Arroyo and Valvassori (2025) [3] utilize the ’Toolbox approach’ to metaphysics, applying Parsons’ Nuclear Meinongianism [ 8] to the problem of Quantum Metaphysical Indeterminacy (QI). They rigorously construct a reductio ad absurdum based on a central trilemma: (P1) Standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics entails QI; (P2) This QI is conceptually equiva- lent to Parsons’ notion of property incompleteness (MI); and (P3) Parsons’ Incompleteness- Entails-Nonexistence Principle (IENP) [10] is valid. This conjunction necessarily leads to the empirically false and ontologically untenable conclusion that quantum objects are nonexistent. Arroyo and Valvassori resolve this paradox by rejecting P3, thereby proposing a modified Meinongianism that accommodates existent-but-incomplete objects. This article argues that their diagnosis, while methodologically sound, is fundamentally mistaken in its target. The er- ror lies not in P3 (IENP)—which we argue is an essential, load-bearing component of Parsons’ meta-ontology separating existentia from fictionalia—but in the unexamined ’bridge thesis’ of P2. We demonstrate that QI and MI are conceptually distinct and ontologically incommensu- rable categories. QI, as evidenced by phenomena such as superposition and contextuality, is a positive, ontologically complete, non-classical state with verifiable causal efficacy. Conversely, MI is an ontic gap, a definitional absence. Consequently, the Parsonsian framework is not merely an ’instrument’ in need of modification, but an ontologically inapposite tool for the analysis of physical reality.