Fulbe of Adamawa.”¹⁵⁹⁰ Another oral account further adds: “being a Muslim means nothing for Fulbe regarding their “slaves” in Ngaoundere. They say, a slave can go pilgrimage (Ar. *hajj*), but if the “master” do not permit this, it does nothing for him. “Slave” can go to paradise only by obeying “his master” properly.”¹⁵⁹¹ The extensive scale of the slave trade, coupled with the near impossibility of integrating enslaved individuals into free communities, has resulted in a profoundly traumatized society, the effects of which continue to resonate to this day,¹⁵⁹² prompting some researchers to call the era of the Adamawa emirate even as “Fulbe colonization”.¹⁵⁹³

The institution of slavery was not the sole determinant of the economic landscape of the Adamawa emirate. In fact, the emirate garnered recognition among long-distance traders from Hausaland and Bornu for its trade in ostrich feathers and ivory. For example, during the 1850s, numerous Kanuri merchants established themselves in Garoua to facilitate commerce between Tibati/Ngaoundere and Kuka, a trend that was mirrored by their Hausa counterparts in the 1870s.¹⁵⁹⁴ The emirate's forces frequently conducted raid campaigns; yet, Hausa merchants engaged in contractual agreements with armed groups to ensure the protection of certain communities willing to supply them with ostrich feathers and ivory. These agreements enabled Hausa merchants to extend their trade routes as far as

1589 Bassoro and Mohammadou, *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle*, 112.

1590 ‘Interview with Abbo Hamadama [Tibati] by Ahmadou Sehou in 2006’. O.A.C. 16; ‘Interview with Dewa Ibrahim [Ngaoundéré] by Ahmadou Sehou in 2006’. O.A.C. 16.

1591 ‘Interview with Sharif Abubakr [Dargala] by Issa Saibo in 2004’. O.A.C. 7.

1592 Alioum Idrissou, ‘Le Discours Sur l’esclavage Parmi Les Residents Du Cameroun Septentrional Dans La Ville de Yaounde: Regard Analytique Sur Une Memoire Errante’, *African Economic History* 41 (2013): 52.

1593 For example, see: Motaze Akam, ‘Ngaoundéré : Discours Sociologique’, in *De l’Adamawa à l’Adamaoua*, ed. Hamadou Adama (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014).

1594 Bassoro and Mohammadou, *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle*, 23–24.

Yaoundé.¹⁵⁹⁵ In the eastern region of the emirate, Kanuri merchants often outpaced their Hausa competitors. Consequently, several Kanuri merchant communities traversed extensive distances, reaching areas as far as present-day Gabon.¹⁵⁹⁶ A contributing factor to the favourable relations with Kanuri merchants was the peaceful diplomatic ties with Bornu. Historically, the northern sub-emirates maintained close relations with Bornu,¹⁵⁹⁷ particularly among the regions of Bornu, Mandara, and Adamawa, where a stable power equilibrium persisted until the invasion by Rabillah, which effectively averted a significant conflict between these entities.¹⁵⁹⁸ Interestingly, the differing levels of integration of Hausa and Kanuri merchants within the emirate also influenced the spread of Islam. In the eastern part of the emirate, Kanuri merchants exhibited little interest in promoting Islam, whereas Hausa merchants actively sought to convert various local communities along the borders of Banyo and Tibati.¹⁵⁹⁹ Thus, by the 1890s, the western frontier of the emirate was undergoing a transformation towards caliphal integration, and the eastern frontier remained largely uncharted within the broader context of the Caliphate.

7.1.5. The case of Ilorin

The Ilorin emirate represents a compelling case within the Gwandu part of the Caliphate. Its attributes do not wholly align with the political and economic dynamics observed in either the western emirates or the emirates around Benue and Adamawa. However, with respect to the concept of "never coming expansion," Ilorin is categorized within the western region, while its political and economic conditions are more closely associated with the Benue region.

The political and historical context of the Ilorin region, along with notable historical figures such as Are-Ona-Kakanfo Afonja and Sheikh Salih bin Janta Alimi, significantly contributed to the distinctiveness of the emirate in the Caliphate. In the 18th century, Ilorin was a relatively small village within the Oyo Empire.¹⁶⁰⁰ During the late 18th century, Yorubaland underwent a

1595 Abubakar, 'A Survey of the Economy of the Eastern Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century', 116.

1596 'Interview No. 14: With Babagana Abubakar Online, 2023'.

1597 Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale, *Maroua et Pette*, 1970, 188–90.

1598 For more details, see: Bawuro Barkindo, 'The Origin and History of the Sultanate of Mandara to 1902' (Ph.D. Thesis, Zaria, Abdullahi Bello University, 1980). Also see: Saad Abubakar, 'Relations Between Bornu and Fombina Before 1901', in *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, ed. Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), 224–30.

1599 Ahmadou Séhou, 'Esclavage, Émancipation et Citoyenneté Dans Les Lamidats de l'Adamaoua (Nord-Cameroun)', *Esclavages & Post-Esclavages* 1 (2019): 5.

1600 Hakeem Olumide Danmole, 'The Frontier Emirate. A History of Islam in Ilorin' (Ph.D. Thesis, Birmingham, Birmingham University, 1980), 63.

transformative period characterized by a decline in the authority of civil rulers and a corresponding rise in the power and influence of military commanders. Some Are-Ona-Kakanfo, army commander leaders, such as Afonja were becoming powerful and autonomous from Oyo-Ile, capital of the Oyo Empire, by establishing a presence in the peripheral regions for their future plans.¹⁶⁰¹ On the contrary, around the same period, the neighbouring Borguland, specifically Nikki State, successfully consolidated various smaller Borgu states under its control, initiating an expansion towards Yorubaland and the Ilorin region.¹⁶⁰² By the early 19th century, the Ilorin region was marked by significant political turmoil. Despite this transformative era, the area maintained substantial connections with Hausaland and Bornu. In fact, since the 16th century, Yorubaland had engaged in regular interactions with Hausa states, which included both economic exchanges and military confrontations.¹⁶⁰³ Notably, Kanuri scholars were already active in Yorubaland by the 17th century.¹⁶⁰⁴ These scholars even build the first mosque in Lagos in the middle of the 18th century.¹⁶⁰⁵ By the late 18th century, additional Hausa and Pullo scholars began to migrate and settle in Yorubaland.¹⁶⁰⁶ Furthermore, Gobirawa merchants facilitated a profitable long-distance trade route between Oyo and Gobir during this period.¹⁶⁰⁷ This prolonged cultural engagement with Islamic communities not only fostered a cosmopolitan atmosphere in Yorubaland but also influenced the origin mythologies of both the Yoruba and Borgu societies.¹⁶⁰⁸ Presently, both societies possess origin myths that assert a historical connection to Mecca, suggesting that their ancestors migrated westward in response to the Muslim conquest of the city. This migration narrative typically involves a journey first to Egypt (or, in some accounts, to Yemen), followed by a passage to Bornu, and ultimately arriving to their present homeland.¹⁶⁰⁹ The use of Islamic symbols to articulate both unity and rivalry with their Muslim neighbours in these origin myths is a characteristic feature of non-Muslim societies that have engaged in extensive cultural exchanges with Muslim communities.

1601 Toyin Falola and Dare Oguntomisin, *The Military in 19th Century Yoruba Politics* (Ife: University of Ife Press, 1984), 35.

1602 Musa Baba Idris, 'Political and Economic Relations in the Bariba States: An Introduction to the Historical Study of a Plural Society from the Traditions of Origin to the Colonial Period' (uncompleted Ph.D Thesis, Birmingham University, 1973), 294.

1603 'Interview with Abou Magaji [Maradi] by Isyaku Yandaki in 2014'. O.A.C. 21.

1604 For more details, see: Kalli Gazali, 'Kanuri in Diaspora: The Contributions of Ulama of Kanem-Borno to Islamic Education in Nupe and Yorubaland' (Ph.D. Thesis, Kano, Bayero University, 2021).

1605 Gazali, 'The Kanuri Diaspora and Its Islamic Intellectual Impact Outside Kanem-Bornu', 186.

1606 Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, 2014, 97–99.

1607 For more details, see: Aliyu Sakariyau Alabir and Ibrahim Abdul Ganiya Jawondo, 'Gobir Agency and Identity in the Mosaic of Ilorin Emirate since 1823' (1th International Conference on Gobir, Past and Present: Transformations and Change, Sokoto, 2018).

1608 C.M.S.A., 1/0/19/12.

1609 Richard Kuba, *Wasangari Und Wangara: Borgu Und Seine Nachabern in Historischer Perspektive* (Hamburg: Lit, 1996), 265.

Similar origin myths can also be observed among the Jukun and Chaamba, as discussed in previous sections.

Under the prevailing historical and social circumstances, the introduction of jihad into the Ilorin region markedly differed from its reception in other areas of the Caliphate. In fact, even following the establishment of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate in the 1810s, there was a lack of significant interest among the Muslim Hausa, Gobirawa, and Kanuri communities, as well as among non-Muslim Pullo communities—particularly those in Borguland—in either declaring jihad or participating in the jihad movement.¹⁶¹⁰ Nevertheless, the sustained efforts of Islamic scholars in the region contributed to the formation of small, autonomous Muslim communities dispersed throughout Yorubaland in the early 19th century.¹⁶¹¹ One prominent scholar was Sheikh Salih bin Janta Alimi, who travelled with his Pullo followers.¹⁶¹² According to Arabic historical accounts, he was dispatched by Uthman dan Fodio prior to the jihad to the south with the mission of promoting Islam. After visiting Bussa and other states in Borgu, he entered Yorubaland around the 1790s.¹⁶¹³ Yoruba sources indicate that he resided for a time in Oyo-Ile before deciding to journey through smaller villages in the east, ultimately settling in Ilorin.¹⁶¹⁴ This period coincided with Afonja's settlement in the same village, since he sought to challenge the Oyo Empire. An alliance was soon forged between Alimi and Afonja, stipulating that Alimi's Pullo followers would support Afonja's ambitions, and Afonja would extend privileges and autonomy to the Muslim communities.¹⁶¹⁵ The immediate outcome of this alliance was Afonja's declaration in 1817 that any enslaved Muslim individuals, primarily of Hausa origin, who escaped from “their owners” and sought refuge with him would be granted freedom and protection.¹⁶¹⁶ This strategy precipitated widespread disorder within the Oyo Empire, considering thousands of enslaved Muslim Hausa fled and sought sanctuary in Ilorin, thereby joining Alimi's community.¹⁶¹⁷ As part of the conditions of their alliance, Alimi permitted Afonja to establish an armed division composed of the newly arrived Hausa groups, which were subsequently referred to

1610 ‘Interview with Musa Mohammad Kigera [Bussa] by Julius Adenkule in 1991’. O.A.C. 8.

1611 Adam Abdullah Al-Iluri, *Lamahat Al-Ballur Fi Mashahir Ulama Ilurin* (Cairo: Al-Maktabah Al-Arabiyyah, 1982), 27.

1612 The Arabic sources name him *Sheihk Salih bin Muhammad bin Janta*, Hausa sources *Salihi*, Yoruba sources *Alimi*.

1613 Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, 2014, 186.

1614 Ahmad Adisa Onikoko, *A Short History of Ilorin Emirate* (Ilorin: Atoto Press Limited, 1992), 8–9.

1615 Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, 2014, 188.

1616 Usman Aribidesi, *The Yoruba from Prehistory to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 153–55.

1617 Toyin Fulola, ‘The Impact of the Nineteenth-Century Sokoto Jihad in Yorubaland’, in *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, ed. A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandhi (Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990), 128.

as *jamaa* in Yoruba sources, a derivative from *jamaat* (Ar. muslim community).¹⁶¹⁸ A critical aspect of this development was that Alimi refrained from participating in any military endeavours, confining his role strictly to religious duties. Despite being the leader of a substantial Muslim community, he exhibited no interest in political or military ambitions. In fact, he contemplated leaving Ilorin and the entire community to further propagate Islam. However, particularly after 1817, his community became so integral to Afonja that he exerted considerable effort to persuade Alimi to remain in Ilorin, fearing that a significant portion of the community would depart with him.¹⁶¹⁹ Hausa oral accounts remember his leadership as a quintessential example of an *idara* application, instead his opportunities to create his own political and economic ambitions: “*Ya shahara wajen tafiyar da yanayi mai wuya da kyau, bai taba sha'awar shugabanci ba.*” (“He was famous for his *idara* instead of difficult situations, he was never interested in *riasa*”).¹⁶²⁰

Nevertheless, following his death in 1821 (or 1823), the situation underwent a dramatic transformation. The Muslim community appointed his son, Abdulsalam, as the new leader.¹⁶²¹ The arrival of a large group of jihadist fugitive Fulbe from Nupe, after their unsuccessful attempt to dethrone the Etsu Nupe, to Ilorin between 1821 and 1823, acquainted Abdulsalam with jihadist aspirations.¹⁶²² Furthermore, Hausa oral accounts remember him even at the very beginning with the application of *tadbir*: “*Ya bambanta da mahaifinsa. Ya daina tafiyar da al'amura kuma ya fara yin taka tsantsan ga shirin jihadinsa na gaba.*” (“He is different from his father. He stopped applying *idara* for the issues, but began to apply *tadbir* for his future jihad plans”).¹⁶²³ Accordingly, around 1823, leveraging the substantial armed division of Muslims, he assassinated Afonja and assumed complete control in Ilorin by officially declaring jihad.¹⁶²⁴ Notably, during this period, Abdulsalam exhibited a lack of interest in joining the Caliphate until 1828. The change of his mind around this time can be attributed to the increasing competition posed by two other Muslim communities in the region. On the one side, Malam Gabari emerged as the leader of the Hausa communities, which

1618 Aribidesi, *The Yoruba from Prehistory to the Present*, 155–60.

1619 Samuel Johnson, *History of the Yorubas from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate* (Lagos: C.S.S. Book shop, 1976), 202.

1620 ‘Interview with Abdulkadir Solagberu [Ilorin] by Hadi Saad in 2015’. O.A.C. 17.

1621 Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, 2014, 191.

1622 Hadi Saad, ‘The Dynamics of Political Development in a Multicultural Society: The Case of Ilorin During the 19th and 20th Centuries’ (Ph.D. Thesis, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, 2015), 81.

1623 ‘Interview with Abdulkadir Solagberu [Ilorin] by Hadi Saad in 2015’. O.A.C. 17.

1624 Al-Iluri, *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*, 2014, 192.

began to distance themselves from Abdulsalam's primary Muslim community.¹⁶²⁵ On the other side, Solagberu, a Yoruba Muslim leader, began to engage in conflict with Abdulsalam, particularly concerning his jihadist aspirations.¹⁶²⁶ According to Hausa oral accounts, both Malam Gabari and Solagberu favoured the *idara* system established by Alimi, which afforded significant autonomy to communities and promoted tolerance towards local non-Muslim populations. Consequently, Abdulsalam's sudden implementation of *tadbir* threatened to disrupt this delicate equilibrium among the Muslim communities and the similarly tenuous peace with local non-Muslim groups.¹⁶²⁷ In an effort to avert a conflict with these influential figures, Abdulsalam sought the support of Gwandu. In response, the emir of Gwandu dispatched a jihad flag along with several letters of counsel regarding the appropriate application of sharia, officially designating Abdulsalam as the first Emir of Ilorin in 1828.¹⁶²⁸ As a result, Abdulsalam was able to assert his authority and commenced raids against neighbouring non-Muslim communities.

The establishment of a jihadist emirate in the regions of Yorubaland and Borguland, characterized by persistent raid attacks on local communities, prompted significant concern among the rulers of Nikke and Oyo-Ile. In response, these states formed an alliance against Ilorin. The Oyo Empire consolidated its local administrators and military chiefs to combat Ilorin, whilst the ruler of Nikke undertook similar efforts to unite the Borgu states in 1836, with the exception of Busso state, which refrained from joining the coalition due to its alliance with the Yauri emirate.¹⁶²⁹ To ensure his survival, Abdulsalam urgently sought assistance from Gwandu in 1837, to which the Grand Emir of Gwandu responded by dispatching a substantial military force to defend Ilorin.¹⁶³⁰ The outcome of this conflict proved disastrous for both Borgu and Oyo, as nearly all Borgu rulers who participated as commanders in the army were killed, leading to a protracted civil war throughout Borguland for the subsequent decades.¹⁶³¹ Following their victory on the battlefield, the combined forces of Gwandu and Ilorin succeeded in sacking the capital of the Oyo Empire, Oyo-Ile, in the same year.

1625 Saad, 'The Dynamics of Political Development in a Multicultural Society: The Case of Ilorin During the 19th and 20th Centuries', 94.

1626 Salihu Ismail, 'The Contest for Ilorin: A Study of Political Struggle for Ascendancy and Supremacy in the 19th and 20th Centuries' (M.A. Thesis, Ilorin, University of Ilorin, 2004), 43–45.

1627 'Interview with Abdulkadir Solagberu [Ilorin] by Hadi Saad in 2015'. O.A.C. 17.

1628 Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 69.

1629 'Interview with Gesere Maman Bamaro [Parakau] by Richard Kuba in 1992'. O.A.C. 9.

1630 N.N.A., SNP 7/1778/1909/Account on Gwandu, f. 14.

1631 Julius Olufemi Adekunle, 'Nigerian Borgu c. 1500-1900: An Analysis of a Segmentary Society' (Ph.D. Thesis, Nova Scotia, Dalhousie University, 1993), 308–10.

Only a newly organized force from Ibadan was able to halt their further southern expansion in 1838.¹⁶³²

This decisive victory allowed the Ilorin emirate to secure its position in Yorubaland, whereas the rapid emergence of new Yoruba states, such as Ibadan, ultimately curtailed the emirate's expansion for the remainder of the century. Consequently, the Gwandu emirate found itself receiving demand of help from Ilorin multiple times throughout the 19th century.¹⁶³³ The precarious circumstances significantly influenced the governance and political-economic dynamics of the emirate throughout the remainder of the century. In certain respects, the emirate underwent a process analogous to that experienced by the Oyo Empire in the 18th century. Due to the emir's insufficient power to counter the assaults from various Yoruba states, he began to grant substantial privileges to military commanders, providing them with land and fiefs in exchange for their military service. These military leaders, known as Balogon, assumed control over the application of *tadbir* and frequently operated autonomously, forming alliances with other Yoruba states by exploiting existing rivalries.¹⁶³⁴ The Emirs, on the other hand, were forced to apply *idara* to keep all arm commanders in balance after the 1840s.¹⁶³⁵ The integration into the caliphate also introduced new challenges for the emirate. Since it was very easy for Muslim communities to leave the region, if they were not satisfied with their fief holders, settled another part of the Caliphate, having a typical “exit option”; this resulted in a chronic shortage of manpower within the emirate.¹⁶³⁶ The long-term consequences of this situation included a significant increase in the slave trade between the central regions of the Caliphate and Ilorin. Throughout the remainder of the century, the Ilorin emirate was required to regularly transport large numbers of enslaved individuals to Kano and Zazzau to sustain their agricultural sector and ensure an adequate supply of soldiers for its military.¹⁶³⁷ In spite of these adversities, neither the Yoruba and Borgu states nor the Ilorin emirate succeeded in achieving dominance over the entire region, nor were they able to annihilate one another. Alongside political conflicts, a notable level of trade developed between the Yoruba-Borgu states and Ilorin. A particularly interesting outcome of this development was the widespread circulation of cowrie,

1632 Ahmed Kayode Jimoh, *Ilorin : The Journey so Far* (Ilorin: Atoto Press Limited, 1994), 109–10.

1633 Dalhatu, *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*, 2016, 151–54.

1634 Jimoh, *Ilorin : The Journey so Far*, 121.

1635 Safi Jimba, *Iwe Itan Ilorin* (Ilorin: Jimba book publication Company, 1990), 165–69.

1636 Saad, ‘The Dynamics of Political Development in a Multicultural Society: The Case of Ilorin During the 19th and 20th Centuries’, 123.

1637 Banwo Adeyinka, ‘The Ilorin Economy in the 19th Century’, *Nigerian Journal of Economic History* 1, no. 1 (1998): 133–35.

which served as the primary currency within the Caliphate, throughout Borguland and Yorubaland by the 1850s.¹⁶³⁸

These details provide a special view for comprehending the changes of the system of governance in Ilorin. The foundation of the emirate began with an unambitious *idara* system. However, the official establishment only came after the application of *tadbir*, which is a very particular character of the emirates around Benue and Adamawa. Still, soon the Ilorin emirate had to return to the *idara* system, aligning the main governmental dynamics in the emirate again with the western emirates of the caliphate.

7.2. New Actors, New Challenges: Changing Dynamics in Bornu

7.2.1. New *Shehus* of Kuka

After the demise of al-Amin al-Kanemi in 1837, two prominent figures significantly influenced the transformation of the Bornu: Omar al-Kanemi, who reigned from 1837 to 1881, and Hashimi, who held power from 1885 to 1893. They endeavoured to implement their distinct governance systems and pursued individual strategies in the face of considerable challenges, including the insurrection of the Sayfawa dynasty and the rise of Rabillah, which marked critical periods in the history of Bornu.

Omar al-Kanemi exhibited tendencies similar to those of al-Amin al-Kanemi concerning governance systems, particularly in his steadfast application of *tadbir* to address prevailing challenges. Nonetheless, he diverged from his father in several aspects of applying the *tadbir*. Al-Kanemi primarily focused on consolidating the authority of Kuka in response to the significant autonomy enjoyed by local fief holders, a situation that had arisen from a long-standing *idara* system. However, the challenges faced by Omar during the early years of his reign were markedly different. The increasing involvement of Wadai in the Kanem region and its diplomatic engagements with the Sayfawa dynasty in the 1840s posed serious threats to Kuka. Notably, Omar adopted a contrasting strategy to that of his father. In 1846, he permitted the Awlad Sulaiman to settle in Kanem and govern autonomously,¹⁶³⁹ as he heard that Wadai forces were preparing to

¹⁶³⁸ N.N.A., Borgdist/SNP/7/4667.

¹⁶³⁹ Abubakr Salim Al-Shaybani and Khald Misbah Abdullah, 'Hijrat Al-Libiyin Ila al-Duwal al-Mujawirat Fi al-Easr al-Hadith (1842-1930m)', *Al-Jamiat Al-Libiyat Li-Ulum Al-Tarbiya* 4 (2022): 259.

invade Kanem, making an alliance with the *mai* of Bornu, Ali Delatumi.¹⁶⁴⁰ Following the success of the Awlad Sulaiman, Omar al-Kanemi used this event to abolish the Sayfawa dynasty in Bornu completely, becoming the *de facto* and *de jure* ruler of the state. Around the same years, he initiated a military campaign to the north, targeting the Kazal region to ensure compliance with Kuka and to establish central authority by appointing the chief of the Dewa community as *kazalma* (Kn. fief holder).¹⁶⁴¹ It is noteworthy that it was his father who had previously dismantled the central authority in the Kazal region and replaced the *kazalma* with various local chiefs designated as *lawal* (Kn. local administrators) in their respective communities during the 1830s. Omar employed a similar strategy in relation to Muniyo with the fear of a Kel Tamasheq invasion from the north. Different from al-Kanemi, who was consistently confronted the rise of Muniyo to prevent their autonomy, Omar openly supported their ascendancy by tolerating their acquisition of territories previously under the control of *lawals*. This approach fostered a peaceful relationship between Kuka and Muniyo.¹⁶⁴² Additionally, in the early 1840s, Omar conferred significant privileges upon members of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty, who had been exiled from Murzuq due to the invasion by Awlad Sulaiman. A prominent member of this dynasty, Muhammad Tahir, was appointed in the 1840s as the representative of Bornu in Zinder, with the aim of promoting the centralization of Damagaram against the possible expansion of Uthmaniyya Caliphate, through the dynastic expertise of Awlad Muhammad from Fezzan, and ensuring Damagaram's allegiance to Kuka.¹⁶⁴³

In the context of this multi-central power policy, Omar aimed at fortifying the frontiers of Bornu against potential threats from the Wadai, Utmhaniyya Caliphate and Kel Tamasheq groups. Still, interestingly, he was not interested in the application of the *idara*. Instead, he opted to utilize this approach to more effectively apply his *tadbir*. For example, while granting autonomy or establishing new autonomous fief holders in the frontier regions, Omar introduced significant reforms through the implementation of the *islah* instrument. This was particularly evident with the growing influence of the Ottoman Empire in Kuka. As previously discussed during the 1850s, Ottoman special agents were actively engaged in Kuka, seeking chances that would facilitate its annexation to the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, they also played a role in cultural and intellectual transfer. Similarly, the Shuwa Arab communities acted as agents of transfer to enhance their trade relations with Tripoli, being key players in the horse trade, which was vital for the Bornu military.

1640 Tarkhan, *Imbraturiyatu l'Borno al-Islamiyyah*, 1975, 138.

1641 'Interview with Lawan Maruma [Mainé-Soroa] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979'. O.A.C. 11.

1642 'Interview with Yakudima Usmae [Guré] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979'. O.A.C. 11.

1643 Tijjani, 'The Force of Religion in the Conduct of Political Affairs and Interpersonal Relations in Bornu and Sokoto', 271–72.

In this regard, Omar further supported the Shuwa Arab communities in their commercial endeavours with Tripoli.¹⁶⁴⁴ Through these intermediaries, the *islah* programs of the Ottoman Empire gained popularity in Kuka. By the late 1850s, Omar initiated land reforms similar to those of the Ottomans to enhance tax collection. Local sources from Bornu indicate that during this period, certain fief holders were instructed to revise the tax collection system. Rather than calculating a general sum for communities, fief holders were tasked with determining the tax obligations of each individual, which was named by the Ottomans as *Tapu Yasası*.¹⁶⁴⁵ Interestingly, this reform caused almost the same resistance from the local communities as the Ottomans faced. Local communities feared that the involvement of the state for every individual tax payment would lead to increased financial burdens.¹⁶⁴⁶ Following the recognition of Ottoman authority in 1869, further *islah* measures were implemented in the central regions of Bornu, including the establishment of a standing army and the appointment of special agents to the fief holders, who were responsible for reporting tax and income calculations directly to Kuka. However, it is important to note that, despite clear similarities, these reforms were not mandated by Istanbul. Rather, they were Omar's personal policies, which he adapted to the prevailing political dynamics within the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶⁴⁷

The strategies employed during the Sayfawa rebellion and the Wadai threat yielded favourable outcomes; however, following the 1870s, Omar encountered the inevitable ascendancy of Damagaram, which attained a level of wealth and influence surpassing that of Bornu. Despite Omar's consistent intervention in both the internal and external affairs of Zinder, the evolving geopolitical landscape significantly diminished Bornu's power. A critical transformation in the region was the reorientation of trans-Saharan trade after the establishment of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. As previously discussed in earlier sections, the decline of Katsina facilitated the emergence of Kano and Zinder as new trade centres, thereby bestowing substantial wealth and authority upon their rulers.

Following the death of Omar in 1881, subsequent rulers aimed to preserve his administrative system; however, their brief tenures hindered the implementation of any substantial reforms. Furthermore, a temporary crisis in the ostrich feather market in 1883 precipitated economic

1644 Sulaiman Ahmad Husseyin, 'Tijara Al-Mudun Wa-l-Wahat al-Libiyat Hilal al-Qarnayn al-Thaamin Eashar Wa-l-Taasie Eashar al-Miladiyin' (M.A. Thesis, Cairo, Jamiyat Al-Qahirat, 2009), 113.

1645 See Chapter 5.

1646 Tijjani, 'The Force of Religion in the Conduct of Political Affairs and Interpersonal Relations in Bornu and Sokoto', 262.

1647 'Interview No.13: With Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Burkani in Benghazi, 2023'.

difficulties for the state,¹⁶⁴⁸ compelling Shehu Bukar Kura, who governed from 1881 to 1884, to impose unpopular new taxes.¹⁶⁴⁹ His unexpected demise, coupled with a recovery in the ostrich feather market, led to the selection of Shehu Ibrahim Kura as the new ruler, noted for his composed demeanour. Nevertheless, he too passed away unexpectedly within a year.¹⁶⁵⁰ Consequently, the year 1885 marked a pivotal moment for Bornu with the ascension of Shehu Hashimi to the throne. The decision by the palace council to appoint Hashimi signified a fundamental shift in the political landscape of Bornu. The rise of the influential Mahdist movement in eastern Sudan in 1881, along with several smaller-scale Mahdist movements throughout the region, created a unique context for the palace council, since they contemplated the future trajectory of the area. Rather than opting for a ruler characterized by military and economic vigor, the council chose a scholar deemed more suitable to navigate the challenges of this millennial period. Thus, for instance, when some letters from Muhammad bin Abdullah, who declared himself as Mahdi in Sudan in the 1880s, reached Kuka regarding his Mahdist claim, Hashimi assembled a scholar commission under his leadership and discussed if these claims are scholarly sound. At the end, the commission wrote an open report to declare the claims of Muhammad bin Adullah wrong.¹⁶⁵¹

In this context, Hashimi's radical transformation of the governance system in Bornu was not unexpected. To address the primary criticisms levied by the millennial Mahdist movements, which accused the existing rulers of corruption and neglect of religious duties, Hashimi instituted a stringent *idara* system that focused on the instrument of *hisba*, effectively aligning political decisions with legal norms.¹⁶⁵² For instance, although the *amana* (Ar. security)¹⁶⁵³ system nominally persisted in Bornu until the rule of Hashimi, the *mais* from the Sayfawa dynasty and *shehus* from al-Kanemi dynasty exhibited minimal adherence to it. When in need of enslaved individuals or plunder, they frequently launched attacks on neighbouring non-Muslim communities, irrespective of whether these communities fulfilled their tribute obligations. Hashimi was the first to explicitly prohibit this practice for all fief holders, including himself. Also during his tenure, judges (Ar. *qadi*) from Kuka were seasonally dispatched to rural areas to enforce the Maliki law.¹⁶⁵⁴ This significant

1648 See Chapter 5.

1649 'Interview with Maina Mustafa [Maiduguri] by Kyari Mohammed in 1993'. O.A.C. 5.

1650 'Interview with Malam Abba Usman [Maiduguri] by Kyari Mohammed in 1993'. O.A.C. 5.

1651 'Account of Al-Hajj Isa Hasan, Interviewed by Naim Şükrü Bey', S.A.D.U., 255/1/135-152.

1652 A.M. Ashafa, 'Afro-European Imperialism and the Making of a New Bornu', in *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, ed. T. El-Miskin et al., vol. Vol I (Ibadan: Krafts Book Limited, 2013), 58.

1653 As discussed in Chapter 2, *aman* system was used by Tripoli as a tribute system in the Mediterranean. In the case of Bornu, it was used against non-Muslim neighbouring states or communities. Its principle was still the same. States or communities that paid a sum of tribute were secure from any possible jihadist attacks.

1654 'Interview No.13: With Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Burkani in Benghazi, 2023'.

transition from *tadbir* to *idara* also provided Damagaram with an opportunity to assert greater autonomy from Kuka, considering Hashimi opposed military interventions, aligned with the Islamic Union policy of Ottoman *padişah* Abdulhamid II, in political matters, preferring to resolve conflicts through *sulh* (Ar. reconciliation).¹⁶⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the biggest challenge for Hashimi was the rise of Rabillah before the frontiers of Bornu. His *idara* system succeeded in fostering a favourable perception among the populace, distancing them from millennial Mahdist movements, whereas it proved ineffective against the invasion by Rabillah's forces. In this context, as noted by Ashafa, Hashimi has often been misinterpreted by historians as a naive and indolent leader who allowed Bornu to succumb to Rabillah. In reality, he was a devoted scholar rather than a military commander, implementing his *idara* system.¹⁶⁵⁶ Therefore, the decline of Bornu during Ashimi's reign should not be attributed to his personal character, but rather to the governance system he adopted, which yielded positive outcomes in certain instances; yet, ultimately failed to counter the threat posed by Rabillah's *riasa* invasion.

7.2.2. New Actors on the Play: Muniyo and Damagaram

During the period from 1808 to the 1820s, Bornu faced significant challenges posed by jihadist forces; however, this era presented opportunities for the *lawal* and fief holders in the frontier regions of Bornu. Notably, the northwestern frontier, encompassing areas such as Damagaram and Muniyo, was characterized by conditions that would shape its future. The decline of Katsina allowed these regions to attract trans-Saharan merchants, whilst simultaneously, the waning authority of Bornu in its confrontations with jihadist forces created a favourable environment for local leaders. One prominent figure during this time was Muniyomo Kosso, a local *lawal* in the Muniyo region, who reigned from 1810 to 1827 and again from 1831 to 1854. Following his coronation in 1810, he seized the opportunity to establish a new capital in Gure during the 1820s, strategically located near emerging trans-Saharan trade routes and positioned advantageously against potential incursions from certain Kel Tamasheq communities, which happened around 1840s, and Muniyo state successfully defended its capital.¹⁶⁵⁷ In the wake of al-Kanemi's death and the emergence of a multi-central power dynamic under Omar, Muniyo capitalized on the shifting political landscape. Focusing on their consolidation and expansion, the rulers of Muniyo maintained

1655 'Interview with Malam Abubakar Al-Miskin [Maiduguri] by Kyari Mohammed in 1994'. O.A.C. 5.

1656 Ashafa, 'Afro-European Imperialism and the Making of a New Bornu', 58.

1657 Zakari, 'Contribution a l'histoire Des Population Du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas Du Mangari (XVIe - XIXe Siècle)', 1983, 278, 300.

a careful relationship with Kuka, and presented their expansionist actions as being conducted on behalf of Kuka.¹⁶⁵⁸ A notable instance of this was the occupation of Ngourbaye by Muniyo in 1845, which occurred with Omar's consent, since he faced challenges from local *lawals* who were harbouring bandits that targeted caravans between Zinder and Kuka.¹⁶⁵⁹ Although Omar's authorization was intended to eliminate the bandits and their supporting *lawals*, Muniyomo Kosso, recognized for his “pragmatic” governance and often referred to as “clever” by the populace, as being the typical descriptions for the *tadbir* application, justified the incorporation of the region into his state by asserting that the local *lawals* were neglecting sharia law, thereby positioning Muniyo as a better protector of religious observance for the common people.¹⁶⁶⁰ It is also very insightful example that when a British agent visited Muniyo around the 1850s, and asked the Kosso his relation with Kuka, he responded: “What Kuka does, I do; as what Stamboul [İstanbul] does so does Tripoli”¹⁶⁶¹ Kosso indeed had the *tadbir* system of Yusuf *paşa* in his mind, carefully kept his autonomy by caring his relation with İstanbul, but also expand his power.

During this period, Damagaram also capitalized on opportunities for expansion, particularly following the coronation of Tinimoun in Zinder in 1841. Early in his reign, Tinimoun recognized the potential for both political and economic growth. By 1842, he established the largest market in Zinder, known as Dore, to attract trans-Saharan merchants to the city.¹⁶⁶² Around the same years, he negotiated a peace treaty with Kel Air to secure vital trade routes.¹⁶⁶³ In 1843, Tinimoun mobilized his military forces to expand towards the northeast, considering several local *lawals* remained outside the control of Muniyo. This ambition quickly escalated into a rivalry between Muniyo and Damagaram, particularly when Damagaram forces launched attacks on villages along the Muniyo frontier in 1843. Muniyomo Kosso prepared to defend his territory. He was also cautious to secure the support of Omar. Consequently, by the end of that year, Omar issued an ultimatum to Tinimoun, demanding the withdrawal of Damagaram forces from the occupied regions. Following Tanimoun's refusal, Omar dispatched an army to depose him in 1843.¹⁶⁶⁴ After his ousting, Tanimoun sought to strengthen his relations with Kuka in anticipation of a potential return to power. This earlier

1658 ‘Interview with Yakudima Usmae [Guré] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979’. O.A.C. 11.

1659 ‘Interview with Lawan Maruma [Mainé-Soroa] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979’. O.A.C. 11.

1660 Zakari, ‘Contribution a l’histoire Des Population Du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas Du Mangari (XVIe - XIXe Siècle)’, 1983, 326–27.

1661 J. Richardson, *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa Performed*, vol. Vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass, 1970), 318.

1662 Tankari Souley, ‘Patrimoine Culturel et Historique et Développement Local: Cas de de La Ville de Zinder’ (M.A. Thesis, Zinder, Université André Salifou, 2019), 33.

1663 ‘Interview with Elders of Zinder [Zinder] by Issoufou Djardaye in 2017’. O.A.C. 19.

1664 André Salifou, *Le Damagaram Ou Sultanada de Zinder Au XIXe Siècle* (Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1971), 51–54.

conflict, however, provided Muniyo with the opportunity to expand further without engaging in conflict with Kuka. Accordingly, by the 1850s, Muniyo emerged as the most powerful vassal state within the Bornu region.¹⁶⁶⁵

The restoration of Tinimoun to the throne in 1851 significantly altered the power dynamics within Bornu. Unlike his previous reign, Tanimoun now operated with a distinctly defined political agenda. Drawing from the favourable outcomes associated with the *tadbir* system employed by Muniyo, he sought to replicate this approach. In this context, akin to Muniyomo Kosso, Tinimoun has been remembered for his “pragmatic” and “cunning” political manoeuvres, which contemporary historians have characterized as even “Machiavellian”.¹⁶⁶⁶ During his early second reign, he initiated the construction of substantial fortifications around the city of Zinder to prevent any military campaigns that could lead to his dethronement. However, this time, he framed these actions as necessary for the protection of merchants from Kuka.¹⁶⁶⁷ Following 1851, Tinimoun promptly established diplomatic and trade connections with Morocco, Tripoli, and Cairo, signalling his intent to foster commercial relations with these regions. In fact, in the wake of Katsina's decline, numerous Ghadamesian merchants began relocating to Kano and Zinder. Tanimoun's personal interest and support made Zinder particularly appealing to Ghadamesian traders, leading to the establishment of new business ventures in the city during the 1850s.¹⁶⁶⁸

Around the same years, he appointed a prominent scholar from the region, Malam Sulaiman, as the judge (Ar. *qadi*) of the city, thereby ensuring that merchants would be protected under Maliki law and exempting them from his own *radd al-mazalim* court.¹⁶⁶⁹ Within a decade, the city had significantly increased its importance in trans-Saharan trade, extending its influence beyond the Sahara. For example, around 1865, a substantial community of Soknian merchants, who had historically only frequented Kuka, chose to settle in Zinder. To facilitate their integration, Tinimoun allocated an entire ward in the city specifically for merchants from Sokna.¹⁶⁷⁰ Hence, Tinimoun's second reign in Damagaram from 1851 to 1884 established a legacy of economic and diplomatic expansion that extended from İstanbul to Mecca.¹⁶⁷¹ Particularly in the 1860s, he successfully

1665 Benasheikh, ‘The 19th Century Galadimas of Bornu’, 149.

1666 For instance, see: Malam Isofou Djardaye, ‘Sultan Timimoune Souleymane: Builder of the City of Zinder’, *Sokoto Journal of History* 12 (2023): 24–34.

1667 ‘Interview with Malam Abdou [Zinder] by Isofou Djardaye in 2017’. O.A.C. 19.

1668 ‘Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023’.

1669 ‘Interview with Malam Falalu [Zinder] by Isofou Djardaye in 2017’. O.A.C. 19.

1670 ‘Interview No.9: Meeting with the Elders of Sokna, 2023’.

1671 Mahamadou Danda, *Niger: Le Cas de Damagaram* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012), 186–87.

assembled a formidable army, preparing to confront Muniyo once more. When Omar was preoccupied with diplomatic matters concerning British spies in 1861, the forces of Damagaram conducted raids across Muniyo, resulting in the temporary exile of Muniyomo Mamadu, the son of Muniyomo Kosso. Recognizing Omar's lack of engagement, Tinimoun began preparations for the ultimate occupation of Muniyo, which was realized in 1871.¹⁶⁷² Consequently, not only did the central Muniyo region come under Damagaram's control, but Ngourbaye, a crucial hub for salt production, was also incorporated. To mitigate any potential rivalry or resistance in the future, Tinimoun reinstated decentral *lawal* administration system in Muniyo, reverting all administrative structures to their late 18th-century configurations.¹⁶⁷³ By the 1870s, Damagaram had emerged as the most powerful vassal state in Bornu, demonstrating an economic and military strength that surpassed that of Kuka, while carefully avoiding any clash with Omar.

The situation in Damagaram significantly improved following the coronation of Hashimi in 1885. Under the *idara* rule of the new *shehu*, the region benefited from a notable degree of political tolerance, which facilitated for Sulaiman dan Aisa, who reigned in Damagaram from 1884 to 1893, the maintenance of the *tadbir* system of Tinimoun. This environment enabled the initiation of an expansionist policy aimed at consolidating control over several smaller *lawals* under the control of Kuka. In 1887, Damagaram successfully annexed a substantial territory from the northwestern frontier of Bornu without encountering opposition from Kuka, as Zinder was regularly paying its tribute to Ashimi.¹⁶⁷⁴ Following the fall of Kuka to Rabillah forces in 1893, Damagaram emerged as the predominant political and economic authority in the region, explicitly declining to assist the al-Kanemi dynasty in their conflict against Rabillah. Instead, in 1895, Damagaram capitalized on the weakened state of the al-Kanemi dynasty and the lack of interest from Rabillah in invading Damagaram, leading to the annexation of additional territories adjacent to Kuka.¹⁶⁷⁵ In this regard, in 1893 Bornu fell in the hand of Rabillah, whereas Damagaram continued to exist and even expand as the only powerful political entity in the area that once under the jurisdiction of Bornu.

7.3. Political and Economic Expansion of Wadai

1672 Zakari, 'Contribution a l'histoire Des Population Du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas Du Mangari (XVIe - XIXe Siècle)', 1983, 342–44.

1673 'Interview with Kaigama Bukar [Kulumbardu] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979'. O.A.C. 11.

1674 Ashafa, 'Afro-European Imperialism and the Making of a New Bornu', 56.

1675 Benasheikh, 'The 19th Century Galadimas of Bornu', 150.

7.3.1. Expansion and Stagnation of the Central Authority

Following nearly two decades of internal strife, Muhammad Sharif's ascension to power in Wara in 1835 reinstated the *tadbir* system in Wadai, which had been established by Abdul Karim Sabun. Muhammad Sharif's rule, spanning from 1835 to 1858, introduced significant transformations within the region, many of which facilitated the consolidation and expansion of the state, thereby leaving a favourable legacy among the Wadaian populace.¹⁶⁷⁶ He initiated a new fiefholder system in Wadai, making a contract (Ar. *aqd*) with some elites, granting them the control of some regions in exchange for paying an annual tribute and supporting his army. Hence, these officeholders bore the title of *aqeed*, a derivative of *aqd*.¹⁶⁷⁷ This contractual ground prevented any dynastic evolution in the fief holding system, which generally tends in the long term to *dairat al-siyasa*. In the case of Wadao, if a fief holder fails to comply with the contract, *kolaks* could easily fire them, even confiscating the wealth that they built during their office.¹⁶⁷⁸ The successful military endeavours of Muhammad Sharif against Baghirmi during the 1830s aimed to re-establish the tributary system, and in the 1840s, his second military campaign to the east, which resulted in the capture of Dar Tama and Dar Qimr, positioned Wadai as a regional power.¹⁶⁷⁹ Concurrently, he dispatched one of his military commanders to Runga, thereby incorporating Dar Runga into Wadai's tributary system.¹⁶⁸⁰ This political expansion coincided with a substantial increase in trade with northern regions. To further promote and facilitate this trade, Muhammad Sharif personally negotiated trade agreements and established partnerships with Majabran merchants from Jalo and Awjila, as once Abdul Karim Sabun did. For instance, in a personal correspondence dated 1843 to his associate in Awjila, referred to as Yunus al-Marji, Muhammad Sharif indicates that a large caravan was en route to Awjila from Wara, requesting Yunus to provide protection and assist with any enslaved individuals as needed. Upon the caravan's arrival, Yunus al-Marji was tasked with determining the subsequent destination for the goods, whether it be Tripoli, Benghazi, or Cairo.¹⁶⁸¹

Muhammad Sharif's clear *ray* implementation in his *tadbir* system as the legacy of Sabun significantly altered the trade dynamics in Wadai, distinguishing it from other southern regions of

1676 'Chronicle of Wadai', uncategorized, P.C. 6.

1677 Uthman Ali Muhammad, 'Lamahāt Min Tārīḥ Tšād Al-Islāmī', fol. 26, uncategorized, M.B.D.A.

1678 Izzeddin Maki Ishaq, *Mukhtasar Tarikh Saltanat Waday Al-Islamiyat al-Abbasiyat Min Eam 1611-2005m* (Cairo: Al-Tabeat Al-Uwla, 2005), 75.

1679 Bachar Moukhtar, 'De 1909 à 1960 Aux Confins Des Etats: Les Peuples Du Tchad Oriental et Leur Evolution Dans Un Ouddai Statique' (Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Université de Paris VII, 1982), 268.

1680 This information comes from a letter written by the Sultan of Dar Tama in 1899. P.A. 21., uncategorized. Dated as 1899.

1681 M.J.L.D.T., Dated as 1843.

Central Sudan. Merchants from Tripolitania frequently travelled to or established themselves in areas such as Kano, Zinder, and Kuka; however, Wadai remained largely inaccessible to them due to the *kolak's ray* implementation by monopolizing the trade. In this regard, only the *kolak* and his close associates in the northern regions were able to engage in this trade. This characteristic rendered the trade system somewhat precarious, leading to minimal trade activity during certain years when the *kolaks* of Wadai were preoccupied with other matters.¹⁶⁸² Nevertheless, the period from 1835 to 1899 was marked by stable internal conditions, which facilitated trade flows.¹⁶⁸³ To enhance the geographical conditions conducive to increase the trade and population growth, Muhammad Sharif established a new capital, Abeche, in 1856.

The establishment of a new capital in the southern region heightened interest in southwestern expansion. This was also a reaction to the unprecedented news from Baghirmi. In 1855, a local scholar named Ibrahim Sharaf al-Din Abu Shar (d. 1860), declared himself Mahdi in the southern Bornu. When scholars of Kuka refuted his claims, he went to Baghirmi with his followers. He made war against the sultan of Baghirmi, Abdulkadir Barki Mandi, in 1858 and achieved to kill him. However, he could not capture the capital. Thus, he moved further south in the land of non-Muslim Sara communities close to the Salamat region under the control of Wadai, to create his own jihadist rule.¹⁶⁸⁴ To secure the Salamat region in 1861, new *kolak* of Wadai, Ali bin Muhammad, commonly referred to as Ali Dinar, who reigned from 1858 to 1874, initiated a military campaign towards Dar Salamat.¹⁶⁸⁵ This campaign yielded rapid success, resulting in Wadai acquiring a new vassal state and securing a trade route for merchants to access the Chari River in pursuit of ivory.¹⁶⁸⁶ According to oral accounts, between 1870 and 1872, the route connecting Abeche and Dar Salamat was rendered impassable due to frequent bandit attacks. In response, Ali Dinar launched another campaign in 1873, this time focusing on southern expansion rather than westward. To mitigate future banditry, he appointed representatives from Wadai to oversee key centres. In this year, for the first time, Wadai forces and merchants reached the newly established sultanates of Bangassou,

1682 In many cases, Majabran merchants waited for the arrival of the *kolak's* caravan to the north to travel to the south, as they joined the *kolak's* caravan returning. If the *kolak's* caravan did not appear in the northern markets for a long time, some Majabran merchants organized their own joint caravans to travel south. This was an exception, however. For more details about the dynamics of this trade, see the letters of the Al-Tariqi family from Awjila. P.A. 26., especially four letters, dated as 1854, 1868, 1872, and 1884.

1683 'Chronicle of Wadai'.

1684 Ibrahim Salih, *Tarikh Al-Islam Wa Hayat al-Arabi* (Kano: Maktabat Al-Qadi Sharif, 1976), 145–46.

1685 'Chronicle of Wadai'.

1686 This information comes from a letter written by a Wadain merchant in 1872, called Karim Al-Zaruq. P.A. 19., uncategorized, dated as 1872.

Rafai, and Zemio,¹⁶⁸⁷ where they constructed warehouses and stationed representatives.¹⁶⁸⁸ This significant expansion coincided with the invasion of Darfur by Zubayir forces acting on behalf of the Ottoman Empire in 1874. Along this line, the period from 1874 to 1899, marked by the Ottoman invasion of Darfur, the Mahdist movement of Muhammad bin Abdullah, and the incursions into Baghirmi and Bornu by Rabillah, presented new challenges for Wadai leading, to a stagnation.

Following this period of stagnation in political and economic expansion after 1874, the state of Wadai managed to sustain its authority through various strategies. The emergence of Zubayir and Rabillah, who posed significant military threats through their use of *riasa* system, presented a formidable challenge. Concurrently, the rise of the Mahdist movement in Eastern Sudan introduced an intellectual and religious conflict, characterized by its millennial *sulta* implementations within the *riasa* system. Kolak Yusuf bin Muhammad effectively repelled the forces of Zubayir and Rabillah from his territory, with the exception of a brief incursion into Dar Runga and Kuti between 1890 and 1895. This success is closely related to his robust trade connections with Majabran merchants, who provided him with firearms.¹⁶⁸⁹ In fact, according to reports of Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Mahdawi, who was the special agent of Tunisian *paşa* in Benghazi from 1875 to 1879,¹⁶⁹⁰ the trade volume between Wadai and Berka after the 1870s was so big that many Tunisian merchants from Jarba island were immigrating to Benghazi to take advantage of this steadily growing commerce.¹⁶⁹¹ For instance, in 1876, in a response of his rapidly increasing wealth, Kolak Muhammad Yusuf donated a big plot of land to a jurist named Omar bin Fakiq Musa Habib.¹⁶⁹² Such donations became a political instrument, especially after the 1880s. Essentially, these were the attempts to keep local scholar communities that rapidly developed in the second half of the 19th century in Wadai on the side of the *kolak* against the millennial narratives of the Mahdist movement. For instance, a prominent scholar, Muhammad Tahir ibn al-Talib bin Isa al-Talib (d. 189?) who was born in the Salamat region and got education under the authority of Imam al-Juluzi

1687 The cases of the Bangassou, Rafai, and Zemio sultanates are noteworthy; these sultanates were established in the 1870s through the displacement of existing local rulers by armed forces from southern Kordofan. Notably, they were not aligned with either Rabillah or the Mahdist movement, and maintained a neutral relationship with Kuti. They did not pay tribute to Ndele or Abeche, but significantly supported Kuti by supplying ivory sourced from the south. A.N.O.M.-A.E.F., 4(3) D9.

1688 'Interview with Banda Serge [Rafai] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018'. O.A.C. 6.

1689 Especially Awjila played a crucial role for weapon export to Wadai. Muhammad Sayid Al-Tawil, 'Awjilat Fi Eahd Yusuf Al-Qaramanli, 1795-1832', in *Awjilat Bayn Am-Madi al-Hadr, 1550-1951m* (Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2007), 197.

1690 Huda Abdulrahman Al-Alam, 'Namadhij Min Taqarir Al-Wakil al-Tunisi Ahmad Al-Mahdawi Wa Murasalatih Hawl al-Awda al-Idariyat Wa-l-Iqtisadiyat Wa-l-Tariqat al-Tunisiyat Bi Benghazi', *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 21, no. 2 (2022): 3.

1691 A.N.T., Reports, 232/457, d. 31.

1692 M.B.D.A., uncategorized, a decree dated as 1876.

(d. 187?) in Abeche, visiting also Cairo and Hijaz for advance study, decided to join Mahdist movement in the 1880s, creating a tension among the local scholars in Wadai. However, before his death in the 1890s, he left this movement and returned to Salamat, establishing a peaceful relation with the *kolak*.¹⁶⁹³ In addressing the intellectual and religious challenges posed by the Mahdist movement, Wadai received substantial support from the Sanussiyya. Since the reign of Muhammad Sharif in Wadai, who ruled from 1835 to 1858, the *kolaks* of Wadai have been affiliated with the Sanussiyya, and they diligently maintained their relationships with Sanussiyya sheikhs, regularly corresponding with them.¹⁶⁹⁴ These sheikhs not only facilitated the security of trade routes between Jalo/Awjila and Wara/Abeche but also offered vital intellectual, religious, and spiritual support.

As the Mahdist forces seized control of Al-Fashir and initiated their westward expansion, *kolak* Yusuf bin Muhammad endeavoured to establish a diplomatic channel to thwart the invasion. In a correspondence addressed to the administrator of Muhammad bin Abdullah in Al-Fashir in 1888, he states that “one can be sultan only if he is the son of a sultan... We recognize Abdullah as Mahdi, although he is not a son of any sultan. He is the sultan of *din* (Ar. religion), and I’m the sultan of *dunya* (Ar. earth).” In subsequent statements, he underscores his willingness to honour Muhammad bin Abdullah's religious authority; yet, he firmly maintains that the political authority within his domain is exclusively his own.¹⁶⁹⁵ Nevertheless, inasmuch as Muhammad bin Abdullah was applying *riasa*, he was not considering any other authority over him. For example, when a local administrator in Dar Masallit, called Ismail al-Naibi, tried to take advantage of the power vacuum between Wadai and Darfur, under the occupation of Mahdist movement, to establish his own sultanate, Abdullah's administrator in Darfur issued a warning in 1888. The administrator cautioned that under the *riasa* governance of Muhammad bin Abdullah, no individual could assert similar authority or establish an independent system of *riasa*: “if you desire to be under our rule, you will find your salvation... But it seems that you only desire *riasa* (... *ladayk hubun li-l-riasa*)... to create your own state.”¹⁶⁹⁶

1693 Ahmad Al-Rifai Mahmud, ‘Athar Al-Sufiyat Fi Nashr al-Adab al-Arabiyyat Fir Wasat Afrikiya’, in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 196.

1694 Mahmud Sharif Muhammad Nur, ‘Fikrat Al-Mahdiyyat Wa Tabiyat al-Marhalat Mintaqat Hawd Buhayrat Tshad Namudhajan’, in *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, ed. Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021), 177.

1695 P.C. 12., uncategorized, dated as 1888.

1696 N.R.O.S., Mahdiyya, 1/6/447.

When Muhammad bin Abdullah personally wrote to *kolak* Yusuf bin Muhammad to assert that he had been divinely appointed with the authority to dismantle all earthly powers,¹⁶⁹⁷ and to caution the *kolak* of Wadai that his continued existence was contingent upon his absolute compliance with the Mahdist promise of Abdullah. In response, Yusuf bin Muhammad articulated that “you are not the only Mahdi in this world, and we have already pledged our allegiance to the Mahdi in Kufra [implying here Sanussi sheikh]. As long as he does not revoke my earthly authority (... *sultanati al-dunyaviya*),... no one has the right to do so.” He further included a letter from Sheikh Muhammed al-Mahdi of the Sanussiya, which expresses that they had heard of Muhammad ibn Abdullah's renown and prayed for his well-being; however, he held no jurisdiction over the Sanussiya, either in this life or the hereafter. Therefore, the Sanussi sheikh says to the *kolak* of Wadai: “stay where you are... If they attack you, fight against them. With my *baraka* (Ar. blessing), the victory will be yours.”¹⁶⁹⁸ Following this diplomatic setback, Mahdist forces began to initiate military campaigns against the vassal states of Wadai. To counter this, Yusuf bin Muhammad gave permission to the Majabran merchants to sell weapons and gunpowder to these vassal states.¹⁶⁹⁹ In 1890, the forces of the Mahdist Abdullah briefly occupied the regions of Dar Tama, Dar Qimr, and Dar Masallit.¹⁷⁰⁰ Following their acknowledgment of allegiance to Abdullah, these armed forces retreated to Al-Fashir. Rather than deploying a military response to regain control, the *kolak* of Wadai opted for an alternative strategy. He composed personal letters to the sultans of the vassal states, expressing his understanding of the challenges they faced due to the Mahdist' invasion. He encouraged them to maintain their collaboration with him while simultaneously planning a rebellion against the Mahdist forces with Wadai.¹⁷⁰¹ Additionally, the *kolak* dispatched several scholars to the area to promote the notion that the *kolaks* of Wadai are descendants of the Abbasid dynasty,¹⁷⁰² thereby garnering support from the Sanussi, who allegedly recognized them as a legitimate caliph. Consequently, the millennial claims of Muhammad bin Abdullah held no sway over Wadai due to the active engagement of the *kolak* with the sultans of Dar Tama and Dar Masallit.¹⁷⁰³

1697 For this aim, Mahdist forces also wrote an antonym text to reject the authority of the Ottoman Empire, and disseminate this text in the whole Eastern Sudan. S.A.D.U., 101/17/3-4.

1698 PC. 12., uncategorized, dated as 1889.

1699 ‘Interview with Yunus Badis [Al-Fashir] by W.E.J. Bramley in 1940’. O.A.C. 23.

1700 ‘Interview with Abdul Banat [Masalit] by Ibrahim Nahid in 1978’. O.A.C. 12.

1701 Ahmad Sami Muhammad Al-Nur, ‘Tarikh Al-Alaqat al-Sudaniyat Wa-l-Tshadiyat Min Eam 1820-1956m’ (M.A. Thesis, Khartoum, Khartoum University, 1997), 82.

1702 Yusuf bin Muhammad was signing the official documents and letters as Sultan Sharif al-Abbasi, clearly claiming his Abbasid lineage. S.A.D.U., 101/9/1.

1703 See, for instance, a letter from the Kolak Muhammad Yusuf to the Sultan of Dar Tama, Sulaiman bin Ibrahim, refuting the Mahdi claims of the Mahdist movement. M.B.D.A., uncategorized, a letter from the 1880s.

Between 1890 and 1895, the authority of Muhammad bin Abdullah gradually diminished in Dar Tama, Dar Qimr, and Dar Masallit, a development that did not escape the notice of the authorities in Al-Fashir.¹⁷⁰⁴ In 1894, Abdullah's administrator of Darfur communicated with *kolak* Yusuf bin Muhammad, asserting that “we are aware of your affairs by propagating against us and stopping merchants who are supplying us. Your words are kind, but your actions are evil. Do you think your Sanussi friends can stand up to the greatness of the Mahdi? Do you believe that your weapons can stay against our power? Then wait and see.”¹⁷⁰⁵ This open thread also created a dynastic separation in Abeche, since some members of the family pressured *kolak* to establish a more moderate relationship with Abdullah. Still, Yusuf bin Muhammad rejected this proposal, and even forced his relatives to leave Abeche to avoid a possible coup.¹⁷⁰⁶ The threat of Abdullah materialized a year later when a substantial army departed from Al-Fashir in 1895, arriving in Dar Tama to await orders an invasion of Wadai. At the same time, Abdullah bin Muhammad wrote a last letter to Sanusi sheikh, Muhammad al-Mahdi. In this letter, he states that they sent several letters to Kufra without receiving any answers. He reminds that it is obligatory for all Muslims to follow the coming Mahdi; thereupon, he asks the Sanussi sheikh to respond to his letters for as long as possible and join him.¹⁷⁰⁷ In a final attempt to secure assistance, *kolak* Yusuf bin Muhammad reached out to Tripoli for Ottoman protection. However, the survival of Wadai did not come from the north but rather from the east. Muhammad bin Abdullah's forces were stationed in Dar Tama; yet, a British offensive commenced against Kordofan, prompting Muhammad bin Abdullah to summon all his armed forces to the city for defence. As a result, soon the Mahdist army not only vacated Dar Tama but also retreated from Darfur entirely.¹⁷⁰⁸

In light of this game-changing news, the *kolak* of Wadai could redirect his focus towards Dar Runga and Kuti, territories that had been under the control of Rabillah since 1890. In fact, Rabillah had previously attempted to establish a political alliance with Wadai in the 1880s by proposing a coalition to the *kolak*. The *kolak* did not respond to Rabillah, perceiving him as an inconsequential

1704 In the same period, the *kolak* of Wadai sent similar letters also to Baghirmi against the threat of Rabillah. Clear emphasis on the Sanussiyya also created a favourable condition for this *tariqa* to expand in Baghirmi. For instance, in 1901, the sultan of Baghirmi, Gawrang, was regularly donating bulls to Sanussiyya. M.M.J.B., Sanussiyya, Al-Barrani, letters, 15 Dhu al-Hijjah 1318. Thus, in 1902, Sanussiyya took an additional role in 1902 to prepare Baghirmi for a war against French colonial invasion forces. M.M.J.B. Sanussiyya, Al-Barrani, letters, 15 Dhu al-Hijjah 1318.

1705 P.C. 12., uncategorized, dated as 1894.

1706 Interestingly, the members who left Abeche decided to come Tripoli. B.O.A., Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı, 325/28.

1707 S.A.D.U., 100/12/1.

1708 ‘Interview No. 16: With Ahmad Muhammad Shanab Online, 2023’.

actor. This situation culminated in 1890 with the invasion of Dar Runga.¹⁷⁰⁹ Given that Rabillah's primary military forces were stationed in Bornu following their incursion into Kuka in 1893, Dar Runga and Kuti became vulnerable to military campaigns. Thus, as will be elaborated in the subsequent sections, in 1895, Dar Runga and Kuti rejoined Wadai. With this quick success, in 1895, Wadai regained control over its territories and began to monitor its western frontier, considering Rabillah's forces remained present in the region. In 1896, the *kolak* of Wadai contacted Tripoli to align with the Ottomans for his political and military interests, as once al-Amin al-Kanemi did in the early 19th century.¹⁷¹⁰ Around the same year, trade with Benghazi also began to get back its previous volume. Due to the war, trade remained at a basic level, resulting in a lack of specific products, such as medicine. In 1896, *kolak* Yusuf bin Muhammad wrote to his Majabran client, Abdullah al-Kahhal, in Benghazi, requesting that he transport various medicines to Wadai.¹⁷¹¹

The surveillance in the western frontier, coupled with efforts to obstruct trade routes from Abeche to Bornu, aimed to isolate and weaken Rabillah, thereby allowing Wadai to effectively safeguard its domain until 1899.¹⁷¹² Although shortly before his death, the *kolak* of Wadai, Yusuf bin Muhammad, was appointed as an Ottoman *paşa*, receiving special envoys from Istanbul to form his army,¹⁷¹³ following his death in 1899, Wadai descended into a civil war among various claimants to the throne, which persisted until 1902.¹⁷¹⁴ When Muhammad Saleh, also known as Doud Marra, ultimately resolved the civil conflict and secured his coronation in 1902, he was confronted with the challenge of a French colonial invasion. In this respect, the year 1899 marked the final period during which Wadai was able to maintain its authority and protect its territories.

The period of expansion from 1835 to 1874 was followed by a phase of stagnation, characterized by both survival and new dynamics in the region from 1874 to 1899. A notable consequence of this latter period was the emergence of Kuti. Following 1874, the political expansion of Wadai's central authority came to a halt due to threats from both the east and west. Nevertheless, during this time,

1709 Arbab Djama Babikir, *L'Empire de Rabeh* (Paris: Dervy, 1950), 30.

1710 See Chapter 6.

1711 S.A.D.U., 101/20/6-7.

1712 The Majabran merchants from Awjila/Jalo were familiar with the dominant regulative role of the *kolaks* of Wadai, thereupon did not consider this policy as trouble for their business. For instance, a Majabran merchant, named Salih al-Sarahna, states in one his letters in 1898 that Rabillah is mainly interested in buying weapon and gunpowder; yet, *kolaks* of Wadai has never allowed such transactions for other states, including even their own vassal estates. In that regard, the merchant accepted this policy without any dissatisfaction or surprise. P.A. 27., uncategorized, a letter dated as 1898.

1713 See Chapter 6.

1714 'Chronicle of Wadai'.

Kuti, a vassal state, continued to pursue economic and political expansion, maintaining this trajectory until 1911.

7.3.2. Peripheral Expansion: Case of Kuti

One of the most noticeable details regarding Kuti is that, different to other historically old vassal states such as Dar Tama, Dar Qimr, or Dar Runga, it was newly established in the second half of the 19th century. Before that, it was a region under the tributary system of Dar Runga. So far, the only comprehensive written source explaining the establishment of the Kuti state comes from a 1881 letter written by a Wadai merchant named Yusuf al-Zaruq. In this correspondence, al-Zaruq indicates that the Kuti region had long been under the dominion of Dar Runga, which annually collected tribute from the area. However, following the jihad in Hausaland, several Pullo and Baghirmi communities migrated to the region.¹⁷¹⁵ Thereafter, the Sultan of Dar Runga resolved to appoint a resident administrator to oversee the collection of *zakah* from these Muslim populations, who were reluctant to pay *jizya* (Ar. a tax imposed on non-Muslims). The Sultan appointed an administrator from Runga called Yusuf in the 1830s. However, tensions arose between this administrator and the local Muslim Pullo and Baghirmi communities, leading the Sultan to appoint a local scholar, Kuburu (or Kobur), as the new administrator, likely around 1850.¹⁷¹⁶ This scholar remains well-regarded in the Kuti region to this day, with oral traditions from the early 20th century recognizing him as the founder of the Kuti state.¹⁷¹⁷ Nonetheless, it is significant to note that Kuti was established not due to Kobur's political ambitions, but rather as a result of his modest application of *idara*, which assured the Sultan of Dar Runga that Kuti would not pose a challenge to his authority. The Sultan believed that Kobur's *idara* system in this remote region would yield additional wealth for the state. In this regard, Kobur was granted considerable autonomy to govern Kuti, whereas his primary focus was on the implementation of the *hisba* within his *idara* system, with a solemn emphasis on the execution of Maliki law in economic, social, and political matters.¹⁷¹⁸

1715 Various oral accounts confirm this phenomenon. Many local communities in Ndele, consider their origin in Baghirmi and “Fulbeland” (Adamawa). ‘Interview No. 15: With Mohammad Tijjani Zanna Laisu Online, 2023’.

1716 P.A. 19., uncategorized, dated as 1881.

1717 A.N.F., SOM., PJ, 6PA. There are also some oral accounts, stating that the founder of Kuti state was a semi-mythical, Baghirnian prince called Djougoultoum. For these accounts, he was the real founder of the state before the rise of Kobur. Yet, in the written sources from private archives, no such information existed.

1718 M.M.L., OA 21/4.

The extensive reserves of ivory and ostrich feathers in the expansive southern regions, coupled with the stringent application of *hisba* within Kobur's *idara* system, established highly favourable conditions for merchants. Hence, it was the Jallaba merchants from Kordofan who first began to arrive in Kuti to engage in long-distance trade. A Jallaba merchant named Muhammad Masu noted in a letter dated 1855 that these merchants commenced their activities in Dar Kuti in 1853, having not encountered any other long-distance traders up to that point. According to this merchant, the offline paraphrasing app reliable implementation of sharia by Kobur fostered a prevailing perception in Darfur and Kordofan of a peaceful territory governed by sharia, thereby attracting numerous Jallaba merchants to Kuti.¹⁷¹⁹ This situation evolved when merchants from Wadai also recognized the advantageous trading conditions. Following the securing of the route to Salamat by Wadai forces in 1861, Wadai merchants began to arrive in Kuti as well.¹⁷²⁰ Particularly after the 1860s, Kuti emerged as a significant trade centre in the region, drawing merchants from Wadai, Darfur, and Kordofan. Oral accounts similarly indicate that until the 1880s, Kobur's reign facilitated a substantial flow of goods, predominantly ivory, from the south—primarily from the Rafai region—through Banda merchants to Ndele, and subsequently through Wadai and Jallaba merchants to northern destinations such as Abeche, Al-Fashir, and Kordofan. The period spanning the 1840s to the 1880s is remembered as one of prosperity and abundance, even by non-Muslim communities in the region.¹⁷²¹

The arrival of Rabillah at the borders of the region did not result in any significant alterations. Kobur maintained his *idara* system in the face of the threat posed by Rabillah, intentionally avoiding direct engagement with him. He advised the frontier communities to emigrate if they encountered any aggression.¹⁷²² However, one of Kobur's sons, Muhammad al-Sanussi, who would later become the ruler of the state, began to assume a pivotal role in the 1880s. Kobur sought to distance himself from Rabillah, whereas al-Sanussi was interested in establishing contact. By approximately 1883, al-Sanussi, as crown prince, initiated a correspondence with Rabillah, proposing a trade agreement for the exchange of ivory in return for a peace treaty.¹⁷²³ Upon receiving a favourable response from Rabillah, he reached out to local communities in the more remote western frontier of Bandaland, which were experiencing raids from Rabillah's forces as well

1719 P.A. 18., uncategorized. Dated as 1855.

1720 This information comes from a letter written by a Wadain merchant called Muhammad Al-Zarruq in 1877. P.A. 18., uncategorized, dated as 1877.

1721 M.M.L., OA 7.2/8.1.

1722 'Interview with Uyaj Muwaku [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018'. O.A.C. 6.

1723 'Interview with Mosange Banza [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018'. O.A.C. 6.

as attacks from the Kresh and Azanda armies.¹⁷²⁴ He proposed that these communities become tributaries of Kuti to alleviate their suffering, a suggestion that was quickly accepted.¹⁷²⁵ It is important to note that during this period, al-Sanussi had not yet ascended to the leadership of Kuti; however, his personal diplomatic and political endeavours, based on his own *ray* implementation, were largely tolerated by his father. The invasion of Dar Runga by Rabillah's forces around 1890 marked a critical juncture for Kuti. Kobur continued to insist on avoiding any dealings with Rabillah. In the meantime, al-Sanussi had already a business partnership with him. This personal connection provided a significant opportunity for the survival of the state when Rabillah dispatched his raiding army to Kuti at the end of 1890. To avert total destruction, al-Sanussi proposed to Rabillah that he would supply soldiers and tribute in exchange for being installed as the ruler of Kuti, rather than allowing the entire territory to be ravaged. Rabillah accepted this proposal, enabling the people of Kuti to escape a devastating raid, whilst al-Sanussi was appointed as the new ruler of Kuti on Rabillah's behalf.¹⁷²⁶ Hence, the era of the *tadbir* system commenced in Kuti, lasting until 1911.

The collapse of Dar Runga and al-Sanussi's allegiance to Rabillah led to a rapid decline in the authority of Wadai within the region. Trade with Wadai experienced a significant downturn, considering merchants were unable to access Kuti. However, Rabillah soon initiated a westward expansion, invading Dar Salamat, and by approximately 1892, he had also invaded Baghirmi, followed shortly by Bornu.¹⁷²⁷ During Rabillah's engagement with local insurrections in Bornu around 1895, the *kolak* of Wadai seized the opportunity to dispatch armed forces to Dar Runga and Kuti, capitalizing on Rabillah's weakened position. Al-Sanussi, who had been acting on behalf of Rabillah since 1890, vacated his settlements upon the arrival of Wadai's army in Kuti and relocated a considerable distance away. He subsequently established contact with the army general, offering his allegiance to Wadai. This led to the formation of an agreement whereby al-Sanussi was permitted to retain his position on the throne, contingent upon his payment of compensation for the military campaign and the initiation of annual tribute payments to Abeche.¹⁷²⁸ Consequentially, after 1896, Wadai merchants resumed their visits to Kuti to procure ivory. However, the circumstances for these merchants had changed significantly. For instance, a Wadai merchant named Ibra Muhammad described Kuti in 1896 as a severely depopulated area, lacking sufficient manpower for

1724 M.M.L., OA 7.2/8.1.

1725 M.M.L., OA 17.2/18.1.

1726 'Interview with Uyaj Muwaku [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018'. O.A.C. 6.

1727 Mohammed, *Bornu in the Rabillah Years, 1893-1901: The Rise and Crash of a Predatory State*, 29.

1728 'Interview with Dorian Boateng [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018'. O.A.C. 6.

elephant hunting. He expressed dissatisfaction to his partner regarding the scarcity of ivory available in the market following his extensive journey from Abeche.¹⁷²⁹ Given that the primary economic activities in the region were agriculture and elephant hunting—both of which are labor-intensive—the indirect impact of Rabillah's actions on the land was substantial. Although al-Sanussi managed to evade potential raids by Rabillah's forces, the pervasive fear of such attacks had already compelled several communities to flee. Since the phenomenon of the “exit option” was a common historical occurrence in the region, in times of crises, local communities often opted to relocate to other areas.¹⁷³⁰ Therefore, Kuti experienced significant depopulation between 1890 and 1896, following the complete destruction of Dar Runga in 1890.¹⁷³¹

Oral narratives indicate that the situation underwent significant changes within a few years. Following the British invasion of eastern Sudan in 1895, the pilgrimage route traversing Darfur and Kordofan was rendered inaccessible, compelling pilgrims to adopt a southern route. In this regard, in 1896, the region of Kuti emerged as a crucial transfer hub for pilgrims from across Western Africa. Oral accounts reveal that the newly established capital of the state, Ndele, which was fortified to prevent a recurrence of the 1895 Wadai invasion, was predominantly inhabited by the “Fillata” (Ar. Fulbe) pilgrims by 1897.¹⁷³² It is important to note that not all pilgrims were of Pullo descent; however, due to the longstanding historical ties with various Pullo nomadic groups migrating from Baghirmi to the east, any Hausa or Kanuri groups in the region were collectively referred to as “Fillata.”¹⁷³³

Al-Sanussi successfully persuaded numerous pilgrims to delay their journeys and establish themselves in Kuti temporarily by providing them with land and seeds.¹⁷³⁴ However, the primary impetus for the re-population of the area stemmed from the military campaigns initiated by al-Sanussi. Around 1898, he commenced military actions against neighbouring states with the aim of capturing individuals. Notably, the majority of these individuals were not subjected to slavery; rather, they were granted land and partners to settle in the vicinity of Ndele.¹⁷³⁵ Although this practice has been inaccurately characterized as slavery, and al-Sanussi's military endeavours have

1729 P.A. 19., uncategorized, dated as 1896.

1730 ‘Interview with Ali Shanab [El Geneina] by Ibrahim Nahid in 1980’. O.A.C. 12.

1731 S.A.D.U., 255/1/135-152. ‘Account of Al-Hajj Isa Hasan, Interviewed by Naim Şükrü Bey’.

1732 ‘Interview with Mosange Banza [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018’. O.A.C. 6.

1733 Alhaji Mohammed Lawan, *Leta Lan Gana Ba* (Maiduguri, 1946), 41.

1734 ‘Interview with Mosange Banza [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018’. O.A.C. 6.

1735 M.M.L., OA 15./16.1.

been interpreted as a form of slave trade by certain British and French historians,¹⁷³⁶ who relied on the French colonial sources that depict the Kuti state as inhabited by "bandits and pirates" and al-Sanussi as a "barbaric slave owner",¹⁷³⁷ oral testimonies and private records from Jallaba merchants, who were purportedly involved in this "slave trade," present a markedly different narrative.

Oral accounts clearly state that individuals captured during campaigns initiated post-1898 were compelled to settle in the vicinity of Ndele for agricultural purposes. However, these individuals were neither enslaved nor employed on any kind of slave plant, which did not exist in Kuti. Rather, they were allocated land for personal use and were exempted from taxation for a period of five years. When researcher Ibrahim Nahid inquired of informants why these individuals did not return to their original lands if they were free, one informant responded, "where could they have returned? They had no home or land left in their homeland, only ruins. If someone provides you with land and a spouse, without imposing tax burdens for several years, where could one find a more favourable situation?"¹⁷³⁸ A letter dated 1898 from a Jallaba merchant named Abubakr al-Falali provides further insights. The merchant recounts purchasing 150 pieces of ivory and one enslaved individual in Ndele during that year. This individual was a captive who had been settled for agricultural work in the city. However, he refused to marry a local woman and intentionally sabotaged the forthcoming harvest, leading al-Sanussi to arrest him and subsequently sell him into slavery.¹⁷³⁹ A similar account is found in a letter from 1899 by another merchant, Ibrahim al-Zaruq, who summarizes his transactions as including 6 bags of coffee, 20 pieces of ostrich feathers, 110 pieces of ivory, and 2 enslaved individuals who also declined agricultural work.¹⁷⁴⁰ This letter is particularly noteworthy, since the merchant specifies that these two enslaved individuals were not captives brought to Ndele but were already local Muslim inhabitants. This suggests that captivity in Kuti did not inherently result in enslavement; rather, it was the refusal to engage in farming that led to such a fate. In this regard, the slave trade was not a business in the region. For example, another Jallaba merchant, Muhammad Masud, expresses in a letter dated 1900 his frustration at being unable to find any enslaved individuals in Ndele, notwithstanding his need for one for his uncle.¹⁷⁴¹

1736 For instance, see: Denis Cordell, *Dar al-Kuti and the Last Years of the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Eric de Dampierre, *Un ancien royaume Bandia du Haut-Oubangui* (Paris: Plon, 1967).

1737 A.N.O.M.-A.E.F., 4(3) D10.

1738 'Interview with Ahmad Abu Lafta [Khartoum] by Ibrahim Nahid in 1981'. O.A.C. 12.

1739 P.A. 22., uncategorized, dated as 1898.

1740 P.A. 19., uncategorized, dated as 1899.

1741 P.A. 18., uncategorized, dated as 1900.

Consequently, military campaigns were wreaking havoc on neighbouring states, whereas they did not lead to an increase in slavery or the slave trade; rather, there was a rapid growth in the population of Kuti. By 1899, Jallaba merchants even began reporting that the market in Ndele was once again abundant with goods.¹⁷⁴² In the same year, even Ghadamesian merchants began to arrive Kuti.¹⁷⁴³ Additionally, oral accounts recall the year 1900 as a period of prosperity, even among those who were captured and settled in Ndele, considering they had not witnessed a comparable level of trade and agricultural productivity. This period was marked by a significant increase in the population surrounding Ndele and an expansion of Kuti's political authority from the Chari River to the Zemio sultanate.¹⁷⁴⁴ In this context, interestingly, even today, non-Muslim Banda communities, whose ancestors were captured by al-Sanussi's army and compelled to settle in Ndele, regard al-Sanussi as a "great man who brought prosperity to the land."¹⁷⁴⁵ French colonial officers operating near the Congo River lamented around 1900s that, despite their military presence intended to compel local populations to abandon their trade affair with Kuti in favour of French protection, the local populace held the prestige of al-Sanussi in higher regard than their military might.¹⁷⁴⁶ As a unique case, the implementation of *ray* in the *tadbir* system by al-Sanussi did not tend to a typical corruption circle as was mostly the case on the Central Sudan, but created favourable conditions for the local people.

These years also coincided with a regional transformation of the lands between the Congo and Ubangi rivers. Notably, between 1850 and 1890, merchants from the Bobangi and Moye communities travelled from the south, primarily from Pool (present-day Brazzaville), to the Ubangi river to procure ivory from Bangassou. Subsequently, they returned to sell the acquired ivory to Portuguese merchants in Pool. Nevertheless, this trade was severely disrupted around 1890 due to the invasion of French forces from the south. Thus, local communities residing between the Ubangi and Congo rivers, who had a preference for elephant meat over ivory, began to transport all ivory to Bangassou. From that point, Banda merchants facilitated the transfer of ivory to Ndele, where it was sold to Wadain and Jallaba merchants. In that regard, by approximately 1895, a substantial flow of ivory emerged from the riverbanks of Congo and Ubangi to Ndele, continuing until 1910, when French colonial forces commenced the massacre of local communities between Ubangi and Congo,

1742 P.A. 18., uncategorized, dated as 1899.

1743 P.A. 4., uncategorized, dated as 1899.

1744 M.M.L., OA 9.1/9.

1745 'Interview with Mulela Deste [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018'. O.A.C. 6.

1746 P.A.B.K., Lettres administratives, 1904.

resulting in the destruction of numerous villages.¹⁷⁴⁷ In fact, It is noteworthy that French colonial forces had already begun to confiscate goods travelling from the Congo riverbank to Ndele as early as 1904.¹⁷⁴⁸

In this respect, around the year 1900, the Kuti state reached its zenith in economic activities, which significantly enhanced the authority of al-Sanussi. An intriguing case illustrates the political side of this dynamic. In a letter dated 1901, a Jallaba merchant named Salih al-Falali recounts his journey from Kordofan to Ndele, during which he encountered a Hausa pilgrim. After completing his pilgrimage to Mecca, the pilgrim received an invitation to İstanbul from *padişah* Abdulhamid II, who bestowed upon him various gifts and several *fermans* to be delivered to al-Sanussi and Rabillah. Upon arriving in Ndele, the Hausa pilgrim presented the gifts and *fermans* to al-Sanussi, who subsequently demanded additional gifts and *fermans* from his belongings. When the pilgrim said these items were for Rabillah, who in fact, had already died, al-Sanussi forced him to give up everything and ordered him to stay in Ndele and work the land, which prevented him from continuing his journey. The merchant narrates the ambitious claim of al-Sanussi to the Hausa pilgrims: “No one can pass through my land for political affairs that I’m not involved. If Rabillah is in need of these gifts and *ferman*, then first he has to come here to pay allegiance to me.”¹⁷⁴⁹ This case illustrates Kuti's political evolution in the region after the 1900s. For the following years, the state became the French invasion forces' biggest rival.

To sum up, the Kuti state serves as a compelling example within the southern region of the Central Sudan that its both *idara* and thereafter *tadbir* rule brought favourable conditions and made possible for such a newly established state became one of the most important centre of trade in the end of the 19th century.

Conclusion

The period preceding the 1840s in the southern region of Central Sudan is characterized by various reform movements that greatly shaped the political landscape of the region. However, following the 1840s, there emerged a prevailing inclination among the central authorities in Sokoto, Kuka, and Wara/Abeche to adhere to the frameworks established by earlier reform efforts. The new leadership

1747 Robert Harms, *River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin in the Era of the Slave and Ivory Trade, 1500-1891* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1981), 40–41, 213, 222–29.

1748 A.N.O.M.-A.E.F., 4(3) D9.

1749 P.A. 22., uncategorized, dated as 1901. Unfortunately, the letter does not explain the content of the *ferman*.

exhibited a lack of interest in instituting entirely new governance systems, instead favouring the perpetuation of existing structures throughout the region. Although there were brief attempts to apply *idara*—once in Sokoto during the 1840s and again in Kuka in the 1890s—these efforts ultimately failed to achieve the desired outcomes. Consequently, the predominant approach in Sokoto, Kuka, and Wara/Abeche remained focused on the application of *tadbir*.

The era after the 1840s was mainly marked by the endeavours of rulers in Sokoto, Kuka, and Wara/Abeche to ensure their political and economic expansion while contending with the increasingly autonomous expansion of their emirates or vassal states. Notably, between the 1870s and 1890s, some emirates, such as Kano and Zazzau, and vassal states, such as Damagaram and Kuti, even became much powerful and wealthy than above-mentioned central authorities. The political and economic development of states within the region was influenced not only by the governance systems implemented by the rulers but also by shifting geo-strategic dynamics and local conditions. A pertinent illustration of this complexity can be observed in the comparison between the western emirates of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate and the Kuti state in Wadai prior to the 1890s. Despite the geographical distance between these regions, the rulers employed similar *idara* systems. However, while this system facilitated substantial economic growth for Kuti due to its active trade networks, the western emirates of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate experienced significant limitations in their economic expansion due to their isolation from the central Caliphate, notwithstanding the emergence of trade hubs such as Sansan Hausa. Conversely, a contrasting example can be found in the governance of Hashimi in Bornu and the sultans of Wadai in relation to the rise of Rabillah. Although both states confronted the same threat, their differing governance systems significantly influenced their respective successes or failures in resisting Rabillah's invasion. The *idara* system employed by Hashimi resulted in a swift failure, whereas the *tadbir* system of Wadai effectively succeeded in repelling Rabillah.

A significant feature in the era after the 1840s was the role and political stance of the scholars. These scholars were not simply crystallizations of established legal and religious doctrines; rather, they possessed their own agendas and interpretations relevant to the contemporary context, which led to diverse roles and political positions. For instance, in Adamawa, the scholars harshly criticized the application of *tadbir* and advocated of *idara* system. Scholars in Sokoto adopted an opposing viewpoint. When a Caliph attempted to transition from the *tadbir* system to the *idara*, they compelled him to revert to the *tadbir*. Similar contrasting dynamics emerged around the turn of the

millennium after 1883. While some scholars in Sokoto continued to support the *tadbir* system, others began to call for the *riasa*. Notably, the response of scholars in Bornu to the millennial movements did not favour the *riasa* system; instead, they opted for the *idara*. This decision significantly influenced the selection of Hashimi as the new *shehu* in 1885, tasked with the application of the *idara*.

The oral narratives reveal a similar level of complexity. In the regions of Sokoto, Kano, and Zaria, most of the people initially expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the *tadbir* system; however, post-1870s disillusionment arose due to escalating corruption. Consequently, certain communities began advocating for the *idara* system, while others gravitated towards *riasa*, influenced by emerging millennial movements. Yet, there were also examples of great satisfaction. A notable example is the Kuti state, where local inhabitants demonstrated contentment with both the *idara* system of Kobur and the *tadbir* system of al-Sanussi. There were also instances where public sentiment shifted rapidly. For example, the local communities in Kuka, who had been vocally critical of the *tadbir* system and supportive of Hashimi's *idara* application, swiftly abandoned Hashimi when Rabillah seized control of Kuka, subsequently seeking a ruler who would apply *riasa*.

These examples illustrate the intricate interplay between geo-strategic transformations, local circumstances, and agencies of various actors. It is important to note that the decision-making process regarding the optimal governance system for the state was not solely influenced by the rulers; the contributions of scholars and local communities, along with their perspectives and aspirations for governance, were also significant. In this context, although there was a lack of substantial ambitions to establish an entirely new governance framework in the region following the 1840s, various actors remained actively engaged in modifying the existing governance structures to adapt to contemporary changes and dynamics.

The outcome of this significant engagement with the contribution of new geo-political dynamics often manifested as substantial economic and political growth for the Central Sudanic states, which conferred considerable power and wealth. Nevertheless, this expansion frequently led to conflicts, not only with neighbouring states but also among the emirates and vassal states that were subject to the central authorities of Sokoto, Kuka, and Wara/Abeche. In this regard, the expansion was not homogeneous. While certain emirates, such as Katsina, Daura, Hadeja and Misau, experienced disadvantages as a result of this growth, others, such as Kano, Zazzau, Bauchi and Katagum, found

themselves in opposition to the central authority due to their immensely increasing power and wealth. There were also some emirates, such as Adamawa, and sub-emirates around the Benue region, and vassal states, such as Damagaram and Kuti, that achieved an immense political and economic expansion while carefully maintaining their relationship with Sokoto, Kuka, and Abeche. Given that the expansion was driven by a variety of actors, each with their own agendas and ambitions, ongoing negotiations, and in many cases conflicts, became integral components of the political and economic landscape.

From a broad perspective, however, it is evident that the period following the 1840s was marked by significant expansion for the states in question. Contrary to the assumptions perpetuated by colonial agents and sources regarding a decline in the region due to local or global circumstances, such a decline never really took place. In reality, the Central Sudanic states reached their peak in both the economic and political spheres by the close of the 19th century.

Conclusion: Afroglobal History of *siyasa* in the Central Sudan during the 19th Century

The initial salient conclusion of this thesis pertains to the methodology. As this research clearly exhibits, in the case of the Central Sudan, building the entire research primarily on Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources is not only feasible but also imperative to elucidate the global history of the region. The Central Sudan was not an isolated passive element of the Eurocentric globalization, which became global only through the colonial and invasive involvement of the European powers. It should not be surprising to notice that this narrative is predominantly rooted in English and French travel accounts and consulate reports, which positioned themselves at the centre of the world and considered all other actors peripheral passive subjects. In that regard, this thesis simply situates Central Sudanic actors at the center of the world and considers all other actors as peripheral subjects. For this reason, different from the other known historical books on the Central Sudan in Anglophone/Francophone research literature, in this thesis, non-Afro-Islamic agents did not possess any meaningful space, whereas Afro-Islamic agents, who were the real determining actors in the region, and fundamentally lacking in the Anglophone/Francophone research literature, constituted the most crucial part of the work. Nevertheless, the outcome of this reverse perspective is, in essence, distinct from Eurocentric historiography. This thesis does not assert the existence of a single globalization, globality, and global history, with the Afroglobal as its sole exemplar. In contrast, the core methodological argument of the thesis is that there were many globalizations, globalities, and global histories; the Afroglobal history was one of them. Furthermore, the Eurocentric globalization also played a role in this global history, it was, however, mainly destructive. Eurocentric globalization dominated the Central Sudan at the cost of the fundamental destruction of the Afroglobal globality. Central Sudanic actors were forced to isolation through massacres and atrocities, thereafter to be the proper passive, insignificant subject for the Eurocentric globalization.

These findings, and related unconventional and ambitious claims, represented merely the initial point of departure for this research. The central objective of this thesis was to make further progress and inquire how this global history transpired in the Central Sudan within the context of *siyasa* during the 19th century with the following questions. Who were the actors? What kind of epistemological background did they act from? Which kind of dynamics, changes, and patterns took place?

The utilization of Afro-Islamic epistemology as an analytical instrument, in conjunction with the examination of Arabic, Hausa, and Turkish sources as the primary foundation, has yielded significant insights into the great transformations in the Central Sudan in terms of *siyasa*. The century commenced with overarching radical reforms in the *system of governance*, being the first meaning of *siyasa*. In the south, the ambitious jihadist movement of the Sokoto Fodiwa elites, who sought to establish a *riasa* system, intersected with the *tadbir* reforms of al-Amin al-Kanemi in Bornu and Abdulkadir Sabun in Wadai. In the north, Yusuf *paşa* was preoccupied with a similar *tadbir* reform, soon intersecting with the *tadbir* reforms of the Ottoman Empire. A notable attribute of these reform movements was their decentralized yet interconnected nature. The actors involved in these reforms were driven by distinct agendas and motivations to implement change. However, they shared several common contexts and affected each other through interactions. While al-Kanemi, Sabun, and Yusuf *paşa* sought to establish a *tadbir* system, expressing discontent with their previous *idara* rule, Fodiwa elites sought to dismantle their *tadbir* system to institute a *riasa* rule. In the context of Bornu, Wadai, and Tripoli, the *tadbir* system was perceived as a pivotal catalyst for political and economic ascendancy within their respective domains. The *idara* system was regarded as beneficial to the populace, offering stability and wealth; however, it was also seen as a system that undermined the political and economic might of the state. Although Fodiwa elites recognized the capacity of the *tadbir* system to amass political power and wealth for the state, their primary concern pertained to its deleterious impact, which engendered inequity and "un-Islamic" practices among the populace. In that regard, with a strong belief in their own religious and moral character, they aimed to create a jihadist rule, in which theological discourses would determine all political, social, and economic spheres. However, these actors were confronted with the challenge of adapting their reform plans to their respective local conditions, which significantly influenced the eventual course of their reform initiatives. Tripoli and Wadai soon descended into a civil war, considering the great ambitions of *tadbir* system brought unpredicted consequences. Interestingly, however, these civil wars could be resolved through the intervention of new actors who shared similar *tadbir* aspirations. In contrast, Bornu experienced a particularly noteworthy success in implementing *tadbir*, achieving swift and evident results. However, al-Kanemi reluctantly acknowledged the unintended consequences of *tadbir* on religious life. The elite of Fodiwa were compelled to follow a particularly arduous path. Despite the initial short-term success of the *riasa*, it was soon realized that the revolutionary nature of this system was not conducive to the establishment of a stable state structure. At this juncture, various actors pursued divergent courses of action. Uthman dan Fodio

promptly recognized the practicality of *tadbir*, seeking to establish an Islam-conform way of *tadbir*, whereas his son Muhammad Bello maintained his insistence on the *riasa* rule. His brother Abdullahi dan Fodio, on the other hand, adopted the *idara* rule, rending the western part of the caliphate, which was under his control, one of the unique examples of the Central Sudan during the 19th century. Following all these personal agendas and confrontations with the local conditions, leading several adjustment attempts, a notable pattern occurred in the region. Towards the end of the first half of the 19th century, a significant portion of the Central Sudan was under the *tadbir* system.

The most significant aspects of these transformations were their global character and vision. Sabun aspired to establish a global trade route connecting Wadai and Benghazi, thereby gaining access to the marine trade. In this way, he could actualize his *tadbir* aspirations. Al-Kanemi maintained consistent communication with Cairo and Tripoli, leveraging the intellectual, political, economic, and military resources from these centres to advance his own *tadbir* ambitions. Yusuf *paşa* aspired to establish himself as a pivotal global actor, one whose influence extended beyond the African and Islamic realms, encompassing states as diverse as the U.S.A. and Europe. His ambition was to ensure that any entity seeking to engage in trade in the Mediterranean region would have to pay him tribute. The Fodiwa elites, in their pursuit of power, swiftly advanced claims to caliphal rule, meticulously cultivating political and intellectual discourse to establish their dominion as a third caliphal power, following the established caliphal powers of Morocco and the Ottoman Empire in the western Islamic world.

The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed a change in the focal point of discourse, with the core debates shifting from the *system of governance* to *political and economic affairs*, representing the secondary aspect of *siyasa*. In the Central Sudan, the legacy of *tadbir* prevailed, with a few notable exceptions such as the sultanate of Air and the western region of the Uthmaniyya Caliphate, which retained their *idara* system. This legacy led to an unparalleled expansion. While this expansion was primarily military in nature in the southernmost region of Central Sudan, various peripheral actors—distinct from Sokoto, Kuka, Abeche, and Tripoli—also engaged in their own political and economic expansion. These developments often gave rise to internal conflicts; yet, the prevailing tendency was toward the continuation of expansion. The intricate diplomatic manoeuvrings among peripheral, central, and external powers, as well as internal and external actors, have been instrumental in shaping the fundamental dynamics and transformations

experienced by the region. Sokoto experienced numerous rebellions from its emirs, concurrently expanding its political and economic frontiers from Dori to Ngaoundere and from Katsina to northern Benin City. Kuka confronted analogous challenges, seeking a balanced approach to capitalize on the rising political and economic power of Damagaram, Muniyo, and the Ottoman Empire for the benefit of Bornu. For Wadai, the primary challenge did not stem from conflicts with its vassal states; rather, it was the frequent external threats from the east. Nevertheless, Abeche managed to ensure its survival and provided the impetus for further evolution of trans-Saharan trade. The challenges confronting the Ottoman Empire were more structural and chronic in nature. On the one hand, they underwent notable expansion, controlling a big part of the Sahara as far as Bornu. On the other hand, the implementation of the *tadbir* system was hindered by the local conditions and external pressures. In this respect, all these expansions were mainly driven by local and peripheral actors, such as al-Ansari family and Owinayt ag Kalala from Ghat, al-Titiwi family, Muhammad Baṣala and Abdurrahman Burkan from Fezzan, Muniyomo Kosso from Munimo, Tinimoun from Zinder, Majo Karofi from Kano, Abdulsalam from Ilorin, Muhammadu Nya from Muri, Ardo Issa from Ngaoundere, Ardo Hamagbo from Banyo, Haman Sambo from Tibati, Kobur and al-Sanussi from Dar Kuti. The primary focus of Tripoli/Istanbul, Sokoto, Kuka, and Abeche was to capitalize on the new expansionist evolution that aligned with their interests and authority, rather than pursue further radical reforms. While these expansions, particularly in the south, were realizing mostly on the cost of the non-Muslim neighbouring communities and their resources, other centres, such as Kano, Zaria, Zinder, Ndele, Ghadames, and Awjila/Jalo were successfully capitalizing these expansions and transforming them into economic and political power. In that regard, the expansion of the Central Sudanic powers continued uninterruptedly until the advent of the *riasa* regimes after the year 1874, initially with Zubayir, subsequently with the Mahdist movement and Rabillah, and ultimately with the colonial invasions of France, Britain, Germany, and Italy towards the end of the 19th century.

Although the system of *riasa* was not an unfamiliar phenomenon in the region, its destructive nature was well known. Therefore, each short-term *riasa* rule—once in Sokoto by Fodiwa elites between the 1800s and the 1810s, and once in Fezzan by Awlad Sulaiman between 1830 and 1842—quickly disappeared or transformed. What really unnatural and unimaginable was the long-term application of *riasa* for the region. In that regard, first, gradual expansion of various *riasa* regimes after 1874 through the East Sudanic actors, and then, complete domination of *riasa* in the Central Sudan in

1911 through the European powers, was the beginning of a new unknown age. No one could imagine the overall destruction of such a long term application of *riasa*, considering the eventual conclusion of the colonial invasion remained uncertain at the time.

In conclusion, the Afroglobal history of *siyasa* in the Central Sudan during the 19th century provides a very concrete and living picture of another global history that was created, transformed, and/or adjusted by the Central Sudanic actors. That was a globality with its own epistemology and actors, with its own visions and aspirations, with its own ambivalences and achievements. This globality was so profoundly and systematically dismantled and destroyed that it is very hard for many to imagine its existence today. Still, this history offers invaluable insights that persist in guiding contemporary thought. Inasmuch as historians had to go to a long way to recognize the fact that the European colonial invasion did not take place in an Africa that was inhabited by irrelevant stateless societies, instead it was a series of collusive wars between unevenly armed states, it is maybe the time for historians of today to recognize the fact that the Eurocentric globalization did not take place in an isolated world that was inhabited by irrelevant local actors, instead it was shaped by ambivalent interactions and numerous of destructive wars between unevenly created globalities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

Algeria

P.A.1: Privat Archive of Abubakr ag Bashir [Djanet]

P.A.8: Private Archive of Ibrahim bin Al-Jilani Al-Awamer [Souf]

P.A.9: Private Archive of Abu Bakr Benu Zefer [Ouargala]

Austria

Ö.S.A.: Österreichische Staatsarchive [Wien]

Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, HO, 104a, HO, 104b

Cameroon

A.N.C.: Archives nationales du Cameroun [Yaoundé]

1AC 1744/2.

O.A.C. 22: Oral Account Collection of Hamoua Dalailou [Ngaoundere]

O.A.C. 16: Oral Account Collection of Ahmadou Sehou [Ngaoundere]

O.A.C. 7: Oral Account Collection of Issa Saibo [Maroua]

Chad

M.B.D.A.: Markaza Al-Buhuth wa-l-Dirasat Al-Afrikiyat bi Jamiat Al-Malik Faysal [Ndjamena]
Uncategorized, letters dated as 1830, 1831, 1876, 1880.

P.A. 16: Private Archive of Bin Hamza al-Majabri [Abeche]

P.A. 17: Private Archive of Muhammad ibn Al-Tuwir [Ndjamena]

P.A. 18: Private Archive of Awlad Masud [Ndjamena]

P.A. 19: Private Archive of Muhammad al-Zaruq [Abeche]

P.A. 20: Private Archive of Abubakar Laka [Ndjamena]

P.A. 21: Private Archive of Yusuf Dereq [N'Djamena]

P.A. 22: Private Archive of Awlad Al-Falali [N'Djamena]

P.C. 6: Private Collection of Wadai Sultan's Palace [Abeche]

P.C. 13: Private Collection of Mohamman Abubakr [Ndjamena]

Egypt

D.K.W.K.: Dar al-Kutub wa-l-Watayiq al-Kawmiyyat [Cairo]

Maghrabiyat, 29.

Tax Registration Daftar 4170/31, 4283/145, 4284/146.

England

B.P.R.O.: British Public Record Office [Kew]

Commonwealth Office, 2/4, 2/9, 2/13, 2/20, 101/44, 446/5.

Foreign Office, 2/8, 2/20, 2/118, 5/32, 8/5, 8/8, 76/6, 76/7, 76/13, 76/14, 76/17, 76/18, 76/21, 76/20, 76/22, 76/25, 76/27, 76/38, 76/40, 77/5, 77/21, 78/284, 78/285, 84, 84/1, 84/373, 84/540,

84/598, 84/737, 84/1062, 84/1144, 84/1412, 95/13, 97/430, 101/4, 101/9, 101/24, 101/26, 101/29, 101/34, 101/36, 101/37, 101/41, 101/45, 101/47, 101/69, 101/84, 160/36, 160/58, 160/65, 161/10, 195/129, 195/148, 195/212, 195/295, 335/55, 371/149, 403/233, 403/254, 881/7027.

Foreign Office Miscellaneous series, 527/25.

C.M.S.A.: Church Mission Society Archive [Birmingham]
1/0/19/12.

S.A.D.U.: Sudan Archive of Durham University [Durham]
100/12/1, 101/9/1, 101/17/3-4, 101/20/6-7, 255/1/135-152, 258/1/904-905, 258/1/907a, 263/1/248-250

Denmark

D.R.: Danmarks Rigsarkiv [København]
Den Kongelige Afrikanske Konsulatsdirektion, 4187.
Korrespondance, 1.
Rapporter fra konsulaterne, S16-4143, 2979.
Tripolis: Almindelige korrespondancesager, 2901.
Tripolis: Sager vedrørende danske konsuler i Tripolis, 2898.
Tunis: Diverse sager vedrørende Tunis, 2909.

France

A.E.F.: Archives des Affaires Etrangères françaises [D'Orsay]
Malte C.P., 27,
Tripoli C.C., 3, 4, 8, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 44, 46, 56, 71, 88, 153
Turquie C.C.C., 46/316, 42/55, 42/112, 44/426,
Turquie C.R., 230
Tuquie, Tripoli de Barbarie, 1, 2
Tunis C.C., 42, 45,
A.N.O.M., 4(3) D10,4(3) D9, Affaire Indigenes, 29 H 2, Papiers Chapelle, 32 APC 1,

A.I.C.P.: Archive Institut Catholique de Paris [Paris]
Rapport de Jean (1904), Dossier 378.

A.I.F.: Archive Institute de France [Paris]
Fond Auguste Terrier, 5935/II.

A.N.F.: Archives Nationales de France [Paris]
SOM, PJ, 6PA.
Tripoli, C.8/71/1881, F.16/4/1875, F.16/27/1874, F.19/137/1881, F.27/252/1891, F.30/30528/1894.
Tunis, F.12/1850C/1814, F.12/1850C/1815.
Turquie, 200/MI606/1908, 200/MI606/1910.

C.H.E.A.: Centre des Hautes Études Administratives sur l'Afrique et Asie-Moderne [Paris]
Mémoires verts, 2355.

C.C.M.: Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille [Marseille]

Tunis (3), 1835-1881

Italy

A.S.M.A.E.I.: Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri d'Italia [Roma]
P, Libia, 6/6, 161/1.

A.S.L.: Archivio di Stato di Livorno [Livorno]
Archivio Consular Toscana, L.C. 1798, L.C. 1799
Archivio Consular Toscana, Corr. M.G.M., let. 8, 1826, Corr. M.G.M., let. 35, 1826, Corr. M.G.M.,
let. 42, 1827, Corr. M.G.M., let. 67, 1828

A.S.T.: Archivio di Stato di Torino [Torino]
Corr. Ministero die guerre e marina, let. 27, 1823, let. 82, 1823, let. 22-23, 1824, let. 2, 1825, let. 9,
1826, let. 124, 1829

A.U.S.M.E.: Archivio del'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito [Roma]
P, Libia, 162/2.

Germany

A.L.I.L.: Archive von Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde [Leipzig]
Nachlass, 309/3, 282/23a, 282/23b-c.

G.S.P.K.: Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz [Berlin]
I. HA Rep. 81 Konstantinopel nach 1807, VIII Nr. 4, 12.
I. HA Rep. 81 Turin nach 1807, Nr. 15.
I. HA Rep. 81 Vatikan, Nr. 398.
I. HA GR, Rep. 68, Nr. 575, 576, 577, 578.

H.S.D.: Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [Darmstadt]
D 4, 568/4.

L.B.W.: Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg [Stuttgart]
Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, 239 Nr. 63.
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, E 50/01 Bü 279.

S.B.: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin [Berlin]
K.3 34.
Krause Collection, MS 844.

S.S.: Stadtarchiv Stralsund [Stralsund]
Rep. 5, Nr. 120.

O.A.C. 9: Oral Account Collection of Richard Kuba [Frankfurt]

Ghana

I.A.S.A.C.: Institute of African Studies Arabic collection, University of Ghana [Legon]
Doc. 417.

Holland

N.A.N.: Nationaal Archief van Nederland [Den Haag]
Ministerie von Buitenlandse Zaken (1796-1810), inv. nr. 356.

U.B.L.: Universitaire Bibliotheken Leiden [Leiden]
Oosterse handschriften, C. 1589, 132-133.

Libya

D.M.T.L.: Dar al-Mahfuzat al-Tarikhiyya al-Libiyya [Trablus]
Al-Sijiliyat al-shariat, 2/1, 2/15, 2/56, 2/78, 2/94, 2/135, 3/58, 4/1, 4/19, 6/12, 6/28, 6/45, 5/180, 7/13, 7/92, 9/120, 10/200, 10/176, 11/56, 11/151, 13/175, 14/11, 15/6, 15/214, 15/31, 15/319.
Fezzan, 3.
Ghuma, letters dated as 1852, 1855.
Idara, 1/27, 2/43, 133/1, 134/1.
Jami Zawaya, 823.
Khadouja Shelli, 129.
Qaramanli, letters dated as 1823, 1828, 1830, 1832, 1835, 1850, 1863.
Manuscript Collection, 40/55.
Sanussiyya, letters dated as 1874.
Sokna Distric File, 1125.
Tax Registration, F. 151-181, No. 174, F. 751-850, No. 814, F. 751-850, No. 871, F. 801-900, No. 861.
Tijarat, 2358, 4623.
Uncategorized, documents dated as 1818, 1833, 1834, 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1849, 1851, 1853, 1855, 1858, 1859, 1862, 1863, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871, 1873, 1874, 1876, 1878, 1880, 1882, 1883, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1889, 1890, 1891, 1892, 1893, 1896, 1898, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1910.
Waqf, 823.
Waqf Collection of Ahmad Pasha Qaramanli Mosque, Ijazat dated as 1866.

J.G.T.M.: Jami'at Ghadamisli-l-Turath wa-l-Makhtutat [Ghadames]
Abdulsalam Adham Collection, 18.
Uncategorized, documents dated as, 1792, 1802, 1808, 1815, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1839, 1841, 1842, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856, 1858, 1860, 1865, 1869, 1871, 1875, 1877, 1878, 1881, 1883, 1884, 1886, 1888, 1890, 1892, 1896, 1899, 1902, 1903, 1907.
Wathayiq wa-l-makhtutat, 23.

M.G.: Maktubat Al-Ghazali [Sokna]
Chronicles of Muhammad Al-Bashir Al-Sukni, Text no. 5, 7, 8, 9, 10.
Official Letters, dated as 1842, 1878.
Family Collections, letters dated as 1855, 1857, 1858, 1860, 1865, 1866, 1876, 1879, 1884, 1885, 1889, 1892, 1908.

M.J.L.D.T.: Markaz Jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasat al-Tarikhiat [Trablus]
Fezzan, 9, D. 5773.
Tijarat, 684.
Uncategorized, documents dated as 1840, 1851.
Wathayiq wa-l-makhtutat, 26, 44, 51, 105, 120.

M.M.A.: Muthaf Madina Al-Qatrun [Al-Qatrun]
Uncategorized, documents dated as 1849.

M.M.J.B.: Al-Maktabat al-Markaziyya Jamiyat Benghazi [Benghazi]
Manuscript Collection, 1/40-10, 40/80-51, 40/80-80, 121/160-104.
Sanussiyya, 19 Shaban 1319.
Sanussiyya: Al-Barrani, 15 Dhu al-Hijjah 1318, Rabi' al-Thani 1319, Tarikh 1319.
Uncategorized, letters dated as 1912.

P.A.2: Private Archive of Abubakr ibn Hasan Katili [Ghat]
P.A.3: Private Archive of Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Thani [Ghat]
P.A.4: Private Archive of Bashir Qasim Yusha [Ghadames]
P.A.5: Private Archive of Muhammad al-Faqih [Tarhuna]
P.A.6: Private Archive of Mustapha ibn Al-Akhdar Othman [Murzuq]
P.A.7: Private Archive of Muhammad ibn Khalifa Ahwal [Sabha]
P.A.12: Private Archive of Abu Hasan bin Al-Jabbar [Trablus]
P.A. 13: Private Archive of Muammar bin Bashir [Benghazi]
P.A. 14: Private Archive of Awlad bin Kabah [Sebha]
P.A. 15: Private Archive of Awlad Al-Mukaysari [Awjila]
P.A. 23: Private Archive of Abdullah Al-Wanshi [Ghadames]
P.A. 24: Private Archive of Abdulhafiyy Hamud [Ghadames]
P.A. 25: Private Archive of Hajj Musa Al-Nafar [Awjila]
P.A. 26: Private Archive of Al-Habib Al-Tariqi [Awjila]
P.A. 27: Private Archive of Abubakr Al-Sarahna [Awjila]

Mali

B.M.D.: La Bibliothèque de Manuscrits de Djenné [Djenne]
9/159

P.C. 2: Private Collection of Essuyuti [Timbuktu]
P.C. 3: Private Collection of Mamma Haidara [Bamako]

Niger

I.R.S.H.: Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines [Niamey]
MARA, 273, 280, 1744.
MARA: Order of Jilani, letters dated as 1797, 1819.

P.A.10: Private Archive of Abu Bakr Mustapha [Dirku/Kawar]

P.C. 7: Private Collection of Mohamed Anako [Agadez]
P.C. 8: Private Collection of Mahaman Souleymane [Agadez]
P.C. 9: Private Collection of Mohamed Hamzata [Agadez]

O.A.C. 10: Oral Account Collection of Idrissa Kimba [Niamey]
O.A.C. 11: Oral Account Collection of Maïkoréma Zakari [Niamey]
O.A.C. 19: Oral Account Collection of Issoufou Djardaye [Zinder]

O.A.C. 20: Oral Account Collection of Hassimi Alassane [Niamey]

Nigeria

A.H.A.: Arewa House Archive [Zaria]

Ciroma Collection, latter dated as 1861, 1870.

C.A.D.: Center of Arabic Documentation, University of Ibadan [Ibadan]

10, 19, 27.

J.M.: Jos Museum [Jos]

AMC, 174, 571 S/J 123, 885

Armybook

K.S.C.B.: Kano State History and Culture Bureau [Kano]

HCB/ARC/AML/011

CHB/ARC/AML/002

SNP 17/97/5

863/13

L.U.I.: Library of the University of Ibadan [Ibadan]

82/57, 82/128, 82/169, 82/397.

N.A.U.I.: National Archive in the University of Ibadan [Ibadan]

82/237, 82/397.

N.H.R.S.: Northern History Research Shema [Zaria]

Bornu, 29, 46.

Borsari Distric Report.

Geidam Distric Report.

K 4/11.

MS 126/8.

P 1/2, 4/17, 7/10, 12/2.

N.N.A.: Nigerian National Archive [Kaduna]

C/AR, 1/6

Maiprof, 4/23, 264/1919

Muriproof, 834/1913

O/AR, 1/1, 1/8, 12

P/AR 2/11, 2/20, 2/22

SNP 7/4667, 7/8/1858/1907, 7/1778/1909, 17/3/24678, 17/25355,

Sokproof, 2/10/123

Zariprof P/ARI, 28

Z.S.A.G.: Zawiyat Sheikh Abubakar Gonimi [Maiduguri]

Gonimi Collection.

P.C. 4: Private Collection of Muhammad bin Abubakr Al-Miskin [Maiduguri]

P.C. 5: Private Collection of Malam Abubakr bin Saadu [Kano]

P.C. 10: Private Collection of Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Ibn Yunus [Abuja]

P.C. 11: Private Collection of Malam Usman Dikwa [Maiduguri]

P.C. 14: Private Collection of Alhaji Boyi [Kano]

P.C. 15: Private Collection of Malam Ahmadu [Durbi Takusheyi]

O.A.C. 1: Oral Account Collection of Usman Suleiman [Zaria]

O.A.C. 2: Oral Account Collection of Milafiya Filaba [Keffi]

O.A.C. 3: Oral Account Collection of Aliyu Idrees [Abuja]

O.A.C. 4: Oral Account Collection of Tiwugi Sheshi [Bida]

O.A.C. 5: Oral Account Collection of Kyari Mohammad [Yola]

O.A.C. 13: Oral Account Collection of Mordakai Dansanko [Wukari]

O.A.C. 14: Oral Account Collection of Nadir Nasidi [Zaria]

O.A.C. 15: Oral Account Collection of Fatimah Bello [Zaria]

O.A.C. 17: Oral Account Collection of Hadi Saad [Ilorin]

O.A.C. 18: Oral Account Collection of Abubakr Tsangarwa [Wukari]

O.A.C. 21: Oral Account Collection of Isyaku Yandaki [Sokoto]

O.A.C. 24: Oral Account Collection of Mansur Wara [Katsina]

Norway

C.M.E.I.S.: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies [Bergen]

Photographic Collection, DF 305.44/5.

Portugal

A.H.U.P.: Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino de Portugal [Lisboa]

Norte de África, N. 8, 1805.

A.N.T.T.: Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [Lisboa]

Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, C. 41, 1813, Tunes L. I, M. 157, C.P.E.B., 1816.

B.N.L.: Bibliotheca Nacional de Lisboa [Lisboa]

Reservados, C. 8543.

République Centrafricaine

P.A.B.K.: Perfecture Archive Basse-Kotto [Mobaye]

Lettres administratives, 1904.

O.A.C. 6: Oral Account Collection of Chérubin Banda Ndele [Bangui]

Senegal

I.F.A.N.: Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire [Dakar]

I7B, II. 54.

Capitaine Buck, No. 6.

Spain

A.H.N.: Archivo Histórico Nacional [Madrid]

Sección Estado (3), Trípoli, L. 6240, L. 6242, L. 6241.

Sección Estado (3), Túnez, L. 6247.

A.M.A.E.: Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores [Madrid]
Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, 147/1.
Política Exterior, Trípoli, L. H 2688.

Sudan

N.R.O.S.: National Record Office of Sudan [Khartoum]
Mahdia, 1/6/447, 10/125.

P.C. 1: Private Collection of Muhammad Basheer [Senna]

P.C. 12: Private Collection of Hassan Al-Mubarik [Khartoum]

O.A.C. 12: Oral Account Collection of Ibrahim Nahid [Khartoum]

O.A.C. 23: Oral Account Collection in Sudan Notes and Records Volume 23, University of Khartoum, 1940 [Khartoum]

Sweden

R.S.: Riksarkivet Sverige [Täby]

Konsulatarkiv Tripolis, SE/RA/231/231155, 1797, 1802, 1805, 1809, 1817, 1818, 1819, 1822, 1825, 1826, 1827, 1832, 1834

Konsulatarkiv Tunis, SE/RA/231/231158, 1797, 1814,

Tunisia

A.N.T.: Archives Nationales de Tunisie [Tunis]

Reports, 232/457.

Série Histoire, C 236, 508.

B.N.T.: Bibliothèque Nationale tunisienne [Tunis]

Manuscrit, 18626.

The United States of America

H.L.C.: The Huntington Library of California [California]

William Eaton Papers, reel 3, 1803.

L.C.W.: Library of Congress Washington [Washington DC]

Series 1: General Correspondence, Mic. Reel. 021.

M.M.L.: UW-Medison Memorial Library [Wisconsin]

OA, 4.1/4, 7.2/8.1, 8.2/8, 9.1/9, 15/16.1, 17.2, 18.1, 21/4.

N.U.A.: Northwestern University Archive [Evanston]

Ghana/115/MSX.

Paden Collection, MS 399.

U.S.N.A.: The U.S. National Archives [Washington DC]

Despatches From United States Consuls in Tripoli: 1796-1885, 6/21, 6/59, 6/61, 7/12, 7/56, 7/60, 7/63.

O.A.C. 8: Oral Account Collection of Julius Adenkule [Monmouth]**Türkiye****B.O.A.:** Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri [İstanbul]

Ayniyet Defterleri, Trablusgarb, 915, 915/9, 915/14, 915/20, 915/21, 915/23, 915/25, 915/32, 915/39, 915/44, 915/45, 915/49, 915/155, 915/160, 915/170, 918.

Bâbiâli Evrak Odası Evrakı, 244/18300, 535/40052, 692/51895, 1486, 12347/1001009.

Bâbiâli Evrak Odası Evrakı: Mısır, 1032/68-4.

Bâbiâli Evrak Odası Evrakı: Trablusgarb, 152/40, 357, 3722/279103.

Bâb-ı Âsafî Divan-ı Hümayun Name-i Hümayun Kalemi, 173/19, 250/1412.

Cevdet Askeriye, 27064-1, 35969, 46893.

Cevdet Dahiliye, 6234.

Cevdet İktisat, 1327.

Cevdet Maliye, 187/7791, 3230.

Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi, 3/86, 417/7, 527/20, 556/57, 623/87, 717/44, 2205/1, 2206/114, 2221/57, 2278/124, 2279/124.

Dâhiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi, 194/54, 270/63, 329/37, 405/1, 405/55.

Divân-ı Hümayûn Mühimme Defteri, 105/333, 111/169, 132/1054, 132/1055, 132/1199, 140/529, 140/530, 200/210, 207/216, 207/217.

Düve-i Ecnebiye, 16/1, 16/108, 29/29.

Evrakı Maarif Nezareti Maruzatı, 2/10.

Eyalet-i Mümtâze Mısır İradeleri, 17/616.

Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 518/22, 520, 520/249, 520/263, 521/25, 523.

Hariciye Nezareti: Londra, 281.

Hariciye Nezareti Mektubî Kalemi Evrakı, 118/67, 377/39, 633/48.

Hariciye Nezareti Mütenevvia Kısmı Evrakı, 523.

Hariciye Nezâreti Siyasî Kısım Evrakı, 966/24, 1002/56, 1947/53.

Hariciye Nezareti Tahrirat, 30/79.

Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası Evrakı, 38/92, 67/82.

Hariciye Siyasi, 1530/23, 1530/32, 1531/20, 1531/41, 1600/71, 1620/27.

Hatt-ı Hümayûn, 118/4770, 364/20161-H, 366/20242-D, 454/22443-A, 454/22449, 456/22505-A, 456/22505-E, 457/2253, 457/22538, 465/22790, 961/41197-S, 1030, 1336/52146-A, 3651, 14337, 22457, 22457-C/A, 22484, 22487, 22487-D, 23984, 31789, 33838, 34101, 34986, 34986-E, 37520-B, 38548, 38548-I, 38709, 46429-S, 49039.

İrade Dahiliye, 49/188, 56/2747, 67/3328, 111/5620, 255/15713, 288/18133, 307/19523, 326/21261, 350/23075, 525/36220, 625, 1218/95393, 1268/99691, 1286/42101, 1292/102002 15368, 18969, 21576.

İrade Dosya Usulü, 139/42.

İrade Eyâlet-i Mümtâze Mısır, 11/302, 19/735.

İrade Hariciye, 172/9390, 337/21811.

İrade Hususi, 39/13, 96/58, 1319/88.

İrade Meclis-i Mahsus, 38/1567, 50/2153, 625.

İrade Meclis-i Vâlâ, 532/23853, 21578, 22191.

İrade Mesail-i Mühimme, 72/2084, 72/2086, 72/2091, 72/2092, 72/2093, 73/2093, 86/2636.

İrade Ticaret ve Nafia, 6/36, 9/36.

Mabeyni Hümayun Evrakı İradeleri, 117/171.

Meclis-i Vâlâ Riyâseti Belgeleri, 146/53, 289/17.
 Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları, 2/33, 58, 132/71, 20493, 21576.
 Nişan-Tahvil Defteri, 1355/22.
 Sadaret Âmedî Kalemî Defterleri, 37/18, 56/30, 65/62, 87/64.
 Sadaret Mektubî Kalemî, 2/80.
 Sadaret Mektubî Kalemî Meclis-i Vâlâ Evrakı, 88/9.
 Sadaret Mektubî Kalemî Mühimme Evrakı, 171/94, 446/85.
 Sadaret Mektubî Kalemî Nezaret ve Devair Yazışmaları Evrakı, 71/70, 250/82.
 Sadaret Mektubî Kalemî Umum Vilayetler Evrakı, 35/88, 47/41, 70/7, 80/118, 183/88, 341/5, 371/62.
 Sadaret Mümtaze Kalemî, Trablusgarp, Posta Telgraf, 20/3.
 Şûra-yı Devlet Evrakı, 2325/32, 3225/32.
 Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 7/13, 8/27, 9/25, 10/24, 14/9, 78/24, 118/2, 122/3, 122/121, 122/2389, 126/9.
 Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, 29/15, 35/111, 59/15, 143/95, 157/139, 172/36, 209/82, 278, 291/53, 295/46.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Askerî Maruzat, 22/3, 22/10, 35/88, 183/62, 210/17.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 3/34, 9/105, 10/62, 13/56.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Başkitabet Dairesi Maruzatı, 7/14, 17/16, 66/42.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Dahiliye, 10/46.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve Ataşemiliterlik, 34/29.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Maliye, 18/100.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Meşihat Dairesi Maruzatı, 1/49.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Müfettişlik Ve Komiserlikler Tahrirâtı, 4/62.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği, 6/61, 7/31, 10/46, 13/2, 19/3, 20/31, 28/55, 34/12, 37/36, 37/37, 40/28.
 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Yâverân ve Maiyet-i Seniyye Erkân-ı Harbiye Dairesi, 3/7, 22/83.
 Yıldız Perakende Umum Vilayetler, 6/27, 11/9, 13/37, 47/41, 68/121.
 Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Evrakı, 231/56, 255/32, 308/117, 325/28, 326/110, 328/39, 329/25, 402/39, 506/30.

H.A.: Hariciye Arşivi [İstanbul]
 521/24.

İ.Ü.N.K.: İstanbul Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi [İstanbul]
 Yazma Eserler, 8897, 5002.
 Türkçe Yazmalar, T8897.

S.K.: Sülaymaniye Kütüphanesi [İstanbul]
 Hacı Muhammed Efendi Koleksiyonu, No. 4890.

T.B.M.M.A.: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Arşivi [Ankara]
 Meclis Görüşmeleri, 27 Mayıs 1322 (9 Haziran 1906).

Interviews conducted by the author

Interview No.1: Meeting with the Elders of Murzuq in Sebha, 2023
 Interview No.2: Meeting with the Elders of Ghat in Ghat, 2023
 Interview No.3: With Ahmad Ain Muhammad Mustafa in Ghat, 2023
 Interview No.4: With Jarmah Abd al-Rahman in Ghat, 2023
 Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023
 Interview No.5: Meeting with the Elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023
 Interview No.6: With Muhammad Hasan Bin Suwawi from Murzuq in Sebha, 2023
 Interview No.7: Meeting with the Elders of Al-Qatrun in Al-Qatrun, 2023
 Interview No.8: With the Abu Bakr Mustapha from Kavar in Al-Qatrun, 2023
 Interview No.9: Meeting with the Elders of Sokna, 2023
 Interview No.9: Meeting with the Elders of Sokna, 2023
 Interview No.10: With the Ahmad Al-Titiwi in Hun, 2023
 Interview No.11: With the Malam Abubakr in Kano, 2023
 Interview No.12: With Seydou Kawsen Mayaga in Agadez in 2023
 Interview No.13: With Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Burkani in Benghazi, 2023
 Interview No.13: With the Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Burkani in Maiduguri, 2023
 Interview No. 14: With Babagana Abubakar Online, 2023
 Interview No. 15: With Mohammad Tijjani Zanna Laisu Online, 2023
 Interview No. 16: With Ahmad Muhammad Shanab Online, 2023
 Interview No. 17: With Sharif Abdullah in Kano, 2023
 Interview No. 18: With Musa Bakri in Kano, 2023
 Interview No. 19: With Yusuf Lawal in Kankia (Katsina), 2023
 Interview No. 21: With Salahuddin Al-Tarqi in Ghat, 2023
 Interview No. 22: With Abubakr Harun in Tripoli, 2023
 Interview No. 23: With Hajj Al-Hadi Al-Tawhami in Ghadames, 2023
 Interview No. 24: With Hussein Al-Mazdawi in Tripoli, 2023
 Interview No. 25: With Muhammad Bin Abubakr Online, 2024
 Interview No. 26: With Ali Bin Abubakr Online, 2024
 Interview No. 27: With Mohamed Ghabdouwane in Agadez in 2023

Interviews conducted by other researchers

Interview with Audu Dan Gado Shagwa [Wara] by Mansur Wara in 2013. O.A.C. 24
 Interview with Abbo Hamadama [Tibati] by Ahmadou Sehou in 2006. O.A.C. 16
 Interview with Abdul Banat [Masalit] by Ibrahim Nahid in 1978. O.A.C. 12
 Interview with Abdulkadir Solagberu [Ilorin] by Hadi Saad in 2015. O.A.C. 17
 Interview with Abdullahi Hayatu [Zaria] by Usman Suleiman in 2002. O.A.C. 1
 Interview with Abou Magaji [Maradi] by Isyaku Yandaki in 2014. O.A.C. 21
 Interview with Ahmad Abu Lafta [Khartoum] by Ibrahim Nahid in 1981. O.A.C. 12
 Interview with Alfa Watu [Say] by Idrissa Kimba in 1974. O.A.C. 10
 Interview with Alhaji Dogo Abubakar [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992. O.A.C. 2
 Interview with Alhaji Gambo Garba [Gombe] by Abubakr Tsangarwa in 2017. O.A.C. 18
 Interview with Alhaji Musa Muazau [Zaria] by Usman Suleiman in 2003. O.A.C. 1
 Interview with Alhassan Garba Abdulrahman [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992. O.A.C. 2
 Interview with Ali Shanab [El Geneina] by Ibrahim Nahid in 1980. O.A.C. 12
 Interview with Atiku Garba Yahya [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1993. O.A.C. 2
 Interview with Babu Adam Bamaro [Parakau] by Richard Kuba in 1993. O.A.C. 9
 Interview with Babu Bature [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1993. O.A.C. 2

- Interview with Banda Serge [Rafai] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018. O.A.C. 6
- Interview with Bappa Sule Karim [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015. O.A.C. 14
- Interview with Dalhatu Abdullahi [Wukari] by Mordakai Dansanko in 2014. O.A.C. 13
- Interview with Dewa Ibrahima [Ngaoundéré] by Ahmadou Sehou in 2006. O.A.C. 16
- Interview with Dorian Boateng [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018. O.A.C. 6
- Interview with Edward Ajibauka [Wukari] by Mordakai Dansanko in 2014. O.A.C. 13
- Interview with Elders of Zinder [Zinder] by Issoufou Djardaye in 2017. O.A.C. 19
- Interview with Gesere Maman Bamaro [Parakau] by Richard Kuba in 1992. O.A.C. 9
- Interview with Godiya Adamu Deye [Keffi] by Milafiya Filaba in 1990. O.A.C. 2
- Interview with Gwonyo Garba [Garun Kurama] by Fatimah Bello in 2009. O.A.C. 15
- Interview with Habu Umar [Donga] by Mordakai Dansanko in 2014. O.A.C. 13
- Interview with Harune Ide [Sansana Hausa] by Hassimi Alassane in 2021. O.A.C. 20
- Interview with Jauro Dinga [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015. O.A.C. 14
- Interview with Jibrin Amfani [Wukari] by Mordakai Dansanko in 2014. O.A.C. 13
- Interview with Jonas Nakorji [Patigi] by Aliyu Idrees in 1988. O.A.C. 3
- Interview with Kaigama Bukar [Kulumbardu] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979. O.A.C. 11
- Interview with Lawan Maruma [Mainé-Soroa] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979. O.A.C. 11
- Interview with Maidodo Maisamari [Lere] by Fatimah Bello in 2009. O.A.C. 15
- Interview with Maina Mustafa [Maiduguri] by Kyari Mohammed in 1993. O.A.C. 5
- Interview with Malam Abba Usman [Maiduguri] by Kyari Mohammed in 1993. O.A.C. 5
- Interview with Malam Abdou [Zinder] by Issoufou Djardaye in 2017. O.A.C. 19
- Interview with Malam Abubakar Al-Miskin [Maiduguri] by Kyari Mohammed in 1994. O.A.C. 5
- Interview with Malam Falalu [Zinder] by Issoufou Djardaye in 2017. O.A.C. 19
- Interview with Malam Usman Miji [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015. O.A.C. 14
- Interview with Mosange Banza [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018. O.A.C. 6
- Interview with Mulela Deste [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018. O.A.C. 6
- Interview with Musa Dinga [Jalingo] by Nadir Nasidi in 2015. O.A.C. 14
- Interview with Musa Mohammad Kigera [Bussa] by Julius Adenkule in 1991. O.A.C. 8
- Interview with Patigi Jimada [Patigi] by Aliyu Idrees in 1988. O.A.C. 3
- Interview with Sani Miko [Garun Kurama] by Fatimah Bello in 2009. O.A.C. 15
- Interview with Shaaba Lafiagi [Kontagora] by Tiwugi Sheshi in 2015. O.A.C. 4
- Interview with Sharif Abubakar [Dargala] by Issa Saibo in 2004. O.A.C. 7
- Interview with Tamah Awuba Anyidakuzo [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992. O.A.C. 2
- Interview with Tswaidan Nupe [Bida] by Tiwugi Sheshi in 2012. O.A.C. 4
- Interview with Tukura Azaki [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1993. O.A.C. 2
- Interview with Umar Farouk Abdulsamad [Zaria] by Usman Suleiman in 2002. O.A.C. 1
- Interview with Uyaj Muwaku [Ndele] by Chérubin Banda Ndele in 2018. O.A.C. 6
- Interview with Walid Jibrin [Nasarawa] by Milafiya Filaba in 1992. O.A.C. 2
- Interview with Yakudima Usmae [Guré] by Maïkoréma Zakari in 1979. O.A.C. 11
- Interview with Yerima Mohaman [Ngaoundere] by Hamoua Dalailou in 1995. O.A.C. 22
- Interview with Yunus Badis [Al-Fashir] by W.E.J. Bramley in 1940. O.A.C. 23

Unedited Manuscripts

Abd Al-Rahman Al-Fulani. 'Al-ṭawāriq āṣḥāb al-ṣaḥrā' al-kubrā', uncategorized, P.C. 7.

- Abdullahi dan Fodio. 'Kitāb al-Adāt', uncategorized, P.C. 14.
- . 'Ḍiyā' Ahl al-Iḥtisāb 'alā Ṭarīq al-Sunnah wa-'l-Şawāb', uncategorized, P.C. 1.
- . 'Ḍiyā' Al-Hukkām Fī-Mā La-Hum Wa 'alayhim Min al-Aḥkām', 04403, P.C. 2.
- . 'Ḍiyā' Al-Imām Fī Şalāḥ al-Anām', 9/159, B.M.D.
- . 'Ḍiyā' Al-Muqtadin Li-'l-Ḥulafā' al-Rāşidīn', 82/397. N.A.U.I.
- . 'Ḍiyā' Al-Siyāsāt', 32385, P.C. 3.
- . 'Ḍiyā' Al-Sulṭān Wa-Ġayrihi Min al-'Iḥwān Fī Aham Mā Yuṭlabu 'Ilmuḥu Fī Umūr al-Zamān', P 1/2. N.H.R.S.
- . 'Ḍiyā' al-tā'wil', uncategorized. P.C. 1.
- . 'Ḍiyā' Ūlī-l-Amr', Arabe 5697, B.N.F.
- . 'Ḥuṭbah Al-Ġum'ah Wa Kayfiyyat Ḍiyārat al-Amwāt', AMC, 885, J.M.
- . 'Kitāb Al-Nasab', Ghana/115/MSX, N.U.A.
- . 'Nayl al-marām min shiyam al-kirām', uncategorized, P.C. 1.
- . 'Ta'lim al-rāḍi fī asbāb al-iḥtişaş bī mawāt al-arāḍi', P/Ar 2, 22, N.N.A.
- . 'Tazyīn Al-Waraqāt', 27112, P.C. 3.
- Abdurrahman Muhib Efendi. 'Fransa Sefâretnâmesi', Hacı Muhammed Efendi Koleksiyonu, No. 4890, S.K.
- 'Account of Al-Hajj Isa Hasan, Interviewed by Naim Şükrü Bey', 255/1/135-152, S.A.D.U
- Al-Haj Said. 'Taqāyīd Mimmā Waşala İlaynā', Arabe 5422, B.N.F.
- Alqadir, Abduljabbar. 'Al-ġawhar al-ṭamīn fī aḥbār şahrā' al-mulattamīn', uncategorized, P.A.12.
- Anonym. 'Afrikâ-Yi Osmanî'den Trablusgarb ve Bingazi ve Fizan'a Dair Malumat', Yazma Eserler, 1891, İ.Ü.N.K.
- . 'Taḥdīr Al-'Iḥwān', uncategorized, P.C. 5.
- . 'Trablusgarb ve Bingazi'de Erkan-ı Harb Miraleyn Zeki ve Fuat Beyler Tarafından Yapılan Erkan-ı Harbiye Seyahati Hakkında Rapor (1890)', Türkçe Yazmalar Katalogu, nr. T8897, İ.Ü.N.K.
- 'Anonym Layiha (1881)', Şûra-yı Devlet Evrakı, 2325/32, B.O.A.
- 'Abd al-Qadir ibn al-Mustafa. 'Aşr Masā'il Fī-l-Ḥilāf', uncategorized, P.C. 1.
- . 'Rawḍāt Al-Āfkār', O/AR 1, 1, N.N.A.
- Canikli Ali Paşa. 'Tedbîr-i Cedîd-i Nâdir', Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, HO, 104b, Ö.S.A.
- Chronicle of Ghadames, Manuscrit Arabe, 1891, B.N.F.
- Chronicle of Katsina, uncategorized, P.C. 15.
- Chronicle of Marou, uncategorized, P.C. 13.
- Chronicle of Wadai, uncategorized, P.C. 6.
- Compilation of Atiqu, 34023, P.C. 3.
- Habib al-Hassan. 'Tsaure Daga Cikin Tarihin Sarkin Musulmi Muhammadu Bello', uncategorized, P.C. 5.
- Hagid Mardechi. 'Toldot Yahodi Tripuli', in the personal archive of the author (Kerem Duymus)
- Liman Aliyu. 'Chronicle of Sokoto', kadcaptory O/AR, 12, N.N.A
- 'Madḥ Sultān 'Ali', Paden Collection, MS 399, N.U.A.
- 'Mahmud Nedim Efendi Layihası (1904)', Yıldız Perakende Umum Vilayetler, 68/121, B.O.A.
- 'Mehmed Namık Paşa Layihası (1885)', Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 10/24, B.O.A.
- 'Mehmed Nazif Paşa Layihası (1881)', Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 9/25, B.O.A.
- 'Miralay Hüseyin Hüsnü Layihası (1886)', Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 8/27, B.O.A.
- Muhammad Abdalrahman Abdullatif. 'Al-tawāriq aṣḥāb al-şahrā' al-kubrā', uncategorized, P.A. 2.
- Muhammad Al-Sayyidi. 'Tarāğim al-'ulamā' Bāğrām', uncategorized, P.C. 8.
- Muhammad Yanbu. 'Kitāb Al-'Idāra Fī Nizām Mamlakah Wa-l-'Imārah', MS 126/8, N.H.R.S.
- Muhammadu Bello. 'Al-Inşāf Fī Ḍikr Mā-Fī Masā'il al-Ḥilāfa Min Wifāq Wa-Ḥilāf', 206, A.I.F.

- . ‘Al-Nuqūl al-Nawāṭiq Fī Ša’n al-Barbar Wa-l-Tawāriq’, MARA, 273, I.R.S.H.
- . ‘Al-Taḥrīr Fī Qawā’id al-Tabšīr’, uncategorized, P.C. 1.
- . ‘Ġawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd’, O/AR, 12, N.N.A.
- . ‘Ribāta wa-l-ḥirāsa’, N.H.R.S., P 12/2.
- . ‘Risāla Ilā Muḥammad Al-Jaylānī’, MARA, 1744, I.R.S.H.
- . ‘Sard Al-Kalām’, O/AR 1, 8, N.N.A.
- . ‘Šamš al-zāhira’, uncategorized, P.C. 14.
- . ‘Šifā’ Al-Asqām’, Arabe 5669, B.N.F.
- . ‘Tahdīb Al-’Insān Min Ḥiṣāl al-Šayṭān’, uncategorized, P.C. 1.
- . ‘Ṭā’ah Al-Sultān’, uncategorized, P.C. 1.
- . ‘Tanbīh al-Šāhib ‘alā Aḥkam al-Makāsib’, 1/5/34, A.H.A.
- . ‘Wathīqa Ilā Ġamā’at Al-Muslimīn’, MARA, order of Bello, uncategorized, I.R.S.H.
- . ‘Uṣūl Al-Siyāsah’, 5/30, 5/30, A.H.A.
- Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Saġīr. ‘Kitāb Al-Ṭarā’if Wa-l-Ṭāl’id’. M.S. Arabic 6755. BNP.
- Şehid Ali Paşa. ‘Ta’līmât-ı Hikmet-Âyât-ı’, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, HO, 104a, Ö.S.A.
- Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Ibn Yunus. ‘Al-Islām Fī Kānim-Bornū Wa-Dawr al “Ulamā”’, uncategorized, P.C. 10.
- . ‘Masādir Ta’rīkh Borno Wa Kanem’, uncategorized, P.C. 10.
- . ‘Mūjaz Ta’rīkh Bilād Borno’, uncategorized, P.C. 10.
- . ‘Ta’rīkh al-Islām Wa-Hayāt al-’Arab Fī Imbaratūriyyat Kānim Barnū’, uncategorized, P.C. 10.
- Sheikh Muhammad al- Amin al-Kanemi. ‘Naṣīḥat li-l-ḥākim’, uncategorized, P.C. 10.
- Tahir bin Ibrahim. ‘Manzūmah Al-Kubrā’, C/AR1/6, N.N.A.
- Umar bin Muhammad Bukhari. ‘Tanbīh Al-’Iḥwān Fī Amār al-Sūdān’, uncategorized, P.C. 5.
- Uthman Ali Muhammad. ‘Lamaḥāt Min Tārīḥ Tšād Al-Islāmī’, uncategorized, M.B.D.A.
- Uthman dan Fodio. ‘Aġwiba Muḥarrara’, P/AR 2, 20, N.N.A.
- . ‘Amr Al-Sā’a Wa-Ašrāṭihā’, P/AR 2, 11, N.N.A.
- . ‘Bida’ Al-Shayṭānīyah’, P 7/10, N.H.R.S.
- . ‘Hidāyat al-Tullāb’, 82/128, L.U.I.
- . ‘Ihyā al-Sunna’, 10, C.A.D.
- . ‘Kitāb Al-Farq’, 82/397, L.U.I.
- . ‘Masā’il Muhimma Yaḥtāġu Ilā Ma’rifatihā Ahl Al-Sūdān’, MARA, 280, I.R.S.H.
- . ‘Naġm Al-’Iḥwān’, 82/57, L.U.I.
- . ‘Naṣā’ih Al-Umma al-Muḥamadiyya Li-Bayān al-Firāq al-Šayṭāniyya Allatī Zāharat Fī Bilādinā al-Sūdāniyya’, R 4/17, I.R.S.H.
- . ‘Tabšīr al-’Iḥwān aḥbāri al-ḥulafā fi al-Sūdān’, 82/169, L.U.I.
- . ‘Tanbīh Al-Umma’, 27, C.A.D.
- . ‘Ta’līm Al-’Iḥwān’, K 4/11, N.H.R.S.
- . ‘Waṭīqah Al-’Iḥwān’, 19, C.A.D.

Edited Primary Sources

Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn Naṣr al-Šaizari. Kitāb Nihāyat Al-Rutbah Fī Ṭalab al-Ḥisbah. Edited by Al-Baz Al-’Arīnī. Cairo: Maṭb’a laġnat al-t’alīf waltarġamat walnašr, 1946.

- Abī Zayd al-Quraṣī („Al-Uḥuwwa“). *M‘aālima Al-Qurba Fī Aḥkām al-Ḥisbah*. Edited by Reuben Levy. London: Luzac & Co, 1938.
- Abū Bakr al-Murādī al-Ḥaḍramī. *Kitāb Al-Iṣāra Ilā Adab al-Imāra*. Edited by Ridwan Al-Sayid. Beirut: Dār al-Talī‘a, 1981.
- Abū Bakr aṭ-Ṭurṭuṣhī. *Sirāj Al-Mulūk*. Edited by Ja‘far al-Bayātī. London: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1990.
- Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī. *Al-mustaṣfā Min ‘ilm al-Uṣūl*. Vol. Vol. 1. Cairo: al-Amīriya, 1904.
- . *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm Al-Dīn*. Vol. 1. Cairo: Uthmaniyya, 1933.
- . *Iqtisād Al-i‘tiqād*. Beirut: Dar alnashr dar wamaktabat alhilar.
- Abū Hilāl al-‘Askarī. *Kitāb Mā Aḥtaqam Bih Al-Ḥalifa’i ‘ilā ‘al-Qudā*. Edited by Mathieu Tillier. Paris: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 2011.
- Aḥmad Bābā at-Tinbuktī. *Ġalb Al-Ni‘ma Wa Daf’ al-Niqma Bi Muġānabat al-Wulāt al-Zalama*. Casablanca: Markaz al-turath al-thawafi al-maghribi, 2011.
- . ‘-Untitled-’. Timbuktu, M.S. 776. IHERI-AB.
- Aḥmad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī. *Al-Ġāmi‘a Liṣ‘ab al-‘iyimani*. Vol. Vol. 9. Riyadh: Maktab al-Rushd, 2003.
- Aḥmad ibn Yahyā al-Wanṣarīsī. *Al-Mi‘yār Al-Mu‘rib*. Muhammad Hajji Edition. Vol. I. Wizarat Al-Awqaf wa-lshuwuwn Al-Islamiyat lil-Mamlakat Al-Maghribia, 1981.
- . *Al-Mi‘yār Al-Mu‘rib*. Muhammad Hajji Edition. Vol. VI. Wizarat Al-Awqaf wa-lshuwuwn Al-Islamiyat lil-Mamlakat Al-Maghribia, 1981.
- Aḥmed Cevdet Paşa. [*Tarih-i Cevdet*] *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*. Edited by Mustafa Güçlükol and Bilge Bozkurt. İstanbul: İlki Kültü Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008.
- Al-Bazdawī Faḥr al-Islām. *Kaṣf Al-Asrār ‘alā Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyyah, 1997.
- Al-Faqih. *Al-Yavmiyat Al-Libiyya*. Vol. I. Bengazi: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2001.
- Al-Ghadāmisī, Mūsā ibn Muḥalhil. *Taḍkīr al-nāsī wa-talyīn al-qalb al-qāsī*. Edited by Abdaljabbar Assaghir. Ghadames, 2004.
- Al-Numayrī al-Ḥarrānī (‘Ibn Taymiyyah’). *Minhāġ As-Sunna*. Vol. Vol 1. Cairo: Būlāq edition, 1903.
- Al-Qaḍī ‘Abd Al-Ġabbār. *Al-Muġnī Fī Abwāb al-Tawḥid Wa-l-‘adl*. Cairo: Dar al-Misriyah lil-Ta’lif wa-al-Tarjamah, 1965.
- Al-Ṭa‘ālibī. *Ādāb Al-Mulūk*. Beirut: Dar al-garb al-Islami, 1990.
- Al-Tuġībī ibn ‘Abdūn. *Risālah Fī Al-Qaḍā’ Wa-l-Ḥisbah*. Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm lil-Ṭibā‘ah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī‘, 2009.
- Al-Zur‘ī l-Dimašqī („Ibn Qayyim al-Ġawziyya“). ‘Ḥisbah’. In *Critical Study and Edition of Al-Ṭuruq al-Ḥukmiyya Fī l-Siyāsa al-Šar‘iyya Ḥisbah Chapter*, edited by Abdulhamid Al-Shaiji, Vol. Vol. 2. PhD Thesis: Univerity of Wales, 2001.
- Anonym. *Bada’i al-Zuhur Fī Waqa’i al-Duhur*. İstanbul, 1931.
- ‘Abū al-Qaṣīm Ibn Riḍwān. *Al-Šuḥub al-Lamī’a Fī al-Siyāsa al-Nafī’a*. Casablanca: Dar al-tafih, 1984.
- ‘Abū Bakr al-Tilimsānī (‘Ibn Marzūq’). *Al-Musnad al-Šaḥīḥ al-Ḥasan Fī Mātar Wa Maḥāsin Mawlānā ‘abī al-Ḥasan*. Edited by Maria J. Bigera. Algeria: Al-Maktabat al-Wataniat al-Jazariyat, 1981.
- ‘Abū Ḥammū Mūsā al-Zayyānī. *Wāsiṭat Al-Sulūk Fī Siyāsāt al-Mulūk*. Edited by Amendine Lefol. Vol. 2. Paris: Ph.D. Thesis, 2019.
- ‘Abu Yūsuf. *Kitāb Al-Ḥarāġ*. Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Salafya, 1927.
- ‘Aḥmad bin Ġunayim Al-Nafrāwī. *Al-Fawakih al-Dawānī*. Vol. I. Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1995.

- ‘Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ğuwaynī. *Al-’iršād*. Edited by J. D. Luciani. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1938.
- . *Ğiyāt Al-Umam f-İltiyāt al-Zulam*. Alexandria: Dar Al-Daw’a, 1979.
- ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Mağīlī. ‘Tağ Al-Dīn Fīmā Yağib ‘alā-l-Mulk’. In *The Life and Teaching of Al-Maghili with PArticular Reference to the Saharan Jewish Community*, edited by Hassan I. Gwarzo. London: Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1972.
- . ‘Taḥlīf Fī Mā Yağib ‘alā Salaḥ Al-Muslimūn Min ’ityānāb al-Kuffār’. In *The Life and Teaching of Al-Maghili with PArticular Reference to the Saharan Jewish Community*, edited by Hassan I. Gwarzo. London: Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1972.
- . ‘Waşiyat Al-Mağīlī Li-Muḥamad Bin Ya’qūb’. edited by Hassan I. Gwarzo. London: Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1972.
- ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Bağhdādī. *Uşūl Al-Dīn*. Istanbul: Matbaat Al-davlat, 1928.
- ‘Abd Ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Askar Al-Bağdādī. *’Iršād Al-Sālik ’ila ’Aşraf Al-Masālik*. Mustafa Qasim At-Tahtawi Edition. Cairo: Al-Fadilah, 2006.
- ‘Alī Ibn al-Ğawzī. *Al-Mişbāḥ al-Mūđi’ Fī Ḥilāfāt al-Mustadī*. Edited by Ibrahim Najiyya. Baghdad: Matba’at al-awqaf, 1979.
- ‘Ayn al-Quđāt Hamadānī. *Nāmah-Ha*. Edited by Alinaqi Munzawī and Afif Usayran. Vol. 1. Tehran: Manūchihrī, 1983.
- Badr al-Dīn ibn Ğamā’a. ‘Taḥrīr Al-Aḥkām Fī Tadbīr Ahl al-Islām’. In *Islamica*, 6, edited by H. Kofler, 349–414, 1934.
- Binbaşı Abdülvahid. *II. Abdülhamid Zamanında Bir Osmanlı Binbaşının Gözünden Libya*. Edited by Süleyman Kızıltoprak and Deniz Şefaattin. İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2020.
- Binbaşı Ömer Subhi. *Trablusgarp ve Bingazi ile Büyük Sahra ve Sudan*. Edited by Şefaattin Deniz. İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2020.
- Blaquiere, E. *Letters from Mediterreanean: Containing a Civil and Political Account of Sicily, Tripoly, Tunis, and Malta*. London: Henry Colburn, 1813.
- Brunialti, Attilio. *Algeria, Tunisia e Tripolitania*. Milano: Fratelli Traves, 1881.
- Cami Baykurt. *Son Osmanlı Afrikası’nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*. Edited by Arı İnan. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009.
- . *Trablusgarp’tan Sahra-Yı Kebire Doğru*. Edited by Yüksel Kaner. İstanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2011.
- Capt. Moll. ‘Situation Economique de La Region de Zinder’. Renseignements coloniaux. Paris, 1901.
- Carbou, H. *La Region Du Tchad et Du Ouadaï*. Vol. Tome II. Paris: Leroux, 1912.
- Clapperton, Hugh. *Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa*. London, 1829.
- Cowther, Samuel Ajayi. *Journal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers Undertaken by Macgregor Laird in Connection with the British Government in 1854*. London: Church Missionary House, 1855.
- Dr. Frank. ‘Tunis: Description de Cette Régence’. In *L’Universe Pittoresque*, edited by J.J. Marcel. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1850.
- Ebü’l-Muzaffer Recep. *Trablus Ahvali*. İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası Matbaası, 1910.
- Eliseev, Alexander. *Po Belu Svetu! Puteshestviya Doktora Aleksandra Yeliseyeva*. Vol. Vol. 1. St. Petersburg: P.P. Soykina, 1898.
- “‘Essai Sur l’histoire Des Karamanlis, Pachas de Tripolitaine de 1714 à 1835”, VII (1919), Part 1’. *Revue de l’Histoire Des Colonies Françaises*, VII (1919): 177–288.
- Féraud, Laurent-Charles. *Annales Tripolitaines*. Paris: Edition Bouchene, 2005.
- Forteguerrī, B. *O Piu Pace o Piu Guerra: Memoria Riguardante Il Sistema Di Pace e Di Guerra Che La Potenza Europea Praticano Con Le Regenze Di Barberia*. Palermo, 1795.

- Fresnel, M. *Mémoire de M. Fresnel, Consul de France à Djeddah, Sur Le Waday (1848-1850)*. Edited by Fresnel. Paris, 1850.
- Gadel, Henri. 'Notes Sur Bilma et Les Oasis Environnantes'. *Coloniale, Explorations, Missions* 7 (1907): 361–86.
- Hajj Osman bin Omar. 'Hausa Chronicle of Ghat in "Aufzeichnungen Über Die Stadt Chat in Der Sahara"'. Edited by Adolf Krause. *Zeitschrift Der Gesellschaft Für Erdkunde Zu Berlin* 17 (1882): 266–338.
- Hornemann, Friedrich. *Fr. Hornemanns Tagebuch Seiner Reise von Cairo Nach Murzuck Der Hauptstadt Des Königreichs Fessan in Afrika in Den Jahren 1797 Und 1798; Aus Der Teutchen Handschrift Desselben*. Edited by Carls König. Weimar: im Verlage des Landes-Industrie-Comptroirs, 1802.
- Ḥalīl ibn Ishāq Al-Ġundī. *Al-Muḥtaṣar*. French Edition.
- Hassanein Bey. *The Lost Oasis*. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1925.
- Ibn Abī Zaid al-Qairawānī. *Al-Risāla*. Aisha Bewley Edition.
- Ibn Abī'l Diyaf. *It'haf Ahl al-Zaman Bi-Akhbar Muluk Tunis Wa 'Ahd al-Aman*. Vol. III. Tunis: Publications du Ministere de la Culture, 1963.
- Ibn Ali al-Qal'ī. *Tahdīb Ar-Ri'asa Wa Tartīb as-Siyāsa*. Edited by Ibrahim Yusuf 'Ajju. Zarqa: Maktabat al-manar, 1985.
- Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā. *Al-Faḥrī Fī al-Ādāb al-Sulṭāniyyah*. Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1966.
- Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī. *Al-Tamhīd Fī'l-Radd 'Alā'l-Mulhidat al-Mu'attala*. Edited by M.M Khudayrī & A. Abū Rīda. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1947.
- Ibn Bassam Al-Muḥtasib. *Nihāyat Al-Rutbah Fī Ṭalab al-Ḥisbah*. Edited by Husam Al-Samaraie. Baghdad: Al-Maarif, 1968.
- Ibn Ḥaldūn al-Ḥaḍramī. *The Muqaddimah : An Introduction to History*. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958.
- Ibn Mansūr ibn al-Ḥaddād. *Al-Ġawhar al-Nafīs Fī Siyāsāt al-Ra'īs*. Edited by R. Said. Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1983.
- Ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī. *Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya Wa-l-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyya*. Translated by Asadullah Yate. London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996.
- . *Tashīl Al-Nazar Wa-Ta'ḡīl al-Zafar Fī Aḥlāq al-Malik Wa Siyāsāt al-Mulk*. Beirut: Dar al-Nahda-l 'arabiyya, 1981.
- Ibn Rušd. *Bidāyat Al-Muġtahid Wa-Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid*. Halid at-Tar Edition. Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 2008.
- Ibn Simāk Al-'Amīli. *Rawnaq Al-T'abīr Fī Uqm al-Siyāsa Wa-l-Tadbīr*. Edited by S. Al-Qureshi. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ilmiyya, 2004.
- Ibn 'Abd Rabbih. *Al-'Iqd al-Farīd*. Vol. Vol. 1. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1983.
- Ibn 'Alī Tūsī ('Niẓām al-Mulk'). *Siyasat-Nama*. Translated by Hubert Darke. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Ibn 'Arafa Al-Warġamī. *Al-Muḥtaṣar Al-Fiqhi*. Abdul Rahman Muhammed Al-Khair Edition. Vol. I. Dubai: Al-Farooq Center, 2014.
- . *Al-Muḥtaṣar Al-Fiqhi*. Abdul Rahman Muhammed Al-Khair Edition. Vol. VI. Dubai: Al-Farooq Center, 2014.
- Ibn 'Āṣim Al-Ġarnāṭī. *Tuḥfat Al-Ḥukkām*. Muhammad Abdulsalam Edition. Cairo: Dar Al-Afaq Al-Arabiya, 2011.
- Ibrāhīm al-Ḥayrbaytī. *Kitāb Al-Durrah al-Gharrā' Fī Naṣīḥat al-Salāṭīn Wa-al-Quḍāt Wa-al-Umarā'*. Riyadh: Maktabat nizar mustaf'a al-baz, 1996.
- Jacobo Gräbert Hamsö. 'Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d'Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell'Italia'. *Antologia* XXVII (1827): 79–99.

- . ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia: Art II, Del Commercio Marittimo Di Tripolia:’ *Antologia* XXX (1828): 1–29.
- . ‘Prospetto Del Commercio Di Tripoli d’Africa, e Delle Sue Relazione Con Quello Dell’Italia: Art III, Dazii, Moneta, Pesi, Misure, Ec.’ *Antologia* XXXVII (1828): 75–97.
- Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī. *Al-Ashbāh Wa-l-Nazā’ir Fī l-Qawā’id al-Fiqhiyya*. Cairo: al-Maktab al-Thaqafi li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi’, 2007.
- . *Mā Rawāhu Al-Asāṭīn Fī ‘adam al-Majī’ Ilā al-Salāṭīn*. Beirut: Dar ibn Hazm, 1992.
- Julien, Emile. ‘Le Dar-Ouadai’. *Afrique Française, Bulletin Du Comité de l’Afrique Française: Renseignements Coloniaux* 14, no. 1 (1904): 51–62.
- Keikāvus Ibn Iskandar. *Qabus-Nama*. Translated by Reuben Levy. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1951.
- Koelle, S. W. *Polyglotta Africana*. London, 1854.
- Kölnische Zeitung*. 1863, 03.11.1863 edition.
- Kröger, J.H. *Sveriges Förhållanden Till Barbaresk Staterna I Afrika*. Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1856.
- Mālik ibn Anas. *Al-Muwatta’*. Aisha Bewley Edition.
- Masson, P. *Histoire Des Établissements et Du Commerce Français Dans l’Afrique Barbaresque*. Paris: Hachette, 1903.
- Mathuisieulx, H. M. *A Travers La Tripolitaine*. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1903.
- Mehmed Nehicüddin Efendi. *Tārīh-i İbn Ğalbūn Der-Beyân-ı Trablusğarb*. İstanbul: Ceride-i Havadi Matbaası, 1284.
- Mehmed Nuri and Mahmud Naci. *Trablusğarb*. İstanbul: Tercüman-ı Hakikat Matbaası, 1330.
- M.G. Merry. ‘Renseignements Commerciaux Sur Le Mouvement Des Echanges Entre La Tripolitane et Le Soudan Central’. *Bulletin du comité de l’Afrique française*. Paris, 1893.
- Mission de Ghadames, 1862*. Alger, 1963.
- Motyliniski, C. *Le Dialecte Berbère de R’edemès*. Paris, 1904.
- Muhammadu Bello. *Infāq Al-Maysūr Fī Tārīḥ Bilād al-Takrūr*. Edited by Muhammad Taqrun. Tunis: Majmua Al-Atrash, 2020.
- Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Kāfiyağī. *Saif Al-Mulūk Wa-l-Ḥukkām*. Edited by Jordan Abdulaziz. Marburg: Ph.D. Thesis, 2015.
- Muhammad Ibn Umar Al-Tunisi. *Voyage Au Ouaday*. Translated by Perron. Paris, 1851.
- Mustafa Naima. *Tārīh-i Nāimā*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1280.
- Mustafa Nuri Paşa. *Netâyicü’l-Vukû’ât*. Edited by Yılmaz Kurt. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Nachtigal, G. *Sahara Und Sudan: Ergebnisse Sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika*. Vol. Dritten Teil. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1889.
- . *Sahara Und Sudan*. Berlin, 1879.
- Naim Şükrü Bey. *Tarih Al-Sūdān*. Cairo, 1903.
- Nehicüddin Efendi. *Tarih-i İbn-i Galbun Der-Beyânı Trablusğarp*. Dersaadet [İstanbul], 1867.
- Niebuhr, Carsten. ‘Noch Etwas Über Das Innere von Afrika’. *Neues Deutsches Museum* 4 (1791): 419–30.
- Penah Efendi. *Mora İhtilâli*. Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2017.
- Petragnani, Enrico. *Il Sahara Tripolitano*. Roma: Sindacato Italiano Arti Grafiche, 1928.
- Piyade Binbaşısı Ali Rıza Muayni. *Trablusğarb Tarik Muvaslatı*. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Hariciye Nezareti: Şark İdaresi, 1334.
- Plantet, Eugène. *Correspondance Des Beys de Tunis et Des Consuls de France Avec La Cour, 1517-1830*. Vol. Vol III. Paris: Alcan, 1893.
- Prentiss, Charles. *Life of the Late General Eaton*. Massachutes: Brookfield, 1813.

- Prévo. 'Rapport: Communiqué à l'institut Français d'Afrique Noire'. In *Confins Libyens*, edited by Gentil, 1909.
- Richardson, J. *Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa Performed*. Vol. Vol. 2. London: Frank Cass, 1970.
- Rottier. 'Une Mission Au Tibesti'. *Supplement Afrique Française* 7 (1925): 425–43.
- Rousseau, A. *Anales Tunisiennes*. Tunis: Bouslama, 1985.
- Sadık El-Müeyyed. *Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat*. Edited by İ.Ö. Bostan. İstanbul: Çamlıca Yayınları, 2018.
- Saḥnūn ibn Sa'īd at-Tanūḥī. *Al-Mudawwanat Al-Kubra*. Vol. I. Beirut: Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyat, 1994.
- . *Al-Mudawwanat Al-Kubra*. Vol. II. Beirut: Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyat, 1994.
- Sami Çölgeçen. *Sahra-Yı Kebiri Nasıl Geçtim*. Edited by Ömer Hakan Özalp. İstanbul: Özgü Yayınları, 2014.
- Sayidī Muḥammad Al-Sağīr. *Al-Risāla al-Ghallāwiya Al-Musamāh*. Edited by Hamallah Salim. Beirut: Dar Al Kotob Al Ilmiyah, 2013.
- Shatev, Pavel P. *Zatochenieto vu Sakhra-Fezanu*. Sofia: Pechanitsa P. Glushkovu, 1910.
- Şihāb Al-Dīn Al-Qarāfī. *Anwār Al-Burūq Fī Anwā' Al-Furūq*. Vol. IV. Beirut: Alam Al-Kutub, 1985.
- . *Kitāb Al-Iḥkām Fī Tamyīz Al-Fatāwā 'an Al-Aḥkām Wa Taṣarrufāt Al-Qāḍī Wa Al-Imām*. Edited by Abdalfattah Abu Ghuddah. Aleppo: Maktabat Al-Matbuat Al-Islamiyah, 1967.
- Staats- und gelehrte Zeitung des Hamburgischen unpartheyischen Correspondenten*. 18, 8.05.1862 edition.
- Tully, Richard. *Narrative of a Ten Years' Residence at Tripoli in Africa*. London: H. Colburn, 1816.
- United States Office of Naval Records and Library. *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*. Vol. Vol II. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939.
- . *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*. Vol. Vol IV. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939.
- . *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*. Vol. Vol V. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939.
- . *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*. Vol. Vol I. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939.
- Viviani, D. *Viaggio Da Tripoli Di Barberia: Alle Frontiere Occidentali Dell Egito*. Edited by D.P. Della-Cella. Genova: A. Ponthenier, 1819.
- Wandel, C.F. *Danmark Og Barbareskerne*. København: Bianco Lunos, 1919.

Secondary Sources

- Abba, Alkasum, and Shuaibu Aliyu. 'Muazu Ibn Muhammad Bello, 1877-1881'. In *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, edited by Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu. Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017.
- Abba, I. 'The Establishment of Gombe Emirate, 1804-1882'. In *The Sokoto Caliphate : History and Legacies, 1804-2004*, edited by Hamidu Bobboyi and Mahmood Yakubu. Kaduna: Arewa House, 2006.
- Abda, M.J. *Tsarin Musulunica Kano*. Kano: Triumph Publishing Company, 2007.
- Abdoul-Bagui, Ouba. 'Le Lamidat de Banyo Des Origines à 1945'. In *Mémoire de Maîtrise d'histoire*. Yaoundé: Université de Yaoundé, 1996.

- Abdoullaye, Hamadjoda, and Mohammadou Eldridge, eds. *Ray Ou Rei-Bouba*. Garoua: O.N.A.R.E.S.T., Institut des sciences humaines, 1979.
- Abdullah, Tavfik, ed. *Proceedings of the International Seminar on Islamic Civilisation in the Malay World*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999.
- Abdullahi, Yusuf. 'A History of Kasar Fakai, 1850s-1996'. M.A. Thesis, Usmanu Danfodio University, 2014.
- Abdullahi, Yusuf, and Mansur Abubakar Wara. 'Slave Raiding and Slave Trade in Zuru Emirate: A Preliminary Study on the Isgogo Slave Market, C. 1700-1900'. *Dutsin-Ma Historical Review* 1, no. 1 (2018): 333–46.
- Abdulzahir, Hasan Isa. *Al-Dawat al-Islamiyya Fi Gharbi Ifrikiyya*. Cairo: Maktabat al-Iskandariyat, 1991.
- Abu Bakr bin Ahmad al-Mustafa al-Mahjubi al-Walati, and Mohamed Lemine Hamady. 'Minah Ar-Rab Al-Ghafur: Biographies Des Lettrés et Recueil Des Événements Du Takrur de La Fin Du XVIIIe Au Début XXe Siècle'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris I, 2004.
- Abubakar, Saad. 'A Survey of the Economy of the Eastern Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- . 'Relations Between Bornu and Fombina Before 1901'. In *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, edited by Bala Usman and Nur Alkali. Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983.
- Abubakar, Saleh. 'Aspects of an Urban Phenomenon: Sokoto and Its Hinterland to c. 1850'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- Adam, Abdulkadi Abukar. 'Athat Al-Ulama Fi Nashr al-Islam Wa-l-Lughat al-Arabiyat Fi Mamlakar Baqarmi al-Sheikh al-Wali Muhammad Bin Sulaiman Namudajan'. In *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, edited by Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Adam, Al-Sadik Ahmad. 'Al-Mamalik Wa Duwaylat al-Islamiyat Fi Afrikiya Mamlakat Waday Namudhajan 1615-1909m'. Khartoum, 2006.
- Adamou, Aboubacar. *Agadez et Sa Région*. Paris: Études nigériennes, 1979.
- Adamu, Danjuma. *The Jukun and Their King*. Jos: Plateau Publishing, 1982.
- Adamu, M. 'A Hausa Government in Decline; Yauri in the 19 Th Century'. M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1968.
- Adamu, M. U. 'Distribution of Trading Centers in the Central Sudan in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- . *Kano Da Makwabtanta*. Kano: Government Printing Press, 2014.
- Addo, Mahamane. 'Institutions et Imaginaire Politiques Haussa: Le Cas Du Katsina Sous La Dyanstie de Korau (XVe-XIXe Siècle)'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Provence-Aix-Marseille, 1998.
- . 'Institutions et Imaginaire Politiques Haussa: Le Cas Du Katsina Sous La Dyanstie de Korau (XVe-XIXe Siècle)'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Provence-Aix-Marseille, 1998.
- Adekunle, Julius Olufemi. 'Nigerian Borgu c. 1500-1900: An Analysis of a Segmentary Society'. Ph.D. Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1993.
- Adem, Walid Shueayb. *Tijarat Al-Raqiq Eabr Sahra' 'iyalat Tarablus al-Gharb*. Trablus: Dar Al-Walid, 2021.
- Adeyinka, Banwo. 'The Ilorin Economy in the 19th Century'. *Nigerian Journal of Economic History* 1, no. 1 (1998): 129–46.

- Ahmad, Khalifa Ibrahim Daw. *Tijarat Al-Raqiq Fi Wilayat Tarablus al-Gharb Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasi Eashr*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2014.
- Ahmad, Murtaza. 'Athar Al-Harakat al-Ilmiyat Wa-l-Thaqafiyat Fi Irsa al-Hadarat al-Islamiya Fir al-Sahil al-Afrikiya'. In *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, edited by Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Ahmadna, Sehou. *L'esclavage Dans La Sociétés Tradionelles Du Cameroon. Le Cas Du Lamidat de Ngaoundéré 1831-1961*. Yaoundé: ENS, 1996.
- Ahmadou, Sehou. *Stratégies de Résistance à l'esclavage Dans Les Lamidats de l'Adamaoua (XIXe -XXe Siècles)*. Yaoundé: ENS, 2012.
- Ahmadu, Yahya Said. *Kitab Diwan Al-Sahra al-Kubra: Al-Madrasat al-Kuntiyat Wa-l-Qasayid al-Niyrat*. Al-Jazayir: Wizarat Al-Thaqafat al-Jazayir, 2009.
- Ahmida, Ali Abdullatif. 'Introduction. Neither a Divide nor an Empty Space: The Sahara as a Bridge'. In *Bridges Across the Sahara: Social, Economic and Cultural Impact of the Trans-Sahara Trade During the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009.
- Ajilat, Muhammad al-Hadi Abu. *Al-Nashar al-Libiyu Fi al-Bahr al-Mutawasit*. Benghazi: Manshurat Jamiat al-Qaryuns, 1997.
- Akam, Motaze. 'Ngaoundéré : Discours Sociologique'. In *De l'Adamawa à l'Adamaoua*, edited by Hamadou Adama. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014.
- Akib, Muhammad Al-Said, and Omar Al-Muqadam. 'Qabayil Al-Makhzan Wa Dawruha Fi Ealaqat al-Sultant al-Uthmaniyat Bi al-Sukan Iyalat al-Jazariyat'. *Majallat Al-Bahith Fi al-Ulum al-Insaniyat Wa-l-Ijtimaiyat* 9, no. 2 (2018): 105–18.
- Akinwumi, Abereoran. *Shape by Destiny; A Biography of Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi, Kuvyo 11, the Aku- Uka of Wukari*. Ilorin: UniIlorin Alumni Association, 1996.
- Akyıldız, Ali. *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform (1836-1856)*.
- Alabir, Aliyu Sakariyau, and Ibrahim Abdul Ganiya Jawondo. 'Gobir Agency and Identity in the Mosaic of Ilorin Emirate since 1823'. Sokoto, 2018.
- Al-Abqari, Muhammd al-Amin. 'Al-Islamiyat Fi Mamlakat Wa Baqarami'. Ph.D. Thesis, Africa International Univerisity, 2003.
- Al-Afif, Al-Mukhtar Ithman. *Madinat Sukna: Dirasat Tarikhiat Lil-Awdae al-Siyasat Wa-l-Iqtisadiat Wa-l-Ijtimaeyat Wa-l-Ilmiat (1835-1911)*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2002.
- Al-Alam, Huda Abdulrahman. 'Al-Nakil Wa Tamuruha Fi Mutasarifiyat Fazan Bayn al-Darayib al-Uthmaniyat Wa-l-Iqtisad al-Harfi Wa-l-Mathur al-Ijtimayi Min Khilal Eayinat Wathayiqiyat Jadida (1842-1875m)'. *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 22, no. 1 (2023): 104–22.
- . 'Namadhij Min Taqarir Al-Wakil al-Tunisi Ahmad Al-Mahdawi Wa Murasalatih Hawl al-Awda al-Idariyat Wa-l-Iqtisadiyat Wa-l-Tariqat al-Tunisiyat Bi Benghazi'. *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 21, no. 2 (2022): 1–17.
- Al-Alusi, Humam Hashim. *Al-Tawariq al-Shaib Wa-l-Qadhiyah Tarikhana Mansiyana, Wa Hadhiran Maqhuran, Wa Mustaqbalan Majhulan*. Rabat: Dar Abi Riqraq li-l-Ribayat wa-l-Nashr, 2010.
- Al-Anf, Recep Nasir. *Madinat Murzuq Wa-Tijarat al-Qawafil al-Sahrawiyat Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasie Eashr, Dirasat Fi al-Tarikh al-Siyasi Wa-l-Iqtisadi*. Al-Markaz al-wataniya li-lmahfuzat wa-l-dirasat, 1998.
- Al-Ansari, Ahmad, and Sadayiq Al-Ansari. *Al-Shier al-Ansari Wa Tarikha Fi Marahilih al-Thalat*. Riyad, 2008.

- Al-Arabi, Ismael. *Al-Sahra al-Kabir Wa Shawatuha*. Algier: Muwassasat al-Vataniyya li-l-Kitab, 1983.
- Alassane, Hassimi. 'Sansan Hausa: Prosperity and Decline of an Important Market in Western Niger in the 19th Century'. *Sokoto Journal of History* 10 (2021): 35–42.
- Al-Birbar, Aqil Muhammad. *Dirasat Fi Tarikh Libiya Al-Hadithi*. Malta: Mansurat ELGA, 1996.
- Al-Cafal, Suad Muhammad. *Al-Alakat al-Libyye – al-Tunisiyye Hilal al-Ahdi al-Osmani al-Sana (1835-1911)*. Trablus, 2006.
- Al-Dajjani, Ahmad Sidqi. *Libiyya Qabl Al-'ihtilal al-Itali*. Trablus: Al-Matbaat al-Faniyat al-Haditha, 1971.
- Al-Dhikel, Hosan Ali. 'Al-Rawabit al-Tarikhiyat Bayn 'iqlim Fazan Wa Dawlat Kanem Barnu 656-957 h., 1258-1550 m.' *Jami'at Sabha Li-l-'ulum al-'insaniyat Majalatan* 21, no. 2 (2022): 188–98.
- Al-Dhuwaybi, Khalifa Muhammad. *Al-Awdea al-Askariyat Fi Tarablus al-Gharb Qubayl al-Ihtilal al-Itali*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasat al-tarikhiyat, 1999.
- Al-Dik, Mahmoud Ahmad. 'Al-Atmea al-Siyasiyat Wa-l-Iqtisadiyat al-Faransiyat Fi Madina Ghadamis Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasi Eashr'. In *Al-Ilmiyat al-Tarikhiyat Hawl Tarikh Ghadamis Min Khilal al-Rahalat Wa-l-Muarikhina*, Ed. Nuraddin Mustafa Al-Thani, edited by Nuraddin Mustafa Al-Thani. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2003.
- Al-Gashat, Muhammad Said. *Al-Tawarik: Arab al-Sahra al-Kabir*. Beirut: Dar Al-Arabiyyat lil-Mevsuwat, 2008.
- Al-Hajj, Muhammad. 'The Meaning of the Sokoto Jihad'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- Al-Hassan, Habib. *Zaman Hausawa, Bugu Na Biyu*. Kano: Islamic Publications Bureau, 1988.
- Al-Huseyn, Al-Nani Vuld. *Sahra Al-Mülesimin*. Bengazi: Dar Al-Medari Al-Islami, 2007.
- Ali, Halima Ben, and Safia Abdoui. 'Manajim Al-Milih Fi al-Sahra Wa Dawruha Fi Aizdihar Rijarat al-Hawadir'. M.A. Thesis, Jamiat Adrar, 2020.
- Ali, Mustafa. *Bornu Fi Eahd Al-Usrat al-Kawmiyati*. Cairo: Dar al-Ulum li-l-Tibaeat wa-l-Nashr, 1984.
- Al-Iluri, Adam Abdullah. *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya Wa-l-Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi al-Fulani al-Mujahid al-Ilsamiyu al-Akbar Bi Gharb Ifrikiya Wa-l-Hadi al-Eala Li-l-Shahid Ahmad Billu*. Edited by Abdalhafiz Dusu. Alexandria: Maktabat al-Iskandariyat, 2014.
- . *Al-Islam Fi Nijariya*. Cairo: Dar Al-Kitab al-Misri, 2014.
- . *Lamahat Al-Ballur Fi Mashahir Ulama Ilurin*. Cairo: Al-Maktabah Al-Arabiyyah, 1982.
- Al-Imam, R. *Siyasat Hammuda Basha Fi Tunis*. Tunis: Manshurat al-Jami'a al-Tunisiyya, 1980.
- Al-Jadal, Al-Mukhtar. *Tijarat Al-Kawafil al-Sahra al-Libyya, Wizarat Al-Thaqafat Wa-l-Hadarat*. Trablus: Culture & Civilization Ministry of Libya, 2013.
- Alkali, Nur. 'Economic Factors in the History of Bornu Under the Seifuwa'. In *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, edited by Bala Usman and Nur Alkali. Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983.
- . 'Kanem-Bornu Under Sayfawa'. Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1978.
- . 'The Political System and Administrative Structure of Bornu under Seifuwa Mais'. In *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno*, edited by Usman Bala. Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983.
- . 'The Political System and Administrative Structure of Bornu under the Seifuwa Mais'. In *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, edited by Bala Usman and Nur Alkali. Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983.
- Al-Karani, Abdulfaz. *Al-Hafz Jalal Al-Din Al-Suyuti*. Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr, 1990.

- Al-Miftah, Ali Ahmad. 'Ruyat Britaniya Min Khilal Qunsuliha Wa-l-Dawlat al-Uthmaniyyat Min al-Taharukat al-Faransiyat Fi al-Sahra al-Kubra (1850-1881m)'. *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 20, no. 3 (2021): 153–63.
- Al-Mili, Muhammad al-Hilali. *Tarih Al-Cezayir Fi-l-Kadim Wa-l-Hadis*. Maktab al-Nahdatil al-Cezayirriye, 1938.
- Al-Misrati, Ali Mustapha. *Siḥafat Libiyya Fi Nisfi Karn*. Beirut: Dar Al-Kashif, 1960.
- Al-Naib al-Ansari. *Kitab Al-Manhal al-'adhb Fi Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*. Trablus: Maktab al-Farjani, 2008.
- Al-Naqra, Aknara Walad. *Al-Tawariq: Min al-Huwiyyat Ila al-Qadiya*. Nouakchott: Al-Markaz al-Muritaniyu li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Buhuth Al-Astiratjiya, 2014.
- Al-Qadi, Abu Bakr Othman. *Fazan Wamarakizuha Al-Hadariat 'abr al-'ushr*. Sebha: markaz dirasat wabhadh alshra'i, 1989.
- Al-Qalqashandi, Ahmad bin Ali. *Subh Al-Asha Fi Sana'yi al-Insha'a*. Vol. Volume 5. Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-'ilmiya, 1987.
- Al-Qasar, Muhammad Saeed. *Al-Tawariq - 'arab al-Sahara al-Kubra*. Markaz dirasat wa-ibhath ashawn al-sahara, 1989.
- Al-Qurashi, Fatima al-Zahra. 'Al-Tawasul al-Thaqafi Wa-l-Iqtisadi Bayn Mamlakat Kanim Birnu Wa Misr Khilal al-Fatrat Ma Bayn al-Qarnayn al-Saadis Eashr Wa-l-Thaasie Eashr al-Miladin'. M.A. Thesis, Jamiat al-Malik Faysal, 2019.
- Al-Shaybani, Abubakr Salim, and Khalid Misbah Abdullah. 'Hijrat Al-Libiyin Ila al-Duwal al-Mujawirat Fi al-Easr al-Hadith (1842-1930m)'. *Al-Jamiat Al-Libiyat Li-Ulum Al-Tarbiya* 4 (2022): 251–66.
- Al-Shaybani, Abubakr Salim Al-Mahdi. 'Madinat Murzuq Wa Dawruha Fi Tijarat Al-'abur al-Sahrawiyat Khilal al-Qarn al-Taasi Eashar'. *Jami'at Sabha Li-l-'ulum al-'insaniyat Majalatan* 20, no. 3 (2021): 127–42.
- Al-Suwri, Saladdin Hasan, and Hamid Said Ali. *Buhuth Wa Dirasat Fi Al-Tarikh al-Libiyu Mundh Aqdam al-Easr Hata Sanat 1911m*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2011.
- Al-Suwriyu, Salah Hasan. *Al-'alaqat Bayn Libiyya Wa Shu'ab al-Sahara' Fi al-Qarn al-Taasie Eashar Wa 'awayil al-Qarn al-Eashrin Min Kilal Ba'd al-Wathayiq al-'uthmaniyyati, 'Amal Nadwat al-Tawasul al-Thaqafi Wa-l-Ijtimayi Bayn al-Aqtar al-Afrikiyat 'Ala Janibay al-Sahara*. Trablus: Kuliyat Al-D'awat Al-Islamiyyat, 1998.
- Al-Tawil, Muhammad Sayid. *Al-Sirae al-Duwliyu Eala Madinat Ghadamis Khilal al-Nisf al-Thaani Min al-Qarn al-Tasie Eashr Wa Ineykasatih Eala Tijaritiha, in Al-Ilmiyyat al-Tarkhiyat Hawl Tarikh Ghadamis*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2003.
- . 'Awjilat Fi Eahd Yusuf Al-Qaramanli, 1795-1832'. In *Awjilat Bayn Am-Madi al-Hadr, 1550-1951m*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2007.
- Al-Tijani, Makki Abdullah. *Tarikh Uduhuli Al-Islam Wa-l-Tariqa al-Tijaniyya Fi Tshad*. Khaftoum: Matba' Al-Tamdun, 1999.
- Al-Tuwir, Muhammad Ahmad. *Al-Ziraat Fi Barigat Fi al-'ahd al-Othmani al-Thaani*. Trablus: Al-Dar al-Jumhuriyyat, 1991.
- . 'Thawrat 'Abd Al-Jalil Saif Al-Nasr Dida al-Hukm al-'Uthmaniyy Fi Libiya, 1831-1842'. 1991.
- Al-Zavi. *Al-Mu'cam al-Buldani al-Libiyya*. Tablus: Maktab al-Nur, 1968.
- Al-Zawi, Al-Tahir. *Walayat Tarabulus*. Beyrut: Dar al-Fath, 1970.
- Al-Zubayri, Al-Arabi. *Al-Tijarat al-Kharijiyyat Li-Sharq al-Jazayir*. Al-Jazayir: Al-sharqiyyat al-wataniyyat li-linashr wa-l-tawziyi, 1972.

- Al-Zubayri, Muhammad al-Arabi. *Al-Tijarat al-Kharijat Lilsharq al-Jazayiri 1792m-1830m*. Al-jazair: al-Sharikat al-wataniyat lilnashr wa-l-tawzi', 1972.
- Amahin, Al-Shawi Al-Lallah Al-Bakkay. *Al-Tawariq Eabr al-Easur*. Edited by Islah Muhammad Al-Bukhari Hamuda. Benghazi, 2007.
- Aribidesi, Usman. *The Yoruba from Prehistory to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Artuç, Nevzat. *İttihat ve Terakki'nin İttihad-ı İslam Siyaseti Çerçevesinde İttihatçı-Senusi İlişkileri (1908-1918)*. İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2013.
- Ashafa, A.M. 'Afro-European Imperialism and the Making of a New Bornu'. In *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, edited by T. El-Miskin, Y. Mukhtar, K. Mohammed, and A.G. Shettima, Vol. Vol I. Ibadan: Krafts Book Limited, 2013.
- Atamer, Hamdi. 'Zenci Ticaretinin Yasaklanması'. *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 3 (1967): 23–29.
- Augi, A.R. 'The Gobir Factor in the Social and Political History of the Rima Basin, c. 1650-1806'. Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1984.
- Awam, Al-Tayyib Ali. 'Al-'alaqa Bin al-'ulama Wa-l-Sultan Fi Mamlaka Waday'. Ph.D. Thesis, Jamiat al-Malik Faysal bi Tshad, 2001.
- Awuda, Afif Muhammad. 'Afif Muhammad Awuda Athat Al-Lughat al-Arabiyyat Eala al-Mamalik Wa-l-Saltanat Fi Wasat Afrikiya'. In *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, edited by Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Ayazko, Sidqi Ali. *Al-Islam Wa-l-Amazigh*. Rabat: Al-Huya, 2002.
- Ayub, Muhammad Salih. 'Al-Talim al-Islamiyyu Fir Kanam Birnu Min Khilal al-Maharim al-Sultaniya (1086-1806m)'. In *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, edited by Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Babikir, Arbab Djama. *L'Empire de Rabeh*. Paris: Dervy, 1950.
- Bah, Thierno Mouctar. 'Le Facteur Peul et Les Relations Inter-Ethniques Dans l'Adamaoua Au XIXe Siècle'. In *Peuples et Cultures de l'Adamaoua (Cameroun)*. Ngaoundéré: Ngaoundéré-Anthropos, 1993.
- Balogun, S.A. 'The Place of Argungu in the Gwandu History'. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 7, no. 3 (1974): 403–15.
- . 'The Position of Gwandu in the Sokoto Caliphate'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- Bari, Fadil Ali, and Said Ibrahim Kiraydiye. *Al-Muslimin Fi Gharbi Ifriqiyya*. Lubnan: Dar Al-Kitab al-Ilmiyye, 2007.
- Barkindo, Bawuro. 'The Origin and History of the Sultanate of Mandara to 1902'. Ph.D. Thesis, Abdullahi Bello University, 1980.
- Barry, Modi Sory. *Hirdè Tarikha è Taali Fuuta Djaloo : La Création d'un État Théocratique*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2021.
- Bassoro, Ahmadu, and Eldridge Mohammadou, eds. *Histoire de Garoua: Cité Peul Du XIXe Siècle*. Yaoundé: O.N.A.R.E.S.T., Institut des sciences humaines, 1977.
- Basyuni, Mustafa. *Bornu Fi Eahd Al-Usrat al-Kanemiyyat, 1814-1969*. Riyadh: Dar Al-Ulum li-l-Tibiyat wa-l-Nashri, 1984.
- Batran, Abdulaziz. 'A Contribution to the Biography of Shaikh Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd-Al-Karīm Ibn Muḥammad ('Umar-A 'Mar) Al-Maghīlī, Al-Tilimsānī'. *The Journal of African History* 14, no. 3 (1973): 381–94.
- . 'Sidi Al-Mukhtar al-Kunti and the Recrudescence of Islam in the Western Sahara and the Middle Niger c. 1750-1811'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1971.

- Bay, Doğançan. 'Mısır'ın Modernleşme Sürecinde Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşânın Reformlarının Yeri'. *Uluslararası Toplumsal Bilimler Dergisi* 7, no. 2 (2023): 127–41.
- Bayat, Fazil, and Amna Meddeb, eds. *Islamic History and Civilization in the Central African Region*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Baz Al-Lubnani, Salim Rustum. *Şarh Al-Mağallah*. 3. Beirut: Dar Ihya Al-Arabi, 1984.
- Bazama, Muhammad Mustafa. *Al-Diblumasiyat al-Libiyat Fi al-Qarn al-Uthamin Eashr: Abd Al-Rahman Agha (1720-1792)*. Benghazi: Maktabat Qurina li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawziya.
- Bello. *Tarihin Zuriyar Galadima Ahmadu*. Zaria, 2017.
- Bello, Abubakar Zakari. 'History of Islam in the Middle Benue Region: A Case Study of Wukari Since C. 1848-1960'. Ph.D. Thesis, Bayero University, 2000.
- Bello, Adnan Bawa. *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*. Kano: Bayero University Press, 2019.
- . *Tarihin Fulani a Kasar Hausa*. Kano: Bayero University Press, 2019.
- Benasheikh, Abdulkadir. 'The 19th Century Galadimas of Bornu'. In *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, edited by Bala Usman and Nur Alkali. Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983.
- . 'The Revenue System of the Government of Bornu in the Nineteenth Century'. In *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, edited by Bala Usman and Nur Alkali. Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983.
- Bernard, A., and N. Lacroix. *La Pénétration Saharienne (1830-1906)*. Algier, 1906.
- Beydilli, Kemal. 'Kabakçı İsyanı Akabinde Hazırlanan Hüccet-i Şer'yye'. *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 4 (2001): 33–48.
- Bieayyu, Abdullah. *Dirasat Fi Al-Tarikh al-Libiyya*. Alexandria, 1953.
- Bin Ismail, Umar Ali. 'Al-Tasavvuru al-Siyasi wa-l-Ijtimai Fi Libiyi Min 1835 Ila 1882'. Ph.D. Thesis, Jamiat Ain Shams, 1972.
- Bobboyi, Hamidu. 'Relations of the Bornu Ulama With the Sayfawa Rulers: The Role of the Mahrams'. *Sudanic Africa: A Journal of Historical Sources* IV (1993): 175–204.
- . 'The 'Ulama of Bornu: A Study of Relations Between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808'. Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University, 1992.
- Bohas, Georger, Alfa Mamadou Lélouma, Abderrahim Sagner, Bernard Salvaing, and Ahyaf Sinnu, eds. *Islam et Bonne Gouvernance Au XIXe Siècle Dans Les Sources Arabes Du Fouta-Djalon*. Paris: Geuthner, 2018.
- Bonfiglioli, Angelo Maliki. *DuDal. Histoire de Famille et Histoire de Troupeau Chez Un Groupe de WoDaaBe Du Niger*. Paris: Edition de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1988.
- Boubaker, Sadok. 'Négoce et Enrichissement Individuel à Tunis Du XVIIe Siècle Au Début Du XIXe Siècle'. *Revue d'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 50, no. 4 (2003): 29–62.
- Boueaziz, Yahya. *Thawrat Al-Jazayir Fi al-Qarnayn al-Taasie Eashar Wa-l-Eishrin*. Al-Jazayir: Dar al-basayir, 2011.
- Bugaje, Usman Muhammad. 'A Tradition of Tajdeed in the Western Bilad Al-Sudan: A Study of Genesis, Development and Patterns of Islamic Revivalism in the REgion, 900-1900 AD'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Khartoum, 1991.
- Bugaje, Usman Muhammad, and Ibrahim M. Jumare. 'Shehu Usman Danfodio 1804-1817: Founder of the Sokoto Caliphate'. In *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, edited by Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu. Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017.
- Bukhari, Wazi Junaidu. *Dabt Al-Multaqitat Akhbar al-Muftarqat Fi al-Muallifat*. NNPC, 1959.
- Bunza, Mukhtar Umar. 'Change of the Guards: Vergaries in Dosso-Zarma Raltions with Kebbi Kingdom and Gwandu Emirate, 1820-1880s'. In *Relations between Dosso, Kebbi, and*

- Sokoto: Spaces, Societies, States, Cultures, Economy & Politics*, edited by A. Bako and B.A. Gado. Niamey: Abdulmumin University Press, 2016.
- . *Gwandu Emirate: The Domain of Abdullahi Fodiyo, since 1805*. Kaduna: GEDA, 2016.
- . ‘The Significance of the Doctrinal Disputations between Muhammad Al-Amin al-Kanemi and the Leadership of the Sokoto Caliphate, 1804-1817’. In *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, edited by T. El-Miskin, Y. Mukhtar, K. Mohammed, and A.G. Shettima, Vol. Vol 1. Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013.
- Çaksu, Ali, and Radik Mukhammetshin, eds. *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilization in Volga-Ural Region*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2004.
- Çaycı, Abdurrahman. *Büyük Sahara’da Türk-Fransız Rekabeti (1858-1911)*. Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1970.
- Çelik, Yüksel. ‘Nizâm-ı Cedîd’in Niteliği ve III. Selim ile I I. Mahmud Devri Askerî Reformlarına Dair Tespitler (1789-1839)’. In *Nizâm-ı Kadîm’den Nizâm-ı Cedîd’e: III. Selim ve Dönemi*, 565–90. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2010.
- Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale. *Maroua et Pette*. Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1970.
- . *Maroua et Pette*. Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1970.
- . *Tradition Historiques Des Katsinaawaa*. Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1970.
- Chafik, Chehata. *Etudes de Droit Musulman*. Vol. I. Paris: PUF, 1971.
- Chater. *Dépendance et Mutations Précoloniales: La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857*. Tunis: Publications de L’universite de Dunis, 1984.
- Chatra, Khayreddine Youssef. ‘Al-Astirajiyat al-Kuluniyalıyat al-Faransiyat Fi Ikhda al-Sahra al-Jazariyat’. *Majallat Al-Adab* 138 (2021): 81–118.
- Cimino, G. ‘La Zecca Di Tripoli d’Occidente Sotto Il Dominio Degli Ottomani’. In *Notiziario Archeologico Del Ministero Delle Colonie*, Vol. III. Roma: Alfieri e Lacroix, 1923.
- Çınar, Ali Osman. ‘Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emîn Behîc’in Sevânihü’l-Levâiyih’i ve Değerlendirmesi.’ M.A. Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 1992.
- Coller, I. ‘“Coller, I., (2016), Ottomans on the Move: Hassuna D’Ghies and the “New Ottomanism” of the 1830s’’. In *Mediterranean Diasporas: Politics and Ideas in the Long 19th Century*, edited by M. Isabella and C. Zanou. London: Bloomsbury, 2016.
- Dalailou, Hamoua. ‘Ardo Issa: Batisseur Du Lamidat de Ngaoundere (1854-1878)’. In *Acteurs de l’histoire Au Nord-Cameroon*. Ngaoundere-Anthropos 1. Ngaoundéré: Université de Ngaoundéré, 1998.
- Dalhatu, Bashir. *Zuriyar Malam Ibrahim Tsoho Dake Kakaki Birnin Zaria*. Zaria: Woodpecker Communication Service, 2001.
- Dalhatu, Usman. *Daular Gwandu Da Tarihin Sarakunan Da Suka Mulke Ta Zuwa Yanzu*. Zaria: Woodpecker Communication Service, 2016.
- Dallal, Ahmad. ‘The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750–1850’. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 113, no. 3: 341–59.
- Danda, Mahamadou. *Niger: Le Cas de Damagaram*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012.
- Daniel, Abwa. ‘Le Glaive et Le Coran : Deux Modes de Penetration de l’islam Au Cameroon Au XIX^{em} Siecle’. In *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l’ouest*, edited by Samba Dieng. Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999.
- Daniya, Usman Abubakar. ‘Abdulrahman Ibn Abubkar Atiku, 1891-1902’. In *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, edited by Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu. Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017.
- . ‘Umar Ibn Aliyu Babba, 1881-1891’. In *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, edited by Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu. Kaduna: Ahmadu

- Bello University Press, 2017.
- Danmole, Hakeem Olumide. 'The Frontier Emirate: A History of Islam in Ilorin'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1980.
- . 'The Frontier Emirate. A History of Islam in Ilorin'. Ph.D. Thesis, Birmingham University, 1980.
- Dansonka, Mordakai Sule. 'Intergroup Relations in Wukari and Donga Areas, 1900-1922: A Case Study of the Jukun And Chamba Peoples'. Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 2016.
- De Agostini. *Le Popolazioni Della Cirenica*. Bengasi: Governo della Cirenica, 1923.
- Diaf, Najmi Rajab. *Madinat Ghat Wa Tijarat Al-Qawafil al-Sahrawiyat Khilal al-Qarn al-Taasie Eashar*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 1999.
- Dieng, Samba, ed. *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999.
- Djardaye, Malam Isofou. 'Sultan Timimoune Souleymane: Builder of the City of Zinder'. *Sokoto Journal of History* 12 (2023): 24–34.
- Duymus, Kerem. 'Afroglobale Geschichte Der Gegenwart (Beiträge Zur Theorie Der Globalgeschichte)'. Session Report. Historiker Tag. Leipzig: H-Soz-Kult, 2023.
- . 'Contribution au rôle de la traite des esclaves dans le Sahara tripolitain au XIX^e siècle : nouvelles découvertes en Libye et en Turquie', *Revue d'Histoire Méditerranéenne* 6, no.2 (2024): 195–208.
- . 'Politico-Theological Debates in Ghadames between the 1770s and the 1850s from a Global Perspective'. *Afriques : Débats, Méthodes Et Terrains D'histoire* 15 (2024): 1–17.
- . 'Tadbir as Marine Diplomacy: Ottoman Foreign Jurisdiction in Practice and the Debate of Piracy in Case of Tripoli between 1790s-1835'. *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 23, no. 2 (2024): 84–90.
- . 'The Political Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate after the 1850s: The Triple System and Its Dynamics'. M.A. Thesis, Universität Bayreuth, 2021.
- Dziekan, Marek M. 'Wahhabi Propaganda in Morocco during the Reign of Sultan Sulayman (1792-1822) as Reflected in the Sources of His Era'. Ph.D. Thesis, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2018.
- Egbefo, Dawood Omolumen. 'The Nupe Invasion of Esanland: An Assessment of Its Socio-Political Impact on the People, 1885-1897'. *Haskenmu* 1 (2008): 95–107.
- Elawa, Nathan Irmia. 'Jukun History and Society'. In *Understanding Religious Change in Africa and Europe: Crossing Latitudes*. Springer, 2020.
- El-Hesnawi, Habib. *Fezzan under the Rule of the Awlad Muhammad*. Sebha, 1990.
- Elridge, Muhammadou. *Le Royaume Du Wandai Ou Mandara Au XIX^e Siecle*. Tokyo: ILCAA, 1982.
- Emecen, Feridun. 'Osmanlı Hanedanına Alternatif Arayışlar Üzerine Bazı Örnekler ve Mülâhazalar'. *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6 (2001): 63–76.
- Eren, Halit, ed. *Buhuth Al-Nadwat al-Dawliyat Hawl Tarikh al-Hadarat al-Islamiyat Fi Sharq Ifriqiya*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2018.
- , ed. *History and Governance of Awqaf in South and Southeast Asia: Colonial Interventions and Modern States*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2019.
- , ed. *History of The Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2001.
- , ed. *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in South Asia*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2013.
- Erkal, Mehmet. 'İslam Ansiklopedisi'. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı.
<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/>.
- Ersoy, Osman. *Türkiye'ye Matbaanın Girişi ve İlk Basılan Eserler*. Ankara: Güven Basımevi, 1959.

- Esenbel, Selçuk, and Chiharu Inbana. *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent*. Istanbul: Bogaziçi University Press, 2003.
- Ezonbi, Boumo. 'Factoring Inter-Group Relations in the Lower Benue Valley to circa 1900. A.D'. *African Journal of Arts and Cultural Studies* 4, no. 2 (2011): 1–6.
- Fagachi, Abbas Muhammad. *Tarihin Sarautu Da Al'adu Na Masarautar Zazzau*. Zaria: Sankore Educational Publisher, 2014.
- Falola, Toyin, and Dare Oguntomisin. *The Military in 19th Century Yoruba Politics*. Ife: University of Ife Press, 1984.
- Farag, Ahmad Ragib. 'Madinat Ghat Al-Libiyat Bayn al-Uthma al-Faransiyat Wa-l-Saytarat al-Uthmaniyat 1860-1900m'. *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 20, no. 3 (2021): 84–94.
- Faraj, Ahmad Rajab. 'Madinat Ghat Al-Libiyat Bayn al-Eatmea al-Faransiyat Wa-l-Sultanat al-Uthmaniyat'. *Jamiat Sabiha Li-l-Ulum al-Insaniyat Majallatan* 20, no. 3 (2021): 84–94.
- Fari, A.A. 'The Jukun Empire: A Reconsideration'. Maiduguri, 1984.
- Fatimah Debbo. 'Lere Vassal State of Zazzau Emirate, c. 1804-1903'. M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 2012.
- Fika, M. *The Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule, 1882–1940*. Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Filaba, Milafiya Aruwa. 'A History of Karu, Kurape and Kurudu Kingdoms: A Study of Economic, Social, and Political Change Among Gbayi of Central Nigeria in the 18th and 19th Centuries'. M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1994.
- Flint, J. E. *Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria*. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Folayan, Kola. *Tripoli During the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1979.
- Fuchs, Peter. *Die Völker Der Südost-Sahara: Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi*. Wien, 1961.
- Fulola, Toyin. 'The Impact of the Nineteenth-Century Sokoto Jihad in Yorubaland'. In *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, edited by A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandi. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990.
- Gado, B.A. *Le Zarmatarey: Contribution a l'histoire Des Populations d'entre Niger et Dallol Mawri*. Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1980.
- Gardel, G. *Les Touareg Ajjer*. Paris, 1961.
- Gazali, Kalli. 'Kanuri in Diaspora: The Contributions of Ulama of Kanem-Borno to Islamic Education in Nupe and Yorubaland'. Ph.D. Thesis, Bayero University, 2021.
- . 'The Kanuri Diaspora and Its Islamic Intellectual Impact Outside Kanem-Bornu'. In *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, edited by T. El-Miskin, Y. Mukhtar, K. Mohammed, and A.G. Shettima, Vol. Vol 1. Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013.
- Gheriyani, Shaban Muhammad. 'Dawr Al-Yahud Fi al-Tijarat Eabr al-Sahra Khilal al-Easr al-Islami Bayn al-Iddiea Wa-l-Haqiqat al-Tarkhiya'. *Majallat Al-Dirasat al-Insaniyat Wa-l-Adabiyat* 28, no. 3 (2023): 603–52.
- Gökyay, Orhan Şaik. 'Katip Çelebi: Hayatı, Şahsiyeti, Eserleri'. In *Katip Çelebi: Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında İnceleme*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991.
- Gusau, Saidu Muhammad. *Fulanin Zamfara-Katsinar Laka Da Tasirinsu a Daular Sakkwato*. Kano: Research and Publishing Century, 2015.
- Gusau, Sule Ahmed. 'Economic Ideas of Shehu Usman Dan Fodiyo'. *Journal of Muslim Minorities* 10, no. 1 (1989): 139–51.
- Hacısalihoglu, Mehmed. *Trabzon'da Ayanlık Mücadelesi: Hacısalihzâde Hasan Ağa, Ömer Ağa ve Büyük Ali Ağa (1737-1844)*. Trabzon: Serander Yayınları, 2014.

- Hamani, Djibo. 'Adar, the Touareg & Sokoto: Relations of Sokoto with the Hausa and Touareg during the 19th Century'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- . *L'Adar Précolonial (Republic Du Niger) - Contribution à l'étude de l'histoire Des Etats Hausa*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006.
- . *Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar - Au Carrefour Du Soudan et de La Berbérie*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Hamid, Al-Shareef. 'Tijarat 'iqlim Fazan Eabr al-Saharayi, Khilal Aleasur al-Kilasikiya'. *Jami'at Sabha Li-l-'ulum al-'insaniyat Majalatan* 20, no. 3 (2021): 230–37.
- Hamman, H. 'Dynastic Conflicts and Political Instability in Muri Emirate, c. 1833-1898'. In *The Sokoto Caliphate : History and Legacies, 1804-2004*, edited by Hamidu Bobboyi and Mahmood Yakubu. Kaduna: Arewa House, 2006.
- Hamman, Mauhmoud. *The Middle Benue Region and the Sokoto Jihad 1812 – 1869: The Impact of Establishment of the Emirate of Muri*. Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2007.
- Hammawa, Ahmed, and Audu Ali. 'Kanem-Bornu Scholars and the Propagation of Islamic Education in Fombina'. In *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, edited by T. El-Miskin, Y. Mukhtar, K. Mohammed, and A.G. Shettima, Vol. Vol 2. Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013.
- Hannoum, Abdelmajid. *The Invention of the Maghreb Between Africa and the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Harms, Robert. *River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin in the Era of the Slave and Ivory Trade, 1500-1891*. Yale: Yale University Press, 1981.
- Haroon, Mahomed, and Essop Dangor, eds. *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in Southern Africa*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2009.
- Harun, Abubakr. *Al-Sahl Wa-l-Muysir Fi Taealum al-Lughat al-Amazighiya: Muhadatha Bi Lahjat Ghadamis*. Trablus: Al-Farjani, 2013.
- Hasan, Alhaji, and Shuaibu Naibi. *A Chorinicle of Abuja*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1952.
- Hasan, Hasan Ibrahim. *Intishar Al-Islam Fi al-Qarat al-Ifriqiyat*. Vol. Vol 4. Cairo: Maktabat Al-Nahdat Al-Misriyat, 2000.
- Hernandez, Rebecca. *The Legal Thought of Jalal Al-Din al-Suyuti: Authority and Legacy*. Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2017.
- Hiskett, Melvin. 'An Islamic Tradition of Reform in the Western Sudan'. *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies* Vol 25, no. 1/3 (1962): 577–96.
- Historical Committee of Tiber. *Gubbaru: Kammalallen Tarhin Gobirawa*. Tibir, 1975.
- Hume, L.J. "Hume, L. J., (1980), "Preparations for Civil War in Tripoli in the 1820s: Ali Karamanli," "Hassuna D'Ghies and Jeremy Bentham'. *Bentham*", *The Journal of African History* 21, no. 3 (1980): 311–22.
- Hunwick, J. O. 'A New Source for the Biography of Aḥmad Bābā Al-Tinbukṭī (1556-1627)'. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 27, no. 3 (1964): 568–93.
- . 'African Perspectives'. *C.U.P.*, 1970, 7–33.
- . 'Mukhtar Ibn Ahmad, Al-'. In *Holy People of the World: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia*. California: ABC-CLIO, 2004.
- . 'Notes on a Late Fifteenth-Century Document Concerning 'al-Takrūr'. In *African Perspectives: Papers in the History, Politics and Economics of Africa Presented to Thomas Hodgkin*, edited by C. Allen and R.W. Johnson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

- . ‘Towards a History of Islamic Thought in West Africa down to the Nineteenth Century’. In *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l’ouest*, edited by Samba Dieng. Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999.
- Husseyin, Sulaiman Ahmad. ‘Tijara Al-Mudun Wa-l-Wahat al-Libiyyat Hilal al-Qarnayn al-Thaamin Eashar Wa-l-Taasie Eashar al-Miladiyin’. M.A. Thesis, Jamiyat Al-Qahirat, 2009.
- Ibrahim, Abdullah Ala. ‘Al-Hayat al-Ilmiyat Wa-l-Thaqafiyat Fo Fazan Khilal al-Fatrat Ma Bayn al-Qarn al-Sabi Eash Wa-l-Qarn al-Tasi Eashr’. In *Amal Al-Mutamar al-Awal Li-l-Wathayiq Wa-l-Makhtutat Fi Libiya Waqiyahu Wafaq al-Amal Hawlaha, Zliten 1988*, edited by Omar Jahidar. Vol.1.
- Ibrahim, Y.Y. ‘Concept and Application of Radd Al-Mazalim in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of the Sokoto Caliphate’. Ph.D. Thesis, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, 2000.
- Idrees, Aliyu. *Political Change and Continuity in Nupeland: Decline and Regeneration of Edegi Ruling Dynasty*. Ibadan: Caltop Publications, 2012.
- Idris, Abdurrahman Abubakr, and Kabiru Haruna Isa. ‘The Place Gobirawa in the Social and Economic History of Kano’. Sokoto, 2018.
- Idris, Musa Baba. ‘Political and Economic Relations in the Bariba States: An Introduction to the Historical Study of a Plural Society from the Traditions of Origin to the Colonial Period’. Uncompleted Ph.D Thesis, Birmingham University, 1973.
- Idrissou, Alioum. ‘Le Discours Sur l’esclavage Parmi Les Residents Du Cameroun Septentrional Dans La Ville de Yaounde: Regard Analytique Sur Une Memoire Errante’. *African Economic History* 41 (2013): 33–58.
- . ‘Pratiques Esclavagistes et Serviles Chez Les Béti Du Cameroun Aux XIX^e et XX^e Siècles’. *Cahier Des Anneaux de La Mémoire* 14 (2011): 92–117.
- Idrissou, Mohammadou. ‘“Kalfu”, or the Fulbe Emirate of Baghirmi and the Toorobbe or Sokoto’. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- Iraqi, A.A. *Nizam Al-Hukum Fi al-Khilafa al-Sokotiyah*. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1963.
- Isa, I.U. *Metropolitan Sokoto: Issues in History and Urban Development since 1960*. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 2013.
- Isgogo, M.G. ‘Islam in Zuru’. M.A. Thesis, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, 1998.
- Ishaq, Izzeddin Maki. *Mukhtasar Tarikh Saltanat Waday Al-Islamiyat al-Abbasiyat Min Eam 1611-2005m*. Cairo: Al-Tabeat Al-Uwla, 2005.
- Ishaqov, Damir, ed. *Tatar History and Civilisation*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2010.
- İsmail, Ömer Ali. *Inhiyar Hukm Al-Usrat al-Qaramanlitte Fi Libya: 1795-1835*. Trablus: Maktab al-Farjani.
- Ismail, Salihu. ‘The Contest for Ilorin: A Study of Political Struggle for Ascendancy and Supremacy in the 19th and 20th Centuries’. M.A. Thesis (Unpublished), University of Ilorin, 2004.
- Jah, Omar. ‘Sufism and Nineteenth Century Jihad Movements in the West Africa’. Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1973.
- Jahidar, Ammar. ‘Al-Bahriyat al-Libiyyat Wa-Harb al-Yunan (1821-1828)’. *Majallat Al-Tarikhiyyat Al-Arabiyat Li-l-Dirasiyat Al-Uthmaniyyati* 1, no. 2 (1990): 243–49.
- Jamila, Ben Moussa. ‘Tijarat Al-Dhahab Bayn al-Maghrib al-Islami Wa-l-Sudan al-Gharbi: Min al-Qarn al-Thalith Ila al-Khamis Hijriun’. Ph.D. Thesis, Jamiat Al-Jazayir, 2001.
- Jibrel, Hasan. ‘Kwatancin Al’adun Kaciya a Kano (Nijeriya) Da Sebha Libya’. *Jami’at Sabha Li-l-’ulum al-’insaniyat Majalatan* 22, no. 1 (2023): 76–81.
- Jibril, Salah al-Din. *Tajridat Habib: M’a Kitab Khalil Wa Qasaid Khazliyya*. Bengazi: Maktab al-Qurina, 1924.

- Jimada, Idris. 'Ahmadu Rufai Ibn Shehu Usman Danfodio, 1867-1873'. In *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, edited by Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu. Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017.
- . 'The Establishment of Patigi Emirate: The Historical Background 1810-1898'. M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1991.
- . *The Nupe and the Origins and Evolution of the Yoruba C. 1275-1897*. Zaria: PMB, 2005.
- Jimba, Safi. *Iwe Itan Ilorin*. Ilorin: Jimba book publication Company, 1990.
- Jimoh, Ahmed Kayode. *Ilorin : The Journey so Far*. Ilorin: Atoto Press Limited, 1994.
- Johansen, Baber. 'Die Sündige, Gesunde Amme: Moral Und Gesetzliche Bestimmung (Hukm) Im Islamischen Recht'. *Die Welt Des Islams* XXVIII (1988): 264–82.
- Johnson, Samuel. *History of the Yorubas from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate*. Lagos: C.S.S. Book shop, 1976.
- Jumare, Ibrahim M. 'Land Tenure in the Sokoto Sultanate of Nigeria'. Ph.D. Thesis, York University, 1995.
- Junaidu, S.W. 'The Concept of Leadership in Sakkwato Caliphate'. In *The Sokoto Caliphate: A Legacy of Good Governance and Scholarship*, edited by Abubaker Aliyu Gwandu, Aminu Mikailu, and S.W. Junaidu. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 2005.
- Kabir, Abdulbaqi Muhammad Ahmad. 'Muajiz Tarikh Qabilat Al-Barnu', Vol. 3. Al-Fashir, 2016.
- Kachalla, Ali. 'The Kanuri in Diaspora: A Case Study of the Kanuri in Kano Zaria c.1503- 1900'. M.A. Thesis, University of Maiduguri, 1997.
- Kadiu, Arian, and Ramiz Zekaj, eds. *The Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in the Balkans*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2007.
- Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. *Tajdid, Islah and Civilisational Renewal in Islam*. Washington: IIIT, 2018.
- Kane, Oumar. *La Première Hégémonie Peule : Le Fuuta Tooro de Koli Tenella à Almaami Abdul*. Paris: Karthala, 2004.
- Kane, Ousmane Oumar. *Beyond Timbuktu: An Intellectual History of Muslim West Africa*. London: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Kani, Ahmad Muhammad. 'Introduction and Consolidation of Islam in the Central Sudan; with Special Reference to Kanem Borno and Hausaland, up to the Seventeenth Century'. In *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest*, edited by Samba Dieng. Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999.
- . 'The Place of Katsina in the Intellectual History of Bilad Al-Sudan up to 1800'. In *Islam and History of Learning in Katsina*, edited by Ismail Tsiga and Abdalla Adamu. Ibadan: Kenbim Press, 1997.
- Karal, Enver Ziya. *Ebubekir Ratip Efendi'nin Nizamı Cedid Islahatında Rolü*. V. Türk Tarih Kongresi. Ankara, 1960.
- . *Selim III'ün Hat-Tı Hümayunları: Nizam-ı Cedit (1789-1807)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988.
- Karim, Hasan Al-Madani Ali. *Al-Aqat Libya Bi Buldan Wa Wara al-Sahra Fi Eahd Yusif Basha al-Qaramanli, 1759-1832*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2009.
- Kasozi, Abdu, and Sadık Ünay, eds. *Islamic Civilization in Southern Africa. History, Contemporary State & Future Perspectives*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006.
- , eds. *Proceedings of the International Symposium on "Islamic Civilisation in Eastern Africa"*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006.
- Khadija, Ahmad bin Halim. 'Li-Qawafil al-Sahrawiat Bayn Tarabulus al-Gharb Wa Janub al-Sahra Fi al-Eahd al-Qaramanili'. B.A. Thesis, Al-Asmariya Islamic University, Zliten, 2002.

- Khafifi, Muhammad Salheen. *Al-Nizam al-Daribi Fi Vilayat Tarabulus al-Gharb (1835-1911)*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2000.
- Khurso, Amma. 'Imbiraturiat Kanam Bornu Wa Salatuha Bi Al-Alam al-Islami Fi Eahd al-Urat al-Kanimiya (1900-1846)'. In *Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage*, edited by T. El-Miskin, Y. Mukhtar, K. Mohammed, and A.G. Shettima, Vol. 1. Ibadan: Kanem-Bornu: A Thousand Years of Heritage, 2013.
- Kimba, Idrissa. 'Guerres et Societes: Les Populations Du Niger Occidental Au XIXe s. et Leurs Reactions Face a La Colonisation, 1896-1906'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris VII, 1979.
- Kılıç, Mahmud Erol, ed. *Islamic Civilization in Southern Africa. History, Contemporary State & Future Perspectives*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2024.
- Kılıç, Orhan. 'Ocaklık Sancakların Osmanlı Hukukunda ve İdari Tatbikattaki Yeri'. *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 11/1 (2001).
- Kodi, Mahamat. 'Islam, Societes et Pouvoir Politique Au Baghirmi (Tchad), Des Origines Au Milieu Du XIXème Siecle'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris I, 1993.
- Kogongar, Gayo. 'Introduction a La Vie et L'Histoire Precoloniales Des Populations Sara Du Tchad'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris I, 1971.
- Kolağası Ali and Mirliva Ahmed Nuri. 'Afrikâ-Yi Osmanî'den Trablusgarb ve Bingazi ve Fizan'a Dair Malumat', 1883. Yazma Eserler. İ.Ü.N.K.
- Kronenberg, Andreas. *Die Teda von Tibesti*. Wien: Verlag Ferdinand Berger, 1958.
- Kuba, Richard. *Wasangari Und Wangara: Borgu Und Seine Nachabern in Historischer Perspektive*. Hamburg: Lit, 1996.
- Kullima, Shettima Bukar, Abdullahi Garba, and Ibrahim Alhaji Modu. "'Soldier of Fortune": From Intellectualist to Strategist in the Establishment and Consolidation of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty in Borno in the 19th Century'. *Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science* 9, no. 5 (2021): 29–34.
- Kyari, Sheikh Ali Bani. 'Borno-Ottoman Relations in the Nineteenth Century'. Maiduguri, 1987.
- Lafi, Nora. 'Ghadames Cite-Oasis Entre Empire Ottoman et Colonisation'. In *La Libia Tra Mediterraneo e Mondo Islamico*, edited by Federico Cresti. Milano: Giuffré, 2006.
- . 'L'Empire Ottoman En Afrique : Perspectives d'histoire Critique'. *Cahiers d'histoire. Revue d'histoire Critique* 128 (2015): 2–9.
- . 'Les Relations de Malte et de Tripoli de Barbarie Au XIXe Siècle'. *Revue Du Monde Musulman et de La Méditerranée* 71 (1994): 127–42.
- . 'Mediterranean Connections: The Circulation of Municipal Knowledge and Practices at the Time of the Ottoman Reforms, c.1830-1910'. In *Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850-2000*, edited by Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen. Springer, 2008.
- . 'Municipalités Méditerranéennes : Pratique Du Comparatisme, Lecture Des Change- Ments Institutionnels et Analyse Historique de l'évolution Des Pouvoirs Urbains Du XVIIIe Au XXe Siècle'. In *Municipalités Méditerranéennes. Les Réformes Urbaines Ottomanes Au Miroir d'une Histoire Comparée (Moyen-Orient, Maghreb, Europe Méridionale)*, edited by Nora Lafi. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2015.
- . 'Tripoli de Barbarie: Port de Mer Port Du Desert 1795-1835'. In *Méditerranée, Mer Ouverte: XIXe et XXe Siècles*, Vol. T. II. Actes de Colloque de Marseille (21-23 Septembre 1995). International Foundation, 1997.
- . 'Tunis Als Laboratorium Osmanischer Modernität: Das Beispiel Der Vorstadtbahn (1863-1881)'. *Die Osmanische Stadt, Moderne Stadtgeschichte*, 51, no. 1 (2018): 16–25.
- . 'Ville Arabe et Modernité Administrative Municipale : Tripoli (Libye Actuelle), 1795-1911'. *Histoire Urbaine, Société française d'histoire urbaine*, 1, no. 3 (2001): 149–67.

- Lawal, S.U. 'The Political Economy of the State in the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination'. In *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, edited by A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandi. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990.
- Lawan, Alhaji Mohammed. *Leta Lan Gana Ba*. Maiduguri, 1946.
- Le Debonnaire, Magadji Pierre. 'History of Mbe-Sub Division in Northern Cameroon, 1900-2006'. M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 2011.
- Le Gal, M. F. 'Pashas Bedouins and Notables: The Ottoman Administration in Tripoli and Benghazi 1881-1902'. Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1990.
- Lecoeur, Charles. *Dictionnaire Ethnographique Têda*. Paris: MIFAN, 1950.
- Lehuraux, Léon. *Les Français Au Sahara*. Algier: Éditions Les territoires du Sud, 1938.
- Libson, Gideon. *On the Development of Custom as a Source of Law in Islamic Law*. Brill, 1997.
- Lovejoy, Paul. *Salt of the Desert Sun: A History of Salt Production and Trade in the Central Sudan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Lydon, Ghislaine. *On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Mahamat, Adam. 'Esclavage et Servitude Dans Les Abords Sud Du Lac Tchad'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Ngaoundéré, 2007.
- Mahibou, Sidi Mohammed. 'L'oeuvre de Abdullahi Dan Fodio et Son Impact Sur La Vie Sociale et Culturelle de Sa Région'. In *La Civilisation Islamique En Afrique de l'ouest*, edited by Samba Dieng. Istanbul: IRCICA, 1999.
- Mahjoub, Amal Muhammad. *Al-Awbia Wal Majat Fi Vilayat Tarabulus al-Gharb Kilal al-Ahd al-Othmani al-Thani*. Trablus: al-jami'a al-tarabulus al-gharb, 1998.
- Mahmoud, Hasan Ahmad. *Al-Islam Wa-l-Thaqafa al-'arabiyat Fi Afriqiyya*. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriat al-Qahirat, 1958.
- Mahmud, Ahmad Al-Rifai. 'Athar Al-Sufiyat Fi Nashr al-Adab al-Arabiyat Fir Wasat Afrikiya'. In *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, edited by Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Maishanu, Hamza Muhammad. *Five Centuries of Historical Writing in Hausaland and Borno, 1500-2000*. Ibadan: Macmillan Nigeria, 2007.
- Makar, Tesemchi. *History of Political Change Among the Tiv in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 1994.
- Maldonado Rivera, Claudio. 'Introducción: Apuntes Sobre Descolonización Epistémica En El Pensamiento Comunicológico Regional'. *Chasqui. Revista Latinoamericana de Comunicación* 131 (2016): 39–46.
- Mamman, Munnir. *Tarihin Unguwannin Birnin Kastina*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2015.
- Maniya, Mukhtari Shehu. *Tarihin Ungawannin Sakkwato Dangane Da Sana'o'i*. Sokoto, 2013.
- Maqsudat, Muhammad. ''awdae al-Karaghilat Fi al-Jazayir Wa-Tunis Wa-Libiyya Khilal al-Qarnayn al-Thaanmin Eashar Wa-l-Thaasie Easher al-Miladiyin'. M.A. Thesis, Jamiat Oran, 2019.
- Mara, Murtala, and Attahiru Ahmad Sifawa. 'Inter-State Royal Marriages Between Gobir and Sokoto Sultanate: A Study in Social Diplomacy'. Sokoto, 2018.
- Marwan, Muhammad Omar. 'Al-Hayat al-Iktisadiat Wa-l-Ijtima'iat Wa-l-Thaqafiat Fi Ghadames Khilal al'ahd al'othmani al-Thani'. Ph.D. Thesis, Jamiat Al-Jazair, 2005.
- Masud, Ali Said. 'Al-Alaqat al-Siyasiyat Li-l-Ustat al-Qaramanliyat Ma Fazan Wa Manatiq Ma Wara al-Sahra Fi Eahd Yusif Basha, 1795-1832'. *Sebha University Journal of Human Sciences* 20, no. 3 (2021): 95–106.

- Mayasi, Ibrahim. *Tawasu Al-Istimar al-Faransi Fi al-Janub al-Gharbi al-Jazayiri (1881-1912)*. Al-Jazayir: Manshurat Al-Muthaf Al-Watani li-l-Mujahidi, 1996.
- Meshal, Muhammad Shakir. *Sevratu Ġûma El-Mahmûdî Fi'l-Cebeli'l-Ġarbî Lîbyâ 1835-1838*. Cairo: Dâru'n-Nahdatu'l-Arabiyye, 1991.
- Micacchi, Rodolfo. *La Tripolitania Sotto Il Dominio Dei Caramanli*. A. Airoidi Editore: Intra, 1936.
- Minna, M.T.M. "“Non Alignment”: Sokoto’s Foreign Policy under Sultan Muhammad Bello”. In *Life and Ideas of Sultan Muhammad Bello*, edited by Centre of Islamic Studies Sokoto. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 2013.
- Miqalad, Abdulfettah Hasama. ‘Saltanat Barnu Sanat 1808m’. M.A. Thesis, Jamiat al-Azhar, 1978.
- Misbahi, Badraddin. ‘Tijarat Al-Sahra Bayn al-Jazayir Wa Gharb Ifriqiya Mundh 10-13h/16-19m’. M.A. Thesis, Université d’Adrar, 2015.
- Mohammed, A.R. ‘The Sokoto Jihad and Its Impact on the Confluence Area and Afenmai’. In *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, edited by A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandi. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990.
- Mohammed, Kyari. *Bornu in the Rabillah Years, 1893-1901: The Rise and Crash of a Predotary State*. Maiduguri: University of Maiduguri Press, 2006.
- Moukhtar, Bachar. ‘De 1909 à 1960 Aux Confins Des Etats: Les Peuples Du Tchad Oriental et Leur Evolution Dans Un Ouddaï Statique’. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris VII, 1982.
- Moumouni, Seyni, and Hamadou Adama, eds. *Islamic History and Civilization in West Africa, Bilad as-Soudan*. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2020.
- Mudaw, Abukar Walar. ‘Ishamat Dawr Al-Thaqafat al-Islamiyat Fi Nashr al-Lughat al-Arabiyyat Bi Shad’. In *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, edited by Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Muhammad, Abdulhaq Adam. *Al-Aslam Fi Tshad Nadwat al-Islam Wa-l-Muslimun al-Atahum*. Trablus: Jamiat Al-Dawat Al-Islamiya, 1998.
- Muhammad Al-Nur, Ahmad Sami. ‘Tarikh Al-Alaqat al-Sudaniyat Wa-l-Tshadiyat Min Eam 1820-1956m’. M.A. Thesis, Khartoum University, 1997.
- Muḥammad al-Raḥbī (‘Al-Simnānī’). *Rawḍat Al-Qudāh Wa Ṭarīq al-Naja*. Edited by S..D. Al-Nahi. Vol. Vol 1. Baghdad: Matba’at As’ad, 1970.
- Muhammad, Al-Safi. ‘Al-Usar al-Tijarat Bi-Mintaqat Wad Nun Wa Dawruha Fi Tanshit al-Rawah al-Tijari Bayn Difatayal-Sahra’. *Al-Majallat al-Ifriqiyat Li-l-Ulum al-Insaniyat Wa-l-Ijtimaiyyati*, 2021, 41–67.
- Muhammad, Muhammad Ag. *Al-Shier al-Arabiyyu Ind al-Tawariq: Kal Al-Suq*. Amman: Dar Fadat li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi, 2020.
- Muhammad, Zaid. *History of Nasarawa Emirate*. Abuja: Garkida Press, 1992.
- Muhammad-Baba, T.A. ‘Pastoral Ascendancy in the Savannah: A Sociological Assesment of the Impacy of the 1804 Jihad on Pastoral Fulbe’. In *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, edited by A.M. Kani and K.A. Gandi. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodio University Press, 1990.
- Mukhtar, T.M. ‘A History of Mazalim Court System in the Administration of Justice in Metropolitan Sokoto, 1808-1903’. Ph.D. Thesis, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, 2015.
- Mukhtar, Tukur Muhammad. ‘Ahmadu Ibn Atiku (Zaruku), 1859-1866’. In *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, edited by Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu. Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017.
- . ‘Aliyu Ibn Bello (Aliyu Babba), 1842-1859’. In *Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographica History Since 1804*, edited by Alkasum Abba, Ibrahim M. Jumare, and Shuaibu Aliyu. Kaduna: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017.
- Murtaza, Ahmad. ‘Al-Imam al-Maghili Wa Ishamuh Fi Bina al-Hadarat al-Islamiyat Fi Bilad al-Hausa’. Biskra, 2014.

- Musi, Nesir bin. *Al-Muhtama' al-'arabiya al-Libiyya Fi al-'ahd al-Othmani*. Trablus: Al-Dar al-Arabiyyat al-Kitab, 1988.
- Mustapha, Abubakar. 'The Contribution of Sayfawa Ulama to the Study of Islam: C.1086-1846'. Ph.D. Thesis, Bayero University, 1984.
- Mustapha, Muhammad. *Tarikh Bariqat Fi Al-Eahd Al-Qirmanili*. Vol. Vol. 2. Beirut: Dar Al-Hiwar, 1994.
- Mutlu, Şamil. *Yeniçeri Ocağının Kaldırılışı ve II. Mahmud'un Edirne Seyahati*. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1995.
- Nababa, Ibrahim D., Isyaku Idris, Lawal Dodo, and Mustapha Garba Bakori. *Tarihin Ungunnin Brinin Katsina Da Kaweya*. Katsina, 2011.
- Naci, Hikmet. *Tarih Boyunca Kuzey Afrika ve Berberiler*. İstanbul: Sulhi Garan Matbaası, 1955.
- Nasidi, Nadir Abdulhaid. 'The Jihad and the Establishment of the Fulbe Emirate of Muri (1817-1926)'. *Wudil Journal of Humanities* 1 (2016): 212–18.
- . 'The Role of Lambe in the Spread of Islam in Muri Emirate: The Contribution of Muhammadu Nya (1874-1896)'. *Jalingo Journal of History and Archaeology* 3, no. 1–2 (2015): 73–80.
- . 'The Spread of Islam in Muri, 1817-1953: The Contributions of the Emirs'. *Lapai Journal of Nigerian History* 12, no. 2 (2021): 91–103.
- Naylor, Paul. *From Rebels to Rulers: Writing Legitimacy in the Early Sokoto State*. Boydell & Brewer, 2021.
- Njeuma, Martin. 'Sokoto and Her Provinces: Some Reflections on the Case of Adamawa'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- Norris, Harry T. *The Tuareg: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel*. Warminster: Aris & Philips, 1975.
- Oberauer, Norbert. *Islamisches Wirtschafts- Und Vertragsrecht: Eine Einführung*. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2017.
- O'Connor Acevedo, Rosa. 'El Giro Epstémico Decolonial: Crítica Da La Colonialidad-Modernidad Hacia Un Proyecto Transmoderno'. *Diálogos* 99 (2016): 127–37.
- Ohiare, A.J. 'The Kingdom of Igu and Opanda C.1700-1939: A Study in Inter-Group Relations'. Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1987.
- Omar, Sadiya. *Malamai Mata a Daular Usmaniyya: A Karni Na 19 Da 20*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2017.
- Öner, Saadet. 'İsveç Devlet Arşivi'nde Mahfûz İ. M. D'Ohsson Evrakı Tasnîfi ve Tahlîli'. M.A. Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1999.
- Onikoko, Ahmad Adisa. *A Short History of Ilorin Emirate*. Ilorin: Atoto Press Limited, 1992.
- Oßwald, Rainer. *Das Islamische Sklavenrecht*. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2017.
- Özbaran, Salih. 'Osmanlılar ve Deniz: 16. Yüzyıl Hint Okyanusu Bağlamında Yeniden Bakış'. In *Türkler ve Deniz*, edited by Özlem Kumrular. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007.
- Özdağ, Abdullah. 'Trablugarb Vilayeti'nde İdari ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapı (1876-1911)'. Ph.D. Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2014.
- Özköse, Kadir. *Sufi Davet'ten Devlete: Osman B. Fudi ve Sokoto Halifeliği*. İstanbul: Gelenek Yayıncılık, 2004.
- Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki. *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993.
- . *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*. Vol. 1. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993.

- . *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*. Vol. 3. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993.
- Pellat, Charles. 'L'Imamat Dans La Doctrine de Ğāhiz'. *Studia Islamica* 15 (1961).
- Qasim, Abdullahi. *Tarihin Masanawa*. Katsina: Self-Publishing, 2011.
- Rambo, Rabi'u Aliyu, and Musa Fadama Gummi. 'The Impacts of Dosso-Kebbi Relationship on Sarkanci in Kebbi'. Dosso, 2014.
- Reis, João José. *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
- Rossi, Ettore. *Storia Di Tripoli e Della Tripolitania: Dalla Qonquista Araba al 1911*. Roma: Istituto per L'Oriente, 1968.
- Saad, Hadi. 'The Dynamics of Political Development in a Multicultural Society: The Case of Ilorin During the 19th and 20th Centuries'. Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 2015.
- Sabra, Adam. 'Prices Are in God's Hands: The Theory and Practice of Price Control in the Medieval Islamic World'. In *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts*, edited by Michael Bonner, Ener, and Singer Amy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Saied, Ahmed. 'Commerce et Commerçants Dan Le Sahara Central'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Provence-Aix-Marseille, 1996.
- Sali, A. 'Le Lamidat de Tibati Des Origines à 1945'. In *Mémoire de Maîtrise d'histoire*. Yaoundé: Université de Yaoundé, 1993.
- Salifou, André. 'Colonisation et Societes Indigenes Au Niger, de La Fin XIXè Siecle Au Debut de La Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale'. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Toulouse.
- . *Le Damagaram Ou Sultanada de Zinder Au XIXe Siècle*. Niamey: I.R.S.H., 1971.
- Salih, Buslim, and Uwzayid Bialhaji. 'Tijarat Al-Qawafil Bayn al-Jazayir Wa Ifriqiyya Janub al-Sahrafi al-Eahd al-Uthmani Wa Dawriha al-Hadari'. *Majallat Rawafid Li-l-Buhuth Wa-l-Dirasat*, 2017, 93–124.
- Salih, Ibrahim. *Tarikh Al-Islam Wa Hayat al-Arabi*. Kano: Maktabat Al-Qadi Sharif, 1976.
- Sall, Mamadou Youry, and Ibrahima Silla. *Alluwal Ceerno Sileymaani Baal : Pensée Politique d'un Tricentenaire Africain*. Dakar: Baajoordo Centre de Recherche, 2020.
- Sanankoua, Bintou. *Un Empire Peul Au XIXe Siècle : La Diina Du Maasina*. Paris: Karthala, 1990.
- Sariyannias, Marinos, and Ekin Tuşalp Atiyas. *A History of Ottoman Political Thought up to the Early Nineteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 2019.
- Sarıcioğlu, Fikret. *Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi: Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789)*. İstanbul: Tatav Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001.
- Sartain, E.M. 'Jalāl Ad-Dīn al-Suyūṭī's Relations with the People of Tākūr'. *Journal of Semitic Studies* 16 (1971): 193–98.
- Savaş, Ali İbrahim. 'Lahiya Geleneği İçinde XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Islahat Projelerindeki Tespit ve Teklifler'. *Billig* 9 (1999): 88–112.
- Séhou, Ahmadou. 'Esclavage, Émancipation et Citoyenneté Dans Les Lamidats de l'Adamaoua (Nord-Cameroun)'. *Esclavages & Post-Esclavages* 1 (2019): 1–18.
- Şen, Adil. *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usûlü'l- Hikem Fî Nizâmi'1-Ümem*. Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1995.
- Shareef, Muhammad. *The Islamic Slave Revolts of Bahia, Brazil: A Continuity of the 19th Century Jihaad Movements of Western Sudan*. Sankore Educational Publisher, 1998.
- Shede, Adamu. 'Fulbe Code of Conduct (Pulaaku) as Portrayed in Their Proverbs'. M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 2014.
- Sheshi, Sidi Tiwugi. *Establishment of Emirate System of Government in Nupeland: The Emirate of Bida as a Case Study, 1832-1857*. Kaduna: Fembo Books, 2000.

- Smith, Abdullahi. *A Little New Light : Selected Historical Writings of Professor Abdullahi Smith*. Zaria: Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research, 1987.
- Smith, M.G. *The Affairs of Daura*. California: University of California Press, 1978.
- Soave, Paolo. *Fezzan: Il Deserto Conteso (1842-1921)*. Milano: Dott. A. Giuffr  Editore, 2001.
- Souley, Tankari. 'Patrimoine Culturel et Historique et D veloppement Local: Cas de de La Ville de Zinder'. M.A. Thesis, Universit  Andr  Salifou, 2019.
- Stilt, Kristen. 'Price Setting and Hoarding in Mamluk Egypt: The Lessons of Legal Realism for Islamic Studies'. In *The Law Applied: Contextualizing the Islamic Sharia*, edited by P. Bearman, Heinrichs, and B.G. Weiss. New York: I.B.Tauris, 2008.
- Sukuji, Bakoji. *The History of Jukun and Kwararafa Kingdom*. Kaduna: Merry-Time Associated Press, 1995.
- Sulaiman, I. 'Towards a Vision of the Future: A Letter from Sultan Muhammad Bello to the Muslim Ummah in Nigeria'. In *The Sokoto Caliphate : History and Legacies, 1804-2004*, edited by Hamidu Bobboyi and Mahmood Yakubu. Kaduna: Arewa House, 2006.
- Sule, Muhammad. *History of the Emirate of Bida to 1899 AD*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, 2011.
- Suleiman, Usman. 'A History of Birnin Zaria from 1350-1902'. M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 2007.
- Suvaysin, Muhamad Bashir, ed. *Awjilat Bayn Am-Madi al-Hadr, 1550-1951m*. Trablus: Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2007.
- Tabako lu, Ahmet. *Gerileme D nemine Girerken Osmanlı M liyesi*. Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1985.
- Tahir, Mustafa. *Salatin Mayrunu  ula a Al-Skaykh Utman Bin Fudi*. Mayrunu, 2023.
- Takou, Th odore. *Justice Traditionnelle, 'justice Indig ne' et R glement Des Litiges Au Cameroun: Le Cas Du Lamidat Ngaound r *. Yaound : Presses Universitaires de Yaound  I, 1998.
- Tall, Hadja. 'Al Hajj Umar Tall: The Biography of a Controversial Leader'. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 32, no. 1 (2006): 73–90.
- Tambo, David C. 'The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century'. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9, no. 2 (1976): 187–217.
- Tando an, Muhammed. 'Osmanlı Devleti'nin Afrika'da Avrupa S m rgecili ine Kar ı Siyaseti: XIX. Y zyıl ve XX. Y zyılın Ba ları'. M.A. Thesis, İstanbul  niversitesi, 2011.
- Tarkhan, Ibrahim Ali. *Imbraturiyatu l'Borno al-Islamiyyah*. Cairo: Al-Maktabah Al-Arabiyyah, 1975.
- Ta , Abdullah Erdem. 'Garp Ocaklarında Birli in Bozulması: 18. Y zyılda Cezayir-Tunus-Trablusgarp İli kileri'. * nsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Ara tırma Dergisi* 9 (2) (2020): 1065–91.
- . 'Osmanlı Garp Ocaklarından Trablusgarp Eyaleti: Karamanlılar D nemi (1711-1835)'. Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul  niversitesi, 2016.
- TDV  sl m Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 11. Ankara: T rkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995.
- TDV  sl m Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 32. Ankara: T rkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995.
- Tijjani, Kyar. 'Issues in the Shariah Debate - Learning from Al-Kanemi: A Political Economy Perspective'. *Bornu Museum Socety Newsletter* 52–53 (2001): 21–28.
- . 'The Force of Religion in the Conduct of Political Affairs and Interpersonal Relations in Bornu and Sokoto'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- Toprak, Saydi V. 'Osmanlı Y netiminde Kuzey Afrika: Garp Ocakları'. * stanbul  niversitesi T rkiyat Mecmuası* XXII (2012): 223–37.
- Tubiana, J r me. *Contes Toubou Du Sahara*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007.

- Turhan, Fatma Sel. 'Rebelling For The Old Order: Ottoman Bosnia, 1826-1836'. Ph.D. Thesis, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2009.
- Tuwayr, Muhammed Imhammed. *Mukâvemetu's-Şeyh Ğûma El-Mahmûdî Li'l-Hukmi'l-Osmânî Fî İyâleti Trablusu'l-Ġarb 1835-1858*. Trablus: Merkezu Dirâseti Cihâdu'l-Lîbiyyin Zıddu'l-Ġazvi'l-Îtâlî, 1988.
- Ubah, C.N. 'The Emirates and the Central Government: The Case of Kano-Sokoto Relations'. In *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers*, edited by Yusufu Bala Usman. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1979.
- Ubaydullah, Muhammad. 'Dawr Al-Harakat al-Sanusiyyat Fi al-Tijarat Eabr al-Sahra (1843-1902)'. *Kulliyat Al-Adab Jamiat Bi-Aamari* 284 (2014): 133–49.
- Uğur, Ahmet. *Osmanlı Siyaset Nameleri*. Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1987.
- Uhweingya, E.A. 'The Jukun up to 1900'. B.A. Thesis, University of Maiduguri, 1981.
- Usman, Yusufu Bala. 'A Reconsideration of the History of Relations Between Bornu and Hausaland Before 1804'. In *Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Bornu*, edited by Bala Usman and Nur Alkali. Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983.
- . 'Transformation of Katsina (1400-1883): The Emergence and Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment of of the Emirate'. Ph.D. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1981.
- Uthman, Uthman Ahmad. 'Athar Al-Istimar al-Thaqafiyat Wa-l-Iqtisadiyat Eala al-Muslimin Fir Wasat Afrikiya - Tshad Mamudhajan'. In *Al-Tarikh Wa-l-Hadariyat al-Islamiyat Fi Wasat Ifrikiya*, edited by Fazil Bayat and Amna Meddeb. Istanbul: IRCICA, 2021.
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. 'Selim III'ün Veliht İken Fransa Kralı Lûi Ile Muhabereleleri'. *Belleten* 2, no. 1 (1938): 191–246.
- Varvar, Toryina Ayati. 'The Role of Trade in the Pre-Colonial Economy of Tivland'. *African Journal of Economy and Society* 5, no. 2 (2005): 1–15.
- Vikor, Knut. *Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law*. London: Hurst and Company, 2005.
- . *The Oasis of Salt: The History of Kavar, a Saharan Centre of Salt Production*. Bergen, 1999.
- Virtanen, Tea. 'Performance and Performativity in Pastoral Fulbe Culture'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2003.
- Wannas, Zaman Obayd, and Hashem Nasser Hussein Al-Kaabi. *Tarikh Al-Aqat al-Arab Ma Ifriqiyya Janub al-Sahra*. Kabul: Dar Muassat Al-Saadiq, 2012.
- Wara, Mansur Abubakar, and Yusuf Abdullahi. 'The Katsina Factor in the History of Yawuri and Zuru Emirates: A Study of Katsinawa in Diaspora'. *Journal of Applied and Theoretical Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (2022): 299–312.
- Warscheid, Ismail. *Droit Musulman et Société Au Sahara Prémoderne : La Justice Islamique Dans Les Oasis Du Grand Touat (Algérie) Aux XVIIe – XIXe Siècles*. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
- . 'La Pratique Du Şulh Dans Les Oasis Du Grand Touat : Justice Consensuelle et Juridiction Islamique Dans Une Société Saharienne Du Xviii Siècle'. *REMM* 140 (2016): 143-162.
- . 'Les Jours Du Makhzen : Levée d'impôt et Relations Communautaires Dans Les Oasis Du Touat (Sud Algérien), 1700-1850'. *Revue d'histoire Du XIXe Siècle*, Société de 1848, 59 (2019): 31–48.
- . 'The Islamic Literature of the Precolonial Sahara: Sources and Approaches'. *History Compass*, 2018, 1–10.
- . 'The Persisting Spectre of Cultural Decline: Historiographical Approaches to Muslim Scholarship in the Early Modern Maghreb'. *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 60, no. 1/2 (2022): 142–73.

- . ‘The West African Jihād Movements and the Islamic Legal Literature of the Southwestern Sahara (1650–1850)’. *Journal of West African History* 6, no. 2 (2020): 33–60.
- Weiss, Bernard G. *Spirit of Islamic Law*. Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1998.
- Wichard, Johannes C. *Zwischen Markt Und Moschee: Wirtschaftliche Bedürfnisse Und Religiöse Anforderungen Im Frühen Islamischen Vertragsrecht*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995.
- Wuam, Terhemba. ‘Tiv Exchange Relations in the Nineteenth Century: A Study of Commodities, Markets, Trade Routes and Currencies’. *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History* 9–10 (2010): 120–35.
- Yacouba, Moumouni. ‘Contribution a l’etude Du Passe Songhai: L’Histoire Du Dendi Origines à La Fin Du XVIe Siècle’. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Abidjan, 1997.
- Yahya, Muslihuiddin. ‘Historiography of Kanem-Borno “Ulama” and Their Contributions to Learning’. In *Impact of the Ulama in Central Sudan*, edited by Abubakar Mustapha and Abubakar Garba. Trans-Saharan Studies. University of Maiduguri, 1991.
- Yalçınkaya, Aladdin. ‘Yusuf Agah Efendi’. In *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999.
- Yandaki, Aminu Isyaku, Sanusi Shehu Gusau, and Umar Aminu Yandaki. ‘Gobir External Relations in the 18th Century’. Sokoto, 2018.
- Yıldız, Aysel. ‘Şehzadeye Öğütler’. *Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 42 (2013): 233–47.
- Yunis, Al-Hadi bin. ‘Al-Hayat al-Ilmiyat Fir Tarablus Fi al-Qarn 12hu/18m, Al-Sheikh Omar Al-Sudani Nashatah Fo al-Fiqh Wa-l-Qada’. In *Amal Al-Mutamar al-Awal Li-l-Wathaiyiq Wa-l-Makhtutat Fi Libiya Waqiyahu Wafaq al-Amal Hawlaha, Zliten 1988*, edited by Omar Jahidar. Vol.1.
- Yusha, Bashir Qasim. ‘Al-Ghadamissiyun Fi Rihlat al-Hashaishi’. *Majallat Al-Buhuth al-Tarikhiyya* 5 (1983): 239–56.
- . ‘Ghadamis Min Al-Ilmiyat al-Thaqafiyat Fi Libiya’. In *Amal Al-Mutamar al-Awal Li-l-Wathaiyiq Wa-l-Makhtutat Fi Libiya Waqiyahu Wafaq al-Amal Hawlaha, Zliten 1988*, edited by Omar Jahidar. Vol.1.
- . *Ghat Malamih Wa-l-Dirasat al-Tarihkiyyat*. Markaz jihad al-Libiyin li-l-dirasar al-tarikhiat, 2011.
- . *Madinahu Ghadames Eabr Al-Asur*. Trablus: Al-Markaz al-wataniya li-lmahfuzat wa-l-dirasat, 2011.
- . ‘Taqsim Tarikh ’ahad Muatini Taf Amin Fi ’Awakhir’. *Majallat Al-Buhuth al-Tarikhiyya* 6 (1984): 181–218.
- Zakari, Maïkoréma. ‘Contribution a l’histoire Des Population Du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas Du Mangari (XVIe - XIXe Siècle)’. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris VII, 1983.
- . ‘Contribution a l’histoire Des Population Du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas Du Mangari (XVIe - XIXe Siècle)’. Ph.D. Thesis, Université de Paris VII, 1983.
- . ‘Le Développement de La Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya Au Niger’. In *Islam et Sociétés En Afrique Subsharienne à l’épreuve de l’histoire*, edited by A. Pondoupoulo and O. Goerg. Paris: Karthala, 2012.
- . ‘L’islam Au Niger’. In *La Civilization Islamique En Afrique de l’ouest*, edited by Samba Dieng. İstanbul: IRCICA, 1999.
- Zeyrek, Suat. *Meşrutiyet: Osmanlı’da Birlikte Yaşamak Ya Da Birlikte Dağılmak*. İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2013.
- Zubairu, Nura Isah. ‘The Economy of Wudil Territory in Pre-Colonial Era’. *Sokoto Journal of History* 12 (2023): 1–10.